Armed Forces

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 5th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I am sure that all your Lordships who have spoken are pleased, as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, said, to have had the opportunity to discuss and comment on the role and contribution of our Armed Forces. However, I fear that today’s debate, in the name of the Minister—timely though it is, this close to Remembrance Sunday—has rather less to do with a collective government desire to discuss defence issues for a second sitting day running and rather more to do with a collective government desire not to discuss the Electoral Registration and Administration Bill, and any troublesome amendments, for even one day running.

I hope that there are not too many Members of your Lordships’ House who would have wished to speak in this debate but have been unable to do so because of the very short notice. Our Armed Forces deserve debates on their role and contribution that are properly and jointly agreed in advance, not least because our military personnel continue to be engaged in major operations on our behalf at a time when they are also facing considerable change.

Unfortunately, all too often in your Lordships’ House we have those sombre moments when we express our sincere condolences to the families and friends of serving members of our Armed Forces who have been killed in operations in the service of our country. We also remember the courage and fortitude of those who have been wounded, particularly those who have suffered what we describe as life-changing injuries. It is only appropriate and right that we should use this debate to pay tribute once again to our Armed Forces and the whole service community.

The main centre of combat operations for our Armed Forces is Afghanistan. My noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen powerfully expressed his concerns on the present position. We should all be determined to ensure that when combat operations by our forces cease and the majority of our personnel return permanently to these shores, they will leave an Afghanistan that is able to function as an effective state, governed by elected representatives in the interests of the population as a whole, and at peace, with a respect for law and order. That would be an appropriate legacy for all our personnel who have been involved in operations in Afghanistan, not least for those who have lost their lives and suffered significant injuries.

Our Armed Forces face major change, and not only as a result of the reduction in their number. New threats are emerging. Weak and failing states outnumber strong states by two to one. Non-state actors are also on the rise. The United States of America is attaching greater emphasis in its approach to military and diplomatic policy to the Pacific region and the Middle and Far East and less to Europe. That has potential implications for our defence strategy. The nature of warfare is also changing, with nuclear proliferation, increased terrorism, more use of unarmed aircraft and the increasing sophistication of cyberattacks.

Maximising security and influence today demands coalition-building. We have argued for greater burden-sharing and deployability of assets within NATO, and exploration of how a “coalition of cuts” between European NATO nations can co-ordinate reductions in defence spending. The practice of allies fighting conflicts together but preparing for them individually is surely no longer the way to proceed.

The Government’s intention, as the size of our Regular Armed Forces contracts, is to increase the strength of our Reserve Forces to be able to meet laid down military objectives. We had a debate on our Reserve Forces last Thursday, and one on defence and Europe the week before. The Minister said that he would respond in writing to the many points raised in the debate last Thursday to which he was not able to reply at the time. Obviously, he has not yet had a chance to prepare and send that letter in time for this debate, which would have been ideal, but I suspect that this debate came almost as much of a surprise to the Minister as it did to probably everyone else.

However, on a crucial part of the Government’s strategy—namely, the increase in our Reserve Forces—we have read in one newspaper this morning, as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, reminded us, that a problem with the recruitment of part-time soldiers, including a backlog of applicants, threatens to undermine plans to expand the Territorial Army.

I repeat that we support an enhanced role for the reserves, whose skills must be maximised and who can be an important link between military and civilian communities. We have to ensure that the system to encourage and enable service leavers and those made redundant to join our reserves is effective, that we support businesses in employing members of the Reserve Forces and that any unnecessary bureaucracy is removed.

With a Green Paper apparently just around the corner, the noble Baroness the Minister, whom we welcome to the Government Defence Front Bench, may not feel inclined in her reply to go further than did the Minister in last week’s debate, although I invite her to do so in the light of the newspaper report this morning.

Since meeting our military objectives in the future is reliant on an expansion of our Reserve Forces as the Regular Army is reduced in numbers, could the noble Baroness be precise about the timescale in which the reserves, with the increased level of commitment required of them compared to today, are being built up and Regular Army numbers drawn down in order to address concerns that there may be a period where the territorial contingency will be too small to cover the capability gap?

