(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Lords ChamberI absolutely recognise the point that the noble Lord made about Andrew Malkinson, who suffered a terrible miscarriage of justice. I understand there has been an interim payment made to him and that it is currently under consideration what the final award will be. My understanding is that the CCRC commissioned its own separate independent review into its handling of Malkinson’s issue and the applications, led by Chris Henley KC. The review, published in July 2024, set out multiple organisational and individual failings leading to that miscarriage of justice. That forms part of the overall review to which I have referred in earlier answers.
My Lords, following on from the sixth recommendation—recommendation F—of Chris Henley’s report of July of last year, what steps is the commission taking in particular to track and revisit unsuccessful forensic inquiries, including tests which do not produce profiles or produce only partial and incomplete profiles, which produce complete profiles that do not produce a match, or which produce developments in areas other than DNA? Is the commission now acting on advice from the national DNA database? I appreciate these are detailed questions. If the Minister cannot answer today, will he please write to me and place a copy in the Library?
I thank the noble Lord for the question. I think I am right in saying that there has been additional money put into the forensic side of the work done by the CCRC. If there is additional information which I need to impart to the House or to the noble Lord, I will put that in a letter.
(2 days, 21 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as the Minister outlined, these regulations follow the Government’s statutory review of the Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021. The proposed amendments would increase compensation for whiplash injuries occurring on or after 31 May 2025 from 14% to 15% across all tariff bands. This increase is intended, as we have heard, to reflect inflation since the original tariffs were introduced. It includes a forecasted buffer to cover inflation over the next three years.
The whiplash tariff system introduced by the previous Conservative Administration was aimed at reducing the number and cost of minor injury claims and lowering motor insurance premiums. It introduced fixed compensation levels for whiplash injuries sustained in road traffic accidents and moved away from case-by-case judicial assessment. The structure of the tariff is not altered by this instrument; what changes is the monetary value assigned to each tariff band. The uplift of 15% is designed to reflect inflation since 2021; it includes a buffer to account for expected inflation until the next statutory review, scheduled for 2027.
In principle, we support this change. It is reasonable that compensation should keep pace with the cost of living. We also welcome the Ministry of Justice’s stated intention to work with MedCo to improve the quality and consistency of medical reporting. Reliable, clear medical evidence is essential to the fair operation of this system, but we have some questions and concerns.
This instrument introduces a significant and untested change in how compensation levels are set. Rather than updating tariff figures in legislation, as had been the practice, this uplift includes a forward-looking inflation buffer based on economic forecasts. As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee pointed out, this is without precedent: no other statutory compensation scheme relies on forecasted inflation in this way. Forecasts, as we know, are often subject to revision and uncertainty. There is a real risk that this buffer may underestimate actual inflation, leaving claimants undercompensated over time. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on this point. What assurances can be given that the inflation buffer will be accurate and what mechanism will be in place to ensure that claimants are not short-changed if those forecasts prove incorrect?
In addition, we are concerned about how the Government have represented feedback from their public consultation. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee made it clear that over 90% of respondents opposed the buffer model. That is not a mixed view, even if the reasons given differed; it is, in fact, an overwhelmingly critical view.
We also note continuing concerns raised by third parties. The Motor Accident Solicitors Society, for example, said that the tariff system and the official injury claims portal have damaged access to justice, particularly for those unfamiliar with legal processes or without representation. It also argues that the original tariff amounts were too low—significantly lower than those typically awarded under Judicial College guidelines for comparable injuries outside a motor vehicle context. While this instrument focuses narrowly on adjusting tariff levels, it is part of a much wider macro-reform framework that remains highly contentious.
In conclusion, we support the uplift proposal in this instrument; ensuring that compensation keeps pace with inflation is necessary and fair. However, this policy cannot be left to run on autopilot. It must be subject to scrutiny, accountability and, where necessary, reform. We will support this instrument today, but we will continue to monitor closely whether the whiplash reforms are delivering on their promises of fairness, accessibility and justice.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their support for the measures in this statutory instrument. On the points which noble Lords have made, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said he supported it, but he repeated his reservations, which he originally articulated in 2018. Just for the record, there is some judicial discretion. All tariff awards can be increased by up to 20% by the court in exceptional circumstances, so I take the noble Lord’s point but there is some judicial discretion in the level of the awards. He asked how much money has been saved. I cannot give him an answer in a figure. However, HM Treasury laid a report on this in Parliament on 27 March 2025. The report details a summary of the information provided by insurers, which have concluded that policyholders benefited from a reduction in insurance costs through paying lower premiums over the period 2020 to 2023. As it is factual reporting of the information from insurers to the Treasury via the Financial Conduct Authority, the report does not represent the Government’s findings or conclusions. Separate to this report, the Ministry of Justice will undertake a post-implementation review of the whiplash reforms later this year. I hope that last point goes some way to reassuring the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. We have no intention of running on autopilot, and all government policies are kept under review. It is certainly the intention in this case as well.
