Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We also think that the provisions in Clauses 76 and 77 are unnecessary and in fact ought to be removed from the Bill.

The Bill requires the Tribunal Procedure Committee to give the tribunals the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for “improper, unreasonable or negligent” behaviour. There are issues about wasted costs. As has been said, this change could certainly affect the willingness of lawyers and solicitors to take on difficult cases for fear of risking personal financial liability. As far as we are concerned, the immigration tribunals already have all the case management costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure.

In Committee I asked how many of the cases dealt with by the immigration tribunal over the last 12 months fall within the category of unreasonable behaviour, for which the Government would expect these costs orders measures to be activated. I thank the Minister for his letter in response, which states in the second paragraph that:

“It is not, however, possible to say how many cases dealt with by the Tribunal within this period fell within the category of unreasonable behaviour. This is because we do not hold data on the number of cases where behaviour or circumstances could have been considered unreasonable, but where no costs order was sought, or considered by the tribunal of its own initiative.”


I have to say that that letter simply confirms that the Government have no hard evidence to support their assertion that the provisions of Clauses 76 and 77 are necessary, because of the reasons set out in the letter, which I quoted and which indicate a certain paucity of hard evidence to support the Government’s position.

I will be interested in the Government’s reply to see whether they challenge my interpretation of the content of the letter of 3 March which the Minister was good enough to send to me. However, certainly, in the absence of a government response saying that their letter did provide the hard evidence to back up their view that the provisions of Clauses 76 and 77 are necessary, I must say that it is very difficult to understand why they are bringing forward the provisions outlined in those clauses.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Baroness McIntosh of Pickering for explaining her amendment. Government Amendment 73 is a technical amendment to Clause 77. It does not change the policy; it makes a minor revision to the drafting of subsection (1) of Clause 77 to ensure that it matches the rest of the clause in only making provision in relation to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This change will prevent any uncertainty arising about the jurisdictions in which this clause should be applied, and it gives the Tribunal Procedure Committee complete clarity about how to approach drafting the rules to enact these measures.

I turn now to Amendments 72 and 73. The Government are committed to making the immigration and asylum system more efficient, while also maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. To achieve this, we need all representatives involved in these proceedings—whether they are acting for the appellant or for the Home Office—to play their part in ensuring that appeals run smoothly. Representatives do not just have a duty to act in the best interests of their client; they also owe duties to the courts and to the public interest, which include acting with integrity, upholding the rule of law and supporting the proper administration of justice. We are aware that there are concerns about the behaviour of some representatives in immigration proceedings, which can waste judicial and tribunal resource and lead to delays in the tribunal process. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours which have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. These have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules through, for example, abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications. As with the current costs orders regime, the policy will apply equally to the representatives of both parties—in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. This will include the Home Secretary when represented by presenting officers. To further ensure fairness, the paying party will be able to make representations before any order is made, and the tribunal retains absolute discretion as to whether a charge should be made in each case.

As I explained in Committee, tribunals can currently make wasted and unreasonable costs orders which relate to the legal costs of the parties. However, these mechanisms are generally only considered at the request of the other party and are infrequently employed. Clause 76 creates a new power for tribunals to order a party to pay an amount which represents a portion of the tribunal’s costs which have been wasted as a direct result of that party acting unreasonably, improperly or negligently. This power applies across all tribunal jurisdictions and is subject to the Tribunal Procedure Committee making rules for its application in a particular tribunal. It will allow the tribunal to make an order in relation to wasted tribunal resources in the same types of circumstances which would currently warrant a wasted or unreasonable costs order. An order can be made against “relevant participants”: this means legal and other representatives exercising rights of audience, and the Secretary of State where they are a party and do not have legal representatives. I hope that this goes some way to reassuring my noble friend.

To encourage increased consideration of whether to make costs orders, Clause 77 provides a duty on the Tribunal Procedure Committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This will lead to judges more regularly considering whether to make a wasted costs order, an unreasonable costs order or a tribunal costs order under the new Clause 76 provision. This will ensure that circumstances and behaviours which have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. While the requirement in Clause 77 is for the TPC to make rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, it is at the committee’s discretion to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate. Specifically, Clause 77 requires procedural rules which identify circumstances or behaviours which, absent of reasonable explanation, the tribunal will treat as warranting consideration of the making of a costs order. The rules thereby introduce a presumption that requires the representative, or other relevant party responsible for such circumstances or behaviour, to explain themselves and why such a costs order should not be made. This will ensure the regular consideration of costs orders by the tribunal. More importantly, however, the tribunal will retain absolute discretion as to whether to make an order in all cases.

Noble Lords have asked whether this will mean fewer representatives willing to take on immigration work. The Government think it right that representatives should explain themselves if they are responsible for circumstances to be set out in the rules as warranting consideration of a costs order. However, where there is a reasonable explanation, no order would be expected. The tribunal continues to have full discretion as to whether to make the order. Therefore, these changes should not impact legal representatives who fulfil their duties to the court, remain committed to their work and ensure justice for their clients.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why these changes are being made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and not in other jurisdictions. Obviously, the Nationality and Borders Bill as whole is focused on reforming the asylum system. Clauses 76 and 77 are part of a programme of reforms designed to streamline immigration and asylum appeals. There has been judicial concern, and a recognition that a problem exists with the behaviour of some legal representatives and other relevant parties in immigration proceedings. It is at the discretion of the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate.