This is an important issue, since even the Secretary of State has admitted that these proposals constitute a risk against a background of falling morale, to which my noble friends Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde and Lord Davies of Stamford referred. Recent figures show that the three-year trend of declining morale has continued, with only 18% of soldiers questioned reporting high morale across the Army and only 33% feeling valued. Even the Secretary of State has admitted that government actions have hit morale.

We are clear that there must be some reduction in the overall number of service personnel, but does the noble Baroness believe that those reductions are being appropriately borne? The percentage reduction in the number of senior officer posts in all three services has been considerably less than the percentage reduction in junior ranks. The Armed Forces must be reshaped to make them as effective as they can be in the light of future numbers and future planned objectives and assumptions. It is right to demand painful efficiencies of those at the bottom, but not while appearing to give greater protection to those at the top.

It is all of a pattern that started with the strategic defence and security review, which was rushed and rendered out of date by events in Libya—not even mentioned in the review—where British forces used some equipment that Ministers had planned to scrap. Ad hoc decision-making appears to be all too common. The fact that Ministers have further reduced Army manpower on top of the cuts outlined in the SDSR shows just how rushed and incomplete was that original document. Perhaps the noble Baroness could say whether the SDSR defence planning assumptions that applied to an Army of 95,000 can be guaranteed by a Regular Army of 82,000.

Until all these issues are addressed or clarified, it will be difficult to overlook the impression that this Government’s defence policy largely adds up to a deficit reduction proposal and policy statements and objectives that have not been thought through, either as far as their relevance and consequences are concerned or the logistics and practicality of their implementation.

Ministers regularly claim the financial situation as justification for the speed and depth of the cuts that they have made. We are continually told by Ministers of a financial “black hole” that was bequeathed, but the National Audit Office, the Defence Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee have all described the figure as “unverifiable”, which says it all.

The Secretary of State has said that he has balanced the equipment budget, but we have seen no detailed figures to support this and how it has been achieved. When will the National Audit Office report on the core equipment programme in the light of the Government’s claim?

Defence reform is not simply about cutting Armed Forces personnel and prioritising the pursuit of savings above all else; it is about aligning present and future capabilities with present and future strategic threats within realistic budgets. We do not believe that that has been this Government’s approach in at least some areas, whatever their intention may have been.

However, in two areas, we are at one with the Government. We supported and welcomed the Royal British Legion’s campaign on the military covenant, albeit that it took a bit of a push to persuade the Government to enshrine it in legislation. It provides a clear duty for us all, as my noble friend Lady Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde reminded us, to ensure that members of our Armed Forces and their families are cared for and are not penalised or discriminated against as a result of their service in the forces, and as members of the military community, on behalf of our country. We have proposed greater resources to tackle veterans’ long-term mental health issues and believe that we need to rebalance the system of allowances in favour of the low paid and those on the front line.

The other area where we are at one with the Government is in our support and admiration for our Armed Forces and in our united backing for them in the military operations that they have undertaken, such as in Libya, and in their current operations in Afghanistan. We know that they are risking their lives to ensure the security of our nation and the protection of our people and our interests, and that, in doing so, they are seeking to give others the opportunity of enjoying the freedoms which we take for granted.

Armed Forces: Reserve Forces

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 1st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, it is clear from this debate that there is unanimity on the importance of the Reserve Forces to our regular Armed Forces, to our national security and to the communities in which they are based. Reservists act as something of a bridge between the military community and the country as a whole. They balance their family and civilian commitments with their military duties, which often involve courageous acts. Thousands of members of the Reserve Forces in total have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Balkans and in Sierra Leone. They also participated in operations in Libya. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, made clear in his thoughtful and interesting maiden speech, our Reserve Forces make an invaluable contribution and are prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice. A number have done so in the service of our country. We all owe them our deep admiration and an enormous debt.

