Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I imagine that, a few months ago, many people would have expected the debate on this year’s gracious Speech to be conducted in air of optimism as we emerged from the shadow of Covid and looked forward to continuing economic recovery. Instead, we find ourselves confronted by a war in Europe and its consequences for our own security. However, I fear that at the moment we are not paying sufficient attention to those consequences. We are rightly focused on providing all possible assistance to Ukraine as it resists Russian aggression, but we cannot postpone a consideration of the wider lessons of the invasion. The implications for our future security are far too profound for us to delay such an analysis.

To my mind, there are three strategic conclusions that we should draw from the events of recent months. The first is, alas, an old lesson—the unbounded capacity of the future to surprise us, usually in very unpleasant ways. International crises, and the armed conflicts that sometimes flow from them, have seldom been anticipated, nor have we been well prepared to meet them. Since no one has a functioning crystal ball, we will no doubt continue to make wrong judgments about the future, so we must expect to be surprised by it and develop military structures and capabilities that will provide us with sufficient agility, adaptability and sustainability to cope with the unforeseen. But we can do that only if we are prepared to make the necessary level of investment—something we are currently failing to do. Despite recent increases, our defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has not even recovered to its 2010 level, and current rates of inflation will rapidly erode its effectiveness. In such a dangerous world, we simply have to do better.

The second issue that I want to touch on is the security impact of globalisation. The drive for commercial advantage that led to lean manufacturing, just-in-time logistics, outsourcing and offshoring and many other such developments has brought significant benefits to western consumers. But we are seeing now how such dependence can constrain our actions in a crisis. In an interconnected world, security cannot be about just military power and economic strength. It must also be about our ability to sustain our economic and social structures in the face of severe disruption to global connections. We have to strike a much better balance between short-term economic advantage and sustained national resilience. As a starting point, perhaps we should consider introducing a national equivalent to the kinds of stress tests that were mandated for banks in the wake of the global financial crisis.

The final lesson—another one that we seem to have to relearn every few decades—is that autocracies are very dangerous things. The lack of constraint on their leaders means that they can, at least in the short term, act very quickly in ways that create huge threats to peace and stability. Putin is therefore not just a dangerous individual; he is a personification of the risks we run if we fail to confront autocracies from the outset. For too many years, we pandered to him, and we are now paying the price. We should not make the same mistake with other regimes.

The elephant in this particular room is clearly China, which is moving back along the road to autocracy. At the same time, it is engaged in a sustained effort to reshape the international order to its own advantage. As some have observed, China is seeking to make the world safe for autocracy. When it seeks to unbalance the rules on which we rely for our own security and prosperity, we must be prepared to contest it. But, if we are to do that successfully, we must expect China to respond vigorously in support of what it sees as its own national interest. Those responses may well include the use of draconian economic, commercial and technological measures intended to sway and possibly coerce those on the other side of the argument. Again, therefore, we must ensure that we have the necessary resilience within our societies to withstand such assaults.

The Government must act on these lessons, and they must act immediately. I hope that, in winding up, the Minister will commit to this. We do of course face many domestic challenges, but, if the Government fail in their first duty to provide for the security of their citizens, all else will be for naught. The challenge on that front is here and now; it needs to be met here and now.