My noble friend Lord Jones was characteristically very generous in his assessment of the Government’s approach overall, so I thank him for that. Regarding the volume of claims in England and Wales, in 2022, there were 1,827, and in 2023 there were 9,335. I am afraid I do not have a breakdown of how much of that is in Wales alone. If I am able to get those figures, I will let him know. I also do not have a percentage for the likely fraudulent claims. Those numbers are not monitored as such because there are different types of fraud. Nevertheless, if there is any data that I can include in my letter to my noble friend, I will do so.
On the Explanatory Memorandum, the calls for evidence and the different views that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, pointed to, more than 108,000 unrepresented claims have been created in the OIC portal since it since it was implemented. The proportion has increased from 9% in the first year to 12.7% as of 31 March 2025, so there is an increase in unrepresented claims, which we think is a good thing. In comparison, only 74 applications were made to the previous system by unrepresented claimants in 2021, so we think that the system is as a whole working well. Nevertheless, I do not want to give any hint of complacency. I undertake that we will continue to review the system and see that it continues to develop, as we hope it will.
Motion agreed.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, traditionally, English common law has recognised two forms of property: tangible things in possession and intangible things in action, such as debts and shares. However, as we have heard, with the rise of digital assets such as crypto- currencies, tokens and non-fungible tokens we encounter items that do not fit neatly into either category. These assets are becoming essential in modern commerce, and it is vital that English law remain at the forefront of international trade, safeguarding London’s position as a legal and financial hub.
The Law Commission looked at this and proposed a third category of property to accommodate such digital innovations, allowing for legal evolution without imposing rigid definitions that might exclude future technologies. The commission emphasised that statutory intervention must not undermine the existing legal clarity or introduce unnecessary complications. The flexibility of English common law is a strength; it has already adapted to address key questions in the digital sphere. The current regime offers a balance of predictability and adaptability, making our jurisdiction well positioned to lead in this space.
The Bill the commission drafted, which is now before us, does just that. We have tested it thoroughly in Committee. I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, and while I recognise them, the Bill has been carefully drafted and it is not necessary to amend it—save for Amendment 6, which we will come to later.
Addressing Amendments 1 and 2 in a little more detail, it will be for the courts to develop the law on the treatment of this category or to widen existing categories—whichever way one wishes to look at it. The proposed wording of Amendment 1 goes too far. The Bill’s wording is elegant and encompasses digital assets, which are not easily categorised in the conventional classifications. It also encompasses other things not yet contemplated or in our imagination but which, when they do come into existence, will be thought by the courts to deserve rights. That is what the Bill is doing; it is expressly not limited by over-definition. It achieves protection for these as yet unimagined things, while making it clear that existing digital assets will be protected.
We would be bold to depart from the views of Professor Green, chair of the Law Commission report, who is very hostile to this sort of amendment. When asked about one such suggested amendment, she said:
“That would really take away the whole bite of the Bill … the whole mischief that it addresses is that we no longer have to be stuck with these categories”.
Therefore, we cannot support Amendments 1 and 2.
Turning to Amendment 3, on codes of practice, we follow the reasoning which I have outlined. Any code of practice risks definitions which do not accommodate a new type of activity or entity outside its scope, but which is worthy of protection. Equally, the code might suggest that property rights be given to an activity which, after the detailed investigation that a trial can give, a court rightly decides should not be so protected. It is best left to the courts, which will receive evidence, hear arguments from competing parties and be able to resolve those matters. The six-month period is too soon. If the Law Commission had thought this a good idea, it could have said so. It is contrary to the tenor of its lengthy report. If the Act would, in five years’ time or whenever, benefit from amendment, it should be done with the benefit of hindsight and experience. Meanwhile, such amendment is premature.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for raising these issues. They get to the heart of the Bill: whether there is a need to recognise a further category in statute, and whether it is helpful to provide further guidance to the courts on the attributes to consider.
On the first of these points, the Government’s firm view is that the Bill’s current approach is the right one. Some stakeholders hold to the two-category view and say that there can be no further category beyond things in action and things in possession. This view is understandable but has its roots in history, including in an influential statement in a 19th-century case. That statement was made at a time when assets such as crypto tokens simply could not have been conceived of. The world has moved on, and the law needs to move on with it.
