Planning and Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Shipley and Lord Fuller

Committee stage
Monday 15th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to my Amendments 190 and 192. I welcome the broad thrust of empowering and reinvigorating the development corporations contemplated in the legislation. This is the best part of a complex Bill, although we know that it has already been overtaken by the devolution Bill launched in the other place.

Clause 94 seeks the achievement of sustainable development, and the mitigation of and adaption to climate change, but there would be no sustainable development without commercially sustainable financing of the proposals that the corporations bring forward. My amendment seeks to bring sustainable finance alongside those other sustainability issues. I approach this subject in the knowledge that local authorities may be reorganised and that mayors may be created in what we now learn to be a cat’s cradle of overlapping and competing responsibilities. Regardless of that, the day-to-day financial pressures felt by national and local government have never been greater.

In a former time, development corporations would simply hold out their hand to the Government or local councils for funding. Of course, that route may still be open, but we need to recognise that the old ways, with joint severability between various tiers of local government, are falling away. Building new towns is the work of generations; it goes beyond political cycles. Relying on national and local politicians will not be enough in a world where building a secondary school costs £40 million and a flyover £100 million. In the pursuit of sustainable development and delivery on the plans, the money needs to be right, because without the money, how can all the desirable options in Clause 94 be delivered?

We need to give the development corporations powers to exploit the difference between funding and financing—by explanation, funding is writing the cheque, but financing is putting the deal together. It is no surprise that it is the financiers in the City of London who are the highest paid, because their task of turning those good ideas into reality is the hardest.

Development corporations are independent, but they have the benefit of being able to lean on the covenant strength that comes from being a statutory body. I will not dwell too much on the significance of the governance of development corporations, but I will make the factual observation that strong governance leads to higher covenant strength, the ability to take a higher credit rating, and the willingness of institutional investors to pony up the cash. We need to make it easy for development corporations to raise funds in new and creative ways at the lowest possible coupon. My amendments would path find those.

Get this right and we will provide investable opportunities for pension funds that desire to invest in infrastructure bonds, for local people who want to invest in local facilities that benefit their area, or for sovereign wealth that seeks a home for its money within an advanced economy with well-defined property rights. But the well of wealth from these sources may not be enough, and there may be other ways to skin the cat. The corporations need to be empowered to engage in all manner of financial instruments, including the traditional issuance of bonds, debt or similar instruments. But we should contemplate other sources of finance. That extends to entering into joint ventures with landowners whose land is to be incorporated as an in-kind contribution to the whole, so that they may enjoy the uplift over a long period rather than cash up front. 

It should not be right that development corporations feel they need to reach for the CPO lever by default and then be forced to pony-up a premium price to the owner up front after the unpleasantness of the process—there are lots of “p”s in that sentence. In other words, development corporations need to have powers not just to assemble land but to be creative in the assembly of that land. The creative concept of the joint venture would allow more money to be spent on upfront infrastructure than on land acquisition. That is a better-value enterprise. By thinking creatively like this, the amount of upfront funding will be less and the ability to deliver essential infrastructure at the outset greater. 

 I want to place finance in its widest possible context, not just rooting it in the sort of funding where you stand on the street corner with your hand out. Let us seed these stand-alone corporations away from the other financial pressures that afflict local government and free them from the apron strings of those local authorities. While I accept that the development corporations can plan for an area and have regard to all manner of desirable outcomes, contemplated in Clause 93, ultimately those plans or outcomes will stand or fall on whether the money can be raised and the finance deals put together. That is what my amendments seek to achieve. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, in the absence of other speakers, I am interested in the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and will be even more interested in the Minister’s response, bearing in mind what I said in the previous group about management of risk and who underpins a development corporation in the event of financial loss.

Amendment 197 is very important. There are two issues: the automatic

“removal of hope value from the valuation of the relevant land”

proposed for development and, secondly, whether land purchases by development corporations should be seen as

“public sector investments to be counted against departmental expenditure limits”.

This amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, is important and I hope that the Minister will respond to it.

Local Audit (Amendment of Definition of Smaller Authority) Regulations 2025

Debate between Lord Shipley and Lord Fuller

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as I have, in the past few days, stepped down as the vice-chairman of the local government resources panel, which has oversight of audit and accountancy within the Local Government Association. In that guise, I have been very well acquainted with the difficulties in local government audit.

