Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government how many members of Afghanistan’s Commando Force 333 have been admitted to the UK under the various Afghan resettlement schemes (1) in 2021–22, and (2) since July 2022.

Answered by Earl of Minto - Shadow Minister (Defence)

In 2021, around 8,000 Afghans were relocated to the UK under Afghan resettlement schemes administered by the Ministry of Defence to the UK. Since July 2022, around 5,300 were relocated. Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a breakdown of individuals relocated to the UK under ARAP by job role.

Figures covering Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS) applicants will need to be provided by the Home Office.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have made any representations to the government of India about the delay in the issue of a visa to the England cricketer, Shoaib Bashir.

Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon

The specifics of this case are a matter for Shoaib Bashir and the Indian Government. We absolutely expect India to treat British citizens fairly at all times in its visa process. The UK Government cannot interfere in the immigration system of another country, but our relationship with India means that where we have concerns we raise them. We note Mr. Bashir's arrival in India ahead of the second test match.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have made any representations to the governments of (1) India, or (2) China, regarding Iran’s support for militias attacking western forces and international shipping in the Middle East.

Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon

The Defence Secretary raised Iran backed Houthi rebels attacking international shipping in the Middle East with his Indian counterpart in January. India is contributing to international naval efforts to help secure shipping in the region. We also raised this with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urging them to use their relationship with Iran to convey that Iran should pressure the Houthis in line with China's call for the cessation of attacks and harassment against civilian ships.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government how many Afghans who were employees of NATO and the UN during 2001–21 have been admitted to the UK under the various Afghan resettlement programmes.

Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon

The UK has two Afghan resettlement schemes. The Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) is for Afghan citizens who worked for or with the UK Government in Afghanistan in exposed or meaningful roles and is managed by the Ministry of Defence. The Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS) prioritises those who assisted the UK efforts in Afghanistan and stood up for values, such as the rule of law, and vulnerable people. The Home Office are the responsible department for ACRS.

FCDO does not hold comprehensive data on who has been resettled under either scheme. We hold data on the first stage of Pathway 3 of ACRS where FCDO acted as the referral partner for Home Office for 3 cohorts - British Council contractors, Gardaworld contractors (Embassy guards) and Chevening alumni. We also hold data on some ARAP eligible persons that FCDO has sponsored because they worked for, alongside or under contract to DFID/FCO in roles contributing to UK national security objectives. We do not hold data on the number of former NATO and UN staff who have been resettled in the UK.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have made any representations to the government of Iran regarding ceasing their support for militias attacking western forces in the Middle East.

Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon

The Government has long condemned Iran's political, financial, and military support to several militant and proscribed groups, including the Houthis and Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria. The current and former Foreign Secretaries have directly raised Iran's support for these groups with the Iranian Foreign Minister three times since 7 October 2023. They made clear in all their conversations that Iran must use its influence with groups in the region to prevent escalation and that the regime bore responsibility for the actions of groups they had supported over many years.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have made any representations to the government of Iran regarding Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon

The Government has long condemned Iran's political, financial, and military support to several militant and proscribed groups, including the Houthis and Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria. The current and former Foreign Secretaries have directly raised Iran's support for these groups with the Iranian Foreign Minister three times since 7 October 2023. They made clear in all their conversations that Iran must use its influence with groups in the region to prevent escalation and that the regime bore responsibility for the actions of groups they had supported over many years.

Found: Letter from Lord Sedwill GCMG to Baroness Drake, Chair of the Constitution Committee (9 January 2025)

Found: Lord Sedwill: Yes.

Found: Lord Sedwill: Yes.

Found: Institute for Government; and Professor Matthew Flinders ; Lord Robertson of Port Ellen ; and Lord Sedwill

Found: Lord Sedwill was clear, however, in evidence to us and elsewhere, 7 that Whitehall has not yet delivered

Found: unfair.Q106 Harriett Baldwin: It sounds like you agree, Cabinet Secretary, with your predecessor, Lord Sedwill

Found: unfair.Q106 Harriett Baldwin: It sounds like you agree, Cabinet Secretary, with your predecessor, Lord Sedwill

Found: Invited guests: Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (LF), [Redacted], Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (LR), Lord Sedwill

Found: III: Lord Sedwill KCMG.

