Soft Power and the UK’s Influence (Select Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, and his committee on an excellent report, and on the customary eloquence with which the noble Lord introduced it. There are many issues worthy of exploration here but I should like to start by taking a step or two back from the detail.

Some 2,500 years ago, during the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians forced the unwilling islanders of Melos to join their side in the conflict against Sparta. In doing so, they told the Melians that,

“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.

That may seem like a rather brutal assertion of the principle that might is right, except for two things. First, the Athenians of course lost the war in the end and, secondly, might—or, as we are discussing it today, power—is a complex and multifaceted thing. The Athenians were right, however, in considering power to be necessary in delivering strategic outcomes. Today’s debate is therefore both important and timely. However, in focusing on soft power, it highlights only one part of a much wider issue: the nature, use and utility of power in contemporary international relations. What part does soft power play in this calculus?

Given my background, you might expect me to argue for the importance of military capability—and, indeed, I do. But that by itself, even when exercised in alliance or partnership with others, is insufficient. The military instrument, important though it is, depends in turn on other forms of power. It must rest on a bedrock of economic strength, clear political purpose and moral authority.

The power that we seek is the power to achieve strategic ends that would not otherwise occur; in other words, the freedom to do things ourselves or the ability to persuade, dissuade or compel others. These are outcomes that depend on complex calculations of cost and benefit by various nations and groups which often tend to see the world in many different ways. We have to know what will sway them, but we also need to possess the necessary means.

It is clear that, without economic strength, we cannot afford much in the way of power, whether soft or hard, and for this reason alone our GDP and rates of growth are important. But a powerful economy is also a crucial factor in its own right. International trade and finance can significantly influence the actions of others, so economic strength is essential if we are to be wealthier, but also if we are to be safer.

The exercise of power also needs a clear political purpose. Since politics is generally regarded as the flow of power and authority between groups and individuals, it follows that our strategic ends will be essentially political in nature. If we have no clear political purpose, anything we do, with either soft or hard power, is simply activity in search of a plan. Of course, this does not mean that we have to set political objectives at the outset and never change them. We should not confuse firmness of purpose with stubborn inflexibility—although it can sometimes be difficult to tell them apart. The course of events and the unexpected may require us to alter our judgments and to reset our objectives, but we should do so consciously, having thought through the consequences.

That brings me to the need for moral authority. If we seek to influence the actions of others, we can, of course, compel them against their will, but this is an inefficient approach that is difficult to sustain. It should generally be considered only as a last resort and as a transitory phase en route to a more lasting solution. So we seek, where possible, to persuade or dissuade rather than to compel. That suasion will, as I have suggested, depend on a complex calculation of cost and benefit, but it will also depend on the value that others attach to our judgments. It is not about trying to impose our particular mores on others; rather, it is about the force and the means of our arguments. Are we seen as fair and consistent in our assessments or are we partial and erratic? Can others rely on our word or are we merely fair-weather friends? Would they buy a used car from us?

In the end, this has to be a question of balance. In such a complex world, we are often faced with hard choices, and you cannot please everybody. But I do not seek to pit ethics against hard-headed national interest—quite the contrary, in fact. I believe that being seen as broadly honest, reliable and fair serves our national interests in the long run. It is therefore important that we use international structures and organisations where we can and ignore them at our peril. We should be careful about the application of international law, even though this can be a very grey area. Above all, we should understand that, in seeking to influence others, we are of necessity engaged in a never-ceasing battle of ideas.

This is an area where, as the committee points out in its report, we have many potential strengths, if only we could work out how to use them to best effect. We are a diverse nation with a great political, legal and cultural heritage. We have a marvellous asset in our membership of the Commonwealth. We are the wellspring of an international language. The BBC has been a source of inspiration to many around the world and through the years. These and the others enumerated by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, have been our strengths in the past. We need to ensure that they remain our strengths in the future and that we add to them. We have, as a nation, to commit ourselves wholeheartedly to this battle of ideas.

Nevertheless, when all else fails and the ends are important enough, we need the capability to use physical force in the pursuit of our interests. We need armed forces that, in concert with allies and partners, have the capacity to coerce those who threaten our security. This is not an option that is separate or distinct from the other elements of power that I have talked about. There has been much discussion about the use of hard and soft power but I am not sure that such a distinction is particularly helpful. Even at the far right of the operational spectrum, in full-blown war fighting, economics, politics and ideas play a crucial role. In situations short of violent conflict, armed forces have an important part to play in diplomacy and development.

To be fully effective, a nation needs to be able to exercise power flexibly, across the spectrum of possibilities, so it needs both the tools and the skill to employ them properly. When, to what degree and how to use these tools will, of course, depend upon circumstances. This is where our crystal ball traditionally breaks down. I have no wish today to add to the list of failed forecasts, so let me end where I began, with the Melian dialogue. The Melians were weak and they suffered for it—there is an important lesson in this—but the possession of power did not in the long run guarantee success for Athens. Power is necessary but it must be applied in a way that is consistent with and contributes towards our strategic objectives. Power, whether soft or hard, provides ways and means but it cannot provide coherent ends.

The committee rightly calls on the Government to provide a clear vision for the country, but that vision must be one with which the majority can and does identify. It is not therefore simply a matter of issuing statements or making speeches. Formulating the right vision is, in itself, a major undertaking and a significant challenge. That, though, is perhaps a matter for another debate and for another day.