Child Labour and Artisanal Cobalt Mining in the DRC

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 30th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

The UK’s Partnership Against Child Exploitation programme, which ended in September, was a consortium of six partners that worked to combat the worst forms of child labour in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the United Kingdom was a key supporter of that partnership. The programme delivered key achievements: 8,430 children are going back to school following a consortium intervention, while 2,583 children have completed training in rights and skills because of PACE support. The point from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is absolutely right—there is still a serious problem—but we are having some success and we want to see more of it.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this Question highlights an important part of a much wider issue. Can the Minister say what progress the Government have made towards developing a strategic plan to ensure the supply of crucial resources in the round in order to enhance national security and resilience while, at the same time, supporting the values that we rightly espouse?

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

This is a massive issue, and I thank the noble and gallant Lord for raising it. The integrated review refresh looked at this. We must make sure that our economy can get what it needs in order to provide for our own needs and so that we can benefit the rest of the world. We cannot look at the security of this nation without looking at supply chains. With a country such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as I said, having 70% of the world’s cobalt, which is a mineral that we need, we want to be at the forefront of making sure both that we have high-integrity supply chains for such minerals and that they are integrated into our whole security policy.

Gaza: Al-Ahli Arab Hospital Explosion

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is correct. We are of course looking at the tragedy which has befallen the Al-Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza. As I said earlier, it is a hospital with strong connections to the Anglican community and has provided, over many years, an important service. On the issue of attribution, as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday, we are working with all key partners, as well as internally to make our own assessment, to establish what happened there. I am not going to speculate any further at this time: work is under way on attribution.

The important point within all this is that the people who have suffered are those who were in the hospital: those who were seeking urgent assistance and support, and among the most vulnerable. It is therefore important that, in establishing the facts, we also do not lose sight of the issue of humanitarian support, which noble Lords have mentioned. On the wider point of not jumping to conclusions, my noble friend was himself a Minister in a distinguished capacity, and one thing you learn clearly—not just as Ministers but as Governments and parliamentarians, and even our friends—is that we vitally defend media freedom in the United Kingdom. It is an important thing that we lead on. But, in all these areas, responsible reporting and responsible assessments are important, and that is what the Government are currently doing.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, further to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, does the Minister agree that the rapid and largely uninformed responses to this tragedy underscore the importance of the information war in this conflict, and that while nothing is likely to move the majority of public opinion in many Arab countries, nevertheless in the context of the wider world, it is crucial that credible evidence on the cause of this disaster is put into the public domain as soon as possible?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I agree with the noble and gallant Lord; that is why my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said as much yesterday during Prime Minister’s Questions. As I said, we are assessing the facts and the noble and gallant Lord will know of the importance of assessment and evidence. It is right, I believe, that we take time to ensure that the narrative that prevails is one which is based on the evidence that we ourselves have assessed. On wider reporting, I personally think it extremely tragic that we live in a very information-based world today where there are many people commenting on every utterance, including those of government Ministers. I assure the noble and gallant Lord that while everything which is said is being assessed and interpreted in a particular way, we want to ensure that, as far as possible, the facts are established and then, as my right honourable friend said, we will of course share them.

Darfur: Risk of Genocide

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 18th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend. I am sure she will acknowledge the steps that we have taken to ensure that the testimonies of those who have survived sexual violence in particular, but other crimes too, are fully documented. Often there are representatives of well-intentioned INGOs in the field, but their collection of evidence can sometimes negate the impact of allowing a successful prosecution.

The concrete steps that we have taken include, as my noble friend knows, the Murad code, which allows not for a time-limited period but ensures that evidence can be collected and sustained, to allow for successful prosecutions. Indeed, that is why we are working closely with international courts such as the ICC, and the prosecutors specifically, to ensure that the connection between testimony collection and prosecution is very live.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, we are aware of the extensive involvement of the Wagner Group in this conflict and its associated criminal activities but, if one is to believe the messages coming from Moscow— I admit that is a bit of a stretch—the Russian Government are taking direct control of the Wagner Group and its activities. What assessment have His Majesty’s Government made of the direct involvement of the Russian Government in the conflict in Sudan, which of course is hardly likely to simplify the challenge of achieving a lasting peace?

