Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Sentamu and Lord Faulks

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I think there is something of both, in the sense that very often in the law of negligence, although the principles are clear, when identifying the answer to a particular factual case—one very much on the margins—a great deal of judicial time is spent identifying what is a duty of care, whether there is a breach of the duty of care and whether there is foreseeability. Extracting the principles from the morass of common-law cases is not easy. This Bill sets out in statutory form principles to which a judge may have regard. That is a legal process. It is also not, I suggest, inappropriate for some form of message—I do not like the word “message” but I think everybody in your Lordships’ House knows what is meant by that—or for some sort of guidance and reassurance to be given to the general population, so that they can act in a way they would like to act without the fear of uncertainty that accompanies litigation.

I was addressing the point made the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, about the Law Commission. He is right about the immensely valuable role it plays in making the law and how desirable it often is to have a proper review. He would accept, I am sure, that it is not a prerequisite for the making of law that the Law Commission has examined a particular area. In fact, the Compensation Act 2006 followed an inquiry by the Department for Constitutional Affairs. The committee had produced a report—I was a special adviser so I declare an interest—so it was not via the Law Commission. Valuable though that can be, there is a limit to the amount it can do in a particular timeframe because of the immense calls on its services. While not disagreeing with anything the noble and learned Lord has said, it does not, I suggest, prevent there being a change in the law, notwithstanding the fact that the Law Commission has not considered this matter specifically.

I suggest that this is an important, although not radical, declaration of the existing law. It sends an important note of reassurance. I accept that it may not be the most transformative Bill that has reached this House but that does not mean that it does not serve an important function. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, continued his attack, which I have sustained now for approximately 12 months, on every proposition that the Government have put forward. I normally follow his arguments, which are lucid and clear. On this occasion, I am unable to follow his argument. However, I do not wish to stretch my already stretched synapses even further in an attempt to do so; I will simply accept what he says.

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords, I am puzzled. Will the noble Lord tell us whether it is ever worthy to use a statute as a means of giving assurance? I thought that a statute was to state the law, not to assure somebody somewhere. That would be okay. It would be an amazing way of—you know what I mean.

[Lord Faulks]

I think I know what the most reverend Primate means. With respect, as I said on a previous occasion, describing a statute as sending a message is too simplistic a way of explaining what we do in Parliament. We do not legislate in a vacuum. For example, we identify particular issues, whether they are modern slavery or revenge porn, which became part of an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. We pass laws which serve the purpose of clarifying the law but they also reflect what people in society think we ought to be doing in Parliament. I rely on what my noble friend Lord Hodgson said about the desire for neighbours to be unshackled. We need more volunteers; we need people to be unshackled. This law may make a modest contribution and I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Sentamu and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords, I, too, want to add a sentence of support to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, said.

I am patron of many charities and it would not be right if we did not strike the right balance. If a charity felt it was defamed because it was a body corporate, the restriction that has been put in here requiring the permission of the court is necessary. We are living in a very litigious society so if you are going to go to court to sue anybody, the permission of the court should be shown.

In proposed new subsection (3) there is the question of finance and the possibility of striking out if you cannot actually show that you have suffered loss. Because of that balance—that common sense that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, was talking about—I am very attracted to this, and I hope that the Government will accept both limbs of the amendment, because you really could not do one without the other. It strikes a balance. For such a very long time, individuals could sue but reputational damage, as well as financial loss, is often incurred by a number of charities and it would be good to be able to do the same thing in terms of bodies corporate.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, of course, there is in the Bill a significant hurdle for any claimant, whether a non-natural person or a natural person: they have to show serious harm, so that is a hurdle of itself.

I supported the general tenor of this amendment in Committee but expressed a reservation at that time. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed a similar reservation, which is: what about the small companies? Of course, I accept that the individual can sue if he or she is sufficiently identified, but if it is a small business—say, the local ice cream vendor; maybe nobody knows them by name but they have a valuable local business reputation—it will have to overcome considerable hurdles before suing. It will have to show substantial financial loss; it may not be very substantial objectively but it may be very substantial to that business. The hurdle of serious harm added to this procedure seems to prevent it recovering in circumstances where it should be able to recover.

Malicious falsehood may be difficult to prove, in the sense that malice is always difficult to establish. None the less, if I say that Hayter & Co. is going out of business, when it plainly is not, it is not difficult to infer malice from that pronouncement. It would be unfortunate if companies had to resort to the alternative tort in circumstances where they should, in my view, be able to rely on ordinary defamation.

My final observation relates to proposed new subsection (4). I accept what my noble friend Lord Lester said about the public function. Deciding whether somebody performs a public function is not necessarily very easy, just as deciding whether something is a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act has caused the courts considerable distress.

I have sympathy with the general tenor of this amendment but I cannot go all the way with it.