International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 27th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I associate myself with the amendment and particularly with the remarks made by my noble friend Lord West. I do that for three reasons: first, because the primary duty of government is the security and welfare of our citizens and our sovereign nation in the world. I will not elaborate on that, as I think it is accepted by most of your Lordships’ House.

My second reason, however, is the commitment of honour that we have towards the men and women who serve this country—not just because charity starts at home but because of the unique contract that they have with the people of this country. It is a contract even until death and, tragically, many of them encounter that and lose their life in the service of this country. We have a debt of honour to illustrate that we are giving just as much attention to them as to others.

The third reason is because of the relationship between development overseas and our position as a nation which has a proud tradition of soldiering and contribution overseas. I am not one of those who believe that every problem has a military solution; they do not. Nor do I believe that you should develop military plans, strategy, operations or structures without regard to what used to be called “grand strategy”. Grand strategy, if we are to have it—I have to say that I do not see many signs of it in the Government—must encompass both hard and soft power: economic development, aid, diplomacy, military, Armed Forces and so on. That needs to be at both the strategic and the operational levels.

As the noble Lord, Lord West, pointed out, there are many cases—though not the majority, I accept—where aid can be supplied only under the umbrella of protection of the British Armed Forces. There are cases where the Armed Forces commit themselves, as in the Ebola crisis, to functions that are not necessarily directly related to defence, but where they are operating in difficult circumstances where they have particular attributes to defend themselves. In other words, you can no longer isolate military and Armed Forces action from soft power, whether diplomacy, aid or whatever. That is the essence of the strategy. In many cases you will not need the military and it would be better, as in some of our recent experience, to pay a little more attention to providing civilian attributes such as justice systems, but the two are meshed together.

The truth is that I believe we are now falling beneath the critical mass regarding our Armed Forces—certainly, though I will not rehearse all the details, with regard to our soldiers, surface fleet and aircraft, some of which has been pointed out already. We are also falling beneath critical mass in terms of our commitment. When I was a much younger lad, we were spending 5.4% of GDP on our Armed Forces. We are now spending less than 2%. If the nuclear deterrent is transferred from the central budget, out of which it has been paid for 50 years, into the defence budget, we will have an even greater deterioration, although that will be disguised because of that internal transfer.

I accept that we are among the highest spenders in NATO in this regard because other members of NATO are, frankly, not even getting to 2%. In some cases, when they are getting to 2% that is rather cloaked in euphemisms as well. I was talking to someone recently about the details of the Belgian defence budget. That country spends 2%, 90% of which is on salaries and pensions. As one official said, “We don’t so much have an Armed Forces as an extremely well guarded pension scheme”. So it is not the case that we are falling dramatically behind the rest but, given some of the things that are happening in Europe and the wider world, and the necessity to combine soft and hard power together, we can no longer allow the isolation and continued deterioration of defence; that is not something that can be put back quickly.

I understand that education, health and other domestic issues are extremely important to people in the country. I understand also the sincerity and motivations behind the discussions on the 0.7% target. Still, it would be better to be cautious about our future strategy as a country, for ourselves but also for the many people in the world who look to us not only for moral assistance and diplomatic and development aid but as partners who can be counted upon when the real hard times come, and they come in the form of threats. There is therefore nothing incompatible between arguing for a strong, robust and effective budget with regard to overseas development—particularly economic development, which is the basis of all human progress—and our commitment to adequate funds for defence.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I suspect that it will not surprise the House to learn that I agree with everything that has been said so far on this amendment. Let me be clear: I support the 0.7% target, although I accept and acknowledge the importance of the much wider suite of tools that can and should be brought to bear on international development, as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, has rightly pointed out.

I have been in the position to see personally some of the outstanding work that is done abroad by the Department for International Development. I have also been in a position personally to witness how much of this work has contributed not just to the betterment of humankind in general but to our own national security; it is important to us in a much wider sense. Equally, I have been in a position to see the importance of what the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, who is not in his place at the moment, referred to earlier as the comprehensive approach. In so many difficult areas of the world, development and military effort have gone hand in hand, as they need to do. Indeed, one of the great improvements we have made in this country over recent years is the breaking down of the barriers that used to exist between the different departments. Here I include the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. Their joint working has improved immeasurably over the years, and as a consequence, the output, the effect that we have in the world, has improved immeasurably as well.

