Telecommunications Restriction Orders (Custodial Institutions) (England and Wales) Regulations 2016
Lord Rowlands Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the order before us today gives an additional power to disrupt the use of illegally held mobile phones in the prison estate by way of a telecommunications restriction order, which requires the telecommunication provider to prevent or restrict the use of communication devices by persons detained in custodial institutions.
I very much agree with the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, contained in Appendix 1 of the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. The option to block mobile phone signals seems to me a far simpler and more effective option available, and it seems odd that that was dismissed out of hand largely, it appears, on the grounds of cost. Clearly, there is a serious problem and action needs to be taken. What is proposed here is better than where we are at present, but it is cumbersome—new phones or SIM cards risk being smuggled in, and a constant battle may take place to identify a new device or number so that another application can be made for a telecommunications restriction order. It does not completely solve the problem. As I said, it is cumbersome. It will require multiple applications to court on a regular basis and the more effective option has been ruled out.
As we have heard and read in the papers, mobile phones held illegally in prisons have enabled serious crimes to be committed by prisoners, including the importation of automatic firearms, the distribution of drugs, the sale of firearms, planned escapes and the harassment and intimidation of witnesses. With a list like that, I think the case for a blanket ban, through the use of blocking devices, is compelling. Can the noble and learned Lord tell us what review processes are going to be in place to evaluate this scheme and whether the blocking devices are off the table for good, or is it something the Home Office will reconsider at some point in the future? Although I prefer the blocking option, I fully support the order before us today.
Lord Rowlands (Lab)
My Lords, I have had three privileges in my life. I have had the privilege of serving in every Parliament for the last 50 years. I have also had the additional privilege—the most recent one—of being a member of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, and it is in that context that I rise to speak. I refer in particular to that part of the report in which our committee reported on the use of the statutory instrument.
Over the years that I have been in both Houses, these were all too familiar words:
“Regulations … may … make incidental, consequential, supplementary or transitional provision”.
Both Houses have warned Ministers and departments over the years not to use these generalised and imprecise words to promote regulations of importance and significance. Our own committee made that very point in the eighth report of 2008, yet here we are in 2016 with Regulation 8 being promoted through these imprecise and general words.
I remind the Committee what Regulation 8 seeks to establish. It will give the courts the power to order that some or all documents can be withheld and prevent a party to the proceedings from having access to such information. Who would deny that that type of restriction is both important and significant? Who would claim that this is just a consequential, incidental, supplementary or transitional matter? If the Government intend to promote Regulation 8 on that basis, which of those applies? Is it incidental? It cannot be, surely. An instrument which will restrict access to information for parties in a hearing is certainly not incidental. Is it consequential? No, how can it be consequential? Is it supplementary? Is the Minister going to rest his case on the basis that this is just a mere supplement? An instrument of this kind, leading to the possible restriction of parties’ access to evidence in the proceedings? That cannot be supplementary. On what possible basis can the Government promote Regulation 8 as regulation that is incidental, consequential, supplementary or transitional?
The Government’s case is even more feeble and flimsy when one goes back and looks at the parent Act. The Act stipulates, in considerable detail, in Sections 80(3) and (4), the matters that should be subject to regulations. Section 80(3) lists some seven matters that must be considered in regulations, while Section 80(4) lists six that may be. Some 13 matters are specified in the two subsections, but what is not in them is the issue of the power to give the courts the right to withhold evidence. Why is that not there? This is an important issue. The 2015 Act specifically listed the kinds of issues that should be dealt with and addressed in regulations, but the important one that is now being brought forward, of withholding evidence, was missing.
Why was it not included in the list in the parent Act? There must have been some debate in the department about it, or among Ministers about such a big issue. Why was it left out? Why was it excluded and why is it now being brought in? Was it an oversight? Did they forget that this was going to be a big issue? If so, they are now trying to remedy an omission or an oversight. I want to find out from the Minister why and how an important issue such as this was left out of the parent Act and is now being brought forward and promoted under this raw, general and imprecise regulation. We deserve answers on this mysterious issue.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords.
