(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI respond to my noble friend by saying that the assertions that it breaches international law simply cannot be determined at this point because it is a matter of exploring the complex background of facts and circumstances, including the manner in which the protocol has been operated.
Can the Minister define in a few words what the necessity is in this particular instance?
My Lords, I think it would be wrong of me at this stage in the Second Reading to engage in a deeper debate. I refer the noble Lord to the terms of the legal statement issued by the Government.
On the diminution of rights which were raised among your Lordships, I return to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Moylan and indeed by other Members of your Lordships’ House from Northern Ireland: what are we to say of the diminution of rights which strips from citizens of this country the right to make laws? Must we not look to that? At present, the circumstances of Northern Ireland strip our fellow countrymen of that right.
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, while the Government acknowledge the challenging environment in which prison officers work, we consider that, by comparison with emergency services such as the police or fire brigade, while the environment is a challenging one, it is to an extent controlled, which those other occupations are not. In that context, we consider that 68 is indeed an appropriate age at which to retire.
The Minister referred to challenging conditions in prison. Would he accept that it is a violent environment? Are prison officers who are sick or injured by assault, or who—very importantly—fail the fitness test, entitled to their full retirement pension between the ages of 60 or 68, or is it diminished because they have not reached the retirement age?
My Lords, the noble Lord and I share a background in the criminal justice system, and I am as aware as he is of the potential for violence to be inflicted on prison officers pursuing their duties. When a prison officer is no longer fit to undertake operational duties, and the operational health practitioner confirms that ill-health retirement is appropriate, the officer would be retired due to ill health and may receive in full the pension benefits due to them, calculated up to the last day of service. I acknowledge with gratitude that the noble Lord alerted me to his question in advance, so I was able to seek further background from officials. If there is other material on which he would like me to expand, I can of course speak to him in person, or I can write.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberCafcass is concerned with representing the interests of children in court. In the report assessing the risk of harm to children and parents in private law children’s cases, published by the Ministry of Justice in June 2020, the expert panel recommended that the MoJ should commission
“an independent, systematic, retrospective research study on the implementation”
of the current law and practice
“in cases where allegations of domestic abuse, child sexual abuse or other serious offences are raised.”
Has that study been commissioned and, if so, what point has it reached?
My Lords, I undertake to write to the noble Lord in relation to that study. I do not have information to hand on its progress but if I may pray the noble Lord’s patience, I will communicate with him in due course.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the draft instrument before us makes consequential amendments to primary and secondary legislation relevant to the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020, ahead of its planned commencement on 6 April this year. The purpose of these measures is twofold: first, to introduce a new jurisdiction ground for joint applications for divorce—namely, either applicant’s habitual residence; secondly, to update the terminology relating to divorce proceedings consequential on the language changes made by the aforementioned divorce Act.
I will speak first to the amendments in paragraphs 1, 4, and 8 of the schedule to the regulations pertaining to the introduction of a jurisdiction ground for joint applications for divorce: namely, the habitual residence of either applicant. Jurisdiction grounds, in this context, are the grounds on which a divorce can be applied for and/or granted in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. The ground we are discussing sets out that, provided either applicant is habitually resident in England or Wales, a joint application can be made by both applicants within this jurisdiction.
This instrument amends a number of measures, including the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, the Civil Partnership (Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) Regulations 2005 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) (Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) Regulations 2014. To each of these pieces of legislation, it brings in the same ground to which I have just referred.
An equivalent jurisdiction ground appears in article 3 of EU Regulation 2201/2003, known as Brussels IIa. Until the end of the transition period, the Brussels IIa regulation jurisdiction ground applied to all cases of opposite sex divorce, legal separation and annulment in England and Wales. The United Kingdom is no longer governed by Brussels IIa, which was revoked by Statutory Instrument 519 of 2019. However, the choice was then made to replicate the applicable Brussels IIa jurisdiction grounds into domestic law by amendment to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.
All the jurisdiction grounds in article 3 of Brussels IIa were replicated save for the ground that we are now discussing, that of habitual residence in joint applications. The sole reason why this ground was not replicated upon exit from the EU was because at that time it was not possible to make a joint application for divorce in England and Wales. With the commencement of the divorce Act, this will now be an option for the first time, so it would be remiss not to replicate this final ground now that the opportunity presents itself.
The same ground is also being introduced into the following measures: the Civil Partnership (Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) Regulations 2005 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) (Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) Regulations 2014. This ensures equality in all legislation relating to ending a partnership or marriage, regardless of whether these are between same or opposite sex couples.
The other amendments in this instrument amend language in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, the Civil Partnership (Registration Provisions) Regulations 2005, the Pension Protection Fund (Provision of Information) Regulations 2005, the Financial Assistance Scheme (Provision of Information and Administration of Payments) Regulations 2005, the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013, and the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.
