Banks: Forgery

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Thursday 30th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that was a completely different case, of course. But we are doing a number of things, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will be aware. Some of this is legislative and some of it is to do with the various taskforces and strategies that I highlighted to some extent earlier. A Joint Fraud Taskforce was set up in October 2021.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, lack of prosecution is a theme today. So much crime has moved online; what we have heard about in this Question is an example of how that has happened. Can we increase the resources for the police and prosecution in respect of digital fraud? My own experience of Action Fraud—admittedly some time ago—was that it was absolutely pathetic.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is right to raise the changing nature of some of these crimes. I am sure that she is partly referring to the UKFI report on fraud, published earlier this week, which showed that some types of fraud are in fact diminishing while others are increasing. A number of actions are being taken: for example, I am sure that noble Lords were surprised to note that the text messages that we used to receive seem to have diminished somewhat, which is partly a response to work done by the telecoms companies. The National Cyber Security Centre has also launched its suspicious email reporting service to remove harmful scams from online. Since April 2020, it has taken down 81,000 scams across 147,000 URLs.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I completely understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is making. I promise him that I am sticking very closely to the script. I am well aware of that.

I think I have dealt with most of the questions, albeit probably not to noble Lords’ satisfaction. What I cannot do, I am afraid, is commit to coming back on Report with anything, but obviously I am going to reflect very carefully on the tone of this debate—to go to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—and take that back to the department.

Turning to Amendment 175ZA, I assure the House that the Government will conduct robust identity and suitability checks before granting an ETA. We will use the information supplied in the ETA application form to check against our watchlist system. However, as I am sure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness will understand, I cannot go into details of the exact checks that applicants will undergo or how those checks will be conducted, as to do so could undermine our ability to secure the UK border. Such a detailed commentary could provide those people whom we want to prevent from travelling to the UK sufficient information to attempt to circumvent our controls, undermining the very objective of the ETA scheme and the wider universal permission-to-travel requirement to enhance the security of our border.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about what has happened since we left the European Union and lost access to the European Criminal Records Information System and the Schengen Information System. The UK participated only in the law enforcement aspects of SIS II, meaning that we could not, and did not, use SIS II information for immigration purposes. Therefore, having returned to the Interpol channels, we are now routinely exchanging information with EU member states on persons of interest, including missing and wanted individuals, and on lost and stolen documents. Moreover, through the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, we continue to share criminal records with the EU for law enforcement purposes, including to assist criminal proceedings and for public protection. This is almost identical to the arrangement that we had under ECRIS as an EU member state.

I assure noble Lords that the confirmation of an individual’s status prior to travel will be a matter for the Home Office and their carrier. The onus will not be on the individual to produce evidence of their status to a carrier; instead, carriers will be expected to check and confirm with the Home Office that an individual has an appropriate permission before they bring them to the UK. It is our long-term ambition for all carriers operating scheduled services across all modes—air, rail and maritime—to use interactive advance passenger information, or iAPI, systems to provide passenger information to the Home Office in advance of travel. In return, passengers will receive confirmation of permission to travel prior to boarding.

iAPI is already a well-established mechanism used around the world, particularly by other countries that already operate travel authorisation schemes. None the less, the Home Office will undertake rigorous systems testing to ensure that our messaging to carriers works before the scheme goes live. We expect the likelihood of a technical malfunction occurring to be negligible.

In the unlikely event that a technical malfunction does occur—

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I wanted to ask my noble friend about what happens when there is a technical malfunction, but I think he was going to answer that question. Having been caught out when the ESTA system went down when I was trying to go to California, I ended up missing my flight and having to go via Seattle, which took another eight or nine hours. It is important to have strong technical systems if you are going to rely on them, but it may be that there is a waiver or some arrangement that can be introduced.