Russia: Sanctions

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, London already operates a public register. When I referred to 2023, that was in the context of our overseas territories. We already have a scheme for OTs, called the exchange of notes, which the noble Lord will be aware of. I know directly through its operation, and through speaking to, for example, tax authorities and crime agencies, that they are able to access the necessary information. However, I agree with the noble Lord that there is more to be done on this issue. I outlined some of our plans for greater transparency at Companies House to show greater levels of ownership. I assure the noble Lord that the broadening of what we are seeking to do through the legislation proposed will allow us to target individuals and organisations quite specifically and to freeze their assets as well.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister and others have referred to an invasion of Ukraine as a trigger for sanctions. Can the Minister tell me what that invasion will look like? Does it include cyberattacks? Does it include subversion by special forces, who are already in parts of Ukraine, and other such grey activities? How are we going to identify an invasion if the 100,000 troops massed there are just there for strong-arming and for show and will not themselves actually be involved?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I alluded to the expertise and insights in your Lordships’ House, and perhaps I should be posing this question to the noble and gallant Lord, who has great insight. The activities of the Russian state and those supported by the Russian state already include such things as the noble Lord alluded to. That has seen some action being taken by the United Kingdom and our key allies and partners. What is very clear is that the physical movement of troops—again, the noble and gallant Lord will know this far better than I—is a real statement of what may come next. To just pass it off as military manoeuvres when the whole of the eastern borders of Ukraine have over 100,000 Russian troops in occupancy is a great cause for concern. Therefore, what we are seeking to do through the Statement, and, importantly, through the widening of legislation and action—be it economic action—is to demonstrate to Russia the real willingness of the alliance and our partners within NATO and Europe to stand up against such further aggression.

As I said, eight years ago Crimea was annexed illegally. No further attempts were made to withdraw troops. I went to Ukraine before Christmas, and saw the anxiety. The massing of troops in Belarus, not that far from Kiev, is causing particular concern, and it is important that we make Statements accordingly. However, behind those Statements must be concerted action.

Diplomatic Influence Post Brexit

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I certainly do not intend to sound complacent. I simply push back on the idea that the UK has lost influence. All the evidence over the last two years shows that we have extraordinary influence around the world, disproportionate to the size of our country and even to the size of our economy—notwithstanding that we are the fifth biggest economy in the world. However, the noble Baroness is right: post-Brexit relations with the EU remain heavily influenced by the resolution of outstanding exit priorities, principally the Northern Ireland protocol, where talks need to proceed with renewed urgency this month. I have every hope that we will see success at the end of those talks.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister has recently appointed a special envoy to the western Balkans. This is a welcome appointment, but what processes and mechanisms will be available to that envoy for co-ordinating with the EU, which has such an important presence on the ground in the western Balkans?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

As I said, my Lords, we retain good diplomatic relations with European states and share foreign policy goals with them, particularly on issues around Russia, Iran and China and indeed on the issue that the noble and gallant Lord raises. The trade and co-operation agreement provides for future co-operation on emerging security challenges—everything from counterterror to cyber- crime. It also provides for an agreement on security of information that will allow the UK and the EU to exchange classified information on a voluntary basis.

Ukraine and Russia: Military Developments

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I have a copy of the letter, and I can give it to him afterwards. On his earlier point, the short answer is yes. When we have worked on sanctions, we have worked with our EU allies as well as others.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this is not an isolated crisis but part of a long-term campaign by a gangster regime, which includes international assassinations, the subversion of legitimate Governments and interference in democratic processes. It has been going on for years and will go on for years. Does the Minister not agree that what is required is not just a set of responses to this particular incident but a long-term diplomatic effort to gain co-operation and determination across Russia’s opposition? Should we not be reducing a little bit the heat of the arguments that we have with some of our neighbours in favour of greater co-operation—stop squabbling over fish when the sharks are circling?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, there is little I can disagree with from the noble and gallant Lord, who speaks with great insight. I assure him that I agree with him totally—we need to take the temperature down. We have seen the situation with the likes of Mr Navalny, and where we have been most effective is when we have acted and acted together.

