Lord Sassoon
Main Page: Lord Sassoon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sassoon's debates with the HM Treasury
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I well remember the debates that we had all those years ago on the Monetary Policy Committee, and how many objectives could be added to the central one. This is a bit of a nostalgic occasion, because we are going through different subject matter but the same basic problems. I start from the point that the more of these extras you have, the more confusing they are likely to become for those who have to identify them and classify them under a heading—for example, “You’ve got a bit of employment here, and perhaps supply of finance. How is that getting on in our calculations?”. Those who attempt to allocate specific ingredients under these headings will fairly quickly find themselves with a lot of practical problems.
That leads me to say that I am probably a bit more cynical than sceptical than most noble Lords here today. There is a tendency to be overexpansive in economic policy-making, because Governments tend to be optimistic, and are therefore more likely to err on the side of overcooking than undercooking. Their focus also tends to be short-term rather than long-term. It is very difficult to feed in long-term assessments of this when it takes a good while for the implications of individual policies to be evident. I am, therefore, at the cautious end of this argument, and we ought to be very careful about not loading the process with too many objectives.
We should definitely say that nothing should conflict with growth or whatever we want, but it is different when one puts it in a negative rather than a positive way. You can add any number of “promoting”, “contributing”, “having regards to” and so forth, but the fact that there are all these different explanations illustrate that it is not a precise science. To treat it as though it were would be a recipe for difficulty and internal conflict. I may, therefore, be in a minority of one about this, but most of what has been said this afternoon comes from a starting point that itself is questionable.
My Lords, the Government have always been clear that the Financial Policy Committee, as the body responsible for ensuring the stability and safety of the financial sector as a whole, must have financial stability as its primary focus. That is our starting point. However, we have been equally clear that the FPC must balance the pursuit of its primary objective for financial stability with the wider impact of its actions.
In our February 2011 consultation document the Government spoke of the need to,
“build the balance between financial stability and sustainable economic growth”,
into the FPC’s objectives. In addition, my right honourable friend the Chancellor made clear, when giving evidence to the Treasury Select Committee almost exactly a year ago, that we do not seek “the stability of the graveyard”. Our first shot at achieving this symmetry within the FPC’s framework was the creation of an economic growth “brake” for the FPC. The provision set out in subsection (4) of new Section 9C prevents the FPC from taking action that would significantly adversely affect the ability of the financial sector to contribute to medium- or long-term economic growth in all cases, regardless of the strength of the financial stability rationale. That is a very strong backstop provision.
However, the Government have listened to calls, both in another place and in our Second Reading debate in this House, for the FPC to be given a positive duty to support economic growth. In response to those calls, government Amendment 35A amends the Bill to give the FPC a secondary objective to support,
“the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment”.
As many noble Lords are aware, this wording is identical to that used in the MPC’s secondary objective.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has used similar wording in his Amendment 34, but in the form of “having regard” rather than a secondary objective. I believe that in this case a secondary objective is more appropriate—more purposive, in the words of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots—than “having regard”. We mean to be purposive here. The Government’s intention is to require the FPC to seek proactively to support economic growth. For this, you need an objective, not simply “having regard”.
Some noble Lords have questioned how such an objective bites in the context of the MPC. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is at last starting to get answers to his questions from the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who is much more expert in these things than I am, and long may he continue to keep the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, supplied with explanations. In my inadequate way, I shall attempt to give one or two examples; first, of how the new secondary objective will impact on the FPC’s decision-making. I do not want to get sidetracked too much on the MPC but I will make one or two remarks to suggest that similar wording has impacted on the MPC as well. It is most important to think about the FPC, because that is what we are talking about here.
Let us imagine that the FPC takes action, such as imposing additional capital requirements, during the upturn of the cycle, when systemic risks are building up and financial stability concerns are heightened. If the situation changes—for example, the expansion subsides and the financial stability risks reduce—the secondary objective for economic growth will incentivise the FPC to remove those additional capital requirements in order to free up money for lending to the real economy. This effect will work in tandem with the new requirement for the Bank to review previous actions, which we will discuss in due course.
My Lords, will the noble Lord recognise that what he has just described as being the result of his amendment is precisely what the Government are not doing in the present circumstances? The economy is not reviving and the Government have not reconsidered their policy of imposing additional capital requirements on banks.
My Lords, first, I was talking about different economic conditions, and, secondly, I would have thought that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, would endorse why it would be extremely helpful to have such a secondary objective on the FPC.
Moving on, a second example of how such a secondary objective will operate is where the FPC is choosing between various different courses of action to address a systemic risk. Assuming that the actions under consideration are equally effective in addressing the risk to stability, the secondary objective will require the FPC to select the action that is more compatible with the Government’s economic objectives.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it is the role of the FPC to lean against the wind.