I will first address the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rowland. I am aware of the report from the Joint Committee. The points made by the committee in its report were not raised with the department before the report was published. However, the Home Office has given careful consideration to this question and its position remains that Regulation 8 is intra vires. Section 80 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 gives power to the courts to make a TRO, and matters such as disclosure, costs, appeals and so on are all supplementary to that process—they do not have to be specified. I acknowledge that the words “supplementary” and “incidental” are broad, but they are broad for that reason, so that they can embrace these issues. In these circumstances, it is the view of the Home Office that the provisions made in Regulation 8 are supplementary to the primary or principal business of Section 80 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, and that remains our position.
Lord Rowlands
But surely, when one reads the list in Section 80, a regulation which allows a court to withhold evidence from a party to proceedings is more significant and important than even those in Section 80. Why was it not at least included in the original Act in those sections? I suggest to the Minister and the Committee that it is quite serious. If this precedent goes through, government departments will be able to use this loose, imprecise regulation to introduce the most wide-reaching changes by regulation, which were not included in the original Act. A quite fundamental point is at stake here.
Lord Keen of Elie
I note what the noble Lord says, but it is the view of the Home Office that these provisions are simply supplementary to the principal purposes of Section 80. The 13 examples that are listed are not conclusive or exclusive in that regard. However, I will undertake to write to the noble Lord further to explain our position with regard to Section 80 if he wishes me to do so.
Lord Keen of Elie
I turn to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, with regard to the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, at an earlier stage, and in particular the stated preference for blocking technology to be fitted in prisons, as opposed to the use of the sort of technology that is contemplated under the present proposed regulations. NOMS makes use of blocking technology in its estate and is committed to investing more in this area. However, while the technology is effective, it is extremely expensive as an option; it is estimated that the cost of employing it over the entire prison estate would be in the region of £300 million, which is massively in excess of the costs anticipated with regard to the provision of TROs—therefore, there is a real cost issue there. It remains the position that blocking technology is used within the estate and NOMS has committed to invest more in this area, but it will take time. On the employment of blocking technology, it is not just the cost of installation, but the cost of maintaining it in each wing of every prison is also considerable and has to be taken into account. That is why NOMS has adopted the position that these regulations should be employed and believes that TROs are the way forward for the immediate future.
Once commenced, the new powers will add to and strengthen the ability to prevent and disrupt offending behind prison walls. That is a key pledge in our serious and organised crime strategy and part of the Government’s overall commitment to tackling serious crime. We are working towards a commencement date for the regulations in England and Wales of July 2016. I therefore hope that this Committee will see fit to approve the draft regulations.
EU: Eurojust (EUC Report)
Lord Rowlands Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Corston. I have the privilege to serve on the European Union Sub-Committee on Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection, which is chaired excellently by the noble Baroness.
The Government have made it quite clear that the current legislation on Eurojust represents a,
“positive model of cross-border co-operation”.
The Government have stated that it is their intention to seek to opt back in to the existing legislation on Eurojust following the decision to exercise the 2014 opt-out of 130 EU police and criminal justice measures adopted before the treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009.
When the sub-committees were considering the general issue of the opt-out, Eurojust was one of the measures on which there was a high level of consensus in favour. Eurojust provides judicial co-ordination meetings, judicial co-operation agreements with third countries, office facilities, the facilitation of mutual legal assistance agreements, the acceleration and execution of European arrest warrants and the funding of joint investigation teams with the accompanying translation costs. As the Government have recognised, all of these are of considerable value to the United Kingdom. In these circumstances it is very clear why the Government wish to opt back in to the existing arrangements.
The DPP, in evidence, to the committee said that Eurojust costs the UK just £360,000 per annum and costs would be much greater were these arrangements to be the subject of individual bilateral liaison between magistrates in each country. Those of us who were involved in the process of criminal investigation prior to 2002 are aware of how very much longer all these things took prior to the establishment of Eurojust. We know that sometimes things took so long and became so complex that criminals were able to avoid justice. We must also bear it in mind that even if criminals are ultimately apprehended, the ancient maxim that justice delayed is justice denied still applies.