Afghanistan: Food Shortages

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 9th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that operationally, as I said, Sir Simon Gass and Martin Longden met with the Taliban and pressed on the importance of human rights within Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian corridors. Through our close liaison with UN agencies, we have seen that those corridors are operational and that support is beginning to get through, but it needs co-ordination. The picture is sketchy, depending on which province of Afghanistan we talk about. On the role of the Muslim world, and the Islamic world in particular, I am very clear that there is no better way of challenging the negative narrative on women and girls that the Taliban peddles than through esteemed leaders who are from the Muslim world—and, yes, they are women as well. We need to ensure that we reel in behind them to show that Islam does not negate women’s rights but actually promotes them.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, co-ordination with the Taliban is clearly crucial if aid is to get through to the people, but, alas, the Taliban is not wholly in control of Afghanistan—certainly not of large swathes of it. To what extent does the Minister assess that the conflict between the Taliban and ISK will hinder the delivery of aid to the people?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord speaks from great insight and experience of the region. He is quite right about the situation with ISKP, but he will also be aware that there is fragmentation within the Taliban; there are different parties within the Taliban who are also wrestling for control and, depending on who has the greatest influence, they will have the greatest influence over respective regions. We are working through the nuances of that. There is one thing I will say about the Taliban—it is realising that it may have wanted administration, but being in government is not an easy job.

Belarus: Roman Protasevich

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 25th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con) [V]]

The advice issued via the NOTAM—the notice to airmen—applies to all registered air carriers, so all aircraft that are UK registered will be subject to the same advice in relation to not overflying Belarus as those carriers operating scheduled routes. Non-UK-registered non-scheduled aircraft, such as smaller commercial charters, still require a permit to fly to the UK and are captured by the decision made by Ministers yesterday.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that this egregious act is not just an isolated incident but part of a wider pattern of criminal outrages perpetrated by gangster regimes, which in this country alone has included murderous attacks with vile poisons and electronic attempts to subvert our democracy, and that what is required now is not just a strong and immediate response to the Belarus incident but a longer-term strategy to counter such regimes and thwart their malign purposes?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con) [V]]

The Government strongly agree with the noble and gallant Lord’s comments. Our approach to tackling these escalating problems in Belarus, which go far further than the events of the past couple of days, is part of a broader approach that we take. In the interests of consistency, the UK transferred 95 designations from the EU on individuals and entities following the transition period, and we are very much working in collaboration with the EU and other partners.

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

I start by saying that the integrated review is a good piece of work. It sets the strategic scene well and I agree with many of the conclusions that it draws. There are inevitably areas of detail that merit more examination and further debate but, alas, there is no opportunity for that today. Given the short time available, I shall make just two points.

First, despite the much-discussed tilt to the Indo-Pacific, the review correctly identifies Russia as the most immediate threat to our security. The maintenance of our commitment to NATO, the associated transatlantic relationship and the continued development of our military capabilities, including in new fields such as cyber, are therefore crucial. But we will continue to face challenges from Russia below the threshold of conventional war. Success with these requires robust international responses, particularly among our European neighbours, but such responses will become increasingly difficult to agree, as issues of security become more entangled with those of trade and supply, and short-term national concerns trump regional solidarity. Nord Stream 2 and its possible effect on Europe’s ability to respond effectively to Russian adventurism is a case in point.

How do we rise to this challenge? The integrated review says that the UK will work with its European partners “where our interests coincide”. Surely there can be no greater example of mutual self-interest than the peace and stability of our own continent. But our ability to influence our European partners has undoubtedly been weakened by Brexit. We are no longer directly involved in the engine rooms where EU foreign and security policy proposals are developed, and our high-level relationships with our neighbours are subject to the tensions and frictions that will arise from time to time, as a consequence of our divergence from previously common positions. These are now inescapable facts of life that will require determined and sustained effort if we are to counteract them, but the review has little or nothing to say about how this is to be done.

My second point concerns China. The review says:

“We will continue to pursue a positive trade and investment relationship … while ensuring our national security and values are protected.”


This is likely to prove an almost impossible balancing act and we need to be clearer about the choices we will have to make and where our true interests lie. China patently does not wish to be constrained by the post-1945 global order. Whether it wants to dictate the course of other nations may be open to question; that it wants to be free of constraints imposed by others is beyond doubt. We are now engaged in a global contest to determine the rules by which international behaviour will be governed for most of the remainder of this century. The outcome of that struggle is crucial to our national interest.