The Government are going down the road of a significant increase in both the number and the role of our Reserve Forces. That is in large measure to meet the requirements of Army 2020, relating to the future structure of the British Army. The volunteer Army reserve will be expanded to a trained strength of some 30,000 with more predictable scales of commitment. The Government have said that they are now recruiting reserves for all three services. The Reserve Forces will be expected to commit to specific amounts of training and, for the Army mainly, to accept a liability of up to six months’ deployed service plus pre-deployment training in a five-year period, dependent on operational demand.

We support the expansion of the role of the Reserve Forces. It is important that we ensure that those with special skills—whether, for example, in engineering, in IT or in the medical field—are able to use them in the context in which they are deployed militarily so that the effectiveness of their contribution can be maximised. However, the reality is that some 15,000 additional highly competent part-time reservists cannot fill the gap created by the loss of 20,000 full-time regulars. Defence planning assumptions have stated that our Armed Forces could undertake one major and two lesser operations at the same time. Does that capability commitment apply to the regular Army of 82,000, that now being its intended strength?

Under the envisaged role of our enhanced Reserve Forces alongside a Regular Army of 82,000, will there potentially, or actually, be greater involvement in front-line operations, with the distinction between members of the Reserve Forces and the regular Army narrowing considerably? Will members of our Reserve Forces face significantly increased risks as a result of the enhanced role that they will be playing in future?

Will the Minister give a guarantee that the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985, which protects reservists’ employment rights, will not be scrapped? The direction in which the Government appear to want to go in employment generally is to weaken the legal rights and protection for people at work. Is that also going to apply to the increasing numbers of members of our Reserve Forces in both their regular civilian employment situation and their role as members of our Reserve Forces?

The Government’s intention is that members of the Reserve Forces will be undertaking their military role for longer periods of time than at present, with a much firmer commitment than now to being available, ready and prepared to carry out that role when called on to do so. How, however, do the Government intend to ensure that the trained reservist manpower will be available when it is really needed, as the scale of the change being embarked upon will need the support of many, particularly employers? For those in civilian employment, there will be pressures likely to affect their willingness to take on the enhanced commitment that will be required from reservists in future, as that extended commitment, with more time away, could well affect their main wage-earning or salary-earning career and their prospects of promotion and progression. Yet the ability to physically recruit and train sufficient numbers for our future Reserve Forces, and then retain them, will be critical, and it is far from clear how that will be achieved.

Equally critical to the delivery of the Government’s plans for the future of our Reserve Forces will be the availability of quality, full-time Reserve Forces support personnel at a time when some reserve unit permanent staff posts important for reservist recruitment, training and administration appear to have been withdrawn under cost-saving initiatives. Can the Minister say any more about the Government’s intentions and objectives in respect of bringing forward legislative proposals to protect the regular employment position of reservists called up for duty under the proposed new enhanced level of commitment that they will be required to give to ensure that they are not disadvantaged or discriminated against in their regular employment, either before undertaking a period of mobilisation as a reservist in the service of our country or indeed on their return? What action do the Government intend to take to ensure that employers are encouraged and incentivised to have and keep more reservists on their staff who are likely to be away from that civilian employment for more time than at present?

I am aware that the Government have said that they intend to publish a consultation paper—this autumn, I think—setting out their detailed proposals. Nevertheless, I hope that the Minister can say something about their thinking on how they intend to achieve their objective for the future role and numerical trained strength of our Reserve Forces. Statements of objectives are relatively easy; it is the delivery of those objectives that can be difficult, and sometimes very difficult indeed.