Before the noble Lord goes on with his agreement, which I am looking forward to, I still have not heard any argument from him about “subject to that”. What he has to say requires the word “and”, not “subject to that”. There is no way that “subject to that” makes any sense. To give him an example, could he imagine the head of the FPC being interviewed on the “Today” programme? The first question is, “What are you doing?”. “I’m contributing to the stability objective.” “Oh, and, incidentally, do you support the Government’s economic policies?” “Oh, no.” Can you imagine him saying, “Oh, no”? I cannot imagine any circumstances in which he would say, “Oh, no”. I cannot even imagine any circumstances—unless he wants to be regarded as insane—in which he would say, “I am unable to answer that question”. His only possible answer to the question “Do you support the Government’s economic policies?” is “Yes”, which is why the word “and” ought to be there and not “subject to that”.
That is why I regard the view that the Treasury took on the MPC as fudging the thing. I am afraid the ex-Treasury people have to recognise that that is what the MPC does. Could you imagine the Governor of the Bank of England saying, “I don’t support the Government’s economic policies”? We are not discussing the MPC. We are discussing the FPC—I always forget its name. Why does the Minister not use the simpler language, rather than “subject to that”, which is totally spurious?
My Lords, as I was coming on to say, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which is very much to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Peston. The FPC has to, and should, be able to lean against the wind—in appropriate circumstances—which is why the FPC’s primary objective is and should remain financial stability. It is right that it is “subject to that” primary objective that the FPC should seek to support the Government’s economic policy. The wording picks that up in the way that an “and” would not. We will have to disagree on that. I have given examples of where I believe that the FPC will interpret the language we have used appropriately.
Although I do not want to go too far into MPC territory, it is relevant to look at the MPC because there are examples one can draw out from its analysis to suggest that language is used in the MPC context in a very similar way to the way I would expect it to be used in the FPC context. I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, to what deputy governor Charlie Bean said in February 2012: that if the MPC,
“had chosen to run a substantially tighter monetary policy, then that would only have served to depress activity and raise unemployment even further … it would also make the task of fiscal consolidation and de-leveraging even more challenging. And by providing a gloomier climate for business, it would also inhibit investment and slow the necessary re-balancing of our economy towards manufacturing and internationally tradable services”.
Although this is not the time to go into it further, it is possible to argue—and the evidence is very much there—that the MPC is affected by the wording in the same way in which the suggested wording of the Government’s amendments will bite on the FPC. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, for further illuminating some of these issues.
The three situations in which the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, quite rightly postulated that the new secondary objective needs to work were good times, crisis and uncertainty. I can only say that I completely agree with her and that the wording that the Government propose strikes the right balance and will take account of all those scenarios. Of course, we are not relying solely on the secondary objective for growth, but I am sure that she understands that.
My Lords, I know that the Minister is about to speak but can I give a slight and practical example of how witnesses will approach these different inquiries. I find myself entirely in agreement, as any Cross-Bencher should be, with both sides of the House. How does a witness approach these different inquiries? They approach the criminal inquiry with the narrowest possible dimension about the facts in dispute. I have appeared at the No. 1 court at the Old Bailey, so I know what it feels like. You are always told that you should answer only the question you are asked. When you appear in front of a parliamentary inquiry, you have the same approach with a view as to where the political issues will come from, which you have to think about. When you appear, as I did, in front of Leveson, you do so on a completely different basis. My evidence to Leveson began in the 1820s. In other words, you are looking at the whole issue in the round. I do not understand why there needs to be any dispute between the two sides of the House in this debate. Have a criminal inquiry, have Tyrie and have a judge-led inquiry into the ultimate circumstances of the way in which the banking culture has taken over parts of our society.
My Lords, first, let us be clear that these amendments have very little to do with the Bill before us today. They are all about the Opposition’s misguided attempts to slow down what we need to do to deal with the consequences of the LIBOR scandal. We need rapidly to restore public confidence in the financial services industry, which the Government are pressing on with. We do not need to kick these very serious matters into the long grass, as the Opposition now propose. It is time for Parliament, as well as the Government, to take clear leadership on these matters. The events of recent days have highlighted that the culture of banking is badly broken. The Government are in the process of fixing the system, but we need to change the mindset of the profession and those working in it. This is about restoring banking to what it should be about: to be the most, and not the least, trusted profession.
The basic facts of the attempted LIBOR manipulation are clear. There have already been published reports from three regulators in the UK and the US. We do not need a judicial inquiry to tell us what the facts are. A judicial inquiry would be principally aimed at establishing the facts; it would likely take years to complete, might not be able to start until after prosecutions had been completed and would cost the taxpayer millions of pounds.
Now we need three things. First, we need the rapid prosecution of individuals who may have broken the criminal law. This is what the SFO and the Crown Office in Scotland are looking to do. Secondly, we need to look at how LIBOR cannot be fixed again, which is the subject of Martin Wheatley’s review. Thirdly, we need to look into the ethical and professional standards of the financial services industry and we need to do so urgently to ensure that the banking industry is serving the needs of the wider UK economy and the continued global competitiveness of London and the UK.