The Special Public Bill Committee heard from stakeholders who would prefer to see these emerging assets categorised as things in action, on the basis that their approach would give more legal certainty. However, the need for new solutions is the result of the unique features of these assets and not of their categorisation. For example, the existing rules on transfer of things in action, or on remedies for interference in things in action, are simply not adequate for assets such as crypto tokens. Either way, the law, through the courts, will have to respond to their new features.
The Bill is the result of a three-year project by the Law Commission during which all arguments, including the arguments in favour of this amendment, were considered in full. A strong majority of consultees to both consultations undertaken by the commission expressed a preference for a further category. Most respondents to the committee’s call for evidence also supported this approach. This approach came from a wide range of stakeholders—from legal professionals to industry bodies and academics.
Another advantage of the Bill’s approach is that it is technologically neutral. As the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, excellently put it in Committee, the Bill
“encompasses other things not yet contemplated or in our imagination”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 16.]
The Bill future-proofs our law in the way the other two categories do not. As Professor Green put it in her evidence, as quoted by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Sandhurst,
“the whole mischief that it addresses is that we no longer have to be stuck with these categories”.
By removing any uncertainty around a possible further category, we will give the courts the freedom to develop our common law. This approach allows them to consider and respond to the unique features of digital assets, and other assets that we cannot yet foresee.
This flexibility is also relevant to the question raised by Amendment 3: whether the Secretary of State should publish codes of practice about the attributes of digital things that confer personal property rights. The Government’s view is that requiring the publication of codes of practice could undermine the flexibility that the current drafting affords the courts. The Law Commission considered the features of assets that have characteristics of property but do not fit into the existing categories. However, City law firms, senior barristers, financial industry groups and crypto industry groups gave clear feedback that a more detailed statutory provision incorporating these features could be counter- productive.
The Government are concerned that the same issues could stem from publishing a code of practice. It could create unhelpful boundary challenges, lead to undue complexity, and prevent the common law being able to respond flexibly and dynamically to new technologies and unforeseen challenges. This feedback was reflected in some of the written evidence submitted to the Bill Committee.
As noble Lords will remember, the Bill Committee was firmly in favour of maintaining the Bill’s current approach. My noble friend Lord Stansgate got to the heart of the matter when he said:
“The whole point of the Bill is to set out something relatively simple, to take into account new technology and to enable judges to develop common law”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 19.]
As the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, so eloquently put it:
“The relative silence of the current Bill is golden”.—[Official Report, 3/2/25; col. 20.]
The Bill deliberately does not try to define the types of assets that may fall within its scope. Rather, it unblocks the common law and leaves it to the courts to develop the appropriate principles, building on centuries of world-renowned common-law development. By doing this, English and Welsh and Northern Ireland law can remain dynamic, globally competitive and a useful tool for those in the digital asset market. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, an impact assessment is not practicable, whether in six months’ or three months’ time, we respectfully suggest. It would be premised on too many uncertainties. What we know is that the Bill will do no harm and is likely to do good. We have, if you like, the theoretical impact assessment of the Law Commission, which looked at all the issues in great detail. So, I suggest that we do not need this amendment, and we would not support it.
As to Amendment 5, six months’ time is, again, with respect, too short. I would suggest in parentheses that a review in five years’ time to see whether it is useful, whether it needs further amendment, how it is operating and what the effect is on the London market and litigation in London, could well be of value. Whether it needs a formal assessment or not is something that can be looked at four years down the road, but this is early days. We simply do not know enough. With respect to my noble friend, a review in a few months’ time will not help us at all. We do not support the amendment.
My Lords, at the outset, I acknowledge the long-standing advocacy for technological innovation of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. I also pay tribute to his deep commitment to ensuring that our regulatory framework is fit for purpose in an increasingly digital world.
These amendments would mandate reviews of the impact of digital assets being treated as property by virtue of the Bill’s provisions. One amendment requires the Government to publish an economic impact assessment of the Bill on the day the Act is passed. As noble Lords will know, the Government published an impact assessment when introducing the Bill. I hope it will assist and reassure noble Lords if I highlight some of the most salient points.
As the impact assessment sets out, the Bill is expected to bring clarity to personal property law, reduce uncertainty for businesses and ensure England, Wales and Northern Ireland remain leading locations in which to innovate. Due to limited data, it is very hard, if not impossible, to quantify these benefits. However, we think the Bill will help ensure our laws remain competitive on an international stage.
The impact assessment considered the potential for the Bill to encourage the use of digital assets. However, this impact is highly debateable, given the Bill merely confirms the position that has been gradually emerging through case law in recent years. It is not expected or intended that the Bill will cause a significant increase in uptake of digital assets.
