Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Fox

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

May I ask a bit more about government Amendment 40 in relation to Crown dependencies and overseas territories? As I understand it, this is a fairly standard clause in Acts of Parliament, but perhaps the Minister can confirm whether that is so or it is something of a rarity.

My understanding of the Minister’s concluding comments is that a Crown dependency or overseas territory, if it wished, could seek to have a spaceport on its territory. However, would government Amendment 40 be activated, in the sense of seeking the Order in Council, by the British Government or could it be activated only if so requested by a UK Crown dependency or overseas territory itself, or could it indeed be activated at the request of a company or even another country? What would be the criteria for determining whether or not the provisions of the Act should be extended as provided for in government Amendment 40?

Would the provisions of the Act be so extended under the terms of government Amendment 40 if it was felt that it worsened the prospects of the development and expansion of the UK space industry in this country—even in Prestwick? If the provisions were so extended, could companies from any country in the world establish spaceflight facilities in a UK Crown dependency or overseas territory, or would it be restricted to British companies, at least as the lead company? Finally, could we have an assurance that extending the provisions of the Act to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or any British overseas territory would not give any companies, whether private or state-owned, any tax advantages, particularly in the form of lower tax, compared to the tax regime that would apply to a space industry company operating under the Act’s provisions in this country?

[Lord Fox]

The noble Lord has stolen many of my lines. There seem to be a lot of loose ends here. I reiterate his question about how much of the Bill applies to a Crown dependency in the event that it builds a spaceport. Are we looking just at the right to do it, or are all the other provisions of the Bill in place in a Crown dependency situation? The point that the noble Lord made very well is: are we in danger of allowing people to set up low-cost competitors in an industry that we are hoping to run from the United Kingdom mainland?

Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Fox

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, there appears to be a theme developing in this afternoon’s debate. In moving Amendment 44, I will also speak to Amendments 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51. Again, we are on the subject of catch-all powers. Despite our having about 45 minutes left, I will keep this relatively brief.

Clause 67(1) states:

“Regulations may make provision generally for carrying this Act into effect and for achieving the purpose set out in section 1(1)”.


We regard this as a catch-all power that should be removed, which would be done by Amendment 44.

Amendments 46 to 50 relate to Clause 67(6), which stipulates that general regulations must be made using the affirmative procedure but that for those that will be made under certain sections, only the first regulations are subject to it. In other words, the first go through the affirmative procedure but the rest follow behind without it. These amendments would remove the word “first” in each paragraph, subjecting all regulations that will be made under the relevant sections to affirmative procedure. I believe that Amendments 46 to 50 enjoy Cross-Bench support. During Second Reading, my noble friend Lord McNally highlighted the need for the sector to be continuously consulted to ensure that legislation is fit for purpose.

Amendment 51 proposes that before any secondary legislation is made under the Act, the Secretary of State must consult the various relevant bodies to ensure that this is done. The Minister may have a view as to which the relevant bodies are, but the principles of consultation and affirmative change are enshrined in these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

I will be very brief. Most of the amendments in this group relate, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has already said, to views expressed by the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The reasons for the committees holding the views that they do are set out in their reports before us at the moment. I simply add that our names are attached to Amendments 44 to 50, and once again we hope that the Government will take note of what the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee have to say.

Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Fox

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I must say that I rather support the thrust of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has made. Later on, though not today, we will come to the amendment we have tabled about how regulations should be dealt with in view of the number of them that will be associated with the Bill.

I shall confine my comments now to the view of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, particularly in respect of the issue in Amendments 9 and 10 where clearly there was a disagreement, with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee arguing that where there was a requirement to abide by the terms of what the Government described as “guidance”, and where there was a requirement that an applicant must do something of importance with that guidance for the regulations to be satisfied, it should in fact be subject to parliamentary scrutiny given its legal significance. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has of course drawn attention to that point.