Armed Forces: Local Overseas Allowance

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the success of Operation Kipion is measured by the fact that our efforts to reassure our Gulf partners through providing a constant presence in the region continue to ensure access and basing in Gulf states. This is vital to support Operation Herrick. The Royal Navy is at the forefront of mine countermeasure capabilities in experience, expertise and technology. The US/UK/French patrols in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are a routine part of our commitment to the free movement of international shipping in the region. In recent years our ships have played a significant role as part of the combined maritime forces of the Bahrain-based coalition naval force drawn from 25 nations, with missions including counterpiracy, counterterrorism and the maintenance of security in and around the Gulf. These are all highly valued by our allies, including the United States.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, an MoD survey of which the Minister will be well aware has shown that nearly two-thirds of officers in the Army, the Navy and the RAF now rate their own morale as low. That is twice the level it was in 2010. What plans do the Government have for improving the morale of our Armed Forces?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I do not share the noble Lord’s pessimistic view of the morale of the senior Armed Forces but, as I said, we are constantly reviewing morale, allowances and everything else that leads to morale in the Armed Forces.

Defence Capabilities: EUC Report

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I listened to my noble friend Lord Gilbert with interest since his contributions are always enjoyable. I have been called a fanatic before, but not, I think, a Eurofanatic. That is the first time.

[Lord Gilbert]

I assure my noble friend that I was not referring to him.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I think the noble Lord’s reference was to the Eurofanatics on this side, so I took it as including me. At the risk of reinforcing my noble friend in his view, I would like to express appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the European Union Committee for this comprehensive and measured report. As the summary states, the shift in the economic and political balance away from the United States and western Europe towards Asia, the revision in US defence thinking and the economic crisis have created a new situation to which the European Union and its member states need to respond.

It is through our global alliances that we can remain a powerful and significant force in the world. We have a unique diplomatic reach through our membership of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the United Nations and, indeed, the Commonwealth. Maximising our role within these institutions through greater co-operation and collaboration will surely be the principal means by which we can remain a lead influence on international trends and world events. Our international partnerships are the principal source of strength in our defence posture.

The threats that we face today, from terrorism to climate change, nuclear proliferation to cyberattack, are shared, and shared operations to combat them are increasingly commonplace. European nations have worked together in the Balkans, Chad, Afghanistan and around the world in European Union, United Nations and NATO missions. We share objectives and standards, priorities and interests. We involve ourselves in joint missions and operations overseas based on mutual support and shared interests in order to protect each of our domestic borders. Our futures are linked, so the action we take to enhance and shape them should be collective.

To say that we need to deepen European defence co-operation is not a change in philosophy, but rather a logical step to ensure that European nations can each maintain a strong defence policy which allows intervention to protect and promote our interests and values. In the same way, during conflict, we must better co-operate in preparation for and prevention of such conflicts, based on a pragmatic approach which reflects the world we live in.

Greater European co-operation in defence procurement is crucial, enabling us to maximise our ability to project force and to do so cost-effectively, supporting both the front line and the bottom line. It is vital that a more efficient defence industry and better value defence products are promoted, distortions in the market are regulated out and defence companies and their supply chains are supported. That means limiting the fragmentation which arises from differing national procurement regulations, reducing the number of national equipment programmes and ironing out the delays which arise from individual export authorisations. There has been progress on this in recent years. The European Defence Agency code of conduct on procurement competition, the directive on defence procurement limiting individual export licences and the EDA’s limits placed on offsets all work in favour of a strong European industrial base.

The merger between BAE Systems and EADS has been prominent recently. We supported the proposal in principle, but we accept from a UK point of view why it could not go ahead,; however, BAE Systems needs to get into new and different markets as the UK and USA markets contract. It would be helpful if the Minister could say what the Government are doing to help BAE Systems retain a sustainable base in the UK in the light of recent developments. Yesterday, the Minister said that Ministers in the Ministry of Defence were doing their best to help BAE Systems sell its products. Is that some new initiative, or simply a continuation of what was happening prior to the possible merger between BAE Systems and EADS falling through?

Co-operation over procurement is the only way Europe can compete in a very expensive and technologically driven activity and it must learn to do this better together or have no other option than continually buy from the United States. We should look first at where we can co-operate further with those with whom we have existing successful partnerships, including, of course, France.