The Government have rightly said that the UK should help to shape those rules, but this will mean opposing China. It will require us to be part of a grouping that can muster sufficient economic strength, military power and technological advantage to influence decisions in a way that runs counter to China’s purposes. As a proud and modern superpower, China will not take such opposition lying down. There will be consequences. We should, of course, seek to trade with China and to engage with it on important issues such as climate change, but we should also expect our stances on global governance and human rights to disrupt those efforts, perhaps severely. Our strategy should make clear that we place long-term benefit over short-term advantage and that we are prepared to face up to the difficulties that this will cause.

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome my noble friend. I assure him, and agree with him, that the United Kingdom will always prioritise how we respond to the threats that we face. As I am sure he will acknowledge and agree, our armed and security forces work tirelessly to protect the UK and our interests at home and abroad. However, I agree with him that we need to be dynamic in our response to the ever-changing and evolving world, including some of the new threats and opportunities, be they in cyber or space.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, a number of pending defence capital investment programmes will be crucial to both our future military capability and the UK’s prosperity agenda, but a one-year financial settlement risks crippling them. Can the Minister assure the House that such important strategic issues will be decided by informed debate and not pre-empted by short-term Treasury fiat?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I assure the noble and gallant Lord that we continue to stand by our Armed Forces. He will note that the Government are investing an additional £2.2 billion in defence over this year and next, which will put our total spending at £41.5 billion. I give him the added assurance that the Government will continue always to prioritise how we respond to the threats that the UK faces. Our Armed Forces and security services work tirelessly in this respect and are fully funded.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 22nd June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, while the focus of the gracious Speech was this year very much on Brexit-related matters, and while these will no doubt consume a great deal of our time and attention over the forthcoming extended Session, the wider world is becoming no less troublesome in the meantime; nor will the issues that confront the international community allow us to sit on the sidelines while we agonise over our relationship with the EU. As the Minister has reminded us, North Korea continues down its dangerous path towards an intercontinental nuclear missile capability; China’s military growth continues to alarm its neighbours; Russia’s tactical opportunism within Europe risks conflict through miscalculation; Syria remains riven between competing factions; the nations of the Gulf are at one another’s throats; and, of course, terrorism in all its guises still casts its fatal shadow across our society.

With all this going on it might be thought that we would have little time for navel gazing, but that, alas, is likely to prove a vain hope. It will nevertheless be important for us to lift our sights from time to time and to contemplate the dangerous world that we inhabit and for us to play our part in containing the global risks to our safety and prosperity. The gracious Speech indicated that the Government would ensure that the UK maintained and enhanced its role on the world stage, but this was a vague commitment, included almost en passant. If such an undertaking is to mean anything, it will require a clear-eyed assessment of the risks we face, the will to address them and the tools that are necessary if one is to exercise power in the real world.

As far as risks are concerned, we should view the current situation in the Gulf with considerable alarm. The stability of that region has long been a crucial national interest for us in the UK, but that stability is looking ever more precarious. The wider security and economic implications could become deep and damaging. The Ministry of Defence and the Government more widely have in recent years placed great emphasis on and made much of their Gulf strategy. Could the Minister therefore tell us how the most recent tensions between Qatar and its neighbours have impacted on that strategy and how the Government are responding to this worrying situation?

On the issue of international terrorism, I have been dismayed by recent remarks that seem to attribute our status as a target to our own foreign and security policy. Have we forgotten why Osama bin Laden founded al-Qaeda in the first place? It was not to attack the West but to overthrow the regime in Saudi Arabia. Have we forgotten the underlying purpose of Daesh? It is not to attack the West but to create a caliphate to oppress the peoples of the Middle East. At their root, these organisations are less concerned with pitting Muslims against non-Muslims than they are with achieving dictatorial power over Islamic nations. There is no doubt that in seeking to counter their loathsome practices and violent purposes we expose ourselves to their wrath and retaliation, but fear of a response should not dictate our policies. History has shown us that appeasement leads only to worse suffering in the long term. There is, of course, plenty of scope for debate about how exactly we should respond to these challenges and there is certainly much room for improvement in the Prevent strand of our counterterrorism strategy, but in formulating our policies the yardstick should be what is most effective in the long run, rather than just what will be safest for us in the short term.