The Government seem less than enthusiastic about going down the road of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on that issue. However, they did not actually address the point being made by that committee, which was the distinction between guidance that an applicant may take into account and guidance that an applicant must take into account in order for the regulator to be satisfied. Although I certainly support the thrust of everything the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, said, I confine my specific comments to that point in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report and invite the Minister to think again about what appears to be the Government’s rejection of it.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, at this stage, I declare my financial interest in GKN and Smiths Group, both of which probably have some activity in the space industry, although I am not currently aware of it. I associate these Benches with the amendments and the overall thrust, which I am sure that the Minister is beginning to get, that there is considerable concern about the exercise of delegated powers. As the previous speaker mentioned, that will come up in a series of later amendments.

I defer in my knowledge to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, who is expert in these matters, but it is clear that we want to get the balance of affirmative and subsequent negative delegation right, and the excuse or otherwise that parliamentary time may not be available for the return of legislation is probably insufficient. Again, I hesitate to say this in front of the noble Lord, but safety is often dealt with by safety cases rather than a line by line, “You should do this, you should do that”, style of legislation. It does not require line-by-line scrutiny by government or Parliament.

With those points in mind, we associate ourselves with the amendments. We ask the Minister to review the Government’s position on delegated powers and are interested to hear how he stands on the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

Clause 14(1) states:

“A licence under this Act may be transferred with the written consent of the regulator”.


The Bill then appears to say little more of substance on this issue. It does not appear to set any considerations the regulator has to take into account before giving such written consent, nor does it appear to say to whom or to what a licence can be transferred or what licences are or are not able to be transferred. Clause 8(3) says:

“The regulator may not grant an application for a licence under this Act unless satisfied that … the applicant has the financial and technical resources to do the things authorised by the licence, and is otherwise a fit and proper person to do them”,


or that,

“the persons who are expected to do, on the applicant’s behalf, any of the things authorised by the licence are fit and proper persons to do them”.

Amendment 22 seeks to ensure that the provisions of Clause 8(3) will also apply to the regulator when deciding whether to give written consent to the transfer of the licence.

An argument could be made for saying that the provisions of Clause 8(2) should also be included in this amendment, since presumably one would want the regulator to be satisfied in agreeing to transfer a licence that it would not impair national security, that it would be consistent with our international obligations and that it would not be,

“contrary to the national interest”.

However, this is Committee stage and I will wait to hear the Government’s response to the amendment as it stands.

On a more general point about the transfer of a licence, can the Minister set out for the record the circumstances in which a transfer might be considered necessary and those in which the Government would not expect written consent to be agreed? Finally, for the granting of a licence, the consent of the Secretary of State will also be required under Clause 8(4) if they are not the regulator granting the licence. That provision does not appear to apply if a licence is being transferred. If this is the case, why is that so?

[Lord Fox]

My Lords, I will be very brief. We welcome this probing amendment because this issue is very important. It is analogous in one sense to the potential for flagging out a particular enterprise. If the regulator is minded to allow a transfer of licence, what legal basis would there be for any enforcement of those licence agreements once they cease to be within the domain of this country? The second point is on the role of takeovers and acquisitions, where companies that own a licence and are within the remit of the United Kingdom are acquired and move beyond these shores for regulatory purposes. Perhaps the Minister can include those points in his answer as well.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, Clause 14 enables a licensee to transfer their licence to another party, provided that the regulator has given written consent. This provision enables a new body or company to take over the licence without starting a licence application afresh. In addition, the Bill requires that a licence holder has the necessary financial and technical resources, and that they are fit and proper persons, to do the things authorised by the licence.

Amendment 22 would ensure that the regulator would need to be satisfied that the new licensee met the requirements under Clause 8(3) before consenting to a transfer. I can confirm that it is our intention that the regulator will need to do this. Where the regulator is appointed under Clause 15, Clause 14(5)(c) requires them to consult the Secretary of State before consenting to a transfer. Thus the Secretary of State can ensure that they are satisfied that the new licensee meets the requirements under Clause 8(3).

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why the power to transfer a licence is necessary. The power avoids the need for wasteful bureaucracy that could affect businesses and local communities. For example, where a spaceport licence has been issued, it should not be necessary to demonstrate the suitability of the site again just because of a change of operator. However, the regulator would need to be content that the new operator met the eligibility criteria under Clause 8. Both the regulator and the Secretary of State would need to be satisfied that the transfer of a licence was appropriate, ensuring that there were the proper checks and balances in the system if that occurred.