For this reason, the Government recommend that Parliament considers undertaking an urgent inquiry into the culture and ethics of the banking industry to help shape the urgent reform that is so much needed. The Government propose the establishment of a full parliamentary committee of inquiry, comprised of representatives from both Houses, and set up by a joint resolution of both Houses. The proposed terms of reference for the committee are building on the Treasury Select Committee’s work and drawing on the conclusions of UK and international regulatory and competition investigations into the LIBOR rate-setting process, consider what lessons are to be learnt in relation to transparency, conflicts of interest and the culture and professional standards of the, financial services industry, including the interaction of these with civil sanctions and criminal law. While I hear noble Lords seeking to paint this as a narrow inquiry, on any construction, these words will give the Joint Committee a very wide remit.
I am also glad that the Opposition now seem to support the creation of this committee. I have laid out what is required. We certainly do not require a proliferation and duplication of reviews that could go on for several years. We recommend that the inquiry should commence immediately and conclude by Christmas. As noble Lords are aware, the Government plan to introduce the banking Bill that will implement the recommendations of Sir John Vickers’s Independent Commission on Banking in January next year. This will bring far-reaching and lasting changes to the structure of British banks. The Government’s preferred timetable for the committee of inquiry would allow the Government to use the Bill to make any appropriate further changes needed to the standards of the banking industry and the criminal and civil powers needed to regulate it, and hold people to account for their behaviour.
The Joint Committee will do its work well and comprehensively and will report by Christmas. However, if, at that stage, this House or another place was not satisfied with the work of the Joint Committee, it will be possible for Parliament to press for a further inquiry. At that time, the inquiry proposed by this amendment would not even have started. The Government fully intend that Parliament should play a significant role in getting to the bottom of what happened and helping make the system more robust. It is surely highly desirable and consistent with many of our previous discussions in recent months that your Lordships’ House should be fully engaged in the process, bringing the full breadth of its expertise to bear from Peers of all the main parties and none.
This is already a big Bill, on which time is now being taken up by debating the merits of an inquiry—a debate that will not help noble Lords with the key business of the House today, namely scrutinising the detailed contents of the Financial Services Bill. It may help your Lordships to know that in another place on Thursday there will be debates on two Motions—one an opposition Motion, another a government Motion—to consider in detail the questions that we have debated at some length this afternoon. It is appropriate to leave another place to debate those Motions on Thursday so that we get on with and stick to the Committee’s core task today on the Financial Services Bill.
I am grateful to my noble friend for his response. Will he confirm that, if there is to be an SFO-led inquiry into any criminality arising from the LIBOR incident, the SFO will not be expected to meet the cost of that inquiry from its existing budget but will be given the separate funding needed so that the inquiry can be full, complete and properly resourced?
My Lords, as was in the Statement yesterday, I can confirm that the SFO is on the case, looking at all the possibilities for criminal prosecutions and that the Crown Office in Scotland is doing likewise. There has been no request of which I am aware from the SFO for additional resources. I assure my noble friend that, if there was such a request, it would be looked at sympathetically by the Government. It has been an important and lively debate because these are critical issues for the financial services industry and I hope that, with those further explanations, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will withdraw his amendment.
I am sorry to hear that it has been a wholly non-party political debate today until the noble Lord got up. However, will he at least consider—or, if not him, get somebody in government to consider—the point that my noble friend Lord Peston made? Given the circumstances of great national interest involved here, the Prime Minister should take the trouble to talk to the leader of the Opposition with a view to finding a way through that would be accepted on all sides. In those circumstances—if he could give us the kind of assurance that we need—I would certainly press my noble friend to withdraw the amendment. Can he give us any kind of assurance?
My Lords, even better than that, two Motions will be tabled in another place on Thursday which will give an opportunity for the different views of the Government and Opposition on these matters to be aired fully. We should look very seriously at where that debates leads to.
My Lords, this group of amendments is a rather mixed bag but all of them refer to various duties of the Financial Policy Committee. The first, Amendment 36, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter, adds to the definitions of systemic risk in new Section 9C(3) of the Bank of England Act 1998 the collapse,
“of confidence in the financial system as a whole”.
Academic research has identified four major sources of systemic risk, at least to date: first, linkages, or the connections between markets, referred to in new Section 9C(3)(a); secondly, the distribution of risk, particularly in the context of cyclical variations in risk, referred to in new subsection (3)(b); thirdly, excessive leverage, debt and credit growth, as referred to in new subsection (3)(c); and fourthly, the general collapse of confidence, which is not referred to at all. This is a serious omission—probably a slip in drafting, but none the less a serious omission in the analysis of systemic risk.