The economic crisis has ushered in competing sentiments. On the one hand, countries need to shrink budgets and are actively seeking savings, which can come from economies of scale but, on the other hand, their protective and protectionist instincts are stronger. We must surely fight the latter and address practices that hinder legitimate access to markets. We must protect national discretion, but strong national export markets will be bolstered, not limited, by European co-operation, and that is surely the shared challenge.

As well as co-operation on procurement, there is a need to better integrate force structures. This takes place but perhaps not to the extent that the real potential for front-line benefits is maximised. Arrangements to pool maintenance, training, education infrastructure and skills on a bilateral or multilateral basis should be explored. Research and development facilities and work streams could be pooled to develop specialisations together. The resultant economies of scale should be used to directly fund training and equipment programmes and to contribute to balancing domestic defence budgets.

The UK-France defence treaty is a very welcome development. It commits to limited interoperability, joint purchasing and sharing of expertise and facilities. It has the potential to build the trust essential for successful partnerships to work and lays the basis for further collaboration between ourselves and France in future. It is characterised by perhaps the most important trait: namely, seriousness of intent. This should not be an isolated achievement. I hope that similar agreements will emerge. Procurement, research and technology spending, maritime surveillance, energy security and combating piracy are all areas that should be looked at in this regard.

The UK-France treaty is surely a model that can lay the foundations for a landscape of European co-operation based on distinct, sometimes regional co-operations. Where countries can do so and where it is in their mutual interests, they should work together. That is certainly not about creating the basis for a “Euro army”, but pursuing gains where they can be found on a case-by-case basis, and making the pursuit of those gains the rule rather than the exception. The steps taken by Nordic countries and the Czech Republic and Slovakia in this direction are to be welcomed. This approach must be balanced, however, with protecting national operational independence and the right for countries to retain the ability to defend themselves without NATO or the European Union.

The success of greater co-operation depends on Europe’s ability and willingness to contribute to tackling international security threats. Europe must decide if it is serious. All European member-state Governments have to be open with each other and about their capacity within NATO. In aggregate, the EU member states, many of which are also members of NATO, have half a million more men and women in uniform than the Americans. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, they can deploy only a fraction of the capabilities of the United States. Among all the talk of coalitions of the willing, the act of creating a coalition of the capable may in the future be a bigger challenge. The present situation hardly appears to be sustainable if Europe wants to prevent the power shift eastwards, to which a number of your Lordships have already referred, from leaving it behind.

The former US Secretary for Defence, Robert Gates, was surely right when he said that Europe cannot rely on others to share the burden of our own security. We must reform or see our own influence wane. As and when the economic situation improves, other nations across Europe should at the very least meet their NATO requirements, which the majority fail to do.

The issue that is well covered in the EU Committee report is about attitude and collective resolve within Europe to retain influence. It is fine that the nations of NATO and the EU share values and goals, but to be truly meaningful, these need to be acted on when threatened. Although the benefits of our alliance are shared by all, too often the contribution to military operations when tested is, as we saw in Libya, unbalanced, as the report points out. In spending and resolve, there must be more equal contributions from within Europe. In Europe, our mutual dependence is a fact, but in too many cases, the embrace of it across Europe is yet to be. Strengthening mutual positions demands greater collaboration and co-operation financially, systematically in procurement, and militarily to boost combat capability. When Europe’s values and interests face a serious test, European countries need to ensure that they can and do act collectively to the very best of their respective abilities. Frankly, one could not say that that is always the case at present.

Armed Forces: Military Corrective Training Centre

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 25th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point. However, our primary objective is to have a professional, volunteer Armed Forces.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, how many inmates of the Military Corrective Training Centre have been deported after sentence or at the completion of their sentence in the past two years? Of that number, how many have been charged and sentenced through the military judicial system rather than the civilian judicial system? What rights of appeal against deportation do they have, and to which individual or body?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the Ministry of Defence does not track the numbers of deportations or rights of appeal. It is a matter for the Home Office. I will undertake to get these figures for the noble Lord and write to him.