Found: The NSC recognises the problem, to which the ‘fusion doctrine’, propounded by Lord Sedwill when he

Found: Lord Sedwill, previously the National Security Adviser, argued that “we should not assume that AI will

Found: Lord Sedwill gave evidence to this inquiry.

Found: Lord Sedwill, the former Cabinet Secretary, has written repeatedly to the Home Secretary about the Afghan

Found: Lord Sedwill, the former Cabinet Secretary, has written repeatedly to the Home Secretary about the Afghan

Found: Yours sincerely signed on behalf of: Lord Sedwill Lord Turnbull Lord

Found: Artificial Intelligence in Weapons Systems Committee in June 2023, former National Security Adviser, Lord Sedwill

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Found: These slightly complicated things that Lord Sedwill talked about, concerning personality fit, come

Found: Lord Sedwill, and University of Sydney Oral Evidence

Found: We posed this issue when we took evidence from Lord Macpherson and Lord Sedwill.

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Found: Lord Sedwill: It is a mix of reasons.

Found: A few examples —Lord Sedwill and Boris Johnson, Tom Scholar and Liz Truss/Kwasi Kwarteng—may suggest

Found: ˆ˘ Former Cabinet Secretary Lord Sedwill made similar arguments to the Committee aer stepping down

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Found: Lord Sedwill, Chair of the G7 Economic Resilience Panel, joined us to give his main reflections on the

Found: There was, you may recall, as I think Lord Sedwill reported in an earlier piece of advice to this

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Found: Committee held an inquiry called “Revision of the Cabinet Manual ”.156 The former Cabinet Secretary Lord Sedwill

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Found: This includes in the G7 where, during the UK’s 2021 G7 Presidency, the Prime Minister nominated Lord Sedwill

Found: They say you normally have one Lord; I can certainly look across this room and see several more: Lord Sedwill

Found: may use control of resources as leverage on other issues.6 Former National Security Advisor, Lord Sedwill

Found: This includes in the G7 where, during the UK’s 2021 G7 Presidency, the Prime Minister nominated Lord Sedwill

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Found: This includes in the G7 where, during the UK’s 2021 G7 Presidency, the Prime Minister nominated Lord Sedwill

In 2024, there are expected to be over 70 elections around the world. As the UK approaches its next general election, JCNSS is launching its inquiry into ‘Defending Democracy’ to better understand how threats to the UK’s democracy may evolve and be addressed. This will primarily focus on the work of the National Security Council’s Defending Democracy Taskforce. 

The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) is a pool of money worth more than £1 billion pounds per year for tackling conflict and instability overseas. It was launched on 1 April 2015, replacing the Conflict (Prevention) Pool and is overseen by the National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Strategy 2015 states that the CSSF is part of an ‘even more ambitious approach’ to tackling conflict and building stability overseas, especially in fragile states and regions. The CSSF supports delivery of the UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is holding an inquiry into the CSSF.

This is a one-off evidence session with the National Security Adviser, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, to discuss his role and the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry examining the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS & SDSR 2015).

The inquiry considered several areas including:

• whether the NSS & SDSR 2015 is a practical guide to investment choices across Government Departments, to operational priorities and to crisis response,
• how the NSS & SDSR 2015 addresses risk and contingency planning, and
• whether the NSS & SDSR 2015 defines "national security" in sufficiently broad terms and achieves an appropriate balance between military, economic and environmental risks.

Further evidence session with the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill, to discuss his role and the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

The rapid development and implementation of digital technology has transformed government, business and society. This digital revolution has led to new threats to the United Kingdom. Cyber security—the protection of systems, networks and data in cyberspace—is critical. Utilities and infrastructure essential to daily life are now dependent on secure digitised processes.

Cyber will become even more important as more devices are connected to the internet and the Internet of Things becomes the norm.

The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review identified “The impact of technology, especially cyber threats” as one of the four key security challenges facing the UK. The second National Cyber Security Strategy set out the diversity of actors seeking to exploit cyber vulnerabilities for illicit purposes. The Strategy was launched in November 2016 to address challenges in relation to cyber security with a total budget of £1.9 billion for 2016 to 2021.

The Joint Committee is holding an inquiry into UK cyber security.