There can be a major systemic failure that is not associated with any of new subsection (3)(a), (b) and (c). You can have a situation that is not represented by linkages between firms, is not to do with the distribution of risk, and is not due to excessive leveraged debt or credit growth, but is due to the collapse of a firm in a particular strategic position within the industry, which leads to a general collapse of confidence. There is no necessary visible linkage between the firms, but the collapse of confidence can lead to a general systemic failure. Adding this fourth component—which is completely standard in the usual list of four in the academic literature—would complete the set from which, for some reason, this element has been neglected. To use the felicitous expression of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, it would plug the gap.
Amendment 37 is a probing amendment, although it has more substance than that. New Section 9C(4) of the Bank of England Act says:
“Subsections (1) and (2) do not require or authorise the Committee”—
the FPC—
“to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect”,
et cetera. The phrase “in its opinion” seems to me to make the new section completely meaningless. How would you ever tell? If something happened and the committee pursued some set of objectives that had a significant adverse affect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to growth—something the noble Lord earlier this afternoon pointed to as a very positive provision in the Bill—how would you then know whether this had been “in its opinion” or not? You would go along to the committee and ask, “Why did you do this?”. It would respond: “In our opinion, it was the right thing to do. End of story”. Consideration of the implications of its acts has been ruled out of court. The phrase “in its opinion” seems to make the clause devoid of meaningful content. If we remove it, we will improve the overall import of the Bill and, significantly, of this section that refers to the functions of the FPC.
With Amendment 39, I have a real mystery. Systemic risks are defined as credit growth, debt and leverage. However, in new Section 9C(7), all those terms are defined with respect to the UK only. Why is that? We live in a global financial market. Why do they refer to the UK? If these conditions had been in place and the FPC was considering the position of the Royal Bank of Scotland, that bank would have been found to be totally secure, because almost all the problems that assailed it occurred outwith the UK. The growth of credit from that bank was excessive outwith the UK. Its debt position was defined not by the debt it owed to individuals in the UK but to bond-holders and individuals throughout the world. I must be reading this completely wrongly but am totally mystified as to why credit growth, debt and leverage, as referred to in the definition of systemic risk, are confined to the UK. I would be very grateful if I could be enlightened and told that somehow I have got this wrong and that this does not confine consideration to the UK but is dealing with some other, wider element.
Continuing the international theme in this pot-pourri of amendments, I turn to Amendment 44, which deals with page 5, line 39, and refers to the overall functions of the Committee, suggesting that it should be,
“assessing its functions in the light of the policies of the European Financial Stability Board”.
As we know, much of the structure of the regulatory rule book for the UK will be written in Brussels. The EU, like the UK, is feeling its way towards defining the proper role of its macroprudential regulator, namely the European Financial Stability Board. The EFSB will, over the next couple of years, build a toolkit not unlike one that we desire for the FPC—rules on leverage ratios, procyclical provisioning, risk-weighted capital ratios and so on.
It is essential that measures taken in the UK are compatible with measures taken at the EU level, and vice versa. That is why the FPC must, at the very least, assess its functions in the light of what the European Financial Stability Board is doing. We will have an independent position, and the EFSB does not have the same European-wide status as the banking securities markets and insurance regulators, but none the less we want the activities of our FPC to be compatible with those of the EFSB.
To sum up, this is somewhat of a bran-tub. You put your hand in and take out amendments to see which aspect you would like to look at, so it is a slightly diverse group. Amendment 36 adds to systemic risk the risk of collapse of confidence in the system as a whole. Amendment 37 removes “in its opinion” from the new subsection whereby the FPC must take account of its impact on the financial sector’s contribution to growth, as the phrase would render the clause meaningless, or at least inoperable. Amendment 39 raises the question of why growth, debt and leverage are defined purely with respect to the UK, when—for goodness’ sake—we in Britain are dealing with some of the largest global financial institutions in the world. Amendment 44 simply adds to the functions and the need to take into account the actions of the European Financial Stability Board. Going back to Amendment 36 and the collapse of confidence in the system as a whole, I beg to move.
My Lords, I do not know whether this group is a pot-pourri or a bran-tub, but let me attempt to do justice to a number of these amendments. Fine group though they make, they do not entirely find favour with the Government, as the noble Lord will know, because I do not believe they are necessary. I shall address each of them in turn.
Amendment 36 attempts to add,
“factors likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole”,
to the list of specific types of systemic risks. I can reassure the Committee and the noble Lord in particular that new subsection (3) is not intended to be an exhaustive definition of systemic risk. The types of risk that have been highlighted in this section are generally accepted to be the main types of macroprudential risk, but systemic risks may well arise in future that are not included in these categories. That is why the FPC is free to look at anything else that it believes might pose a systemic risk to financial stability, and I would certainly expect that something that would undermine confidence in the system as a whole would have an impact on stability. It could be argued that market confidence is a necessary component for financial stability. I therefore believe that this is already included in the FPC’s objectives as they stand, and that Amendment 36 is not necessary.