Defence Equipment and Support

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating as a Statement the response to the Urgent Question that was accepted and answered in the other place earlier today.

The Secretary of State also issued a Written Ministerial Statement today, the last day before the House of Commons breaks for the Summer Recess. In that Written Statement as well as in the Statement that we have just heard, the Secretary of State set out his views on why the present system of procurement did not work as effectively as it might. He went on to say that the restructuring of defence equipment and support was key to maintaining the defence budget in balance.

Two options for restructuring have been considered—namely; either an executive non-departmental public body, with a strategic partner from the private sector, or a government-owned contractor-operated entity. The Government take the view that the work done to date “suggests” that the case for the government-owned contractor-operated company is stronger than the first option, but say that further value-for-money work is under way “to confirm this assessment”, which indicates that in the minds of some a conclusion has already nearly been reached.

In the mean time, the Secretary of State said in his Written Statement that,

“as resources and commercial appetite constrain our ability to pursue these two options simultaneously to the next stage, I have decided that MOD should focus its effort on developing and testing the GOCO option further”—

that is the government-owned contractor-operated option.

I have a number of questions for the Minister, although, before I start, I must say that I am not expecting him to be a walking encyclopaedia. If he is not able to respond to all my questions, it would be more than acceptable if he were able to give the answers subsequently in writing.

First, what would be the additional cost of pursuing the two options simultaneously to the next stage, and what exactly are the “resources and commercial appetite” constraints referred to? Unless it is going to cost a substantial sum, the constraints cannot be financial since the Secretary of State has told us that he has balanced the defence budget. He has also told us that the restructuring of defence equipment and supplies is key to the process of maintaining the budget in balance. This is hardly an issue one would have thought appropriate for not undertaking with complete thoroughness and openness and testing fully the merits of the two options when the Government agree that the work done to date only “suggests” that the GOCO option might be better.

The Secretary of State said more than once in his Statement today that the criterion is value for money and apparently only value for money. Is it literally the case that no other factors will be taken into account in determining the most appropriate form of restructuring for defence equipment and supplies? What factors are included within the criterion of value for money? Issues of national security must surely be involved in defence procurement, including security of sensitive information or the potential loss of skilled staff who may not wish to move to the private sector under the new structure proposed. How will non-monetary considerations be assessed against a value-for-money criterion?

The Statement refers to having a competition for the private sector management company to run the organisation. What kind of companies will be invited to tender? Will they be major defence contractors and, if so, would there not be a potential conflict of interest if such a company were running an organisation awarding contracts? Or, will major defence contractors or companies with defence contracts be excluded? In which case, what skills or expertise in the defence field would such a management company be expected to be able to show?

After all, we need to be very careful. We have just had an example of a major private company involved in the Olympic Games on the security side which has not exactly excelled itself. One of the issues in that case is that the Home Office said that it was not aware of the impending failure to deliver because contracts were with LOCOG and not direct with itself. Is that not a possible likelihood with the GOCO: namely, that Ministers become a step further removed from knowing what is actually happening, with the potential consequence of the kind of situation we have seen with G4S? The GOCO appears to bring a third party between the defence contractors and the Ministry of Defence, which may not be helpful.

Under the GOCO arrangement, where will commercial risk within the private sector lie in future? In particular, what commercial risk would lie with the GOCO? The GOCO will have contracts with defence contractors. If the defence contractor fails to deliver, presumably the defence contractor picks up the bill. However, what happens if changes are made to the specification? Will the GOCO and the private management company bear the additional costs, or will they continue to lie with the Ministry of Defence? What expertise is it considered that the private management company will bring that is not there at present? Will it be technical, or some other form, of expertise? Is it envisaged that all DE and S will be transferred over to the new private management company, and continue to work at its existing locations? Will military personnel continue to be part of DE and S if it becomes a GOCO, and on what basis will they be employed? As it will be run as a private company, will they be required to leave the Armed Forces? Is the reality in fact that the only change is that at boardroom level the GOCO will be run by private sector managers, who will not be required to have any defence experience, as opposed to DE and S being run by the Ministry of Defence?