For the reasons I have outlined, I hope that my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering feels able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I express our wholehearted support for the amendment and the extension of the BNO scheme to young Hong Kongers. I congratulate all noble Lords around this Chamber, from all parties and no party, who have campaigned on this issue. I thank the Government for their decision and the progress that has been made, which has led to agreement all around the House.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords and pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, who tirelessly campaigns on this and other issues. I thank him for his kind words, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate on Amendment 76.

We recognise that the BNO route is creating unfair outcomes for the families of BNO status holders, with some children able to access the route independently because they were old enough to be registered for BNO status, while their younger siblings, aged between 18 and 24, are unable to do so. That is why, on 24 February, the Government announced a change to the BNO route to enable individuals aged 18 or over who were born on or after 1 July 1997 and who have at least one BNO parent to apply to the route independently of their parents.

The policy change addresses the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and other Members of both Houses. It will ensure that we are addressing potentially unfair outcomes for families of BNO status holders and ensure that the UK meets its ongoing commitment to BNO status holders.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I say that there are of course other routes for those who are not eligible under this particular scheme. We intend to lay the changes to the Immigration Rules in September, and they are expected to take effect from October.

In the light of these assurances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett has set out the background to and purpose of this amendment. As we know, currently only those born on the islands and the first generation born in exile have the right to British Overseas Territories citizenship and, therefore, to British citizenship. As a result, families have been broken up and communities divided. Some members have access to citizenship rights while others do not.

In the Commons, as has already been commented on, the Government accepted, on 4 November last year during the Committee stage of the Bill, that the Chagossians presented a unique case. By Report Stage in the following month, however, the Government seem to have decided that the Chagossians were no longer a unique case, because going down the road proposed,

“would undermine a long-standing principle of British nationality law … under which nationality or entitlement to nationality is not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and its territories”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/12/21; col. 258.]

The reason that the small number of Chagossians in question do not meet this condition is because they are descended from people who were evicted against their will from a British overseas territory. That is why they are unique, as the Government have already conceded. They did not leave of their own free will to settle elsewhere: they were kicked out—forcibly evicted. There would be no precedent set by agreeing to this amendment. In effect, the Government are using, in support of their case to deny these Chagossians the right to British citizenship, the cause of the very injustice which this amendment seeks to address. We support this amendment, and it would appear that we are far from the only ones in this House to do so.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for meeting my noble friend Lady Williams last week and for the opportunity to hear further about the issues impacting the Chagossian community. As has been said previously, both in Committee and when my noble friend met the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, last week, and as noted by my noble friend Lady Altmann, the Government empathise and sympathise with the Chagossians about how they were treated in the 1960s and 1970s.

It is, however, important to clarify who this amendment seeks to assist. It is not those Chagossians who were of the generations born on the British Indian Ocean Territory, as they have always been British nationals and have been automatically considered both British Overseas Territories citizens and British citizens since 2002. Similarly, it is not their children, the first generation of Chagossians born outside of British territory, who are also both automatically British Overseas Territories citizens and British citizens. It is also not those in the first generation of Chagossians born outside of British territory, who, as the Chagossian community highlights, have missed out on rights to British nationality due to historical legislative unfairness, and this Bill already seeks to rectify that issue.

This amendment is limited to those in the second and successive generations of Chagossians born outside of British territory who, like all children of British nationals by descent, face a different route to British nationality. For this generation, if they wish to acquire British nationality, it is right that they must establish a close, continuing connection with either the UK or a British overseas territory by lawfully residing and settling there, although I recognise that since the 1970s, it has not been possible to establish such a link to the British Indian Ocean Territory. This must be in line with either the UK’s or an overseas territory’s Immigration Rules. This has also been the case with Hong Kong British Nationals Overseas, who do not have a right of abode in British territory and must complete a period of residence in the UK before acquiring the permanent residence status that is required in order to naturalise as a British citizen.

The points raised by the descendants of Chagossians, who are members of the second generation born outside British territory and who are now seeking to settle in the UK under the Immigration Rules, are often very complex. As the Minister for Safe and Legal Migration has stated in the House of Commons, the Home Office is keen to consider what more we could do to support those families seeking to settle here under the current system.

The Home Office is actively engaging with the Chagossian community to identify practical proposals that would support the second generation born outside British territory in navigating the system. In addition, the Home Office is discussing with the FCDO how the £40 million Chagos support fund, referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, could be used to deliver further support for Chagossians seeking to settle here under the Immigration Rules. Those discussions are current and ongoing, and I had some this morning.

As the Government have consistently stated, allowing entitlements to—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, under the rules of Report stage, one is allowed to speak only once during the debate.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, as has been said, Clause 11 is about differential treatment of recognised refugees. There is the distinction that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to between refugees and immigration generally. We believe that Clause 11 contravenes the 1951 refugee convention: it sets a dangerous precedent by creating a two-tier system—group 1 refugees and group 2 refugees—and, frankly, it is also inhumane.

Under the Bill, the Home Secretary will be given sweeping powers to decide asylum cases based on how someone arrives in this country and their mode of transport, not on the strength of their claim, contrary to the 1951 refugee convention, of which Britain was a founding member. The different ways those two groups could be treated is not limited in any way by the Bill, although Clause 11 provides examples: those who travel via a third country, who do not have documents or who did not claim asylum immediately will routinely be designated as group 2 refugees.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

This clause would extend the use of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act to people who have been detained under the immigration Acts and transported outside of a port or border area. Schedule 7 can be an important tool in the prevention of terrorism, but it has had a chequered past at times. It has been improved in recent years by the work of independent reviewers of terrorism legislation, two of whom we are now fortunate to have as Members of this House.