The committee in its 23rd report of the 2003-04 Session, stated that Eurojust was,
“a model of how to make progress in an area where the differences between national jurisdictions are so great that it would be unrealistic to aim for harmonisation. It is also an example of the sort of effective practical co-operation that an EU agency can provide”.
The Government’s concerns have been articulated very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Corston. They are threefold: ramifications for fundamental rights; concerns in relation to the governance and management structures of Eurojust; and the nature of the extended powers to be given to national members. The decision is imminent and the sub-committee to which I belong has recommended that we should opt in. The real problem with Eurojust is well recognised. It is the extent to which the new proposal interacts the European Public Prosecutors Office proposal with Eurojust. I understand the reservations in relation to the EPPO. They are shared by a significant number of other states. As we say in our report, the UK will not be alone in opposing the EPPO.
The UK needs to be at the table to participate in these fundamentally important negotiations in the Council. We need to ensure that our voice is heard in these debates, particularly in support of those other members who wish to support less radical change to Eurojust, as the UK does. These will be complex and important arrangements. Ultimately it is likely that the current Eurojust arrangements will change. If we are not part of the negotiations, we will not be able to influence the outcome as effectively as if we were at the table. It is not impossible, as we say in the report, that if the UK fails to take its place at these negotiations, they will proceed. Eurojust will change, and the UK will find itself unable to opt back in to the existing arrangements, leaving us at a significant disadvantage in the fight against crime. The existing Eurojust will disappear, and we will not have brought to bear our very considerable influence on the creation of the new Eurojust. This can only leave the UK at a disadvantage.
As we contemplate the fight against crime and terrorism across borders, we have good cause to ensure that co-operative arrangements are as comprehensive as possible, while still retaining and maintaining our national independence. In Ireland last night, a massive bomb was intercepted by the Irish police. It was destined for the north. It would have caused carnage. We have increasing levels of evidence of more militant views in many communities, with the creation of many murals glorifying what they called the armed struggle. We have to consider the concerns we know exist in Northern Ireland about the possible effects of the current opt-out proposals on the protection of security in these islands. We have also to consider the ramifications of the interdependence between organised crime and terrorism in the context of this proposal. For example, we have two individuals who are subject to TPIMs currently on the run. They are subject to TPIMs because they were regarded by a judge as a threat to national security.
We cannot revert to the times when we were dependent on bilateral arrangements and individual processes took months, if not years. If we opt out of Eurojust under the protocol 36 arrangements and find ourselves unable to opt back in because things have moved on, that may well threaten the coherence of the whole package which the United Kingdom will present to the Commission when it seeks to opt back in to the various measures. European arrest warrants, the other 34 measures and, indeed, the other measures which have been recommended for inclusion in the package are interdependent. The Government stated in their response to the 13th report:
“Europol currently provides support in over 280 operations involving UK law enforcement”.
If we opt in, we can negotiate so as to secure the removal of the powers to direct national law enforcement agencies to initiate investigations or share data. We can influence other states to achieve an outcome acceptable to the UK. We will definitely do so more effectively if we are sitting at the table than if we are on the sidelines watching, seeking ultimately to rejoin a Eurojust on terms for which we have not argued and which ultimately we may even be unable to accept.
We put our whole protocol 36 situation at risk if we do not opt in. Eurojust represents great value to us. We must ensure that we have a voice in the ongoing debates, and I ask the Minister to consider again the decision the Government have made.
Lord Rowlands (Lab)
My Lords, if only I could improve upon the powerful and compelling case that the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Corston, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, have made on our committee’s report. This time last week, we had a consensus on our report on the EPPO. As I understand it, we have a consensus of a rather different kind tonight: a consensus of two Front Benches opposing our report. I find that all the more puzzling given the events of the past week or two.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, since we wrote this report, the context has changed. We have seen a very significant and “important”—in inverted commas—rebellion across a number of European Parliaments to the draft proposal on the EPPO. It was our case that if the Government joined in the debate and discussion on Eurojust, they would find enough allies to change and alter that report effectively. Surely the evidence of the past week or two has been that there are such allies and that if one engaged in an active and proactive way on this measure, one would find enough allies to change or transform the report itself. Our case has been strengthened by the events of the past week or two, and therefore I am puzzled if both Front Benches for some reason oppose the conclusions of our report.