I have listened very carefully to the arguments that have been made in support of this legislation and for why the 0.7% target needs to be enshrined in legislation. I listened very carefully to the arguments the noble Baroness the Minister made in resisting a number of the amendments that have been put forward. Any one of her colleagues from any of the other spending departments could stand at the Dispatch Box and make the same case with the same force for their own department. Most of the arguments that have been advanced today have no particular significance in international development over any other task that the Government undertake in general public expenditure, except, perhaps, for one, and that one is that we have agreed to an international target for international development, but so we have for defence, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has pointed out. We have said that it is crucial that nations do not fall below spending 2% of their GDP on defence within NATO. Those nations that do not meet that target should work towards achieving it. We have taken the lead, at least in terms of words, in this regard. What we have not yet done is taken the lead in terms of action.

Surely two departments that have worked and will continue to work so closely together in future as defence and international development, two departments that rely upon each other so much for a synergistic approach in the world, two departments, perhaps the only two departments, which have an international commitment to a specific target, two departments that are linked so closely, should be treated the same in our legislation. I support the amendment.

[Lord Tugendhat (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister will recall that at Second Reading and in Committee I stressed my support for the aid programme and that I have also supported the 0.7% target. The points made by my noble friend Lord Forsyth and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, are central to the debate we are having. Although I and other colleagues doubt the wisdom of guaranteeing a particular share of the national budget to one particular spending programme for exactly the reasons that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, emphasised, the Government are arguing that that is the right thing to do in the case of this programme, as distinct from any other, partly because of its international nature, partly because of the commitments we have entered into, partly because of their belief that we would be setting an example to other people and partly because of their belief that others will follow that example.

Given that that is the Government’s position, the Minister owes it to the House to explain why what is sauce for the development goose is not sauce for the defence gander. I recognise that she is not a member of the Conservative Party, but she is speaking on behalf of the Government in this House and the Prime Minister, who leads the Government of which she is a member, has been emphasising very strongly in recent days the importance of other nations following our example in relation to the 2% target set for NATO. We have recently received evidence that the British Government may not be able to meet that target next year. If this idea of setting targets and guaranteeing a share of national expenditure is so important in one field, the Minister must be able to argue, for the reasons set out so eloquently by my noble friend Lord Forsyth and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, why they should not apply in the case of defence.

I hope she will also be able to accept that while the problems of the developing world are of a continuing nature, problems in the case of defence wax and wane, and at the moment, when we look at what is happening in Ukraine and the Middle East, problems in the defence sphere are certainly waxing. Therefore, if the Government are going to be able to defend on a rational basis the reasons why they are privileging the development budget in his way, it is essential that they are able to explain why they do not wish to do so for defence. I know defence is not the Minister’s department, but she is proposing this Bill and doing so on a particular set of grounds which apply to the defence area, where we are also committed to a particular target.

Afghanistan: Quarterly Statement

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 14th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. I point, for example, to revenue collection. In 2004-05, only $250 million was collected. In 2011-12, $2 billion was collected. That is a sea change.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I note that the Minister said that the end of 2014 is not the end. That is, of course, quite right. The endeavour in Afghanistan has been a major international effort. Co-ordinating that international effort has been something of a challenge, to say the least, even when it was at the top of various nations’ foreign policy and security agendas and when organisations such as NATO were involved. Will the Minister indicate to the House how the ongoing international effort in developing politics, economics and social life in Afghanistan is to be co-ordinated in future, which will be necessary if it is to be effective?

[Baroness Northover]

The noble and gallant Lord is right. It is something of a new science to have so many countries involved in this constructive activity. Obviously there are lessons to be learnt but, if he looks to the NATO summit which will take place later this year and to the development conference, he will see some of those lessons being taken forward.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the gracious Speech last week set out the Government’s intent to prevent conflict and reduce terrorism. These are ambitious aims to encapsulate in such a few words, especially given the kind of international turmoil that we currently see in so many parts of the world. So how are they to be achieved?

The conflict in Syria steals most of the headlines these days, and not without cause. The consequences for the Syrian people are tragic and the stresses on the wider region become ever more worrying, but what can external actors do to help address these issues? The first thing, perhaps, is to ensure that by their actions they do not make the situation even worse. We know little for sure about the Syrian opposition groups. We believe that some of them at least are pursuing an extremist agenda, and the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, has pointed out some of the other concerns about the nature of the conflict. The Assad regime is extremely unsavoury and we would certainly like to see something better in its place, but how content are we that this is actually achievable?