Sudan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not have the figures for the most recent contribution to the World Food Programme, but we are one of the major donors. We have always been one of the major donors and we remain committed to that programme.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, although it is early days, are the Government making an assessment of the potential impact of the events in Russia over the weekend on the involvement of the Wagner Group with the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and, indeed, on its criminal activities on the wider international scene?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, the UK has repeatedly emphasised, and pointed the finger at, the negative influence of Russian activities in Africa. Russian state and non-state activities in Sudan seek to capitalise on instability for their own interests. The UK Government have repeatedly made clear our concerns over negative Russian activities—including, reportedly, by the Wagner Group—in the exploitation of Sudanese gold resources and in supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces. The impacts of recent events in Russia are being assessed in relation to this and other conflicts in Africa, but we are not yet in a position to articulate them.

Nova Kakhovka Dam

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the basis of what the noble Lord says is important: we need to ascertain what the needs of Ukraine are and to meet them. If boats are required, as I said in my first Answer, we will seek to provide them.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the consequences of the breach of the Nova Kakhovka dam have been described as “generational” in their impact. Does the Minister agree that this underlines the importance of next week’s Ukraine Recovery Conference and the need for it to address ecological issues as well as infrastructure and economic development matters?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I totally agree with the noble and gallant Lord. In preparation for this Question, I saw the mapping made of the flooding, which is on both sides of the Dnipro river; half is on the Russian side. Even organisations such as the ICRC cannot access the area, and people are suffering. I agree with the noble and gallant Lord that there are issues concerning agriculture and the natural habitats, which will be impacted, but as the waters recede we will be able to make a better assessment. However, we will not be able to make that assessment unless Russia allows access to its side of the river.

Sudan: Civilian Population

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 18th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, our country has a long tradition of ensuring that we are a sanctuary for those fleeing persecution. I know that my colleagues in the Home Office are monitoring the situation very closely to ensure that we are able to respond effectively to this crisis.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the growing involvement of the Wagner Group in Sudan? We are only too well aware of its appalling track record on a great many issues, not least the treatment of civilians in conflict areas. How soon can we expect the Government to proscribe that repugnant organisation?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord will know that I cannot speculate on his final question. However, we are fully aware of the work of the Wagner Group from emerging reports about possible activities in Sudan and wherever there is a gap, as I have said before at the Dispatch Box. We have seen that the Wagner Group is operating very effectively in the Sahel too, particularly in Mali. There is an added element: this is not just an ordinary mercenary group—it does a deal with whoever is governing or controlling a particular area, so there is a direct economic benefit. I agree with the noble and gallant Lord that this is a very dangerous development, and we certainly do not need the Wagner Group emerging as another threat in Sudan.

Ukraine: Ceasefire

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I totally concur with the noble Lord. I thank him once again for both his support from the Front Bench and that of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition for the Government’s position. That is important: whether we talk of the Liberal Democrat Benches, the Labour Benches, the Government Benches or indeed the Cross Benches, the unity of purpose and action in standing up with and for Ukraine is very clear.

The noble Lord raises the important issue of sanctions. I agree with him. We need to articulate more clearly. Let us be absolutely clear: every sanction has within it—[Interruption.] I welcome those sound effects, which, I believe, amplify the voice of this Chamber. Every sanction the United Kingdom applies in this respect has a carve-out for humanitarian support. We have articulated that. On Saturday, I was pleased to receive an invitation and attend as part of His Majesty’s Government a meeting with our European partners and those in the Indo-Pacific. I was delighted that, as part of one of these sessions, we were addressed by Foreign Minister Kuleba from Ukraine, who underlined the importance of unity not just within Europe but elsewhere in the world.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the support being offered to Ukraine, including the training of pilots, but the truth is that we have had a hard enough time over the past few years training our own pilots with the capacity we have. Have the Government finally learned the lesson that we need to retain sufficient military capacity and resilience in our own country if we are to be secure in the years ahead? This is something they have signally failed to do in recent years.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I recognise the valuable insights of the noble and gallant Lord, and I assure him that we are doing just that by ensuring that we replenish any support we are giving to Ukraine in terms of ammunition, missiles and other equipment, because the first responsibility of the Government is the security of our own nation.