I have three or four questions for the Government on the provisions of Clause 74. Have the Government consulted on the extension of the power? Has the change been requested and, if so, by whom or by what body? Can the Minister give more detail on the scale of the problem this is designed to address? How many individuals are officers unable to stop and question under the current arrangements? How was the period of five days arrived at? For those who travel through conventional routes, does not the power have to be used pretty much immediately, in which case five days is a considerable extension? Finally, the powers apply provided an officer “believes” that the person arrived at sea, was apprehended within 24 hours of arrival, and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. What will that “belief” that the officer is required to have be based on? It would be helpful if the Government could give some responses to those questions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both Members of the Committee for their remarks. Schedule 7 examinations have been instrumental in securing evidence to convict terrorists, yielding intelligence to detect terrorist threats and supporting the disruption or deterrence of terrorist activity. Currently, officers may exercise Schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area as defined in the Act. Clause 74 will provide an added layer of protection to the existing processes in place for dealing with those who arrive irregularly by sea in the UK. I think that goes some way to answering the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—they are arriving irregularly outside of ports. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, has stated:

“In principle, people arriving irregularly in the United Kingdom should be liable to counter-terrorism examination as much as those arriving at sea ports and airports.”


This clause ensures that, for those arriving irregularly by sea, such as via illegal channel crossings, this will continue be the case.

There are several reasons why those who engage in illegal channel crossings can be moved to a different location from their place of arrival very quickly after arriving. They can range from weight of numbers to the need to move the vulnerable or those in need of medical attention to more appropriate facilities. It is impractical and inhumane to keep large groups of people port side in order to give counterterrorism police an appropriate opportunity to exercise their current powers under Schedule 7.

I reassure noble Lords who tabled the amendment that this is by no means an attempt to treat all migrants arriving in this manner as terrorists, or to stop and examine large numbers of people away from ports and borders. Schedule 7 is not designed and cannot be used as a universal screening mechanism, and Clause 74 has been deliberately drawn to provide an appropriate time window for counterterrorism police to exercise their powers under Schedule 7.

To remove the effect of Clause 74 would impact our ability to determine whether those who are entering the UK in this way are involved in terrorism, impacting our national security. It would continue a scenario where those who arrive in the UK by conventional means are subject to powers to determine involvement in terrorist activity, whereas those who have arrived irregularly by sea, and about whom we have very little documented information, may not be.

I cannot answer precisely who has been consulted on this, other than the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and obviously the counterterrorism police will have a keen interest in how this debate develops. To answer on the numbers, this concerns those arriving irregularly by sea, outside established ports, under the existing rules. I could not tell you how many there are. The other questions impinge on operational matters, on which I am not qualified to comment. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, we strongly welcome Clause 1 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, in a Bill where there is so little to welcome, the early clauses of Part 1 seek to redress historical injustices in our nationality law. That is certainly welcomed from these Benches, as well as by other noble Lords who have spoken.

Clause 1 corrects an historical injustice left over from what many would regard as the appalling situation in which mothers did not have the same citizenship rights as fathers. It addresses the citizenship rights of children of mothers who were British Overseas Territory citizens. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her amendments. We raised the clarity of drafting of the clause when the Bill was in the Commons. As the noble Baroness also explained, this concern was raised by the JCHR, which noted that the language in this clause is not the same as the language used for similar purposes in the 1981 Act and raised questions over how well the clause achieves its intention. The JCHR said:

“We recommend that the Home Office consider how best to ensure that the intention to treat those previously discriminated against equally well as those not previously discriminated against, is made clear in the drafting of clause 1.”


In the Commons, my colleagues pushed the Government to amend the clause so that its drafting reflects the drafting in the 1981 Act, when this discrimination was addressed for children of British citizens. I am sure that the Minister will appreciate that, in raising this concern, we are all trying to get this right and make the clause work as it should.

The Minister’s response in the Commons was that he did not believe that amendments were necessary, which is quite a standard government reply, and that the current drafting worked as intended. He also said that these points would be further clarified in underpinning guidance. Have the Government given this issue further thought since it was raised in the Commons? What objection do they have to a minor amendment to answer the JCHR’s concerns? If Ministers believe that that will be further clarified in guidance, should they not consider clarifying it in the Bill?

When we consider the good character requirement—I do not want to repeat everything that has been said—the JCHR is concerned that requiring good character when considering applications resolving prior discrimination risks perpetuating the effects of discrimination for those previously discriminated against. Much of this debate is familiar. As has been said, over the past few years the JCHR has routinely raised concerns about the impact of the good character requirement in cases resolving previous discrimination and in cases concerning children. I simply ask: how does that square with our primary duty to act in the best interests of the child and how is that currently balanced with the good character test? Can the Minister provide details to the Committee on how many children each year are refused citizenship based on this requirement and on what grounds it is deemed that they do not meet the test?

I too welcome the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Dubs on behalf of the JCHR on the application of the good character requirement in Clause 3. I simply wish to make the point that we are debating this clause due to gaps left in the law where we attempt to redress historical discrimination. Where the JCHR is raising concerns that the good character requirement is inappropriate where an applicant has already had their rights denied for a significant number of years, the Government should consider that challenge seriously. If we are to remove existing injustices in our system, we should do so thoroughly and with great care, so that we do not find ourselves having to come back for further fixes at a future date.

I look forward to the noble Baroness the Minister’s reply on behalf of the Government—or perhaps it is the noble Lord; I am sorry.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords, and I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Rosser..