We all accept the value of Eurojust. The Government accept the value of Eurojust. They want to opt back in to Eurojust under the opt-in proposals. We all support that opt-in to the system. I certainly share the Government’s concerns about the existing draft proposal. Almost all those concerns are about the interrelationship between it and the proposed draft for the EPPO. If those fall—if, in fact, the Commission is going to have to withdraw or revise its proposal—surely there will be a consequential fallout in the draft Eurojust proposal. Will the Minister bring us up to date on what has happened since last Monday, when there were enough reasoned opinions across Europe to mean that the Commission will have to review it? What has the Commission intimated? It has suggested that it is going to do so, and it accepts and understands the voices of concern. If it does that, does it not also have to review and almost withdraw this proposal because they are totally interlinked? A portion of the Eurojust draft is related to the proposed public prosecutor’s office. Will the Minister tell us whether, if the Commission has to review the EPPO, it will also probably have to undertake some kind of review of this draft?
In this case, we have a compelling case for joining in the negotiation because we now have a good clear view that we could affect those negotiations in a very positive way. As other members of the committee have said, one of the things that swung me in favour of our report—and I was sceptical at the beginning because I understood and appreciated the Government’s concerns—was that we could influence this because we sensed there would be a lot of other supporters. The other reason why I supported it was that I looked down the road and thought that a bizarre situation could happen in which the Government opt in to the existing measure and then find that this measure has been revised and it belongs to an existing measure which down the road may well be of a different kind, and they have opted out of that. I think that would cause a very puzzling and bizarre situation in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Eurojust system.
There is one thing on which we surely have consensus: we are in favour of Eurojust and we are in favour of the United Kingdom’s participation in it. Therefore, I beg the Minister to tell us what has happened since last Monday and whether the impact of what happened in the past week or two means that the Government should rethink their position on this issue and should at least keep an open mind on the question of opting in, negotiating and influencing what I think is a very important organisation.
Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)
My Lords, the matter before the House concerns only Eurojust, but it is clear that Eurojust and the EPPO have a very close nexus one to another. There are two ways of looking at that nexus: one is positive and the other is negative. It seems to me that the Government, and the Opposition for that matter—one is in the luxurious position on the Cross Benches of being able to say, “A mild plague on both your houses”—are approaching the matter from an utterly negative point of view. The Government have asked the question: is Eurojust in any way tainted by association with the EPPO? They answered yes; ergo, it must be rejected.
I argue that there is a forceful and utterly convincing case to the contrary. I am proud to say that I, too, am a member of Sub-Committee E. We have heard a great deal of evidence over the months with regard to European fraud. The official figure for fraud was €440 million or something of that nature. I do not think that anybody applied their minds to it properly, as the evidence was very different, appearing to range somewhere between €3 billion and €5 billion, possibly even in excess of that latter figure. Nobody was charged with overarching responsibility. That is where the case for the EPPO comes in. There is a saying in Welsh: “Everybody’s concern is nobody’s responsibility”. That is the situation here. Unless there is a body that is charged with the particular commission of looking at European fraud in a serious way, as has never happened before, I think that the whole system will be jeopardised to its very roots.
If one accepts that there should be an EPPO—and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has pointed out that the objections are sere thin, casuistic and have no merit whatever—it seems to be the case that the Eurojust situation very much fits into that picture. It seems to me that the whole situation is tainted by the prejudices that have become so prevalent in the last few months in relation to Third Pillar matters. We have heard abundant evidence to show that it does not matter a row of beans what we do about 90 to 95 of those 130 measures, as most of them have virtually no effect upon our situation. One or two are of peripheral significance. Yet somehow or other the Government have managed to taint the whole situation by pretending that this is a massive battle for British sovereignty. In doing so, they are jeopardising something like 30 to 35 matters that are of crucial significance in so many different fields, and doing so cynically in order to pretend that we are somehow winning a great victory in relation to the 95 matters that never mattered at all.