If there is a villain of the piece—I use that word advisedly—the noble Lord, Lord Porter, when he was chairman of the Local Government Association struck a wonderful deal that established the PSAA, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. He drove down those costs and council tax payers benefited from low-cost audit for many years. With the benefit of hindsight, however, perhaps he did too good a job, because it came to pass that it was very difficult for audit practitioners to recruit the right staff at the right level, and they got behind.

We ended up in regrettable circumstances—through no fault of the noble Lord, Lord Porter, I stress—aggravated by Covid, in which a number of local authorities had failed to sign off their accounts. I cannot remember the precise details but some were four or five years old—so old, in fact, that the authorities concerned no longer existed because they had been reorganised away. I am very pleased that the previous Government, belatedly perhaps, took a grip. A line was drawn in the sand and some transitional arrangements made, and now things are much better.

However, I am very concerned that we now see the increase in the threshold. I appreciate that we need to increase the threshold value, but going from £6.5 million to £15 million is a huge increase—of 230% in one bite. That will mean that some of the smaller authorities, which hitherto have been contained within the audit regulations—I will give some examples presently—no longer will be.

I am seeking reassurance because we are establishing the definition of a smaller authority. I cannot be blind to the notion—the Minister referred to it in the earlier debate—that we have a local government devolution and reorganisation Bill in the other place; it passed Second Reading yesterday. In that circumstance, we will see a large number of smaller principal authorities, which are subject to the full audit regime, fall into the third tier of local government—that is, they will not be subject to the 5% or £5 council tax increase cap, if I may use that word.

I want to highlight the example of Salisbury City Council. It used to be a district council and a principal authority but, since the reorganisations in Wiltshire, that is no longer the case. In the past four years, it has jacked up its council tax by 44%. I note that its total precept for this year is only £6.065 million, marginally below the threshold limit to which it is subject. Its gross income is £8.64 million. Currently, it is part of the arrangement to have a full audit. Having jacked up council tax by 44% over the past four years, I think it should be. If it is increased to £15 million, however, what assurance can the local people—the long-suffering residents of Salisbury—have that the council has their best interests at heart? By contrast, the Wiltshire unitary authority, which has assumed responsibility for most of the expensive services, put its council tax up by only 4.5% last year.

I am concerned that this definition will, in due course—not today, because I am conscious that we are concerned solely with audit—be used, as we go through local government reorganisation, to give a free pass to some of the smaller city councils and larger town councils, which will inevitably will fall out of the LGR process and let them let rip. Of course, it is not just the district councils, it is the internal drainage boards. I am concerned about the case of Great Yarmouth Borough Council, which had an increase in the internal drainage board levy of 91% last year, which the council was mandated to pass on to local taxpayers. Over the past few years, it has gone up by 117%. That means that because the district council in Great Yarmouth is a principal authority, it could put its council tax up by only £5, but 91% of that was as a result of the unavoidable increase from the internal drainage board that lies within it. That meant that only 9%, just £26,000 of the increase in council tax in that historic borough—I declare an interest because my business is in that borough, but I do not pay council tax there—could be devoted to the provision and improvement of local services. We shall see a whole class of authority that would currently be within the £6.5 million but will no longer be caught if the threshold rises to £15 million.

I want to highlight the example of the Broads Authority, which is well known for its governance failings. It is well known to be a dysfunctional organisation and, in the interests of transparency, I have in the past made complaints to that body through the mishandling of certain planning matters. Its gross budget is £9.7 million. If ever an organisation needed the close scrutiny of a full audit, it is the Broads Authority and now it will be given a free pass. It will be let off from public scrutiny. This is the unintended consequence of this legislation.