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling Amendments 1 and 2. Both refer to Clause 1, which I am pleased to introduce, as it corrects a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I appreciate my noble friend’s attention to detail in seeking to make sure that this new provision is clear and in line with the parallel provision in the British Nationality Act 1981 for children of British citizen mothers. However, we do not think that an amendment is needed, as the proposed wording here achieves what is intended. In saying that this provision applies to someone who would have been a citizen had their parents been treated equally, we are talking about a situation where the law applied equally to mothers or fathers, women or men. We are satisfied that the current wording does what is required.

I turn now to Amendment 8 and consequential Amendments 10, 12, 17 and 21, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. British citizenship is a privilege, reserved for those who meet the requirements of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who respect the law and values of the UK. This is reflected by the statutory requirement for an individual to be of good character when they apply for British citizenship. Published guidance sets out the basis for how we assess whether a person is of good character and the types of conduct that must be taken into account as part of this assessment.

Decision-makers are required to give careful consideration to each application on a case-by-case basis, and must decide on the balance of probabilities whether an applicant is of good character. Grounds for refusal of citizenship on the basis of not meeting the good character test include criminality that meets the threshold laid out in guidance, immigration offending such as illegal entry or unlawful residence, and serious adverse behaviour such as war crimes, terrorism or genocide. Such behaviour is fundamentally in opposition to core British values of decency and adherence to the law. Removing the good character requirement from all registration routes for British citizenship would mean that we could no longer refuse citizenship to those opposed to these values.

I turn, finally, to Amendment 9, for which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dubs; I know he has taken a great interest in a number of the provisions of the Bill. I start by reassuring the Committee that the Government are committed to removing discrimination from nationality legislation. That is the aim of Clauses 1 and 2. The Government also recognise the difficulties that current British nationality law has presented for some British Overseas Territories citizen parents who wish to pass on their citizenship. However, the Government do not agree that the application of the good character requirement as set out in Clause 3(4) results in unlawful discrimination. Removing the good character requirement for those applying to register as a British citizen having acquired British Overseas Territories citizenship through the new routes established by Clauses 1 and 2, as this amendment proposes, would be unfair and inconsistent with the approach for British Overseas Territories citizens who can apply to become British citizens by virtue of Section 3 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 and who are subject to the good character requirement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned the word “misdemeanour” in connection with such matters. We need to be clear that the guidance is clear that a criminal record does not necessarily mean that an application for citizenship will be refused. Those with a non-custodial sentence or who have received an out-of-court disposal will normally be refused citizenship unless three years have passed. Caseworkers have discretion to make an exceptional grant of citizenship in certain circumstances. On the subject of children, we ought to remind ourselves that 10 years old is the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales.

I want to clarify that the good character test applies only to new provisions introduced in the Bill to resolve historical discrimination where it already applies to the current route that the person would have been entitled to register under had the discrimination not existed. So the only people who will have to meet a good character requirement under Clause 3 are those who would have had an entitlement to registration as a British Overseas Territories citizen under Sections 15(3), 17(2) and 17(5) if their parents had been married, because registration under those routes carries a good character requirement.

To try to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, where people would have become British automatically had women and unmarried fathers been able to pass on citizenship at the time of their birth, the good character requirement does not apply.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many children this issue has affected. I am afraid that I do not know the answer and will have to write to him. I should say that if the person would have become British automatically had the discrimination not existed, they will not now have to meet the good character requirement. That deserves reiteration.

I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments for the reasons that I have outlined.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I express our support for the amendments in this group. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, raise a simple and crucial point. The intention of this part of the Bill, at least its early clauses, is to remove barriers for those who have been unjustly denied citizenship. To then present a barrier to that citizenship in the form of fees for accessing those withheld rights raises obvious problems. This is particularly, and one would hope undeniably, the case for those who would and should have been automatically granted citizenship if it were not for outdated injustices impacting their mother or the marital status of their father.

What has so far been missing from the Government is clarity on this issue. I understand that in Committee in the Commons, the Minister would not directly answer questions as to whether fees will be charged. I hope we may fare a little better today, with the noble Lord the Minister—if that is who responds—telling the House whether the Government intend to charge people to access these routes. Is the intention no fees, fee waivers in some cases, reduced fees from what we have now, or the continuation of existing fees? When and how will this be made clear? In the Commons, the Minister suggested that this was more appropriately dealt with in secondary legislation, but why should clarity not be provided in the Bill in relation to this key issue?

I express too our support for Amendment 13, in the name of my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett, with notable cross-party support from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. As has been said, to say that my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett has been tenacious on this issue would be the understatement of the year; she has been rather more than that.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend addresses a current fee policy that charges people who have the right to register for citizenship exorbitant amounts to do so. As has been said, the amendment does not ask the Government to scrap the fee for application; it simply requires the fee not to be higher than the actual cost of the registration process. As has been said, this means it could be fixed at a considerably lower level or there could be no fee at all.

In particular, I add our strong support for measures to reduce the cost for children to register their citizenship, which they have as much right to access as any Member of this House, and to remove the cost completely, certainly for children in our care. Although the Government have repeatedly resisted this change, it is not without Cabinet support, as has been said. After all, the Health Secretary has described the fees as

“a huge amount of money to ask children to pay”.

I repeat that these costs are levied against children who are born here, grew up here and go to school here but who, unlike their classmates, are not automatically British at birth. Surely it is the will of this Parliament and our nationality law that those children are entitled to citizenship after certain conditions are met. But, in reality, that right is being denied for at least some—probably many—because it is just too expensive for them to access. The Government have already been asked for information on the numbers who have been denied citizenship on the basis that the fees are too high. I am not sure whether we are going to get a response to that point.