I therefore very respectfully ask the Minister, whom I believe to be one of the most reasonable Ministers in government, to consider yet again whether he may be wrong in this particular matter.
European Public Prosecutor’s Office: EUC Report
Lord Rowlands Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Rowlands
That this House takes note of the Report of the European Union Committee on the Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (COM(2013)534, Council Document 12558/13) (3rd Report, HL Paper 65).
Lord Rowlands (Lab)
My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion on the Order Paper in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, present their apologies. Both are attending the COSAC meeting in Vilnius. As a member of Sub-Committee E, which prepared this report, I have the pleasure of inviting the House to agree to its recommendation. That recommendation is that the House issue a formal reasoned opinion that the Commission’s proposal to create a European Public Prosecutor’s Office breaches the principle of subsidiarity.
The principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5 requires that the EU should take legislative action,
“only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States … but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”.
No one now denies that there are significant problems with European Union fraud. Indeed, it was our committee which sought to highlight this point in its April report when it suggested that European fraud now ran to the tune of about £5 billion a year. We recognise that there are considerable shortcomings in the system for combating such fraud. We are not arguing this evening that one does not need to address these issues seriously but about in what way one should address them.
The Commission has now come up with the proposal that the way to deal with European fraud is to create a new supranational European body, with an independent power to investigate and prosecute EU fraud offences in national courts, called the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, or EPPO. Our report outlines, in detail, the structures and powers of the proposed public prosecutor’s office. I will identify some of the features that concern us most. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office will have a very wide jurisdiction as to what it investigates and prosecutes. Although the definition of European fraud has yet to be firmly fixed, it will be very likely to encompass any act or omission which has the effect of wrongly acquiring or retaining EU funds or assets or which results in the diminution of European Union revenue. It would include, for example, incitement, aiding and abetting such offences, and corporate criminal liability.
The committee was particularly concerned about the proposal for the prosecutor’s office to gain exclusive jurisdiction over any other offence which is inextricably linked to a European fraud offence. That has the considerable capacity to further expand and involve the office in national jurisdictions and expand its own jurisdiction. We should all be concerned at the nature and potential character of that proposal.
The proposed office will also have exclusive power to investigate and prosecute a wide range of offences. It will have a wide range of investigative powers such as the right to search premises and intercept telecommunications, to be exercised in accordance with national law and subject to obtaining a judicial warrant where national investigators would be obliged to obtain one. It can require information and assistance from national authorities. The proposals also suggest that it can operate under its own rules on the admissibility of evidence.
The committee, in considering these proposals, concluded that the proposal fails the subsidiarity test. The report lists nine bullet points at paragraph 14 to justify that opinion. I will briefly underline or summarise a few of them. First, we suggest that there are better alternatives, based on the current framework, which is built on criminal enforcement by member states. More can be done to prevent fraud happening in the first place through good quality legislation and careful administration of resources by the Commission and member states. We should remember that 80% of all European Union funds are administered by member states themselves. That is a vital factor, which should be taken into account. Co-ordinated action needs to be improved, but we do not believe that this particular proposal for this particular kind of office is justifiable.
The EPPO would undermine the effectiveness of existing EU fraud-fighting organisations such as Eurojust and OLAF. Giving the EPPO exclusive competence would create an unnecessary faultline between national and European Union efforts to counter fraud, introduce complication, and risk the moral hazard that member states will feel that they can leave EU fraud to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. By contrast, it must be a shared responsibility, particularly given that, as I emphasise again, 80% of all European Union funds are administered by the member states themselves. Our committee was concerned that the proposal would interfere disproportionately in the sensitive area of member states’ criminal law systems, by conferring exclusive powers on the public prosecutor’s office and giving it power to dictate how finite national criminal law enforcement resources are deployed and by allowing it to operate according to its own rules on the admissibility of evidence.
Our committee found that the Commission has not made its case adequately. It underestimates the costs and overestimates the benefits of such an office, particularly as at least two member states, the UK and Denmark, will not be participating. The Government have made it clear that the UK is not going to opt into this proposal and, indeed, that a referendum would be required for it to do so. It is nevertheless, in our view, appropriate for this House to issue a reasoned opinion, and it does not absolve the House from coming to a position on the issue of subsidiarity. All national parliaments have a special role to play in monitoring compliance with subsidiarity in accordance with the treaties, and many national parliaments have been very active on this proposal.