Where will the GOCO fit in as far as the international dimension is concerned? There is the issue of our defence manufacturers being asked to provide equipment which will also meet specifications to make sales overseas achievable. There is also the political decision on whether to procure defence equipment from overseas which is made overseas, or whether to have equipment largely made and supplied from within our own country. Who will make those decisions: the GOCO or the Ministry of Defence? Will primary legislation be required if the government-owned, contractor-operated company is to be established?

The Statement by the Secretary of State also referred to testing the GOCO against a public sector comparator before finally deciding whether to proceed. Which public sector comparator would that be, and will the only criterion once again be value for money? Finally, how can we be assured that our brave troops on the front line, who it is widely accepted have the best equipment and supplies under the present DS and E structure, will continue to do so under the vague and unclear future now being proposed?

Army 2020

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I associate this side of the House with the tributes paid by the Minister to the three air crew who were involved in the Tornado GR4 aircraft incident on Tuesday and who were killed or are missing, presumed dead; and with the tributes paid to the three members of our Armed Forces who were killed recently on operations in Afghanistan. We, too, extend our sincere condolences to their families and friends at this difficult time. Our thoughts are also with the fourth member of the Tornado squadron, who remains in hospital.

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place by the Secretary of State. We endorse the comments about the commitment and professionalism of our Armed Forces. The Secretary of State’s Statement—true to form—contained two references to the financial situation, one near the beginning and one near the end. Claims about a £38-billion black hole continue to be made. However, this figure has not been supported by the National Audit Office; it appears to assume no increase in financial resources over a 10-year period, when even the Government’s SDSR stated that the defence budget would rise in cash terms; and, despite requests from the Commons Defence Select Committee, the Government failed to produce a breakdown of their figure to show how it had been calculated. One can only draw the obvious conclusion that the figure has no substance.

I will raise a number of points in view of the fact that the announcement today was primarily financially driven. As the Minister said, the withdrawals and mergers will hardly be welcomed in the units affected. The Statement said that it was about how we should structure the future Army and support it to deliver the greatest possible military effect with the manpower available. Later on the Statement says that,

“no current Regimental names or cap badges will be lost as a consequence of the changes”.

Can the Minister say which came first in determining the Government’s plans for the future structure of the Army? Was it the need to ensure that the future Army looked at as a whole would have the greatest possible military effect with the manpower available, or was it the need to ensure that no regimental names or cap badges would be lost?

The Statement indicates, as indeed did the strategic defence and security review, that reservists will play a bigger role in future operations, since the number of reservists is rising while the number of regular troops is being reduced to 82,000, which is well below the figure indicated in the 2010 SDSR. Bearing that in mind, the question of how long a future operation could be sustained is highly relevant, not least in the light of the defence planning assumptions referred to in the SDSR. Reservists may be able to be away from their regular employment for a few months, but there may be greater difficulties over their availability if they are required to be away for longer periods or for regular and sustained periods of a few months. It is not just a case of how long an employer might be prepared to accept the absence of an employee, but from the employee’s point of view it is also about the impact that regular and extended absences might have on career development, including progression within the organisation or company where they are employed.

For how long and how frequently do the Government envisage that reservists will be deployed in support of an extended or enduring operation? The Secretary of State’s Written Ministerial Statement today refers to reservists accepting a liability for up to six months’ deployed service plus pre-deployment training in a five-year period. Is that the maximum commitment that will be expected of reservists under the Army 2020 proposals, even if we are involved in the maximum number of operations and interventions at any one time laid down in the 2010 SDSR? If the role of reservists is to be enhanced, what discussions have there been with employers’ organisations on the implications for them? I understand that the answer may well be, effectively, none.