There has been some discussion about the legal position. As has been said, in February last year the Court of Appeal, in referring to the best interests of the child, ruled that the child citizenship fee, at over £1,000, is unlawful. That had also been determined earlier by the High Court. A number of noble Lords commented that, instead of using the obvious vehicle of this Bill on citizenship to rectify the issue, the Government have argued—as I understand it—that they want to await a further ruling in the Supreme Court.

Finally, I admit my surprise that, in the Commons, the government Minister claimed that this issue of the cost of registering citizenship was

“not a matter for the Bill.”—[Official Report, Commons, Nationality and Borders Bill Committee, 19/10/21; col. 165.]

This part of the Bill is about access to citizenship. I question how the Government can say that this issue, which has been raised many times across both Houses and with cross-party support, should not be regarded as a matter for this Bill. I hope we have a helpful response from the Government when they now reply.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester speaking on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for tabling Amendment 13; and to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for tabling Amendments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 18 and 22 on fees charged for applications for British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship. My noble friend the Minister would also like to place on record her thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for engaging with her on this subject in various meetings.

I first turn to the amendments put forward by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. You will be aware of the importance that application fees play in the funding of the migration and borders system, which has been noted in this debate, and that this income is vital to reduce the reliance on taxpayer funding and run a sustainable immigration system. Immigration and nationality fees are set in fees regulations, which are laid before Parliament and subject to the negative procedure. I hope that answers a number of noble Lords’ questions. If we were to remove or amend fees during the passage of the Bill, it would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of the sustainability of the system and fairness to the UK taxpayer. Not only that, but it would create an alternative mechanism for controlling fees, which would reduce the clarity of the fee structure.

As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noted, I am of course aware that similar provisions were considered in the other place. We are sympathetic to the view that a fee should not be charged where a person missed out on becoming a British citizen due to historical anomalies.

In answer to the specific questions of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, about those who cannot afford application fees, we have always provided for exceptions to the need to pay application fees for leave to remain in a number of specific circumstances. These exceptions ensure that the Home Office’s immigration and nationality fees structure complies with international obligations and wider government policy.

The subject of children in government or local authority care also came up. The Government do cater for children and their well-being. There are a number of exceptions to application fees, which protect the most vulnerable, including young people who are in the care of a local authority and applying for limited or indefinite leave to remain.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Report stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the case for the amendment and to all noble Lords who took part in this short debate. I wholly agree that the targeting, grooming and exploitation of children who are often the most vulnerable in our society for criminal purposes is deplorable. This Government are committed to tackling it.

Before I start, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the Government are not complicit in crime. I remember CHIS being debated quite extensively in your Lordships’ House. They are subject to significant and stringent safeguards, so I think that we can leave that there.

This amendment seeks to establish a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation. As I indicated in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Field of Birkenhead, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and Maria Miller MP undertook an independent review into the Modern Slavery Act 2015, the findings of which were published in May 2019. The definition of exploitation in Section 3 of the Act was explored as part of this review in response to calls that it should be amended to explicitly reflect new and emerging forms of exploitation, such as county lines.

The review heard evidence from the CPS, which warned against expanding the scope of the meaning of exploitation or defining exploitation so precisely that it would lack flexibility when applying the legislation to a changing profile of criminal conduct. The authors of the review agreed and recommended that the definition should not be amended, as it is sufficiently flexible to cover a range of circumstances, including new and emerging forms of modern slavery.

We agree that front-line practitioners need to have a clear understanding of child exploitation; the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made these points very well. That is why child exploitation is already defined in statutory guidance, including the Keeping Children Safe in Education and Working Together to Safeguard Children statutory guidance. It is also set out in non-statutory practice documents for those working with young people, such as the Home Office Child Exploitation Disruption Toolkit and the county lines guidance.

We recognise that the vast majority of child criminal exploitation cases occur in the context of county lines. That is why the Home Office is providing up to £1 million this financial year to the St Giles Trust to provide specialist support for under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation. The project is operating in London, the West Midlands and Merseyside, which are the three largest exporting county lines areas. We also continue to fund the Missing People’s SafeCall service. This is a national confidential helpline service for young people, families and carers who are experiencing county lines exploitation.

I listened carefully to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who made some powerful points. She mentioned the Children’s Society. I should point out that the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. This has included a public awareness campaign called “Look Closer”, which started in September. It focuses on increasing awareness of the signs and indicators of child exploitation and encourages the public and service, retail and transport sector workers to report concerns to the police quickly.

Back to county lines and drugs. They devastate lives, ruin families and damage communities. That is why this Government have recently introduced a 10-year strategy to combat illicit drugs using a whole-system approach to cut off the supply of drugs by criminal gangs and give people with a drug addiction a route to a productive and drug-free life. Through the strategy, we will bolster our flagship county lines programme, investing up to £145 million to tackle the most violent and exploitative distribution model yet seen.

Clearly, we are all in agreement that tackling child criminal exploitation must be a priority. I have set out some of the steps that the Government are taking to do just that. However, the Government remain unpersuaded that defining child criminal exploitation in statute would aid understanding of the issue or help such exploitation. As I have indicated, we should pay heed to the conclusions of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, which commended the flexibility afforded by the current definition of exploitation. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

First, I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for adding their names to this amendment. Indeed, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate.