The same amendment calls for the impact assessment to cover the estimated change in demand for, and use of, digital assets. The assessment would also have to cover data centre power usage, the current level of data centre power provision and its ability to meet any increase in demand for digital assets. This follows on from the points the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, made in Committee. He mentioned that he would like to hear that the Government are committed to data centres being fuelled through renewable energy and a discussion around where data centres would be located, given the value they can bring to the country. Although these are important points, they sit outside the remit of the Bill.
I say to my noble friend Lord Stansgate that whether a data centre is in space or not is also outside the relevant part of the Bill.
Furthermore, it would likely be impossible to accurately estimate the long-term effect of the Bill on data centres. There are many greater influences on these areas, such as cloud computing, AI and general data storage. This will make it extremely difficult to assess the impact of the Bill. Therefore, such a review could result in speculative or misleading conclusions.
The other amendment calls for reviewing the
“need for further regulation of stablecoins and tokenised deposits”
within six months of the Act passing. Here, I reiterate that the Bill does not specify how the courts will treat these particular digital assets. If they were considered personal property under the Bill, this would not affect the need—or not—for regulation. The Bill deals only with a discrete matter of private law. Therefore, the proposed review is unlikely to yield any meaningful conclusions.
Moreover, issues around regulating stablecoins and tokenised deposits are already being addressed. The Government’s forthcoming financial services regulatory regime of crypto assets will include a new regulated activity for stablecoin issuance in the UK. Overseas-issued stablecoin will be regulated in the UK in line with other crypto assets. This will ensure that the Financial Conduct Authority can properly manage stablecoin-specific risks.
In addition, the Prudential Regulation Authority has published its views on the risks associated with tokenised deposits and how it expects banks to address those risks. Where tokenisation does not change the underlying economics and fundamental nature of a depositor’s claim, the PRA’s prudential regulatory framework will treat a tokenised deposit similarly to a traditional deposit. Where banks intend to take tokenised deposits from retail customers, the PRA expects this to be done in a way that meets the PRA’s rules for eligibility for depositor protection under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
The Bill takes a minimalist approach to achieve the specific aim of unblocking the common law on personal property. While I am very pleased that I have had the opportunity to debate these amendments, the Government fear that they could cause unnecessary bureaucracy and regulatory duplication, which could increase uncertainty rather than alleviate it.
As set out already, we think there are significant benefits of the Bill, such as bringing clarity to English, Welsh and Northern Irish law and keeping it world leading. We will, of course, monitor those benefits closely in the future. Given that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, we support this amendment, for the reasons advanced by my noble friend Lord Holmes. I, too, add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for all the hard work which he put in and to our excellent clerk, Matthew Burton. It is a pleasure now to see this Bill reach a happy conclusion, I hope.
My Lords, this amendment seeks to restate the Long Title of the Bill, and I have put my name to it as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said. The amendment was tabled by the noble Lord but was suggested by Adam Temple, a senior barrister who specialises in financial services, when he gave evidence. This amendment addresses a slight discrepancy between the wording in the Long Title and the Bill’s operative clause. This discrepancy in wording came about following the Law Commission consultation on the draft Bill, which led to Clause 1 being amended to address concerns that it could be read as providing that any thing was capable of being personal property. That is not the intended effect of the Bill. Therefore, the wording changed from saying that a thing may be capable of being an object of property rights to instead saying that a thing is not prevented from being the object of personal property rights merely because it does not fit into the traditional categories of things in possession or things in action.
At the time of drafting, the Law Commission did not feel it was necessary to make a corresponding change to the Long Title. However, several noble Lords raised concerns about this discrepancy during our Committee debate and asked the Government to consider it further. Having reflected carefully, we are satisfied that making this change will not have any substantive effect. We are therefore content to accept this amendment so that the Long Title is consistent with the operative clause of the Bill. I end by thanking the noble Lord for his constructive discussions on this point. As for thanking noble Lords, I will leave that to the last stage of the Bill.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI pay tribute to my predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. When I was in opposition, he made a point of encouraging me to visit a pathfinder court in Dorset. I was very impressed by what I saw, and the Government are pleased to carry on that initiative. Again, I am afraid the further rollout of pathfinder is also subject to those allocation discussions, which are ongoing, but I absolutely endorse the point my noble friend makes about the importance of pathfinder, not least because it is a way of highlighting and cracking down on domestic abuse in the court system.
My Lords, until 2012, there was funding for the excellent support scheme for specialist providers of social welfare and housing law. What consideration are the Government giving to its revival? If the Minister is not aware of plans, will he undertake to look at this?
I will undertake to look at that. I am not aware of it in detail; I know that various pilots have been undertaken. I will write to the noble Lord.