Integrated Review Refresh

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, an effective strategy requires a sensible balance between ends, ways and means. The integrated review refresh is certainly better than its predecessor on ends and ways. I welcome the sharper focus on Europe and the Russian threat and the more coherent and robust approach to China. Unfortunately, the refresh fails signally when it comes to means. Does the Minister recall that as recently as 2010, we were spending 2.6% of GDP on defence? Given the accounting changes that have occurred since then, that probably equates to something like 2.8% in our present terms. The integrated review refresh is saying, in essence, that we face a more dangerous world than we have seen for many a year, and the Government’s response is a vague aspiration to increase our defence expenditure at some indeterminate point in the future to a level still well below that which we had in 2010. Could he have a go at explaining the logic behind that?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, it is not true that these are vague aspirations. I think I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we are committed to investing £5 billion over the next two years to replenish our ammunition stocks, modernise our nuclear enterprise and fund the next phase of the AUKUS partnership. We are committed to spending at least 2.5% of GDP in the longer term. As I said, I cannot provide a precise timeline on that, but there is pretty clear evidence of our intent in the commitments that have been quantified and given a timeline.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is right that a Foreign Office Minister made representations before the execution took place. I think it would be wrong to exaggerate the power we have as a country; we cannot command countries not to take decisions of the sort that Saudi Arabia took, but it is right that Foreign Office Ministers made representations. We will always continue to do so. It is a long-standing policy that we oppose the death penalty.

We use every opportunity we can to promote the values we hold dear: freedom of speech, freedom of religion and democracy. I do not think anyone questions our commitment to those values. Equally, we work with countries all around the world that do not share all those values. If we were to work only with countries whose values aligned entirely with ours, we would be pretty isolated on the world stage. It is right that we should have a constructive relationship. We are working closely, for instance, with the UAE as it makes preparations for COP 28. We will be a very strong partner to ensure that all the commitments secured at previous COPs are followed through and strengthened at COP 28, which is being hosted by the UAE.

On climate change, the noble Baroness is right, but this is a refresh. It is an additional document, almost an appendix to the IR, and does not replace it. Although there are many ways in which the threat of our abusive relationship with the natural world can be seen to have increased over the last two years—or at least our understanding of the threat has—the emphasis in the IR on the need to prioritise global environmental protection, restoration and tackling climate change was pretty much front and centre. Therefore, by definition, it remains front and centre. The refresh does nothing to diminish that commitment.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister make a clarification? In his answer to my question, he said that the Government had a firm commitment to increase defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. The integrated review refresh says it is an aspiration. I would be very pleased indeed if the Minister were able to say that his remarks were the accurate statement of the Government’s position.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I think what I said was that the firm commitment related to the £5 billion over the next two years. Did I use the term commitment in regard to the 2.5%?

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

Yes.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

In that case, it is a goal. The language that has been used is that it is a goal to get to 2.5%, but the commitment I was referring to is the £5 billion over the next two years.

UNCLOS: The Law of the Sea in the 21st Century (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this report makes it clear that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and crucially the instruments that fall within its overarching framework, have helped to bring a welcome degree of certainty to the governance of the world’s waters, which, of course, cover the larger portion of the planet’s surface. It also underscores the ongoing importance of the convention and outlines how it continues to be crucial in addressing a range of important and difficult new maritime issues.

However, at the moment, UNCLOS does not answer all questions, nor does it provide a resolution to all issues. The report highlights the current gaps and challenges that are likely to emerge in the years ahead. As a maritime nation that relies on predictable and equitable rules at sea, it is important that the UK continues to take a leading role in the maintenance and development of UNCLOS and its subsidiary instruments.

At the same time, we must recognise that, no matter what we do, there will be issues that UNCLOS will not—or will not be allowed to—resolve. This is not an excuse for slackening our efforts to strengthen maritime governance, but it is important to recognise the limits of what is likely to be achievable and to think about how we manage the consequent challenges to international order. That is what I will focus on today.

The principal difficulty characterises international law more generally: there is no global government, so international law is essentially what the most powerful members of the international community decide it should be. We should not, therefore, be surprised that UNCLOS relies on consensus. This of course limits its scope when there is disagreement among the major players in the system, although we should note that, where there is consensus, we tend to get a high degree of compliance. However, compliance can also be a significant challenge. Just as there is no global government, there is no global enforcement mechanism that can be brought to bear on those who contravene international agreements. China’s repudiation of the 2016 UNCLOS ruling in favour of the Philippines regarding activities in the South China Sea—already mentioned several times this afternoon—clearly demonstrates the limits of the system.

