Stalking Protection Orders
Debate between Lord Stewart of Dirleton and Lord Rosser(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that question. I am aware, of course, that one of the great values of SPOs is that they can impose positive conditions as well as negative ones. I regret to say that I do not have the specific statistic for which the noble Baroness asked, but if she will permit me, I will write to her with that.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, by what specific criteria will the Government judge whether their intervention with chief constables on stalking protection orders has been successful or unsuccessful, so that we can hold the Government to account?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
In the first instance, we look at the number of stalking protection orders that are sought and imposed. The figures that I have in relation to their use are encouraging. I can tell the House that 78% of SPO applications in 2021 were granted, compared to only 5% refused, with 17% being dealt with in other ways or withdrawn.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Debate between Lord Stewart of Dirleton and Lord RosserThursday 10th December 2020
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 View all Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 144(Corr)-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee - (7 Dec 2020)
Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
First, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, well in his campaign against skeleton Bills, as that issue is getting worse, not better.
The Bill provides that the Secretary of State may, by order, prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, Amendments 57 and 74, in his name, would remove those provisions and, as he confirmed, their purpose is to probe the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.
Earlier in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, stated that the order-making provisions in the Bill
“allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited.”
He continued:
“I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards ... The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they are contained in secondary legislation.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 676.]
When the noble and learned Lord said that the order-making powers could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards, did the Government mean that the wording in the Bill would make it contrary to law to do that, or did they mean only that the intention was not to use the order-making powers to remove any of the existing safeguards? That, of course, is a very different thing, as intentions can change.
No doubt in their response the Government will address that point and give specific examples of the purposes or intentions for which these order-making powers to prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given would—and, equally, would not—be used by the Secretary of State.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, these amendments have been tabled to discuss the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.
As I set out in response to the amendments to the order-making powers tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, there are good reasons why these powers have been included. I do not wish to repeat the detail of what was said on group 7 of the amendments, other than to highlight again that the provisions have been drafted to resemble closely the terms of Section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which provides the underlying authorisation for CHIS use and conduct.
To answer the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I repeat what I said earlier and provide the Committee with reassurance that these powers could be used only to impose further safeguards and not to remove them. That point was raised also by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts posed the question of whether the Secretary of State can add bodies to, or remove them from, the list of authorising bodies. The addition of bodies can be accomplished only through the affirmative procedure. The changes to the bodies listed will reflect changes over time in investigative functions and the threats that the country faces. The rank of authorising officers is set by secondary legislation and will be dealt with in line with Section 29 authorisations.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, posed the question of whether the terms of the provision are such as to make it impossible for the powers to be extended rather than removed, or whether that is merely the intention of the Government. He correctly remarked on the fact that the persons occupying posts will change from time to time. As I see it, the legislation will not simply rely on the intention of the Government but will have force beyond that. I think that I also addressed the matter when answering the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She focused on the meaning of the words “conduct” and “requirements”. I am able to confirm that her understanding was correct. Indeed, as a consequence of what I have said, the interpretation of those words restricts, and does not permit addition to, the provisions in the Bill.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Debate between Lord Stewart of Dirleton and Lord RosserTuesday 1st December 2020
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 View all Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 144(Corr)-III(Rev) Revised third marshalled list for Committee - (1 Dec 2020)
Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the amendments in this group would variously remove the power for the Secretary of State to impose requirements restricting when a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, require the Secretary of State to consult with such persons as are appropriate before imposing requirements, and require regulations in which the Secretary of State imposes additional requirements that must be satisfied before a criminal conduct authorisation is granted to be subject to the affirmative procedure. There is also an amendment in this group which would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to bring different provisions of the Bill into force at different times and in different areas, to ensure that all the safeguards provided in the Bill always apply.