We have been criticised for our extensive engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, for our more ephemeral involvement in Libya and for our lack of presence in Syria. We seem to be in the position of someone who is criticised if they go straight ahead, if they go backwards, if they turn left or right or, indeed, if they stand still. The real problem is that we often have grand ambitions that are totally unrealistic. We cannot transform countries overnight, if at all; nor can we dictate the constitutional and political arrangements under which people live. We can, however, observe the patterns that emerge in international affairs, support those patterns that are reasonably benign and work with partners to suppress those that are malign. This is a limited objective, it is true, but one that we have at least a fair chance of achieving.

To do even this much we will need the necessary tools. The gracious Speech reiterated the Government’s commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. This is welcome, but I, like others, would draw your Lordships’ attention to the words “at least”. Despite the Minister’s remarks about the equipment programme, there is no doubt that the fall in the value of the pound over the past year is impacting on what the MoD can achieve within the present budget. When added to the unrealistic estimate of the extra funds that could be released through efficiency measures—an unrealism that has a long and inglorious history in government accounting—the defence programme is clearly under severe pressure.

Even in these circumstances, it would be unwise to expect a sudden flow of great largesse from the Treasury, and I indulge in no such fantasy. Our overall economic position remains challenging, with a continuing, if reduced, deficit and a burdensome level of debt. Nor should the MoD be exempt from the search for ever greater value for money. But the Government’s first responsibility remains the protection of the citizens of the UK and their interests. If they are to meet this crucial obligation, they need to ensure that the defence budget continues to grow in real terms and that the growth represents actual spending power and not funny money.

Finally, our Armed Forces will, as ever, require talented and courageous people of the highest quality if they are to discharge their onerous responsibilities as we and they both expect. They do indeed have superb people, but we must recognise that they are not keeping enough of them for as long as they should, and this is particularly true when it comes to female personnel. I am proud that the Royal Air Force has led the way when it comes to the promotion of women to the most senior ranks, up to and including two-star, but there is much more still to do. Too many talented people, especially women, are leaving early because the terms of their service are not flexible enough to accommodate their evolving personal circumstances and the associated pressures. We cannot afford such waste: it is expensive in terms of training replacements and it impacts on our operational capability.

It will remain the case that service personnel must make sacrifices that would be unacceptable in most civilian occupations. It will remain the case that the demands of operations must often take priority over personal preferences. We must never lower our standards in this regard. Even with these caveats, however, it is surely possible to develop more flexible terms of service that allow people, for a limited period, greater opportunity to accommodate their personal circumstances and thus to retain them and all they offer for much longer. I am therefore grateful to the Minister for outlining the plans that the Government have to deal with this issue and ask that he keeps us updated as the MoD seeks to accomplish what will no doubt be a difficult balancing act.

For Parliament, the next two years may well be predominantly about Brexit, but we live in a complex, dynamic and dangerous world that will care little for our preoccupations. We cannot afford to drop our guard in such an uncertain security environment. We cannot allow the pressure of immediate political events to make us introspective and insular. If we mean what we say about developing a Britain that is confident, outward-looking and engaged, then surely it is here—in this place—and now that we should demonstrate the truth of those sentiments.

EU Foreign and Security Strategy (EUC Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as a member of the sub-committee that conducted this inquiry, I am delighted that we have the opportunity today to debate this report. As we do so, though, it is perhaps worth pausing, just for a moment, to reflect on why the EU’s strategic review of its foreign and security policy is so important to us. After all—some might argue—if the people of this country vote on 23 June to separate themselves from the Union then that review will be of no more than academic interest to us.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has observed, nothing could be further from the truth. We acceded to the EU in 1973, yet more than 400 years earlier, in the 16th century, we were busily engaged in maintaining a balance of power in Europe, making use of alliances with such partners as Portugal, the Ottoman Empire and the Netherlands. During the 18th century we engaged in the stately quadrille, in which we, Austria, France and Russia moved through a series of changing alliances designed to provide security within Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars came the Concert of Europe, then the Triple Entente. The failure of the League of Nations in the 20th century led eventually to the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland; and in the aftermath of the Second World War, we moved on to NATO and then the EU.

