(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as someone who has never been averse to having a go at the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I start by saying how idiotic and puerile it is for newspapers to make a lead story of which ticket he used for his journey from Chester to London. It is George Osborne’s stewardship of the economy, not his travel arrangements, which deserves censure. However, we have an infantile press.
Three big mistakes stick out over the past two and a half years. The first was the belief that cutting down government spending would automatically produce recovery. I know the Government now claim that they never believed anything so simple or idiotic, but they did, and there is plenty of evidence to prove it. Austerity is not a recovery policy.
The second has been the Chancellor’s failure to distinguish between current and capital spending. This has made the deficit seem more dangerous than it was. The prime example of this blind spot was the £50 billion cut in capital spending. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has drawn attention to the devastating consequences of this for the construction industry and for house, transport, education and hospital building.
The third was the Chancellor’s belief that without a severe fiscal contraction Britain would go the way of Greece: that is, interest rates would go through the roof. This was doubly wrong. First, with an independent central bank able to buy government debt in whatever quantities were needed there was never any chance of gilt yields rising to the levels experienced by Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, a reduction in the cost of government borrowing is no guarantee of a reduction in the cost of commercial loans sufficient to offset the collapse of the private demand for loans. That is the explanation of a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, regarding cash mountains sitting in corporations.
All three mistakes were interrelated parts of the wrong theory of the economy. Anyone who is interested in economics must start the analysis there. I am not going to go into it, but it is well known to those who are economically literate. The results have been zero growth since George Osborne took office. That was entirely predictable and was predicted by some of us. I have been saying for two and a half years—and I am not alone—that austerity would not produce growth and it has not produced growth. Now the international agencies are saying the same thing. Slowly but surely, the Government are being driven to plan B, though the Prime Minister prefers to call it plan A-plus.
It is against that background that I give a cautious welcome to the proposals in this Bill. Better late than never, better too little than nothing at all. As I understand it, the Bill aims to do three things. First, it provides for the Government to guarantee up to £40 billion or £50 billion of “nationally significant” private infrastructure investments which have to be ready to start within 12 months of the guarantee. As the Treasury explains it, the aim is,
“to kick start critical infrastructure projects that may have stalled because of adverse credit conditions”.
That is Treasury language. The guarantees might cover key project risks such as construction, performance or revenue.
Secondly, the Government will lend money directly to private investors to enable 30 public/private partnership projects worth £6 billion to go ahead in the next 12 months; I do not think that has been mentioned yet in the debate. Finally, a £5 billion export financing facility will be available later this year to overseas buyers of British capital goods; in other words, an export credit guarantee scheme of the type we are all familiar with. I would like to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. Having cancelled about £50 billion of certain public capital spending, the Government are hoping to replace it with an equivalent amount of private capital spending, much of which will never happen. That is completely illogical.
The main difference between this Bill and the British investment bank, which I have been urging, is that my bank—I call it “my bank” because I feel a certain sense of paternity in the idea, having been floating it for the last three years—would actively raise money in the private markets for its own investment projects whereas UK Guarantees, the government scheme, merely provides some finance for projects initiated by the private sector. In other words, the government scheme is still governed by the ideology that the private sector is more likely to pick winners than a state investment bank and that that is sufficient justification for waiting for the private sector to produce its projects.
My Lords, the logic of what is being said is not that it is more likely to pick winners but that it already has all those winners. The only things holding them back are the risks of the projects which the taxpayer is taking over. It is a new theory to replace classical economics which—as the noble Lord well knows—says savings cause investment. Now we have loan guarantees causing investment and it is just as nonsensical as a serious piece of economics.
The noble Lord is quite right. The argument can be developed, but my point about picking winners and losers is that there is no empirical evidence for it being true, as a general proposition, that the state is more likely to pick losers than the private sector. We have had many examples of that not being true. The economic collapse of 2008 is a very good one.