Yes, I can see that. I put a little question mark linking the two new subsections which seem to me to be contradictory, or at least inconsistent. I still do not understand why new subsection (3)(c) says that the systemic risks which the Financial Policy Committee has to consider are those which include,
“in particular … systemic risks attributable to structural features”,
and,
“unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”.
How do we define leverage? It means,
“the leverage of the financial sector in the United Kingdom”.
Why? Debt means,
“debt owed to the financial sector by individuals in the United Kingdom”.
Why? Credit growth means,
“the growth in lending by the financial sector to individuals in the United Kingdom”.
Why? Why do we have these definitions when the noble Lord is quite right that new subsection (6) seems to contradict them?
My Lords, the most important thing is that we are talking about financial stability in the UK, and the FPC needs to consider first and most importantly the metrics and indicators of financial stability in the UK. After all, the objective is for the FPC to protect and enhance the stability of the UK, so it is quite right that the definitions refer to the effects in the UK. We are not interested in the FPC deeming that it is not its business to deal with leverage in non-UK markets, but on the other hand it is quite right that the risks themselves may come from factors that arise outside the UK; I think that that is the point the noble Lord is trying to get to, which I believe is well covered by new subsection (6) and which we have made clear in the response to the Joint Committee. It is not the responsibility of the FPC to actually engender results outside the UK; it should be engendering results in the UK.
I am sorry; the noble Lord must be wrong on that. If a bank is lending excessively outside the UK, then the FPC most certainly should be concerned. The idea that the FPC should be concerned only in managing results in the UK must be entirely wrong and could not be the basis of successful stability for the UK financial sector.
No, my Lords, it is not wrong. If we are talking about a British bank, it is a British bank, and that is linked to these metrics and to the remit of the FPC. Of course that is captured in the FPC’s remit. I think we are getting ourselves excessively excited about a simple issue that is perfectly well drafted in the Bill, which is that the FPC has a wide and appropriate remit to deal with financial stability in the UK, but that it should properly take account of systemic risks that may arise both inside and outside the UK. That is exactly what the drafting of the two clauses taken together means. If the noble Lord had been critiquing the Bill as it was introduced in another place, he would have proper grounds for questioning that, but we have plugged a possible gap, and the construction now works.
I do not wish to be unhelpful to my noble friend, but I am probably going to be. What the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says seems to make sense. The systemic risks in subsection (3)(a) and (b) are defined in subsections (5) and (6) as not having any geographic restriction, but subsection (3)(c), which is defined by subsection (7), as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, relates only to,
“individuals in the United Kingdom and businesses … in the United Kingdom”,
for credit growth, debt, and so on. That ignores the fact that many banks have global balance sheets. As we do not have rigid subsidiarisation, a UK balance sheet could have significant exposures to other territories, depending on how a particular bank’s overseas operations were organised. Many of them are run as branches out of the UK institution and therefore, I should have thought, would be posing the kind of risks on which the FPC would need to keep an eye. I am unclear why we have chosen that formulation. I accept that for the systemic risks it does not matter where it applies, but when we are talking specifically about credit growth, debt and leverage, it is as if it can impact on the UK only if it happens in the UK, and I do not think that that is correct.
I shall have another go, because this is tricky but important. The Financial Policy Committee is charged with responsibility for the overall financial stability of the UK: the systemic risks and the macroprudential role. We need to distinguish that from the situation of individual firms which will or may contribute to the overall systemic risk. In this discussion we risk conflating two things. One is the systemic risk in the system, which the FPC is charged with dealing with. That is credit growth, debt and leverage as defined by subsection (7), which is referenced to the United Kingdom. The financial stability of the United Kingdom is the concern of the FPC. That does not mean that risk may not come from the international financial system—that is made completely clear by subsection (6). However, for individual financial institutions for which the PRA will have first responsibility, if the FPC considers that they contribute to the overall situation, it does not rule out or limit consideration of the factors that affect individual financial institutions. The clause and the definitions do not rule that out. We should not confuse what is being defined here. The definitions are not exhaustive of the systemic risks which the FPC should consider. It may consider whatever else it considers relevant.
Let me try this just one more time, because the argument that the list is not exhaustive is a toss-away argument: we did not include that, but it does not matter, because it covers everything. Let us be a bit more serious and deal with precisely what is in the Bill. To make the discussion concrete, I shall deal with the first part of subsection (7), which refers to credit growth. In my opinion, credit growth is an important indicator of systemic risk. Indeed, Professor Shin of Princeton University, who is the authority in this field, has identified credit growth as one of the key variables which any macroprudential regulator should have in its sights.
Let us consider credit growth. We are told that with regard to systemic risks in particular,
“‘credit growth’ means the growth in lending by the financial sector to individuals in the United Kingdom and businesses carried on in the United Kingdom”.