Although Article 86 of the Lisbon treaty specifically envisaged the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, that does not undermine our reasoned opinion. First, the article is permissive. Our opinion is consistent with the treaty—we do not challenge the right of the EU to create such a body, but are saying that this particular set of proposals is far-reaching, intrusive and infringes the principle of subsidiarity. Under the subsidiarity procedures, national parliaments can force European institutions to review a proposal—it requires, as I understand it, 14 parliamentary votes across the union. Fascinatingly, there has been, in the past few weeks, a growing groundswell of parliamentary opinion across the union critical of these proposals. I understand that we have already reached 14 parliamentary votes and five more are in the pipeline including, I hope, in this House tonight. The House should support the report and our reasoned opinion, and put further pressure on the Commission to review these radical and unacceptable proposals.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands. He has laid out the case as to why this proposal to establish a European public prosecutor’s office does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity with forensic skill, and I will try to avoid repeating what he has said.
I was a member of Sub-Committee E, both at the time of issuing this subsidiary assessment and of the publication of the report, The Fight Against Fraud on the EU’s Finances. That report found that there appeared to be a significant level of fraud within the EU budget, and that official figures appeared, at least to us, to significantly underestimate the volume and value of that fraud. Therefore, at first blush one has some sympathy with a proposal that appears to have as its objective, the sharpening up of the organisational response to these defects. Further to that, our report found significant weaknesses in the work of the European anti-fraud office, known as OLAF, which included tensions between the supervisory committee and the executive arm of the agency; frequent turnover of representation so that consistent policies were not followed through; an absence of classification of fraud offences, which the noble Lord referred to; a reluctance to name and shame countries where it appeared that fraud was taking place; and last but not least, a lack of will among member states to report and follow up suspected cases of fraud.
To be fair to the commission, it has put in place a number of measures to improve OLAF’s operational efficiency, notably the regulations adopted just six weeks ago on 11 September. However, one of the more depressing features of the Brussels bureaucracy—at least to a Euro-agnostic like me—is the tendency, where an organisation is not operating up to par, not to undertake a serious attempt to improve the efficiency, but instead to pile on top of, or in this case alongside, that organisation yet another body to look after it. It is almost certain that an EPPO operating alongside OLAF and Eurojust will surely only serve to undermine OLAF’s work at this time, when the recent changes just introduced, as I mentioned, should give it a new sense of purpose and direction.
I particularly share the view expressed in the report that the anticipated costs of running the EPPO are woefully understated; a net annual cost of just €6.1 million is surely not credible. The reason for the subsidiarity judgment is that the fight against EU fraud needs to be developed from first principles, and they can be done without the introduction of the EPPO. The Commission needs to improve the clarity of its budgeting system; improve its own systems for overseeing that budget; and work more closely, where appropriate, through OLAF and Eurojust with member states so that they investigate and prosecute fraudulent activity with vigour and purpose.
The noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, quite rightly focused on the impact of this proposal on the national criminal law systems of individual member states. He was right to do so and I support him. However, I believe that even if it were possible to overcome these principle objections—and I, for the record, do not believe this would be possible—establishing the EPPO would, on purely practical grounds, likely offend the principle of subsidiarity and undermine the existing organisations of OLAF and Eurojust at the same time.
My concern on this point was underlined by the Written Statement published in Hansard on 15 October, which states:
“Vice President Reding presented her recent proposals for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office … There was support, in principle, from a large proportion of Member States … but less agreement on issues of substance, including scope; structure; competence; powers; jurisdiction and governance”.—[Official Report, 15/10/13; col. WS 52.]
In effect, the EU member states could not agree how this thing should be proceeded with on any practical level, and that is why I support this reasoned opinion.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, for tabling this debate. He cannot be here this evening because he is exercising his responsibilities as chairman of the European Union Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for moving the Motions of the committee and its reasoned opinion on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposal and for presenting the issues so clearly—as does the report that the committee produced.