We will await with interest more detail from the Government in their response as to the nature, extent, purpose, reasons for and frequency of the requirements that the Secretary of State might wish to impose by order before a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, and why it would not have been possible to include this greater detail on the face of the Bill to reduce the possibility of this power being exercised at any time in the future in an inappropriate manner. We also want to hear the Government’s response to the concern about safeguards always being applicable, which has led to the amendment restricting the power to bring different provisions into force at different times.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, turning first to the order-making powers, addressed first by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the ability of Parliament to scrutinise statutory instruments is a broader topic than this debate permits me to go into. As to the order-making powers in this Bill, these powers allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited. I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards. I particularly seek to assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on that point. The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they be contained in secondary legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether there was a precedent for such powers to be subject to the negative procedure. The equivalent powers in Section 29 of RIPA are both subject to the negative procedure. Taking similar powers in respect of criminal conduct authorisations to those already contained in Section 29 will allow the Secretary of State to make equivalent provision for Section 29 authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations, where appropriate, so that similar arrangements are in place for both. There is a high degree of interrelationship between the two provisions. While the Government do not have any particular safeguards or limits in mind, such requirements may arise in the future that will need to be legislated for.
An example of the past use of the Section 29 powers is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Matters Subject to Legal Privilege) Order 2010, which imposes specific additional requirements that must be met regarding the authorisation of a CHIS in connection with material subject to legal professional privilege. Were any changes proposed in the future, the relevant persons would of course be consulted prior to those changes being made. Amendments 21 and 58 are therefore not considered necessary.
Turning to Amendment 81, the Bill contains provision to commence the Act for different areas on different days, to allow time to make any necessary secondary legislation, issue guidance, undertake appropriate training and put the necessary systems and procedures in place, as appropriate. I assure the Committee that this power will not be used to delay commencing those sections relating to safeguards. The power could not lawfully be used to frustrate the will of Parliament in this way.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Debate between Lord Stewart of Dirleton and Lord RosserTuesday 24th November 2020
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 View all Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 144(Corr)-I(Corr)(a) Amendments for Committee (for Second Marshalled List) - (24 Nov 2020)
Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
As drafted, the Bill refers to criminal conduct as conduct
“in the course of, or otherwise in connection with”
the conduct of a covert human intelligence source, and as
“conduct by or in relation to the person”
who is specified as the covert human intelligence source. As has been said, the amendments would establish that criminal conduct is conduct by the covert human intelligence source in the absence of any explanation as to why the additional words to which I have referred are needed, and what the consequences would be, and for whom, if they were not in the Bill. A further amendment in this group also puts on the face of the Bill that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot retrospectively give clearance for behaviour that has already happened before the date the authorisation is given.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also raised these issues in its report on the Bill when it said that the definition of what amounts to “criminal conduct” for the purpose of an authorisation is wider than simply criminal activity by a covert human intelligence source, and referred to the wording which the amendments in this group would delete. The only explanation for this which the Joint Committee on Human Rights could find was in the draft code of practice, which states that
“a criminal conduct authorisation may authorise conduct by someone else ‘in relation to’ a
covert human intelligence source,
“namely those within a public authority that are involved in or affected by the authorisation.”
No doubt the Government will wish to respond in some detail setting out why the words “in connection with” and “in relation to” are essential, what exactly they mean and, giving examples, explaining why it is considered necessary to enable a public authority to authorise criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source, which some might feel is rather at odds with the title of the Bill.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, having made my maiden remarks at Second Reading, it is a pleasure now to assist the House in scrutinising the detail of this legislation. I hope to reassure noble Lords with regard to the scope, safeguards and limits to conduct that can be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. I recognise the feeling of the House on the last appearance of the Bill as a recognition of the complexities and difficulties which attach to this field of criminal investigation.
With regard to the remarks by my noble friend Lord Cormack, he will perhaps recollect that when I spoke at Second Reading I recognised the inelegance of the expression “CHIS”, and I fully share his concerns about it. However, until such time as we have evolved a suitable replacement, if that is possible, I trust I will not trespass on his patience if I continue to use the expression.
The Bill is drafted to allow things to be authorised which are certainly connected to the conduct of the CHIS but not the same thing as it: actions which are connected to the activities of the CHIS but which are not the CHIS activities themselves. This is deliberate and it is to allow for activity which facilitates and supports the core conduct of the CHIS, most obviously to allow the CHIS to avoid detection in order to remain in place and to provide the intelligence needed. The purpose of the expressions “in connection with” and “in relation to” is to ensure that such activity may be authorised. This language also serves the function of ensuring that the scope of a criminal conduct authorisation is properly limited. It helps to make it clear that it is not the case that any and all criminality by a CHIS may be authorised. It cannot be some private venture that the CHIS has involved himself or herself in. The criminal conduct to be authorised must be connected to the conduct of a CHIS and to the criminal conduct authority.