Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill

Debate between Lord Sikka and Viscount Hanworth

Committee stage
Wednesday 23rd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 44 requires the Secretary of State, within 12 months of enacting the Bill, to publish an annual report on the relationship between the provisions of the Bill and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies. My preference would have been to end the private ownership of rolling stock, but the Bill officer suggested that such an amendment was beyond the scope of the Bill—hence this silly weak amendment that I am putting forward.

The background is that, during Second Reading, on 7 October, the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, laid down the principles of the Bill. She said:

“This Bill will ensure that trains are run for the benefit of the British public, not for the profits of shareholders around the world”.


She added that, by ending the current franchise system for passenger railways,

“the taxpayer will save between £110 million and £150 million a year in fees”.—[Official Report, 7/10/24; cols. 1831, 1833.]

The Government have already said that they will not bring rolling stock back into public ownership. However, the new system, operated by a public company, will still need rolling stock, and the Government have not provided a great deal of clarity on that so far. By leaving the rolling stock in private hands, they will be negating their own principle, which was to deny profits to shareholders around the world.

The Bill will not facilitate public ownership of passenger railway services. Instead, it will facilitate what I call “rent a carriage”. That will guarantee massive profits for rolling stock companies—roscos—which do not build or commission trains but make huge profits. Last year, roscos charged £3.1 billion for leasing out rolling stock and had a profit margin of 41.6%. That is a profit of £1.29 billion in one year, extracted from customers and the public purse. The actual amount which the shareholders have extracted from roscos is likely to be much, much bigger—more of that in a moment.

I looked at the accounts of one of the roscos and it is full of financial engineering. The £1.29 billion profit which it declared for a year is far greater than the savings for the passenger services that the Minister said would be £110 million to £150 million a year. There is no justification for the profiteering of roscos, especially as the payments are guaranteed and in future will be guaranteed by the state—at worst, it can simply print the money—so the risk is very low. The return should be no higher than the yield on any government bond, which is technically called a risk-free rate of return.

The actual returns extracted by rosco shareholders are much bigger than the dividends. Let me illustrate that with quotes from the accounts of Porterbrook, which is one of these companies. It is owned by foreign shareholders: Canadian pension fund manager Alberta Investment Management; Luxembourg-based Allianz Capital Partners; EDF Invest, which is owned by the French Government; and Australian infrastructure investor Hastings Funds Management. Porterbrook’s 2023 accounts show a payment in dividends of £150 million. In 2022, it was £285 million. That is £435 million in dividends in just two years, which is far greater than the expected total saving of £110 million to £150 million for the publicly operated passenger service.

The company also shifts profits through intra-group transactions. In 2023, it paid £154 million interest on its debt, which included £153.5 million to other entities in the same group—not to an outsider, but within the same group. In 2022, it made interest payments of £162.4 million, which included £161.2 million to other group entities. In the absence of additional information, it is hard to know whether such payments are genuine. They are probably not.

Of course, profits are also shifted to avoid taxes. Interest payments give the company a tax-deductible expense, even though the transactions are not arm’s length and may lack economic substance. This company paid no corporation tax in the last two years, dividends are paid to foreign investors, and they did not pay any UK tax on those. This really is organised looting, permitted by the last Government, and I urge the Minister to ask HMRC to investigate these companies. Over the last two years, Porterbrook extracted at least £750 million in returns for its shareholders, or an average of £375 million a year. This is far greater than the £110 million to £150 million which the Government hope to save by ending passenger rail franchises.

I have referred to only one company, which is by no means the largest one, but I am sure the Minister gets the substance of my arguments. Billions of pounds can be saved by ending the role of current roscos in the railway industry. Leasing out rolling stock is effectively a licence to print money. I understand from rail company executives that the useful economic life of a carriage is around 30 years or more. The cost of a carriage is normally recovered through rental or leasing arrangements over a period of five to seven years. This being so, the rental charges of 23 to 25 years are pure profit, nothing else. There is absolutely no economic justification for this. The Government can help by stopping the use of current roscos. They can buy direct from manufacturers or set up a Great British Railways leasing company. All of these options are preferable to the current practice.

I hope that, as a first step towards ending profiteering, the Minister will agree to publish the annual report that this amendment calls for. It should provide data about the returns extracted by shareholders in dividends, intragroup transactions, related-party transactions and various profit-shifting techniques. Of course, my preference is to end this roscos circus altogether.

[Viscount Hanworth (Lab)]

My Lords, I offer my support to Amendment 44 and, beyond that, want to support and reiterate what my colleague has just asserted.

I agree that, consequent upon the Bill, the whole of the rail system needs to be kept under review during the period of transition. The privatisation of British Rail imposed costs on rail users and taxpayers. There were costs that resulted from the disorganisation of the system which might have been alleviated by rational central planning. There were also costs that arose from the profit-seeking and rent-seeking of the agents of privatisation.

Some of the main train operating companies have been paying large dividends to their ultimate owners. These include consortia of foreign banks and foreign national rail companies, as we have heard. The companies that own the rolling stock and lease it to the train operating companies have been deriving large and exorbitant rents. These companies are of course called the roscos.

The three largest companies, Porterbrook, Eversholt Rail Group and Angel Trains, own 84% of the UK’s rolling stock. They were established in 1994, at the time of the privatisation. They acquired their rolling stock at vastly undervalued prices and substantial profits were reaped when they were sold on to subsequent owners. These companies have complicated structures of foreign and domestic ownership. Between 2012 and 2018, the three largest roscos passed on a total of £1.2 billion to their parent companies in the form of dividends. We have heard that this sum has recently become even more exorbitant. The Government appear to have concluded that it would be far too expensive to bring these companies into public ownership.

It should be observed that the era of the roscos has coincided with the demise of our railway manufacturing industry, the remnants of which have now fallen into the hands of foreign owners. This demise has been due, in part, to the activities of the rolling stock companies. Instead of providing a steady flow of orders for new rolling stock, they have often opted to refurbish their existing stock. This has made it unprofitable to manufacture trains in the UK. The train manufacturers are now in foreign hands, and they may decide to retreat abroad.

To avert this, there needs to be a consistent stream of rolling stock replacements, subject to a centrally managed plan. The question is how this can be achieved. Others may have opinions to offer on this matter, but I believe that, when Great British Railways is properly established, it should undertake this task. Great British Railways would not be remitting exorbitant dividends to financial consortia, such as the owners of the existing roscos do, and it would not be paying eye-watering salaries to its executive staff. As a consequence of such savings, it would be able to offer attractive rates of return to funds borrowed from capital markets, which might assist investment in new rolling stock.