• Terms of Reference

One year after the publication of the Government’s first ever Biosecurity Strategy, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy is to inquire into the Government’s approach to biosecurity and human health.

The strategy is intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats, whether they materialise naturally, accidentally or deliberately in the form of a malicious attack. It cites globalisation and technology as key factors in today’s biosecurity risks.

The Government has long prioritised public health as a national security issue, with pandemics and emerging infectious diseases categorised as a top-tier risk in the 2010 and 2015 National Security Risk Assessments.

Attacks using biological weapons are categorised as a second-tier risk, along with attacks using chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons.

In 2018, the Government’s National Security Capability Review elevated “diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK” to one of six principal challenges likely to drive national security priorities over the coming decade.

Building on our previous work on the cyber security of critical national infrastructure and the Government’s 2018 White Paper on National Security and Investment, the Committee is holding an inquiry into the Government’s approach to sustaining access to ‘safe’ telecoms technology as a national security issue. The inquiry will focus on 5G and the wider telecoms sector as an important test case.

The Committee is taking forward its planned follow-on examination of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR).

The Government launched its NSCR in July 2017 and later a separated out ‘defence’ strand under the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP). In March 2018 the Committee published a report — ‘National Security Capability Review: A Changing Security Environment’, in which it considered what the NSCR should cover and the Government’s review process so far.

With the Government subsequently publishing its NSCR in March 2018 and its MDP later in December, the Committee is now undertaking its planned follow-up scrutiny, looking at the results of the two strands of the Review, against the background of the Government’s 2019 Spending Review.

In February 2017, the predecessor Committee raised significant concerns about the Fund’s lack of transparency and ministerial accountability, concluding it was unable to assess the strategic impact of CSSF-funded activity without access to much more information.

The Committee’s Report said the objective, operation and achievements of the Fund were ‘opaque’.

Following the Committee’s Report, the Government has made a number of changes to how the Fund is run and how it reports on its work, most notably establishing a dedicated National Security Council sub-committee and publishing summaries and annual reviews of many CSSF programmes, as well as Annual Reports on the Fund overall for the financial year (FY) 2016–17 and FY2017–18.

However, other recent parliamentary work continues to highlight shortcomings related to how the Fund works.

Government response published

• Read the Government response
• Read the Government response (PDF 167 KB)

In July 2017, the Government announced that it had launched a review of national security capabilities, in support of the ongoing implementation of the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015 NSS & SDSR).

The Government said the objective of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR) was “to ensure that the UK’s investment in national security capabilities is as joined-up, effective and efficient as possible, to address current national security challenges.” It added that “The review will also be informed by work which has already been commissioned in response to recent national security-related incidents.” These included, but were not limited to, terror attacks in Manchester and London in the first half of 2017.

The Committee plans to hold a two-part inquiry on this subject.

Report on Cyber Security of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure published

Note: Table 1 in the report inadvertently omitted some departments when referencing a written evidence source (CNI0013).

• Read the report summary
• Read the report conclusions and recommendations
• Read the full report: Cyber Security of the UK's Critical National Infrastructure
• Read the full report (PDF 709KB)

Government Response published

• Read the Government Response

The Government's 2016 cyber security strategy states that the cyber security of the UK’s critical national infrastructure (CNI)—from the physical infrastructure to the digital networks and data—is critical, because a successful attack "would have the severest impact on the country’s national security". Yet the strategy also acknowledges that across many priority sectors "cyber risk is still not properly understood or managed, even as the threat continues to diversify and increase". An additional challenge to Government is that most of the UK's CNI is owned and operated by the private sector.

The Joint Committee is holding an inquiry into the Government's approach to ensuring the cyber security of UK critical national infrastructure, exploring in particular how it works together with private-sector operators and industry regulators in doing so.

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) welcomes written evidence for its new inquiry into ransomware. The Integrated Review identified ransomware – a type of cyber extortion – as one of the most “pernicious forms of cybercrime”, and the 2021 National Cyber Strategy described it as “the most significant cyber threat facing the UK”. 

This inquiry aims to determine what the main risks and vulnerabilities are to the UK’s economic security and will scrutinise whether the Government has the necessary powers and capabilities in place to intervene in the economy on national security grounds, and to enforce economic deterrence measures and enhance economic resilience.