Syria and the Middle East

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as we debate Syria and the Middle East today, it is clear that we have witnessed and continue to witness a significant degree of political and social upheaval across the region. To that extent, the cards are up in the air, but we can have little control and less certainty about where they will eventually fall. This naturally poses some serious challenges to the formulation of a coherent UK policy in the Middle East. If we are to develop and maintain a credible strategic approach to the dynamic and complex challenges of the region, we need first a comprehensive analysis of the context and then a clear focus on those issues that are most important to our own security and prosperity. I do not mean to diminish the importance of moral and humanitarian concerns—we should continue our efforts in this regard—but as a nation we have limited resources and influence. It is therefore crucial that we identify our own policy priorities.

The context is surely an unravelling of the post-1918 settlement that was intended to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France, of course, have their fingerprints all over this settlement. Consider Syria. The Ottomans ruled it for just over 400 years until 1918. The San Remo conference of 1920 placed Syria-Lebanon under a French mandate while, incidentally, putting Palestine under a British mandate at the same time. Syria became independent in 1946 but had no settled constitutional or political base. Between 1946 and 1956 the country had 20 different Cabinets and four different constitutions. The turmoil in Syria today is only the latest episode in a drawn-out process that has its roots in the end of Ottoman rule in 1918.

We now see long-buried fissures reappearing across many parts of the region. We see tribe pitted against tribe, Muslim against non-Muslim, Arab against non-Arab, authoritarian against libertarian and, perhaps most significantly, Sunni against Shia. Indeed, the last division is one of the most polarising and potentially one of the most dangerous. Overshadowing all this is the regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This, of course, encompasses some of the fissures that I have mentioned—Sunni/Shia and Arab/non-Arab—but the degree of national animosity and the pursuit of regional political dominance take the problem to a new level and the competition is increasingly being played out in Syria.

The political upheaval in Syria is different in nature from many of the others that we have seen elsewhere in the region. In places such as Libya and Egypt, the impetus for change came from, or quickly gravitated to, those in the cities and centres of population. In Syria it came from those on the periphery, particularly the impoverished and drought-ridden agricultural communities, and was directed against those at the centre. So change was more difficult to achieve, particularly since survival of the military leadership was more closely tied to the survival of the regime. Even so, it looked as if Assad could not last, but the intervention of Hezbollah changed the outlook.

Given the support of Iran and Russia, it is now hard to see how Assad could be removed in the near term. Given the support of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and to some extent at least the United States, it is hard to see how the regime could achieve a decisive military victory over the opposition groups. The most likely outcome in Syria is either degeneration into a Somalia-like failed state or division into a number of warring baronies. Neither outcome is palatable from a wider security perspective and both are likely to perpetuate large-scale human tragedy. Without substantial international intervention, for which there seems little or no appetite, it is hard to see a plausible alternative.

At the same time, two key sets of negotiations continue: on the Middle East peace process and on the Iranian nuclear issue. Both are likely to reach some sort of conclusion, whether satisfactory or not, later this year.

These then, are some of the key features of the regional context. With so many challenges and so little clarity on the likely outcomes, where should the UK place its own policy priorities? I should like to propose three areas. Top of the list, I suggest, should be the Iranian nuclear issue. The consequences of failure on this front for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and for long-term security within the region are likely to be extremely serious and to have a lasting effect on the UK’s own security. The ongoing negotiations are therefore critical. Of course, we have to negotiate well if we are to achieve the right outcome and, of course, we must take nothing on trust. Any agreement has to be verifiable. There will inevitably be different views on what constitutes a bad deal or a good deal.

I want to focus on two short-term issues that seem to me of fundamental importance in this whole process. The first is the sustainment of the agreed sanctions regime. As negotiations continue and some restrictions are lifted, there is a clear risk that sanctions as a whole will start to unravel. There will be a temptation for some countries or companies to jump the gun in order to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. That risk cannot be entirely eliminated, so it will have to be managed. It will require strong and obvious resolve on the part of the major economic players to take firm and painful action against transgressors. The UK and the EU more generally will have an important part to play here.

The other issue concerns the question of where we go if negotiations fail. What is plan B? In such situations there is often a reluctance to consider plan B at all in case this is taken as a belief that plan A will not work, but such precautionary thinking does not need to be public. We can and should be discreetly considering what options are open to us if it proves impossible, even with more time, to reach a comprehensive settlement. This will involve some difficult decisions, but leaving them to the last minute risks making the difficult impossible. Of course the implicit existence of a plan B could help to focus minds on reaching a satisfactory agreement in the first place.

The second policy priority, I suggest, should be our relationship with Saudi Arabia. This has suffered over recent months, not least because of divergent views over Syria and concerns about the negotiations with Iran. However, Saudi Arabia remains the pivotal country in the Gulf region and is of considerable economic importance to the UK. Given the differences in our societies and cultures, the relationship is never going to be an easy one. It will require hard work, a degree of tolerance on both sides and, above all, constant and clear communication. The relationship is too important to the UK and its interests for us to neglect it. How closely are the Saudis being consulted on the negotiations with Iran? What we might consider a satisfactory outcome might look very different to Saudi eyes. Although we cannot give them a veto over the process, attempting to deal with or mitigate their concerns must be a key policy objective for the international community as well as for us.

The third priority should be to contain, as far as that is possible, the wider regional consequences of a Syrian conflict. Jordan matters to us as an old friend and it matters to Israel because of the latter’s concerns over strategic depth, so it is key to wider regional stability. However, Jordan is being weakened and undermined by the conflict in Syria. As others have mentioned, the large number of refugees is putting great stress on the already weak economy. There is no doubt that the social impact of what is going on in Jordan as a result of the conflict in Syria is having enormous repercussions for the regime there. Therefore, support for Jordan, for its economy and for its political development should be a key part of the UK’s policy in the region.

There are of course other malign international repercussions of the war in Syria. The Lebanon is being seriously affected. Perhaps one of the most worrying consequences is the growth of an ungoverned space straddling the Syria-Iraq border and the implications for radical Islamist terrorist groups. For example, the recent activities of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant demonstrate the risk of such an ungoverned space. The group poses serious dangers to the future of both Iraq and Syria and potentially further afield. Containing this risk will require some sort of governance over the affected area. For this reason, if no other, the feuding baronies outcome in Syria that I described earlier, while unpalatable, would certainly be preferable to a Somalia-like failed state. Another wider consequence of the Syrian situation is the return of radicalised and battle-hardened jihadis from the conflict zone to their home states. Saudi Arabia is increasingly concerned about this issue and the implications for its own security. It also affects us here in the UK. In many ways, this is a challenge for domestic rather than foreign policy, but it is a challenge nevertheless.

There are, of course, other important issues, such as the Middle East peace process, that I do not have time to cover, but many of these, while crucial to the UK, are beyond our power to influence directly. As I said at the outset, the proliferation of challenges within the Middle East and the limits on our ability to confront them should force us to a clear-eyed analysis of UK priorities. Naturally, some may disagree with those that I have proposed, but in my view such an analysis is essential if we are to take a coherent and strategically informed approach to the many dangers that we face, rather than simply wringing our hands about them.