Basically, the Government have repeated what they said in Committee. There is nothing new and no response to the point that a statutory duty to reduce violence cannot be effective without a statutory duty to safeguard children, which is what this amendment would provide by putting a recognised definition in law for the first time. There has not really been a response to that.

I made the point that the evidence indicates that there is no consistency of approach across the agencies on child criminal exploitation. Clearly, the definitions on which the Government relied in Committee, which they have now repeated on Report, are not assisting in the way that they should in responding to child criminal exploitation scenarios. It is a bit depressing to find no movement at all on the Government’s stance and, if I may say so, no attempt to respond to my point that, bearing in mind the inconsistencies, the existing definitions are clearly not doing the job that the Government claim they should be doing and, indeed, claim they are doing. That clearly is not the case.

I do not intend to test the opinion of the House on this. I say only that the issue is not going to going away. If we continue, as I suspect we will, with the inconsistencies of approach that have been identified by Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society and referred to during this debate—that is, if the Government do not address them, which is what this amendment in effect invites them to do—this matter will not go away. I am quite sure that it will be the subject of further discussion and debate if the present highly unsatisfactory situation continues in respect of child criminal exploitation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I recall that the Minister said in Committee on this amendment

“I fear that my ice thins a little here”.

One can only say that I think it has got even warmer since then. The Government said in Committee:

“Having said all that, I have heard everything that has been said around the Chamber this evening, across party, and I will make sure that those arguments are reflected back to the Home Office.”


What happened when those arguments were then reflected back to the Home Office, to whom in the Home Office were they reflected back to, and what was the response?

The rules on previous convictions, which the Government said in Committee were necessary to ensure

“the highest levels of integrity on the part of the person holding office and to protect the public’s trust in policing”

do not seem to have been very effective or relevant in North Yorkshire on two occasions already where two different PCCs have already departed the scene in interesting circumstances.

I conclude, in indicating our support for this amendment and thanking noble Lords for all the arguments and points made, that in Committee the Government referred to part 2 of the review of police and crime commissioners. They said that it is “currently under way” and that

“this review will also assess the benefits and demerits of a trigger mechanism for the recall of PCCs; it is being debated.”—[Official Report, 22/11/21; cols. 649-50.]

Will this part of the review of PCCs also now look at the issue of the current bar, in its present form, on a potential candidate being able to stand for the position of police and crime commissioner, which is the issue we are debating tonight? If the Government cannot even say that this will now be included in part 2 of the review, what is the reason for that stance?

I very much hope, like my noble friend Lord Bach, that the Government will accept this amendment, or at the very least agree to reflect on it further prior to Third Reading so that it can be brought back again if the Government’s reflections are not very satisfactory.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for giving us a further opportunity to discuss the disqualification criteria for those wishing to be elected as police and crime commissioners and for joining the meeting yesterday when we discussed this issue online. I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate and, to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I do fear my ice is rather thinner.

However, this latest amendment would allow anyone convicted of an imprisonable offence before the age of 21 to stand as a police and crime commissioner. I commend the noble Lord for seeking some middle ground to address this issue, but the amendment would still dilute the current high standard of integrity we expect of PCCs—namely, preventing anyone convicted of an imprisonable offence to stand for or hold the office of PCC.

As I said on this matter in Committee, the rules governing who can stand as a PCC are the strictest of all elected roles in England and Wales. We believe that this is necessary to ensure the highest levels of integrity of the person holding office and thus protect the public’s trust in policing. Any dilution of that high standard, as proposed by the noble Lord, could still undermine public confidence in a PCC.

Under the noble Lord’s amendment, it would be open to a person convicted of and imprisoned for a very serious violent offence at the age of 20, for example, to stand for election as a police and crime commissioner. That is inappropriate, given the nature of the role the PCC plays in holding the chief constable and the force to account. I suggest that were a PCC to hold office with a previous conviction for an imprisonable offence, both the PCC and the chief constable may find it untenable to maintain a professional and respectful relationship.

The current standard was set with cross-party agreement and the support of senior police officers. If the current standard is lowered, the Government maintain that it would be a very serious risk to public confidence and the integrity of the PCC model at a time when we should be doing all we can to protect and increase public confidence in the police.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

With regard to public confidence, I go back to what I said earlier: this was originally designed with cross-party support and with the assistance and advice of police chiefs.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I have a response to my question? Bearing in mind that in Committee the Government were prepared to tell us that part 2 of the review will

“also assess the benefits and demerits of a trigger mechanism for the recall of PCCs; it is being debated,”—[Official Report, 22/11/21; col. 649.]

may I ask for an assurance that part 2 of the review will also look at the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Bach in this amendment about the bar on being able to seek office as a PCC? May I have that assurance?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry I forgot to answer the noble Lord’s specific question. The problem is that I do not have the terms of reference to hand so I cannot give him the assurance he seeks, but I will write to him.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As has been said, this amendment raises the issue of food-related crime and the powers and resources available to tackle it. I will make just one or two comments that may seem almost irrelevant, in view of the very strong case that my noble friend Lord Rooker has already made, as we anticipated he would.

As my noble friend said, the National Food Crime Unit, which is part of the Food Standards Agency, works to tackle serious organised cases of food-related crime. My noble friend Lord Rooker powerfully and persuasively made the case that there are blocks on the powers that the unit can access and that it is often reliant on the police, who are overstretched across competing priorities, to be able to use certain powers or apply for warrants, for example. The amendment that my noble friend has moved would allow the unit to access powers directly, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, rather than waiting for police support to become available.

