Parliament: Elected House of Lords

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Wednesday 10th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Grocott for securing this important debate. Sadly, I cannot go all the way with the implications behind some of the questions he was asking, which seemed to me to be extremely leading towards a particular set of conclusions. I think there are answers to some of the points he raised. I particularly want to stress that the problem with having a legislature that is not elected is that it is simply both unacceptable in principle and unsustainable in practice.

There are three answers to the question that is implied in the Question. First, relations between the Houses will certainly be affected by the way in which the House is elected. It surely must be common ground that the way in which the House is elected will determine its legitimacy, perhaps not just in absolute terms but in the way in which that legitimacy is perceived. That may be key to whether we have the authority to act when we come to do so.

Secondly, relations will be affected by the powers that are allocated to the House after it becomes an elected House, and not necessarily a straight continuation of them. My noble friend referred to the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. According to Professor Vernon Bogdanor and others, this has established a unicameral system in this country in the sense that a determined Government can always get their business through, irrespective of the wishes of this House, except in two very narrow cases: extending the term of the elected House, and the dismissal of judges. On the other hand, as we learnt to a considerable extent yesterday, the Parliament Acts do not affect secondary legislation, so this House has powers over those. In practice, although it is a restraint, we really have not used the powers that are allocated to us. It will be interesting to see whether they will develop in time. Between 1911 and 1949, the Parliament Act was invoked three times; since 1949, it has been applied only four times.

Thirdly, relations should not be affected in the areas in which the House has earned a fantastic reputation—I have certainly enjoyed in my short time here the sort of debates we have just experienced. Committee work seems to be the envy of the world. It is one of the most extraordinary features of this House when you first come into it, it goes on virtually unnoticed and yet is of terrific quality, and in the specialist debates often arising from that committee work we hear contributions from noble Lords on all sides of the House that are of the highest quality. Indeed, that third function—in addition to legislative scrutiny and efficient government—is what really sets out this House as different.

In closing, I suggest simply that we might think about separating out the functions along the lines suggested by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart and the late Lord Bingham, who made proposals for a council of state that could deal with issues that are separate from the legislative processes we have been talking about.