Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Merron on 9 February (HL13391), why the Chief Executive of South Yorkshire Integrated Care Board received contractual redundancy pay before the approval of the national model voluntary redundancy scheme by the Treasury in November 2025.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
As referred to in the answer to HL15722 and HL15723, the redundancy exercise arose from structural reform reducing the number of integrated care boards (ICBs) from 42 to 26, which resulted in the removal of a number of Chief Executive roles.
Contractual National Health Service redundancy arises where a role is removed as part of an organisational restructuring and the postholder’s employment is terminated on a compulsory basis, in line with their contractual NHS terms and conditions of service. This applies, for example, where an ICB is abolished or merged and the Chief Executive role therefore ceases to exist.
In contrast, the national model voluntary redundancy scheme applies only where an employer chooses to offer staff the option of a voluntary exit. These contractual redundancy arrangements pre-date the later development of the national model voluntary redundancy scheme which required HM Treasury’s approval before it could be offered by employers.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Merron on 9 February (HL13391), whether they were consulted before the announcement by South Yorkshire Integrated Care Board on 3 September 2025 of the chief executive's retirement; and what assessment they have made of the public transparency of announcements of retirement when the retiring individual is receiving a redundancy payment.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The Department is not required to be consulted on and does not have responsibility for local announcements made by the integrated care boards (ICBs) about individual employment matters, including retirements. ICBs are independent statutory employers and are responsible for managing their own workforce and communications. They are expected to act in accordance with employment law, contractual obligations, and to communicate appropriately and transparently within those frameworks.
In the case of the South Yorkshire ICB, the redundancy payment referenced was contractual and arose from the removal of the role resultant from ICB reforms. It was not linked to the timing or manner of any subsequent announcement regarding the Chief Executive’s retirement.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the level of bureaucracy for trusts participating in the national provider improvement programme.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The intensive recovery programme (IRP) has been built to give the most challenged providers the support to turn around their performance in a precise and structured way. It will not directly replace the National Provider Improvement Programme (NPIP); however we are reviewing the improvement approach to ensure organisations receive the right level of support.
NPIP segmentation is derived from performance against the NHS Oversight Framework (NOF) and provider capability. The most challenged providers have been designated from a combination of sustained financial deficit for 11 or more years, long-standing issues, and those in segment five of the NOF.
The five organisations that have been selected for the IRP are the first wave of providers in the regime, and the programme will aim to cover more organisations in the future.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government what factors led to the decision to exclude (1) University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust, (2) Queen Elizabeth Hospital King’s Lynn NHS Foundation Trust, (3) Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, (4) Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, (5) Medway NHS Foundation Trust, and (6) Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, from the intensive recovery programme; and whether that exclusion is based on an assessment of improved performance since 4 March.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The intensive recovery programme (IRP) has been built to give the most challenged providers the support to turn around their performance in a precise and structured way. It will not directly replace the National Provider Improvement Programme (NPIP); however we are reviewing the improvement approach to ensure organisations receive the right level of support.
NPIP segmentation is derived from performance against the NHS Oversight Framework (NOF) and provider capability. The most challenged providers have been designated from a combination of sustained financial deficit for 11 or more years, long-standing issues, and those in segment five of the NOF.
The five organisations that have been selected for the IRP are the first wave of providers in the regime, and the programme will aim to cover more organisations in the future.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government what criteria or performance improvements will determine whether a trust included in the national provider improvement programme will be (1) included in the intensive recovery programme, or (2) removed from intensive oversight.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The intensive recovery programme (IRP) has been built to give the most challenged providers the support to turn around their performance in a precise and structured way. It will not directly replace the National Provider Improvement Programme (NPIP); however we are reviewing the improvement approach to ensure organisations receive the right level of support.
NPIP segmentation is derived from performance against the NHS Oversight Framework (NOF) and provider capability. The most challenged providers have been designated from a combination of sustained financial deficit for 11 or more years, long-standing issues, and those in segment five of the NOF.