I will spell out exactly the Oral Question that my noble friend asked in February last year:

“My Lords, does the Minister accept that the National Food Crime Unit is operating against organised crime with its hands tied? Investigations are being hampered. Does the Minister agree that investigation powers should be strengthened to include powers to collect the necessary evidence to a higher standard? In other words, will the Government agree that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers should be granted to the National Food Crime Unit? The National Police Chiefs’ Council agrees to this to remove the burden from local police forces, which actually agree that food crime is not a high priority.”


As my noble friend said, the Minister replied:

“The noble Lord entirely has a point. I completely agree with him that the National Food Crime Unit has a formidable task ahead of it and that its investigatory powers could be enhanced and its impact improved. That is the view of the Government, industry and the police, and that is why we are committed to the dialogue”.—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. 614.]


That is what the Government said in reply.

We welcome this commitment and would have given appropriate support to a resulting legislative process, which is why we are supportive of what my noble friend Lord Rooker seeks to achieve with this amendment. The Government have thus previously recognised that this is a problem, but what action has been taken so far since that clear recognition, which was repeated last February? Will the Government now accept the amendment my noble friend has moved? If not, why not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for raising this important matter. I acknowledge that there is considerable experience of the Food Standards Agency in your Lordships’ House. We support, in principle, the proposal to increase the investigative powers available to the National Food Crime Unit. The fraud cases of which we have been made aware by the chair of the Food Standards Agency, Professor Susan Jebb—as referred to by the noble Lord—are truly shocking.

Food crime is a very serious issue, with fraud in our food supply chains costing billions of pounds each year. The National Food Crime Unit, which was established to investigate these crimes, should be empowered to tackle them, to improve the response to these cases and to reduce the burden on its colleagues in law enforcement. As such, we are still committed to working with the Food Standards Agency and DHSC, its sponsoring department, on extending certain Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers to the National Food Crime Unit. However, in doing so, we need to work through the implications of this. It may assist the noble Lord if I briefly set out some of the issues we think we would need to explore further.

First, the exercise of any PACE powers by the National Food Crime Unit must be necessary, proportionate and legitimate. As such, it is important that there are suitable governance, accountability, oversight, investigations and complaints arrangements in place, as there are for the police. The National Food Crime Unit is not a statutory body, nor does it have a separate legal identity. Oversight, governance and the complaints processes sit with the Food Standards Agency board, which commissions independent reviews and facilitates a complaints process which ultimately reports to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. There is therefore no formal independent oversight.

There is also a lack of clarity on the necessary protocols when PACE powers would be exercised, including in relation to post-incident procedures on seizure, retention and evaluation of evidence, and the treatment of arrested persons without police presence. These are all issues which, I have no doubt, can be resolved but I am sure noble Lords would agree on the necessity of ensuring that the appropriate accountability and governance arrangements are in place, given that we are dealing with intrusive powers of the state. As such, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to extend the search and seizure powers in PACE to the National Food Crime Unit without further consultation on the issues I have described. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, misses very much, but that is the answer to his question.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that we are committed to taking this work forward with the Food Standards Agency. I do not have a specific answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on where the dialogue is at the moment. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I too will be brief. As has been said, this group includes government amendments relating to recommendations from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the Government have accepted. It includes the requirement that strategies under the serious violence reduction duty are published, and that guidance on the series violence duty, police powers under Part 4 and serious violence reduction orders must be laid before Parliament. However, the Government have not accepted every recommendation of the DPRRC, and on some they have gone only half way. For example, the DPRRC recommended that guidance on serious violence reduction orders should be subject to the affirmative procedure, but the Government have made it subject only to the negative.

Like other noble Lords, I extend our thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for the invaluable work that they do and no doubt will continue to do. We welcome the amendments in this group that go some way towards accepting a number of recommendations from the DPRRC, but it is interesting to note that, in its report on the powers in the Bill to introduce unpublished strategies and guidance without parliamentary scrutiny, the DPRRC said:

“We are disappointed that the inclusion of these types of delegations of power—on flimsy grounds—suggests that the Government have failed when preparing this Bill to give serious consideration to recommendations that we have made in recent reports on other Bills.”


This group of amendments introduces some improvements into the Bill, which we welcome. On that basis, we hope that the Government will be in listening mode over the next few days of debate on Report. Perhaps the next Bill that appears before us will not have such powers in it to begin with.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate. I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Blencathra was in his place when I started speaking, but I was praising him and his committee—I also praise him for his stealthy entrance. He asked about statutory guidance. As I said in my brief introduction, all the guidance will now be laid before Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, noted, and the SVRO guidance will be subject to the negative procedure.

The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, asked the most detailed question, on behalf of her noble friend Lady Lister. She asked specifically about the comments on the gold-plating of human rights. I have a copy here of the letter that was sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and it is very clear that this is about balance:

“This language has been used in HM Government guidance on unauthorised encampments since March 2015,”


as the noble Baroness noted, but it was not statutory guidance; the Bill now provides this.

“That guidance made clear that human rights legislation does not prevent action to protect local amenities and the local environment; to maintain public order and safety; and to protect public health - for example, by preventing fly-tipping and criminal damage.


The necessary balancing of interests and rights of both travellers and settled residents reflects the position regarding qualified rights in the Human Rights Act 1998/European Convention on Human Rights … and the need to maintain good community relations under the Equality Act 2010. But operationally in the past, this may have been misunderstood by some public bodies.”