The amendments update the terminology in relation to divorce consequential upon the language changes made by the divorce Act. The divorce Act amended terminology in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973—for example, by the replacement of terms such as “decree nisi”, “decree absolute” and “petitioner” with “conditional order”, “final order” and “applicant”. This means that the same terms will now be used in legislation relating to both divorce and dissolution. It simplifies language too, making terms more recognisable and readily accessible to members of the public. This supports the aim of the divorce Act in supporting citizens representing themselves in divorce proceedings. This instrument consequentially replicates those language changes across relevant legislation.
By making the amendments I have outlined today, the intention is that we will standardise and update language across all relevant pieces of legislation and amend jurisdiction grounds to add a specific relevant ground for joint divorce applications. This instrument is consequential on the divorce Act, reflective of the ultimate aims of the divorce Act, to reduce conflict between couples and families. I beg to move.
My Lords, we support this instrument. I have just a couple of questions. I am surprised that the question of jurisdiction was not dealt with in the Act itself. Perhaps the Minister has some explanation for that, which I have not perceived.
My second question relates to paragraph 7.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which says:
“The Government’s policy intention behind the reformed law”,
which in turn has resulted in the consequential amendments contained in this instrument,
“is that the decision to divorce should be a considered one, and that separating couples should not be put through legal requirements which do not serve their or the state’s interests”.
I find that a bit puzzling, and I wonder whether the Minister can help me with what it is directed to. However, as I say, we support the amendments.
My Lords, we, too, support the regulations. The provisions are primarily to reflect the new terminology associated with the reformed divorce, dissolution and separation proceedings in the Act, as well as to add a jurisdictional ground for the newly created joint applications.
The Act has not yet come into effect, but we hope that it will soon and that there is no further delay. I think I heard the Minister confirm that the date will be 6 April 2022—he is nodding, so I take that as an indication that that is correct—which is very pleasing. My party fully supports that Act and the changes to divorce, dissolution and separation that it will introduce. As a result of this Act, it will be much easier for couples to divorce in cases where the relationship has irretrievably broken down.
We hope that this will end some of the adversarial system currently in place. A spouse will no longer be able to object to or oppose a divorce, and couples will no longer have to apportion blame for the breakdown, leading, we hope, to less conflict and acrimony for all involved. A simple statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down should be sufficient for proceedings to commence. I am very pleased to welcome the measures that the Minister has outlined today.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in relation to the Question posed by the noble Lord on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, we spent more than a quarter of £1 billion on recovery in the last financial year, making court buildings safe, rolling out new technology for remote hearings and opening 60 Nightingale courtrooms. Although there is further to go, this has made a difference. In the Crown Courts, we are completing around 2,000 cases each week, which is the same as before the pandemic.
My Lords, my apologies. Given that physical accommodation has at last been made available for Nightingale courts in football grounds, hotels, theatres and even the ballroom in Chester Town Hall, how are these being manned by trained court staff? Given the fact that very few have custody facilities, to what extent are serious cases being held back and periods of remand in custody thereby lengthened?
My Lords, at the Nightingale venues, we use experienced court staff who are trained to deal with the type of work heard on site. While Nightingales deal with non-custodial cases, by taking this work away from the main court estate, custody cases can be heard in our specialist facilities faster than would otherwise be possible. To expand further our capacity to hear complex cases, we have also modified around 70 courtrooms to increase the capability to hear multi-handed trials of up to 10 defendants. In addition, work has begun on a super-courtroom in Manchester, which will further increase capacity for multi-handed cases. For those on remand in custody, our systems show that the majority of such cases had their first hearing in February 2021, and those who have pleaded not guilty have been listed for trial prior to September 2021. I acknowledge the courtesy shown by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, by intimating to my department the terms of his supplementary question in order that a specific answer could be given to this important point.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like my noble friend Lady Smith and others, I am concerned that there should not be a different principle of limitation for service personnel for injuries received as the result of overseas operations as opposed to those injured while they are serving in the United Kingdom. However, I want to also speak up for the civilians in the country where the overseas operations took place.
I am not naive about this. I very much recall a court martial in Colchester, in 2005, for which a lady was brought from Iraq with a complaint that a British soldier had stripped her naked in the street and had caused her huge embarrassment. She went into the witness box, took the oath on the Koran and then turned to the judge and said, “Now I have taken the oath on the Koran, I have to tell the truth. I made it all up.” There were many complaints that were made up at that time.
At the time of the Baha Mousa trial, Mr Phil Shiner was wandering around trying to infiltrate our discussions, and he always had someone taking a note of the evidence as it emerged, which he subsequently misapplied. I am very glad that he was struck off by the Law Society.