It is laid out in the EU treaties that the Commission must consider the principle of subsidiarity when drafting all EU legislation. It must also include a detailed subsidiarity statement in the published text. It should be,
“substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators”.
In effect, the Commission should not only say that the principle of subsidiarity has been met but also clearly demonstrate how it has been met and provide well researched and accurate evidence. To assess this, there is a two-limbed subsidiarity test. The Commission should clearly demonstrate in its rationale and impact assessments that the objectives of a proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved at member state level—the first limb of the test—and then that the objectives of a proposal can be better achieved at EU level by reason of their scale and effect, which is the second limb and the so-called EU added-value test.
The EU treaties give this House and Parliament the right to decide whether the proposal meets both limbs of the subsidiarity test. If noble Lords believe that the Commission has failed clearly to demonstrate that EU-level action is necessary and is of added value, it is their right to say so by issuing a reasoned opinion. This is therefore a matter for Parliament and not for the Government. In the case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposal published in July this year, as we know, the European Union Committee considered the two-limbed test and found that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The reasoned opinion clearly lays out the reasoning. The Government agree with the European Union Committee’s assessment.
In the Government’s Explanatory Memorandum on the proposal, we made it clear that we do not believe that the principle of subsidiarity has been met in this case. We share the view that the Commission has not presented a convincing case. The figures used by the Commission to justify the EPPO are flawed and inflated, while other evidence draws on inappropriate, partial and unsubstantiated information. There are many gaps and blanks, especially in the costs of change and future funding needs. While of course the issue of fraud must be tackled at all levels—including when it involves funds that form part of the EU budget—we do not agree that the establishment of an EPPO is the right approach. The relevant legal base in the treaties—Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—says that a European Prosecutor’s Office “may” be established. The treaties do not say that it “shall” be created, yet the Commission presents that as the only solution.
The Commission has not allowed time for current reforms at national level to take effect and make a difference. For example, reforms to the European Anti-Fraud Office—OLAF—are currently being introduced to improve information exchange between OLAF and national authorities and to improve OLAF’s internal quality control. Indeed, a new regulation governing the work of OLAF entered into force only on 1 October. We hope that the improved quality of evidence provided by OLAF to national courts will address many of the conviction issues that the Commission raises in its assessment of the EU fraud problem. These changes need time to be implemented before any action is contemplated. The Commission has not considered adequately other options to strengthen the current system further. For example, it has not considered enhanced incentives or other options for reform at regional or national level in any detail or in a rigorous manner.
In the Government’s view, the best way to tackle EU fraud is through prevention. The UK has a zero-tolerance approach to all fraud, with robust management controls and payment systems in place that seek to prevent incidents of EU fraud. Additionally, we should continue efforts that are already being made to strengthen the current system. The House is also aware of our long-standing position in the coalition agreement not to participate in the establishment of any European Prosecutor’s Office. The details of the proposal serve only to reinforce that position. This proposal is unnecessary, unsubstantiated and unwelcome.
On the principle of subsidiarity, every reasoned opinion sends a political message to the Commission. If a quarter of the votes allocated to EU national parliaments were cast, the so-called yellow card would be triggered. The Commission would then be obliged to review the proposal. I am pleased to say that, as the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, indicated, the 14-vote threshold has now been achieved in the case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. I firmly believe that this House should join that group and send a political signal to the Commission that its proposal does not meet the subsidiarity test.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for the way in which he has presented the report of the EU Committee, members of that committee and my noble friends Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Dykes for their contributions to the debate. It has been a thorough report and a good debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for her support on this issue. Time is of the essence. I understand that our votes have to be in by midnight tonight.
To conclude, this Motion is for Parliament. It is not for the Government to act. I can only encourage your Lordships to agree this reasoned opinion and exercise the right given to this House under EU treaties.
Lord Rowlands
Our committee will take great comfort and satisfaction in the nature of this debate and in the unanimity that exists. I will not be tempted to rise to the bait of the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, and describe my Euro-tendencies at this time, except to say that this is one of the rarer moments when he and I agree on European issues. We have not agreed in the past. We certainly can agree on this issue.