These are not new questions, but there is a natural concern that while we grapple with them, so far unsuccessfully, more people are dying and the humanitarian situation is growing steadily worse. I have sympathy with this concern, but it is important to remember that the issue in Syria is essentially political in nature and that any attempt to address it must itself be at root political. Employing military force in the region without a clear and achievable political objective would be a leap into the unknown and would certainly risk worsening the situation rather than improving it. We most certainly can and should be making every effort to contain the regional impact of the conflict. We see the consequences in Turkey, in Lebanon and, most worryingly of all, in Jordan. Sustaining and increasing our support for the latter country is perhaps one of the most useful things we can do in this crisis, at least in the immediate future.

Meanwhile, President Obama’s second term and a new Secretary of State present yet another window of opportunity for the Middle East peace process. The current regional turmoil makes progress on this issue more rather than less pressing. The experience of many weary years makes us naturally cautious about expecting too much, if anything at all, from the latest efforts in this regard. Nevertheless, unrelenting persistence is one of the most important prerequisites for dealing with the problem. As has been pointed out already, Israeli settlements are certainly a major obstacle, but treating them en masse is likely to make them a showstopper in any negotiations. Some of these settlements would almost certainly remain on the Israeli side of the line under any land swap deal, while others are much more controversial, and it is on these that negotiators should perhaps focus their efforts.

The Palestinians, for their part, will have to acknowledge that there can be no right of return. This presents all sorts of difficulties, but there are no easy parts to this puzzle. This is another issue on which negotiators should perhaps concentrate their efforts to find an acceptable formula. Most important of all, the peace process needs to focus on constituents within Israel and the West Bank. The leaders are important, but if they cannot deliver the key elements of their constituencies, they will be unable to make the concessions necessary for progress. It may be unrealistic to expect a resolution of the Palestinian issue in the near term, but just a degree of movement on these key points would go at least some way to relieving the air of stagnation and pessimism that seems so prevalent at the moment.

There are of course a great many other challenges for the UK on the international scene, and numerous potential threats to our interests. Other noble Lords have covered or will cover some of these, and time precludes me from touching on more of them today, but they exist and we must guard against them. If we are to do so, we shall need the appropriate resources, including adequately manned, equipped and trained Armed Forces. The Government’s plans for Future Force 2020 set out how that particular requirement is to be achieved. These plans, while constrained to a greater degree than I believe wise, are at least coherent, but when they were conceived during the strategic defence and security review in 2010, it was made clear that they depended on real-terms increases in the defence budget—and, I stress, in the entire budget, not just in the equipment programme—in each of the years after 2015: that is, beyond the period of the 2010 spending review from financial year 2015-16 onwards.

This is the basis on which the Ministry of Defence has conducted its planning over the past three years, but far from increasing the budget from 2015-16 the Government seem to be about to reduce it further, and the prospect for the succeeding years does not look bright. Some will say that the circumstances have changed and the economy is not where, in 2010, we all hoped it would be by now and therefore we have to tighten our belts further. They would say that defence cannot be protected from this further pressure. That may indeed be the Government’s judgment, but in announcing the outcome of the 2010 review in another place, the Prime Minister himself was clear that the plans for Future Force 2020 depend on the sort of budget increases that I have outlined.

One does not have to be a master logician to work out that the reverse must also be true: that without those rises, the Government’s plans for the Armed Forces will be unachievable. That appears to be the current situation. The Ministry of Defence is working to a plan that is not being funded appropriately and that will therefore fail. I should be grateful if the Minister could say in his winding up how his department intends to square this circle.

Finally, I feel that I, too, must say a word about the Afghan interpreters who contributed so much to our operations in their country and who now face such a fraught future. The Government have so far declined to put in place for them a scheme similar to the one that allowed endangered Iraqi interpreters to settle in the UK. I simply cannot understand this. I accept entirely the desirability of talented Afghans remaining in and contributing to the development of their country, and I welcome the introduction of incentives to persuade them to do so, but if they judge that the risk to themselves and their families outweighs the incentives to remain, surely we have a duty to provide them with a viable alternative. It is simply not good enough to say that they can apply for asylum like everybody else; they deserve far better from us than that.

The moral argument for treating these people as a special case is clear, but there is a practical one, too. As the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, noted, we shall certainly need high-quality interpreters in future crises. If we are to persuade people to work for us in such a capacity and in such circumstances, they will need to have some confidence in the long-term prospects for themselves and for their families. We need to be seen as a country that looks after those who serve it. That, I regret to say, is not how we are seen at the moment. The case for a change of course is overwhelming. The Government’s case for their current stance is, to my mind, wholly underwhelming.