Today I will highlight two challenges where in future UNCLOS may find itself constrained or even neutered. The first concerns the crucial issue of resource exploitation. The report covers the difficulties in regulating the development of deep seabed mining and fisheries management, but these will be greatly exacerbated by another factor, which is also discussed in the report and has been mentioned this afternoon: climate change.

The availability of an ice-free northern sea route from the east to the west will dramatically increase the commercial viability of maritime exploitation of the Atlantic by powers such as China, and this will have serious implications for fisheries. China’s demand for fish far outstrips its current supplies. Once its trawlers can access the Atlantic, we are likely to face a huge assault on fish stocks in that region. When I say “trawlers”, I am not talking about the sort of vessels that we can see sailing in and out of Brixham harbour; these are ships that are at sea for six months at a time and operate on an industrial scale.

We are likely to see a similar assault on non-living seabed resources. Despite the recent declarations made at COP 27, to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred, I suspect that the availability of strategic minerals will be like a magnet to resource-hungry nations, and the scale of China’s requirements will drive it to exploit the seabed wherever it can. Indeed, its activities in this regard have more than once been referred to as ocean rape. The International Seabed Authority will no doubt do its utmost to regulate such exploitation, but we have seen with the South China Sea how the PRC reacts to rulings that run counter to what it regards as its national interests. While we should continue to support such international governance mechanisms, we should also prepare now for an ice-free, Arctic route and the challenges this will bring. We should discuss with partner nations how together we might respond to those challenges in cases where international agreements prove powerless.

The other problem I want to highlight, already referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, is the security of subsea cables. The committee’s report emphasises their importance. Around 95% to 97% of global communications depend on them, and around 25% of the UK’s electricity is delivered through such cables. UNCLOS contains important provisions for their laying, maintenance and repair, but there are no comprehensive rules protecting maritime cables.

The report highlights areas where the UK should work to improve the regulatory environment in this regard, which of course is important. Better domestic legislation and closer co-operation with the International Cable Protection Committee are necessary steps in this regard, but, as with resources, we must recognise the likely limits of international law.

Subsea cables are crucial to our security and prosperity, but at the same time they are vulnerable. While accidental anchoring, fishing and natural disasters are the main threats to those cables in normal times, they are also obvious targets for hostile military action or, in future, for terrorist attack. UNCLOS will be of no help in the face of such risks. We need to develop comprehensive plans for the defence of subsea cables, but we also need to recognise that no defence can ever be perfect. This underlines the importance of developing sufficient resilience to be able to cope with successful attacks on those crucial assets. But that, as they say, is a whole other story.

In essence, the committee’s report confirms that UNCLOS, along with its subsidiary instruments, has on the whole been a huge success story, and it goes on to argue persuasively that the UK should work to develop the convention’s usefulness in the face of future challenges. I say amen to that, but, as I have argued, we must also be aware of the limitations that are inherent in any aspect of international law, UNCLOS not least, and prepare our responses to the inevitable and serious challenges that will face us as a consequence.

China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the International Relations and Defence Committee’s report The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship contains much material and covers a lot of ground, but the central thrust of its argument can be identified from the second part of its title A Strategic Void.

The Government’s integrated review contained many aspirations and listed many activities, including in the section on China and the Indo-Pacific. But lists are not strategies. They do not aid clarity; indeed, they often confuse. The committee’s report, like that of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, called on the Government to produce a strategy which would set out a framework for dealing with China, and indeed it suggested what such a strategy might look like.

In their response, the Government seem to suggest that they have a strategy but are not going to tell us what it is for security reasons. This, if it is more than just camouflage, is unconvincing. No one expects the Government to reveal exact plans, specific means and tactical details—if indeed they exist—and I for one certainly acknowledge that intentional ambiguity can be useful in certain situations. But businesses wishing to engage with China need to have a clear idea of the risks they might be running. Academic institutions, too, need to have a good idea of how the Government might react to certain developments on the international scene. They do not need to know exactly what those reactions would be, but they need to be aware of where the Government set their priorities.