That cannot be right, because the stability of banks and financial institutions in the UK often crucially depends on the nature of credit growth in lending to individuals outside the UK. The businesses to which they lend will operate within and outwith the UK. What is the notion that somehow it must be businesses carried on in the UK? Will, say, British Aerospace be included? It happens to be a British company, but I believe that most of its operations take place outside the United Kingdom. I may be wrong about that, but a substantial proportion of its operations take place outside the United Kingdom. Would British Aerospace be covered in respect of lending to businesses carried on in the UK?
We could take out subsection (7) and lose nothing. It is the old adage that you teach pupils all the time: when in doubt, take it out. It adds nothing but confusion to the specification of the role of the FPC and the definition of systemic risk. Of course, the FPC is responsible for systemic risk in the UK, because that is its juridical domain, but that systemic risk can arise from activities by UK institutions on a worldwide scale. When in doubt, take it out. Let us drop subsection (7) and make the Bill more coherent.
As there is doubt about this—considerable doubt, it seems, in the noble Lord’s mind—that is precisely why we need to leave it in. Again, he conflates the role of the FPC, which is to deal with financial stability issues, threats and risks in the UK. He says that it is clear that the Financial Policy Committee's remit is only for the UK. I do not know how he comes to that conclusion. If there were no definition of levels of unsustainable leveraged debt or credit growth, that would precisely raise in people’s minds the question of what is their geographic limit.
If the noble Lord will let me continue, this discussion precisely makes the point that the FPC is responsible for systemic risk, which may be measured in terms of these factors and others listed in the clause. In that respect, we are talking about the UK. That is independent of whether banks are or were lending excessively to foreign companies. That is dealt with in other ways, as I have explained: partly through the PRA looking at the individual leverage ratios or whatever for the individual bank. Equally, if there is a systemically important institution about which the FPC is concerned, this in no way limits the considerations to the business of that institution simply in the United Kingdom, because this is dealing with something else. This is dealing with the overall systemic risk that the FPC is trying to deal with, not any question about where individual firms are doing business.
My Lords, if it in no way limits the consideration of systemic risk, I would say again that it is otiose; it is worthless. It adds only confusion to the Bill. With respect to the noble Lord, the juridical domain of the FPC is defined by the definition of “regulated persons”.
My Lords, we risk confusing different things again. The definition of “regulated persons” is wholly different from the question of financial stability for the UK. The concept of “regulated persons” is dealt with elsewhere. We are in a completely different part of the financial landscape. We are risking mixing up the microprudential with the macroprudential. When the noble Lord reflects on this debate, he will understand that these definitions are appropriate. He would say that they are unnecessary; I say that they are necessary in order to define the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee. However, a careful reading will show that they in no way restrict the FPC or the PRA in looking at the activities of individual regulated businesses, wherever they are, in so far as they relate to regulated activities or to the financial stability objective.
I shall move on to Amendment 37, which seeks to remove the words “in its opinion” from the economic growth “brake” that prevents the FPC taking action that would have a significant adverse affect on the ability of the financial sector to contribute to long-term sustainable growth. I disagree with this for three reasons.
First, in principle, the FPC is the best placed to assess the likely effect of its own actions. We do not want the FPC to rely on other people in forming this assessment. The FPC will be the expert macroprudential regulator. It is the right body to decide how the brake applies and the drafting should reflect that. Secondly, that assessment will be completely open, transparent and subject to outside scrutiny via publication of the decisions in the FPC’s meeting records. The government amendment, which we will discuss shortly, will go further and require the FPC to explain how it has complied with the duty to consider the “brake”. Thirdly, in practical terms I do not believe that there is any sensible alternative to this approach. In whose opinion would it be, if not that of the FPC itself? I am sure that the noble Lord does not envisage the FPC’s meeting adjourning while it seeks the opinion of some other body.
Amendment 44 would add to the FPC a function of assessing its functions in the light of the policies of the European Systemic Risk Board, or ESRB. I appreciate the sentiment behind this amendment. The Government believe that, given the international nature of financial markets, macroprudential policy will be most effective when co-ordinated internationally. I assure the Committee that, in the Government’s view, the current measures in the Bill and other arrangements are more than sufficient to achieve this.
The Bill requires the FPC to have regard to the international obligations of the United Kingdom. This will encompass the obligation to have regard to any warnings or recommendations from the ESRB that apply to the UK. It is also worth noting that the Governor of the Bank of England, like all European central bank governors, is a member of the ESRB. The current governor is also the first vice-chair of the board. The Bank is, and will continue to be, closely involved with the work of the ESRB and this will be reflected in the work of the FPC. The governor will be able to feed back the decisions and policies of the ESRB directly to the FPC. As the governor and the Bank will influence the policy of the ESRB, I expect that it will often be closely aligned to that of the FPC. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the UK authorities are required to respond to any recommendations that they receive from the ESRB. I am sure that they will give careful consideration to the policies of that board.