That, however, should not prevent, in an appropriate case, a claim for damages going forward if it is equitable to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed with considerable authority the complexity of this area of law and the difficulties that exist in any event—never mind in overseas operations.
There are valid claims. I put in a Written Question on 2 June last year. The Answer told me that, since 2003, there have been
“1,330 claims for damages relating to alleged misconduct … The claims … focus predominately on alleged unlawful detention but many incorporate allegations of mistreatment”.
The Ministry of Defence has paid out £32 million in respect of these allegations, and says that it does not pay out without consideration and finding the claim valid. It meets the bill, which does not fall on the soldier in question.
The practice of the court is not to extend to extend limitation periods easily, and that is a particular concern where valid claims are coming forward. When the court considers whether to extend the limitation period, it investigates all the circumstances. It is very difficult for a poor person in a foreign country to bring a case, and as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, pointed out, it is not easy to extend the limitation period. Date of knowledge is frequently an issue. Sometimes it almost seems as if when a court hears an application for an extended limitation period it will be granted on the nod. But that is not the case: it is a difficult thing to argue. I am, therefore, in favour of these amendments, and I look forward to seeing how they appear on Report.
My Lords, I begin by addressing Amendment 29, which seeks to carve out claims from service personnel and veterans from the limitation longstops in the Bill. I have to be clear from the outset: such a carve-out would amount to an unjustifiable difference in treatment between different categories of claimants and would therefore be likely to be incompatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
A carve-out would also have very limited practical impact. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, anticipated the statistic that I am about to quote. Analysis of previous claims has indicated that the vast majority of claims—around 94% of relevant claims brought by service personnel or veterans in connection with overseas operations—have been brought within six years, which is the period of the longstop.
In answer to the noble and gallant Lord, it must be the case that many of the remaining 6% will come under the state of knowledge provisions, whereby the period of limitation will commence at the point at which the individual has become aware of their condition. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, adverted to this in her submission when she spoke about hearing loss, a condition that might well become manifest outwith the period of six years from the point at which it had been incurred or commenced. The same might equally be said for post-traumatic stress disorder.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIn moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I shall speak also to Amendments 67 and 70, also in his name. These amendments are intended to modify Scottish provisions on sentencing with the intention of providing that, throughout the United Kingdom, terrorist offenders serve the appropriate custodial period of sentences for terrorism offences. They are made necessary by an aspect of Scottish sentencing practice that does not appear elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
The three amendments, taken together, make provision for technical sentence calculation adjustment. They clarify how terrorism sentences will operate when served consecutively with non-terrorism sentences. The amendments come at the end of a positive engagement with the devolved Government; as a result of that engagement, the Scottish Government have now tabled a legislative consent Motion in respect of this Bill.
As I said in the course of these brief remarks, the amendments are technical in nature and I shall be happy to place detail of them and their implications in a letter in the Library of this House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for moving these amendments and for pronouncing “Tredegar” correctly. I am sure that the noble Lord who hails from, or has a connection with, Tredegar, will be happy with his pronunciation as well. I have looked at these Scottish provisions. I agree that they are technical, and I really have nothing to add.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 9 in this group. Both are minor technical amendments to Clause 23. Amendment 8 would make a minor amendment to Clause 23, which introduces the terrorism sentence with fixed licence period in Scotland. The amendment would add the sentence of detention without time limit to the “waterfall” list of sentences of imprisonment and detention that a court can impose in relation to an offence. This would ensure that the new terrorism sentence was available only where a court did not impose a sentence in this list, which includes the indeterminate sentence of detention under Section 208, making the order of sentencing options clear.
Amendment 9 would simply remove a now redundant reference to new Section 205ZC(6) in subsection (4) relating to the new terrorism sentence introduced in Clause 23 due to an amendment to that provision on Report in the Commons. Subsection (4) defines the meaning of the aggregate term in relation to a sentence of detention in respect of the new terrorism sentence in Scotland, as it applies to offenders of at least 16 years of age but under 21. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Minister’s words brought to mind many waterfalls that I know and love in Scotland, but I will forgo the opportunity to comment on Scottish criminal law. I am sure that both these minor and technical amendments are perfectly justified and I have no more to say about them.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for the clarity with which he introduced these two technical amendments. Perhaps I may ask two questions. First, on Amendment 8, what would the implications have been had this amendment not been made? I was not clear from what he said whether it would change any position. Secondly, in relation to Amendment 9, how many further convictions would have been included without the decision to limit the availability of the new sentence to cases of conviction on indictment?