The plain fact is that, for most of the past millennium, the security of these islands has been bound inextricably to the security of the rest of the continent, and that will continue to be the case whatever the outcome of the referendum on 23 June. Whether we are inside or outside the Union, the EU’s foreign and security policy will have huge implications for us in the UK. We have, and will continue to have, a critical stake in its success or failure.

So what can the EU do now and in the years ahead to improve the effectiveness of its policies in these areas? In the limited time available to me, I should like to point to three areas—already touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, in his excellent speech—where it might focus its efforts. First, it must recognise that its strategy must link ends, ways and means in a coherent and achievable fashion. There is a common saying which holds that you cannot will the end if you do not will the means. This is certainly true, but it can be expressed in another form: you cannot will the end if you do not possess the means.

When we talk of “means” in this sense, we refer essentially to power: the power to persuade others to change their minds and/or their courses of action. That power can take many forms. Moral authority, economic weight, diplomatic skill, military force—these are all dimensions of power, but many of the sources of such power, and the authority to wield them, reside within individual states, not with the authorities of the EU. In many ways, therefore, the EU as an institution acts as an organising, co-ordinating and focusing instrument for such power, rather than its source. This does not mean that the Union is powerless, far from it, but it means that for its foreign and security policy to be effective, the EU must recognise and account for the limitations inherent in the means by which that power is generated.

However and wherever it is generated, though, most elements of that power will depend upon a framework of economic strength. Delivering that strength is not the remit of those working on the foreign and security policy, but their efforts will be largely in vain if the EU and its members cannot restore their economic vigour. Riches cannot by themselves guarantee security, but poverty can pretty much ensure its absence. That holds, of course, for individual states just as much as for the continent more widely.

My second proposition concerns the need for prioritisation, as set out in the report. Not long ago there was perhaps a sense that security within the immediate environs of the EU could be taken broadly for granted—that while we might not have seen the end of history on the global stage, we had witnessed it within Europe and the EU could therefore focus its attention and spread its benison further afield. That dangerous illusion has been dispelled. The threats to the security of our continent and to the members of the EU are serious and growing. The EU needs to act strategically to counter them. Of course the Union has wider interests and should not ignore them, but its priority must be its own members and the European neighbourhood, not grandiose schemes for global security.

My final point concerns the worrying disconnect within the EU between hard and soft power. The EU’s strengths lie very much with the latter, but power cannot sensibly be divided up into discrete parcels. Clausewitz maintained that war was the continuation of policy—or politics—by other means. The nature and measure of the power appropriate to the conduct of international affairs will vary not just between, but within situations. So while the EU may not, and indeed should not, be the principal instrument for the exercise of hard power, it should nevertheless be able to co-ordinate its own activities effectively with the application of such power.

As the report makes clear, the Berlin Plus arrangements, which were to provide for such co-ordination by linking NATO and EU activities, have proved ineffective. This is a dangerous situation. There are many dimensions of power that are unavailable to NATO and the same is true of the EU. Together they can supply the continent with the spectrum of power necessary for our security, but if they cannot do it seamlessly and coherently, then we are in danger. The two institutions must find a solution to this dilemma.

There are, of course, several other very useful recommendations in the report, and I hope that the EU will give them all the serious consideration that they deserve. I sense that throughout the continent there is a growing realisation that we need to pay much more attention to our security, and that this may at last be beginning to be reflected in the appropriate budgets. It is still too little, but it is at least a beginning. The UK has rightly given a lead to our partners in this regard. We need to continue to give such a lead in that and all other areas of this crucial debate.