On the basis of this more extensive debate than I had anticipated, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will agree, on reflection, that his bran tub of amendments is not completely necessary. I would ask him to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I think I am naïve, because I am bemused by the drafting of this Bill. Sometimes we are told that things are unnecessary; of course they are being done, but they do not need to be on the face of the Bill. At other times we are told, “We have got to describe everything in extreme detail. Even though there might be some apparent internal contradictions, at least it covers every base”. We do not seem to care very much, with respect to the logic of the story, whether we have the one or the other. I will comment on the amendments, so that we can take them formally as we go through.
With respect to the collapse of confidence in the system as a whole, that is just leaving a hole in the Bill. If the Minister wants to leave a hole in the Bill, that is up to him. I was trying to make it a bit better, and more comprehensive; just the sort of thing we are told that we should do. It would have helped; it would have provided the FPC with another stimulus in its overall definitions of its objectives, which would have contributed to its effectiveness. The idea that it is just rolled into everything else is not true. It is easy to construct models which do not have the other elements, and this element is important. I refer noble Lords to the literature: Professor Shin is the name reference.
If we turn to “in its opinion”, the noble Lord was very convincing on that one, so I take his arguments. On Amendment 39, and the whole addition of this business about the UK, I think that it is a mess. The noble Lord has been completely unconvincing. He has not been able to justify in any coherent way subsection (7) and that is regrettable. It is regrettable that the Bill is left like this. One would think that the Minister would at least say, “Let’s take it away and look at it, just to make sure that I have got it right”, since he cannot defend it on this occasion.
On Amendment 44, we are told, “Oh, it’s all going to happen anyhow. There are nice informal procedures, whereby these things will be taken into account. So you don’t need it, because it’s going to happen anyhow.” It is going to happen anyhow because the governor happens to have yet another hat: was it vice-president of the organisation? I am sure that the vice-president of that organisation is busier and better informed than the Vice-President of the United States is reputed to be on policy there. None the less, how can we be sure that our next governor—whoever it might be; maybe it will be the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who is not in his place—will not also be the vice-president and be as engaged and whatever else it might be?
We cannot make laws on an ad hominem basis; that is not the right way to do it. Surely, if the noble Lord accepts that these functions are appropriate—indeed necessary—he should accept Amendment 44 or agree to have a look at it and come back with some rather better drafting than mine. In the mean time, I am sorry to be grumpy about this process, but I really thought that we were trying to improve the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This is—reflecting our earlier discussions—one of the Tyrie amendments. It is very cleverly drafted because it does not attempt to specify a particular set of indicators. It knows that the FPC is in a learning experience: that we are all going to be in a debate over indicators, instruments and so on in the years to come. Nothing could further that debate better than to propose a set of indicators, such as, for example, the rate of credit growth, which we have just been talking about, although not just in the UK. This is an extremely valuable amendment which, is, I hear, supported all round the Committee and I would expect the Minister to take account of the weight of this support.
Also in this group is a series of amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter. I would like to take a few minutes to address these. They are all concerned with the reports that the Financial Policy Committee is required to make and they all specify characteristics of the report. The first one requires the presentation of scenarios: the attempt by the Financial Policy Committee to look at various potential crises—stress-testing, we call it at a micro level—and assess the impact of their policies and of various events. We have learnt from the Office for Budget Responsibility how useful this technique can be and I am sure it will be extremely effective in the assessment of macroprudential measures. Amendment 73, requiring the presentation of scenarios, fits in with the philosophy of policy-making and of the empirical basis of evidence-based policy-making in finance today. I therefore hope the Government will accept it.
Amendment 74 is consequential upon today’s acceptance of the Government’s Amendment 35A, which we agreed earlier this afternoon. After all, if the Financial Policy Committee is required to take into account government policies on growth and employment, then it is surely appropriate that it should report on its performance on what it is required to take into account. This should really have been down as a consequential amendment to Amendment 35A but I am happy to help the Government out and introduce their consequential amendment for them.
Amendment 75, on the issue of indicators, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, places those indicators in the reporting structure of the FPC. Amendment 76 would relate the FPC’s report to the functioning of financial markets and of the wider economy. If they do not discuss that then I am blowed if I know what they are going to discuss. So let us at least hope that that is agreed by everyone around the Committee.
These are just four amendments to flesh out the characteristics of FPC reporting which will be a crucial part of FPC accountability. Given that we are handing these powers to unelected officials, the reporting structure is an important component. That reporting structure— and the debates over the role of the FPC—would be enormously enhanced by the acceptance of Amendment 40 in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall and of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
My Lords, I wish we had a simple tag that we could use for amendments which come up so often when talking about legislation where we all agree on the substance but there is a kind of debate on whether it needs to be in or not. We are substantially in that territory with a number of amendments in this group. I will take them in turn.