I am confident that the amendment is not necessary but I will reflect on whether it is appropriate to make our intentions explicit in the Bill. On those grounds, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I have just about recovered from the shock of hearing the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, refer to not being here for a much later amendment. I was rather hoping we would not get to that because it says here that the target for the day is to complete the group beginning Amendment 32, which is the group we are about to embark on. I sincerely hope that this is the last group we deal with today.

This amendment relates to a view expressed by the Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill published last month. Much of what I will say is lifted straight from that report. It points out that Clause 31 sets out an enforcement regime under which,

“a justice of the peace may issue an ‘enforcement warrant’ in certain circumstances if, for instance, there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is carrying out spaceflight activities without a licence or in breach of licence conditions”.

The committee points out that:

“Enforcement warrants may authorise extensive powers, including powers to enter property and to use reasonable force. For urgent cases, an alternative regime is set out in clause 32. This allows the Secretary of State to grant an ‘enforcement authorisation’ if satisfied that the case is urgent and that relevant conduct or anticipated conduct gives rise to a serious risk (a) to national security, (b) of contravention of any international obligation, or (c) to the health or safety of persons. Such an authorisation permits a named person to do ‘anything necessary’ for protecting national security, securing compliance with international obligations or protecting health or safety”.


Even though the power conferred by Clause 32 is very extensive and broad, the Bill does not appear to lay down any,

“system of judicial oversight (either anticipatory or post hoc). The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee expressed concerns about this aspect of the Draft Bill”.

In its response to that committee, the Government said that:

“In line with the Committee’s recommendation, we have reduced the period for which an authorisation would be valid from one month to 48 hours. This limits the Secretary of State’s power and if a longer authorisation is required, it will be necessary to get a warrant from a Justice of the Peace under clause 31 (Warrants authorising entry or direct action)”.


The Constitution Committee went on to say that:

“The reduction in the time for which an urgent authorisation may apply is welcome. However, we are concerned that such wide-ranging and potentially draconian powers would be exercisable without anticipatory or rapid post hoc judicial involvement. We draw attention to these enforcement authorisations and call on the Government to consider post-hoc judicial approval of their use”.


Amendment 32 provides that an urgent enforcement authorisation under Clause 32 must be referred to a justice of the peace for evaluation within 48 hours, following the 48-hour period under Clause 32(7) of the Bill, during which the enforcement authorisation remains in force. I hope that the Minister will give a sympathetic and helpful response to this amendment and others in the group. I beg to move.

[Lord Fox]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, set out, Clause 32 as it stands offers strong powers to the Secretary of State in which there is no judicial involvement authorising the activities. I support Amendment 32 and will speak to Amendment 33. Those noble Lords who have read them will see that Amendment 32 is repeated by Amendment 33, which goes into more detail at some length, also taking into account the judicial systems of the countries of the United Kingdom.

As the noble Lord said, Clause 32 allows the Secretary of State to authorise the regulator to do “anything necessary”, which is a very dramatic—possibly cinematic—phrase, but we understand what it means. We can understand that there are times when moving quickly would be an issue, but this is not necessarily a block to judicial oversight. In contrast to the proposal in Clause 32, I point to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 where warrants issued urgently by the Secretary of State, without advance approval by a judicial commissioner, must be approved by a judicial commissioner within three working days of the warrant. If it can be done in those circumstances, I suspect it can be done in those which we are talking about today. The Government have not offered sufficient justification for the wider scope of the powers offered in Clause 32, so Amendment 33 is based on provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act and ensures judicial scrutiny of any enforcement authorisations under that clause. In similar vein to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, it calls for a 48-hour period through which a justice of the peace can be involved. Our amendment stipulates that, if an enforcement remains in force for 48 hours, a justice of the peace should offer authorisation within that time or the action would cease to exist. Furthermore, no future enforcement authorisations may be granted under Clause 32 in relation to the same incident.

Amendment 33 then goes on to spell out the roles of the courts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the detail therein. Overall, we would welcome strong support for this principle from the Government and some idea of how other judicial oversight will be added to what currently appears to be a very wide legal writ for one person in government.