I thank all those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, rightly emphasised the changes that are occurring within the existing institutions; the door should be left open to carry them through. My noble friend Lady Smith on the Front Bench rightly said that the primary responsibility will lie with national jurisdictions. That is where 80% of the funds are administered. Article 325 of the treaty says that responsibility for dealing with European fraud lies both with the Union and with member states. This proposal is therefore in this context wrong and I am delighted that all of us who have spoken in this debate share that view.
EU: Justice and Home Affairs
Lord Rowlands Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Rowlands
My Lords, I welcome this first report of the application of the protocols. In doing so, it might be helpful to remind ourselves how these procedures and processes came about in the first place.
I had the good fortune to be a member of the Constitution Committee that considered and scrutinised the last European Union Bill in which the Government proposed these protocols. We heard a great deal from the Government about the strength of these protocols, how cast-iron these opt-outs were, and that they represented—as many Members will remember—the famous red lines that had been drawn around them. The committee kept asking one simple question: what if future Governments, of any side or character, decide to accept the opt-ins and therefore remove some of the red lines that have been drawn around the protocols? We asked what the procedure would be if the Government made this decision, what the form of scrutiny would be, and what sort of approval would be required. The Government of the day had rested their case on the strength of these protocols, which was partly why they claimed there was no any need for a referendum at the time.
The Constitution Committee, of which I was a proud member, felt so strongly about these matters that it took the rather unusual step of producing almost a committee amendment to the European Union Bill to try to establish processes for the approval and scrutiny of opt-ins. I recall that debate very well, because it raised considerable interest in a number of areas of the House and led to negotiations and discussions with the European Union Committee, the Constitution Committee and the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and to the procedures we are now partly using.
In fairness, I remember the noble Baroness telling us that we would be surprised by the sheer number of opt-in proposals. Many of us thought that there would be just a handful dealing with fundamental issues. She frequently reminded us that there would be more than we thought and that they would be diverse and often of a technical nature. As a member now of Sub-Committee E, my experience—and I am sure the experience of other members of that committee—shows that her case was valid. We have had something like 20 opt-ins in the last 12 months and are faced with another large collection in the next 12 months. I have found it rather difficult, and I do not know whether other members of those committees also feel this, because of the diversity and sometimes technical nature of the opt-in proposals and directives to establish some common criteria to decide whether or not there should be an opt-in. As the Minister has said, one ends up taking a case-by-case approach, applying common sense and asking whether co-operating, by opting-in, would help to enforce the better administration of certain aspects of justice.
I have come to the conclusion at various times in the last 12 months that it was right to opt in on issues such as human trafficking, combating sexual abuse, the exploitation of children and child pornography, because there is an advantage to having a European approach here. I have been less keen on the road safety directive, which has not proved its cost-benefit potential. I have certainly found in the case of succession that the idea of a succession certificate goes far too far. Our whole notion of succession is very different from that of most of the rest of the continent. There is a gulf larger than the Channel in respect of succession, and I suspect that that gulf will also arise in issues of matrimonial property. Therefore, like everyone else, one takes this case-by-case approach. We are going to be faced in sub-committee with at least another dozen within the next 12 months.
That raises a more general point, which the Minister herself touched on: when one uses a case-by-case approach, one tries to apply the simple common-sense test to the decision or directive that has been proposed, but one should be vigilant and mindful of the cumulative effect of opting in. If we opt in on an increasing number of cases, where will those red lines be that the previous Government drew such attention to? We might see, without necessarily recognising it, an erasing of those red lines. The House and its committees should seriously consider the cumulative effect over a period of the opt-in issues that arise.
I have also been increasingly concerned that many of these opt-in issues raise problems of centralising data on a much wider basis. As someone who, when on the constitutional committees, helped to write a report on the surveillance society, I think that one should be conscious and vigilant that many of these opt-in proposals are associated with the collection of data in increasingly centralised circumstances. I therefore hope that on these issues our House and committees will remain vigilant on the vital issue of opt-ins.