The issue of Taiwan, already mentioned this afternoon, is clearly the most dangerous aspect of our engagement with China. Supporting that country’s independence, while avoiding a general war over it, should be our top priority. President Xi’s recent statements have only added to the tension. The Government’s response to the report acknowledges the importance of the issue, but it does not say what assessments have been made of the risk of the likelihood of conflict and its possible consequences. This is not an area where I would look for detail, but I do look for an assurance that such work is in hand.

Beyond that, it is clear that China is, as one inquiry witness put it, out to make the world safe for autocracy. For those who have not read it, the special report in the latest edition of the Economist sets this out in stark terms. The Government’s response to the committee’s report admits that:

“Aspects of China’s approach to the multilateral system run counter to UK interests and values”,


and goes on:

“We will continue to take targeted action with international partners to defend universal human rights, free and fair trade, and ensure that in areas, such as emerging technology or space, that new rules, norms and standards enable freedom and democracy to survive and thrive.”


This is woefully inadequate. It makes the whole thing sound like a piece of peripheral business.

In fact, we are, or certainly should be, engaged in a fierce contest to determine the rules of the international order under which we will have to live and operate for most of the rest of this century. Very few things could be more central to our future welfare and prosperity; securing the right outcome should be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the UK. It certainly is for the United States. President Biden has made his Administration’s position very clear on this and has set about assembling the necessary international economic, technological and military weight to counter that of China.

None of this is to argue against the desirability of business, academic and cultural links with China, but setting out the UK’s priorities in this regard would make it clear that those other areas of engagement would all be contingent upon the pursuit of our objectives regarding the international order. It is hard to see how spelling this out would endanger our security. It would, however, give those in business and elsewhere a clearer idea of the downside risks associated with such engagement.

As it is, if one reads the Government’s response regarding Huawei, for example, one gets the clear impression that this company would now have a substantial hold over our 5G network had the Americans not rather annoyingly imposed additional sanctions on it. A little earlier, the Government’s response says that the National Security and Investment Act is “country agnostic”. That might be true with regard to the wording of the Act, but to suggest the same is true of its application seems to me breathtakingly complacent.

The principal risk for UK business is of course the likely adverse Chinese reaction to our opposition in the contest to determine the future rules of the international order. The committee called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment of such an outcome. The Government’s response is a fine example of departmental waffle:

“The … relationship … is multifaceted”;


they will

“manage disagreements and defend our values while preserving space for cooperation in tackling transnational challenges … and … continued pursuit of a positive trade and investment relationship in line with our national security and values.”

It is cakeism at its best. But what do we do if somebody takes away the cake? We are given no answer.

This Panglossian approach is also evident in the Government’s response on higher education. They say:

“We will also ensure that Chinese students are treated equally to all British and international students, including protecting them from any undue pressure on political issues.”


Really? How? Are we going to ensure that their families in China are protected from official pressure or sanction? Are we going to monitor all their interactions with their own Government? Or perhaps these matters do not fall under the heading of “undue pressure”.

The Government’s response on supply chain resilience is little better. We are told:

“The Foreign Secretary has been clear that it is important that the UK does not become strategically dependent, and that, particularly in areas of Critical National Infrastructure, we work with reliable partners.”


So what action has followed? What exercises have been undertaken with a range of scenarios to give us a better idea of critical vulnerabilities and how these might be reduced? What specific command and control processes have been set in place to train for and respond to threats to our national resilience? Once again, we are given only vague reassurances.

The Government could and should do much better. We are dealing with an increasingly autocratic regime in China. I would have thought that our experiences with Russia over the past decade would have taught us what we should never have forgotten: how dangerous such regimes can be, especially when they are militarily powerful and, most especially, when they have nuclear weapons. We need a long-term strategy for dealing with them.

The Government should set out such a strategy. They should give some shape and sense of priority to their otherwise all too comprehensive and sometimes contradictory aspirations with regard to China. The committee has proposed such a shape. Finding a satisfactory but peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue is at the top, but close behind it comes our pursuit of an international order that is fair to all and helps to protect the world from autocracy. Trade and wider engagement with China should be pursued, but not at the expense of higher-priority objectives, and in the knowledge that such prioritisation will at times lead to Chinese retaliation and all the associated risks.

In its leader article on China this week, the Economist said that

“handling the most powerful dictatorship in history was always going to require both strength and wisdom.”

It is not at all clear to me at the moment that we see enough of either. I hope that we can get more from the next Prime Minister, whoever that will be.