The five organisations that have been selected for the IRP are the first wave of providers in the regime, and the programme will aim to cover more organisations in the future.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the intensive recovery programme replaced the national provider improvement programme (NPIP); and if so, what assessment they have made of the impact of the programme changes on the stability of the NHS trusts identified for intervention as part of the NPIP.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The intensive recovery programme (IRP) has been built to give the most challenged providers the support to turn around their performance in a precise and structured way. It will not directly replace the National Provider Improvement Programme (NPIP); however we are reviewing the improvement approach to ensure organisations receive the right level of support.
NPIP segmentation is derived from performance against the NHS Oversight Framework (NOF) and provider capability. The most challenged providers have been designated from a combination of sustained financial deficit for 11 or more years, long-standing issues, and those in segment five of the NOF.
The five organisations that have been selected for the IRP are the first wave of providers in the regime, and the programme will aim to cover more organisations in the future.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to reports that the Joint Chair of the North West London Acute Provider Collaborative advised Palantir while privately advocating for the integration of patient-level data into that company’s platform, what assessment they have made of the adequacy of conflict of interest protections within the NHS.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
Detailed guidance for National Health Service organisations on Managing conflicts of interest in the NHS was issued in 2024. NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts must have regard to this guidance and comply with the Code of Governance for NHS provider trusts.
This states that board of directors should take action to identify and manage conflicts of interest and ensure that the influence of third parties does not compromise or override independent judgement. Directors must declare any business interests, or any connection with bodies contracting for NHS services. These declarations must be entered into a publicly available register.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Merron on 9 February (HL13391), what was the legal basis for the compulsory redundancy of the chief executive of the South Yorkshire Integrated Care Board and then filling that role immediately on an interim basis; and what changes were made to the job description of the redundant role for the interim role.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The compulsory redundancy of integrated care board (ICB) chief executives in August 2025 arose from a structural re-organisation following the reduction in the number of ICBs from 42 to 26. Where an ICB was abolished or merged, the Chief Executive office role ceased to exist, and affected postholders were therefore eligible for redundancy in line with their contractual terms and conditions of service.
Employment decisions, including management and restructuring, redundancy and any interim arrangements, sit with ICBs as statutory and independent employers. The redundancy decision in respect of the South Yorkshire ICB Chief Executive was based on the removal of the role and pre-dates any subsequent arrangements for interim leadership cover. Any interim appointment made following restructuring is a separate matter from the redundancy decision and must be managed in accordance with relevant national frameworks including the Very Senior Manager Pay Framework. The Department does not hold centrally collated information on changes to individual job descriptions, as these are determined locally by ICBs.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Merron on 9 February (HL13391), what was the composition of the group of integrated care board (ICB) chief executive officers subject to compulsory redundancy in August 2025; and whether that group consisted only of those from ICBs being abolished or merged, or if it included leaders of boards that remained as standalone entities.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
The Department does not hold a centrally collated breakdown of individual integrated care board (ICB) chief executive officer cases who were subject to compulsory redundancy, as such matters sit with ICBs as independent statutory employers.
This was a structural redundancy exercise, arising directly from the reduction in the number of ICBs from 42 to 26 under system reform. Only chief executive officers whose roles ceased to exist because their ICB was abolished or merged were in scope for compulsory redundancy in line with their contractual terms and conditions of service. Chief executives of ICBs that continued as standalone organisations were not included in the redundancy group.
Asked by: Lord Scriven (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Merron on 9 February (HL13391), whether the chief executive of the South Yorkshire Integrated Care Board (ICB) was offered the opportunity to remain in post under the new 26-ICB framework prior to his selection for compulsory redundancy; and if so, whether his refusal of that offer was considered when determining his eligibility for a contractual redundancy payment.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
As referred to in the answer to HL15722 and HL15723, the redundancy exercise arose from structural reform reducing the number of the integrated care boards (ICBs) from 42 to 26, which resulted in the removal of a number of Chief Executive roles.
Only chief executives whose roles ceased to exist because their ICB was abolished or merged were in scope for compulsory redundancy. In the case of South Yorkshire ICB, the redundancy decision was based solely on the removal of the role as part of restructuring, not on the individual occupying the post. The Department does not hold centrally collated information on local discussions about alternative roles or offers made by individual ICBs, as they operate as statutory and independent employers and such decisions are a matter for local employers, not the Department.