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with regard to the noble Lord’s first question, legal aid is available for private families where an applicant is a victim of, or at risk of being a victim of, domestic abuse or child abuse, and that is subject to the means and merits criteria. Legal aid is available for the purpose of obtaining urgent protection such as non-molestation orders without any up-front evidence requirements, and the Legal Aid Agency has the power to waive all financial eligibility limits so that a victim may qualify for legal aid even if their income or capital exceeds the eligibility limits. An overall contribution may be required later. Legal aid for matters out of scope of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is available via the exceptional case funding scheme. That is intended to ensure that legal aid is accessible in all cases where there is a risk of breach of human rights, subject to the statutory means and merits test.
[Inaudible.] Can the Minister confirm that, as discussed in the recent GR judicial review case, where a wife subjected to domestic abuse has been assessed as having capital in a jointly owned matrimonial home but is otherwise penniless, and where she can demonstrate that she is unable to access that capital because the violent husband refuses to sell or mortgage the property, the director of legal aid casework has a discretion which he should exercise to treat the applicant as financially eligible for legal aid?
The noble Lord’s question addresses aspects of detail as well as recent case law. I do not have the detail and the material with me to permit me to provide the noble Lord with a satisfactory answer. Again, I shall ensure that I correspond with him and put down in writing the answer to his question.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is indeed a privilege to follow the magisterial and extensive exposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, whose depth of experience and knowledge I defer to. He referred to the Bill as an intruder, which was an interesting description.
The Second Reading took place on 17 March, just at the beginning of lockdown. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, outlined the wide scope of the issues raised by the Bill. He said:
“Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1439.]
The Minister echoed that opening today but I was surprised when he suggested that the area of law was narrow. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, it may encompass disappearing railway carriages in Italy, which has an Agatha Christie ring about it.
The new clause inserted by the other place reflects that width. The Westminster Government or a devolved Government may, by regulation, implement any international agreement so far as it relates to private international law. Further, the appropriate national authority may, by regulation, apply any agreement between the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom or give effect to any arrangements between the UK Government and the British Overseas Territories, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. The emphasis throughout is on any future agreement of whatever nature that involves private international law anywhere in the world or internally within the United Kingdom.
It would appear that the Government have listened to the many voices suggesting that these clauses are excessively wide. Consequently, in response, the Minister today introduced the outline of a sunset clause, limited in the first instance to five years. He said that the urgent need is “ to update the framework” lost by our leaving the EU. The principle that there should be a temporal limit to the exercise of these wide powers in the uncertainties of the present time is clearly a good one. Unfortunately, the Government have decided that, like the British Empire, the sun shall never set upon these provisions. That is the effect of granting power to extend the operative period, not just for a further period of five years but, under proposed new subsection (3D), to renew the power to extend the period indefinitely. It just keeps rolling along. That makes a mockery of a sunset clause; consequently, I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
As I said at earlier stages of the Bill, our hugely unsatisfactory procedures for passing secondary legislation by resolution, whether affirmative or negative, may be tempered in the interests of democracy by consultation with interested parties. Amendment 4 pays lip service to that concept but, in effect, gives power to the Minister to choose whomsoever he thinks appropriate to consult. The wording is loose, such that although there is a duty to consult if the Minister thinks subjectively that there is nobody appropriate—as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said—he does not have to exercise that choice; or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said a moment ago, he could walk out into the street and consult someone.
The purpose of the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is to bring some objectivity to the exercise. The Minister may be surprised to know that the shelf life of a Minister in this and the previous Government tends to be no more than two years, and that Secretaries of State come and go through the various offices of state without necessarily knowing anything at all about their work. As WS Gilbert put it over 100 years ago, the way to advancement may well be to polish up the brasses on the big front door of No. 10.
Consequently, it is only sensible to have the guiding hand of the head of the judiciary in the various jurisdictions. No doubt the Sir Humphreys of this world can suggest that the Secretary of State rounds up the usual suspects, but that is no substitute for the Lord Chief Justice and his peers, who have a lifetime of experience of the legal world and the whole of the judiciary to draw on for advice as to who the suspects should be. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is inconceivable that they should not be consulted in any event.
I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks and, in particular, his call for a full and transparent report on the fruits of the consultation.
My Lords, I begin by thanking noble Lords for their thoughtful and erudite contributions. I thank them also for their courteous and warm words of welcome to me at the Dispatch Box. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in a phrase that I think will resonate with the entire House and with which none of us would disagree: our imperative is the preservation of this country’s good name and its standing in private international law matters.
The matters raised in the course of our discussions overlapped to some extent but I will, if I may, do my best to treat the contributions to the debate in the order in which they were made. First, I shall address the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in relation to Amendment 1C, which omits some text from my Amendment 1A, the effect of which would be to allow the sunset period—which my amendment allows to be extended for five years by affirmative statutory instrument—to be extended only once.