Finally, I want to get the definition of “smaller authority” on the record in the context of local government reorganisation, and ask the Minister what the Government’s intentions are. If it is contemplated that this definition of “smaller authority”—the £15 million threshold—will be used post local government reorganisation, when some of these smaller cities, such as Salisbury, or larger towns such as Scarborough or Shrewsbury, which are certainly covered by the audit now but would not be in future, is it proposed that this definition will cap them at £5 or 5%? There will have to be some reckoning. We cannot have a situation whereby only the large unitary authorities that will be formed after LGR have their council tax capped at £5 or 5%. What is the Government’s view about capping, limiting and putting the local taxpayer first from some of these much larger authorities, which will take on other responsibilities—possibly for local culture, parks and dog bins—when their current responsibilities for social care, planning, housing and homelessness are removed? We cannot have a situation where a 230% increase in threshold allows a new class of large, small authority to let rip at the expense of local taxpayers.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the statutory instrument. I share many of the perspectives of the noble Lords, Lord Sikka and Lord Fuller. I hope the Minister, in replying, will be able to meet some of the concerns expressed. The context, as we have heard, is the abolition of the Audit Commission 10 years ago. It was supposed to save £100 million a year but it did not do that. It was supposed to make local audit more efficient and it did not do that. It has not saved money. Costs have risen substantially since 2015. The private sector was supposed to take over from the Audit Commission but it has not worked like that, because there have been nowhere near enough trained auditors. There have been, as we have heard, huge delays in the audits of English local authorities. That is the background to this draft statutory instrument.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

As the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was speaking, I was looking at the RPI tables from the Office for National Statistics. Had the £6.5 million been increased by inflation, it would have been £10.3 million. So we are seeing a proposed threshold that is fully 50% greater than the increase in inflation over the same period. I just wonder whether that might help the noble Lord’s argument.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. It may be that RPI is the right way of doing it. I do not know why he took RPI there and not CPI. However, the issue is: why, in fact, are the Government not going to peg the £15 million to inflation? At what point will that figure then be adjusted because inflation continues to rise? We have to have a debate about that fact, but I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for explaining the RPI figures since 2014. Clearly, it may be that £15 million is the correct figure, but I would like to know what assessment the department has made of the implications of that figure on the number of local authorities that will be taken out of the full audit requirement?

Renters’ Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Shipley and Lord Fuller

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I am a vice-president of the Local Government Association. In Committee I was one of those probing the Government’s intentions on purpose-built student accommodation, houses in multiple occupation—HMOs—and the application of ground 4A to those properties but not to smaller units in the private rented sector that some students might choose to live in.

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s reply in Committee and have thought further. Indeed, I have listened carefully to the debate so far and I am sorry to have to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, although I agree with him that it will be very important for the Government to monitor the impact of the student market on the private rented sector. I will explain why I take that view.

I have reached the conclusion that there is a good reason to restrict the application of ground 4A to purpose-built student accommodation—the very large blocks—and houses in multiple occupation. The danger of not doing so is that some unscrupulous landlords renting smaller units of accommodation which do not qualify for the term HMO might decide to call tenants students when they are not students, to get around the provisions of the Bill. I think that would be a serious defect in the Bill. Indeed, as the Minister said in her reply on this issue in Committee:

“The core principle of the Bill is that tenants should have more security in their homes, and we think it is right that these groups should not be exposed to potential eviction using ground 4A”.—[Official Report, 22/4/25; col. 589.]


I have come to the conclusion that the Minister is right on that matter and, for that reason, ground 4A, I submit, should be restricted to purpose-built student accommodation and houses in multiple occupation.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

It is quite straightforward that we know who students are. The universities issue certificates and those certificates are handed to the local authority in the case of council tax, so they can get the 100% council tax allowance. It is not difficult to identify who those students are. Does the noble Lord agree? Has he thought whether the existing statutory process for determining who a student is would be sufficient to avoid the jeopardy that he has suggested?

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

The very point that the noble Lord raises is that I do not think it would be sufficient. Indeed, when I spoke on this issue in Committee, I suggested that the council tax register, because whole-student households do not pay council tax, would potentially be sufficient; I just do not think that is the case. It is not just about university accommodation. it is about students more generally. Indeed, there is an amendment coming up on the Marshalled List to define who is a university student. So I think it is a great deal more complicated than the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, has indicated to us.

I have concluded that those students who are in smaller units of accommodation will be protected anyway, as tenants under the Act. I have concluded that, on this matter, the Government should be given the benefit of the doubt, but I hope very much that the Minister will be able to meet the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, which is that they have to keep this matter under review.