First, Amendments 40 and 75 seek to require the Financial Policy Committee to publish a set of indicators of financial stability. I agree that financial indicators will aid the Committee, Parliament and the public in assessing the effectiveness of the FPC’s actions, but I hope I can assure the Committee that the amendments are unnecessary. The noble Lord may groan, but I acknowledged at the outset that this is one of those “is it necessary or not” amendments. Let me try to give the evidence because it is important to adduce the evidence of how things are going already—of which there is quite a lot—to put flesh on to the bones of why I believe it. We have looked very carefully at the Treasury Committee’s recommendations and have accepted a lot of amendments as a result. The Government’s record in picking up the Treasury Committee’s recommendations is very clear. We have been through them very seriously, and we have accepted a lot of them. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, and my noble friend Lady Noakes for assiduously going through them and provoking a further debate on the ones we have not picked up. That is quite right and proper. This is one amendment that we believe is unnecessary. I will give some reasons why I think the Committee should be satisfied on this.
The starting point is the Bank’s statement, in its response to the Treasury Committee’s report on bank accountability, that the FPC will publish and report against a set of indicators. Further than that, the FPC has already given some signals of the indicators it finds most useful for assessing risk through its oversight of the Bank’s financial stability reports over the past year and so too has the governor via a letter to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee last year.
My Lords, I am sorry if my noble friend thinks that I mischaracterised her argument. My interpretation of the words,
“The Treasury and the Financial Policy Committee must agree … a set of indicators”,
is that effectively the Treasury would have a veto over the set of indicators. What would happen if the Treasury and the FPC did not agree? It states in the amendment that they must agree. They would therefore have to find some common ground and it would be difficult if the Treasury dug its heels in and said, “We believe that this and that should be in the indicators”. Our starting premise here is that the FPC is the expert body and it should be left to define the indicators. As I have tried to indicate to the Committee, the Bank and the FPC are already on the case, providing a high degree of transparency, and there will be a series of draft policy statements available in time for consideration of the passage in the relevant secondary legislation. There will be appropriate scrutiny, but we would be going into pretty dangerous territory if we were to hard-wire the Treasury into the set of indicators that should be for the experts to set. Appropriate parliamentary and public scrutiny is allowed for in the Bill in the way that I have described.
Amendment 73, which would require the financial stability report to include the FPC’s predictions about the likely future state of the UK financial stability, is unnecessary. Subsection (3)(d) of new Section 9T, which appears at the bottom of page 11 of the Bill, already requires the report to include an assessment of the risks to stability that is very similar to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it includes a “range of … possible scenarios”. Subsection (3)(e) of new Section 9T already requires that the report includes the committee’s view of the outlook for the stability of the UK financial system. The interim FPC has already published three financial stability reports since its establishment. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the most recent report, published just last week, contains a whole chapter devoted to the committee’s outlook and the actions that the FPC felt necessary to tackle risks that it had identified.
I move on to Amendment 74. It is important that we learn from the mistakes of the previous system of regulation. In that system, the Bank was given responsibility for maintaining financial stability but no means of achieving that objective. That is why it is vital to give the FPC effective and proportionate powers to use certain macroprudential tools. However, the use of those tools will need to be monitored carefully. That is why the Bill already requires that the financial stability report includes an assessment of the extent to which the committee’s actions have succeeded in achieving its objectives, including its new secondary objective for economic growth. That is also why the FPC is required to publish and maintain policy statements for each of its macroprudential tools. We expect these statements to include estimates of their impact on both financial stability and growth. As we will discuss in due course, other amendments will require the FPC to produce explanations of how its actions are compatible with its objectives, including the costs and benefits of those actions. I do not therefore think that Amendment 74, which would require the financial stability report to include an assessment of the impact of each of its macroprudential measures on employment and economic growth, is needed.
Lastly, on Amendment 76, the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets is a key requirement for financial stability. As such, the FPC’s objective to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system extends to the functioning of markets. As I have mentioned, the Bill already requires the FPC to include an assessment of its actions as part of the financial stability report. The amendments that I have made require the FPC to explain how its actions are compatible with its objectives with regard to financial stability and supporting the Government’s economic policy. I therefore regard Amendment 76 as unnecessary because the same ground is already amply covered by the Bill.
I hope that on the basis of those explanations and reassurances noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments.
My Lords, this was the gentlest of amendments ever. The genesis of it was the tripartite authority, and how the link between the Bank and the Treasury did not work as well as it could. Here we have an ill-defined term—financial stability—for which there is no definition whatever. On that basis, in getting the balance right between the two institutions, the Joint Committee at the time recommended—and I promoted, because I did not want anything prescriptive—that they should agree indicators. That is a very general term, so that people knew what the Treasury was expecting, and what the Financial Policy Committee was asked, and tasked, to do. That was the genesis of it. If we do not get that balance right we could find, in a few years time, someone saying in this very place—if it still exists—why did they not come to some agreement, so that there was a general consensus on what was happening?
Far from it being dangerous territory, I think it is nothing more than plain common sense. I hope that the Minister will look at this again, particularly when we come back to the Report stage, but I do not intend to move the amendment tonight. I beg leave to withdraw.