We have published in draft the guidance to be issued under Clause 65, so it is open to anyone who wishes to comment on the document to do so. We will, of course, continue to take any such comments into account before promulgating the final version of the guidance. With that, I hope that I have answered the questions, and I beg to move.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As has been said, Article 22 of the general data protection regulation provides that a person has

“the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”

It also provides that there is an exemption to this if the automated decision-making is explicitly provided in law. Section 14 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides, as has been said, some safeguards based on Article 22 for cases where the law allows automated decision-making on things that may have a significant effect on a person. It provides that where a significant decision is made by automated means, the subject may request that the decision is retaken with human oversight. The section currently provides protections for a decision taken, as has once again been said, “solely” by automated means. The amendment would extend this provision to decisions taken solely “or significantly” by automated means.

The issue of automated decision-making will become, and indeed is becoming, increasingly prevalent in our lives—a point made by all sides during the passage of the 2018 Act, when we tried to add far stronger safeguards to the then Bill to prevent decisions that engaged an individual’s human rights being decided by automated means. On that basis, I am certainly interested in the points raised to extend the right of appeal to decisions that are based “significantly” on automated processing.

Finally, it is potentially concerning that the Government are currently consulting on removing Article 22 of the GDPR and the associated protections from UK law altogether. I believe that consultation closed last week. Can the Government give an indication of when we can expect their response?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining this amendment, which relates to automated decision-making. Let me first say that the Government are committed to maintaining high standards of data protection and agree that the clarity of safeguards relating to automated decision-making is important. The Government are also aware of some of the difficulties faced by organisations in navigating the terminology of these automated processing provisions.

As all noble Lords have noted, to address this issue the Government are currently seeking evidence via a public consultation, which is being run by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, noted, that consultation closed only last Friday. He also mentioned Article 22. The consultation is looking at the need for legislative reform of the UK data protection framework overall, including GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. It covers Article 22 of the UK GDPR, including organisations experienced with navigating the solely automated processing and similarly significant terminology. As I say, that consultation closed on 19 November.

In examining the responses to the consultation, the Government will consider the safeguards in respect of automated decision-making that involve personal data in the round. We will address this matter in the government response to the consultation, which we expect to publish in the spring. We also look forward to the report of the inquiry by the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and will take its conclusions and recommendations into account when bringing forward our proposals for legislation. In the meantime, with apologies for being brief, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Rosser

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be brief because I think that the arguments in favour of these two amendments have been made very powerfully. They are both intended to require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of road traffic offences and penalties. As has been pointed out, there have been so many changes with our roads and new vehicles in recent years as to justify in itself the need for the review which these two amendments seek. As I understand it, the Government promised a full review of road traffic offences and penalties back in 2014. So far as I know, this has not yet happened. In expressing our support for these amendments and for what they seek to achieve, I simply ask what has happened to the promised review so far as the Government are concerned.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this relatively short debate. As we have heard, Amendments 159 and 165 would require the Government to conduct a full review of road traffic offences. I shall make a number of brief points in response.

First, we do not consider it appropriate to include a requirement in legislation for the Government to undertake a review, especially in the case of Amendment 165 from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. The Government are concerned that this amendment sets out, without consultation or regard to practicalities, the terms of reference and timing of such a review. We are also concerned that the amendment does not fully grasp the range and complexity of the review which the Government would be required to undertake. Nor, might I suggest, does it consider who is best placed to conduct such a review—the Government, an independent body such as the Law Commission, or an expert panel.

Secondly, I point out the announcement of a review of driving offences and penalties in May 2014 by the then Secretary of State for Justice. The Government did conduct a review; I hope that goes some way towards answering the question from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. As part of that internal review, we considered a range of concerns that had been raised by campaigners, victims and parliamentarians. In the debate on an earlier group of amendments, my noble friend Lord Wolfson committed to writing to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and some of those concerned participants.

The review focused on the most serious offences that can result in death or serious injury, and the results are what we see now in Clauses 65 and 66 of the Bill. As we have already debated, the Bill includes provisions that will increase the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years’ imprisonment to life—again, I refer to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Provisions in the Bill will also increase the maximum penalty for causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years to life imprisonment and create a new offence of causing serious injury by careless driving. These provisions have been long awaited, and they have widespread support. Those reforms also fit within the existing framework of road traffic offences. They are therefore consistent and proportionate responses and should be allowed to take effect before any further reform is considered.

I take note of the list that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, gave of other things she thinks should be considered, but, without going into detail on all of it, I will make just a couple of points. First, I mentioned in the group of amendments on pedicabs that there is a consultation on cycling which began in 2018 and is due to report towards the end of this year or the beginning of next year. I hope that will help to answer some of those questions about the changing nature of cycling. On e-scooters, they are of course illegal unless they are hired and, if the rider is not insured, they can be impounded. I take the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about enforcement very seriously—these rules are not being enforced, and they perfectly well should be. I also say to the noble Lord that I am extremely jealous of his mother’s red MG—my mother had a Ford Popular, and we used to have to hide on the back seat.

My last point is simply this: while we do not think it is necessary to legislate to require such a review, or to set out its terms of reference in such a restrictive way, the Government are not ruling out a wider review of road traffic offences in the future. As the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said, there will be a whole bunch of considerations when we have the advent of technologies such as autonomous vehicles—not just road traffic considerations but things such as who insures them, how you insure them, and whether you are insuring the car, the driver, the software or the hardware. There are a whole variety of different implications. We will, of course, keep the law under review both in terms of specific offences and where it is necessary to reform the structure of the legislation. But having had this opportunity to debate this issue, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, to withdraw her amendment.