The Statement the Minister has repeated said that it was not about the size of the Army, but it is when compared with what was envisaged at the time of the strategic defence and security review, which announced cuts of 7,000. Since then the Government have announced an additional 13,000 Army redundancies. The SDSR was based on an assumption that we could undertake one major and two lesser operations at any one time. It said that the Armed Forces in the future would be sized and shaped to conduct an “enduring stabilisation operation” at around brigade level involving up to 6,500 personnel with maritime and air support as required, while conducting one non-enduring complex intervention involving up to 2,000 personnel and one non-enduring simple intervention involving up to 1,000 personnel, or, for a limited time and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades with maritime and air support involving around 30,000 personnel. Does this Armed Forces capability set out in the 2010 SDSR still hold in the light of the Statement today about the future shape and structure of the Army and the further reductions in Regular Army personnel announced since the SDSR, and is it still the situation in the light of the higher percentage of our future Army personnel who will be reservists?

What is the maximum length of time for which we could conduct the “enduring stabilisation operation” referred to in the SDSR in the light of the Statement today and statements made since the SDSR about the size and structure of the Army, and is it a shorter period of time than that envisaged at the time of the SDSR? How long is “for a limited time” for the one-off intervention referred to in the SDSR in the light of the Statement today and statements made since the SDSR, and is that now a shorter period than that envisaged at the time of the SDSR?

The Statement lays out the future structure for the Army, but just how resilient is that structure? There is nothing in the Statement to suggest there has been any risk analysis undertaken in the light of developments in the last couple of years since the 2010 SDSR, despite those two years hardly being ones of stability in the world around us. Neither does there appear to have been a risk analysis of the consequences of our Army relying to a greater degree than before on reservists as opposed to regular troops. The Statement gives every impression of simply driving on from the 2010 SDSR without any obvious regard to the impact of changes and developments that have taken place since the SDSR.

The Statement is about the future shape and structure of the Army. What happens if the 2015 SDSR indicates a need for operations to be undertaken by the Army which are radically different from those indicated in the 2010 SDSR and this Statement? Is this new structure for the Army capable of embracing radically different operations? For example, will the split between reaction forces and adaptable forces still be relevant? Would the split between regulars and reservists still be appropriate, or is this a shape and structure that might not survive the 2015 SDSR? It may be that this Statement is, in reality, the beginnings of the 2015 SDSR. Will the 2015 SDSR be based on an assessment of the threats we face to our security and to our interests, with the numbers of Armed Forces personnel and the shape and structure of the Army being determined by the requirements and capabilities needed to meet those threats? Or will it be the case that today’s Statement on shape and structure sets out the kind of operations, in size and areas of capability, that the Army is geared to meet and that the rest of the 2015 SDSR will have to fit round it?

I sense a real risk in the smaller, reshaped and reconfigured Army that this Statement reveals. It appears to be based on an assumption that, with our withdrawal from Afghanistan, our commitments will reduce and remain at a lower level despite the current uncertainty and instability in the world. It also seems that, while a much heavier reliance will be placed on reservists in future, little has been done to consider and address the likely practical problems that will arise and whether, in reality, we will be able to meet effectively the capabilities that this Statement requires of the Army, including the commitments on the number and types of operation that could be conducted at any one time, as laid down in the 2010 SDSR. There is a strong sense that key parts of this Statement are expressions of hope rather than conclusions based on hard and robust evidence. I hope the Government’s gamble pays off, because if it does not it is our country and our people who will be exposed to the potentially very serious consequences.

Armed Forces Day

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2012 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Rosser]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what level of financial or other form of support they are providing for Armed Forces Day on Saturday 30 June.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, the Government are supporting this Saturday’s Armed Forces Day in many different ways. Members of the Armed Forces are involved in events up and down the country, from parades to fly-pasts, including the national event in Plymouth. As well as meeting the costs of this participation, the Ministry of Defence has made grants of some £223,000 to help communities to organise their own events. In addition, reservists were invited to wear their uniforms to work yesterday, and Armed Forces veterans were encouraged to wear their veterans’ badge. As part of the build-up to Armed Forces Day, show your support flags will be flown on all government buildings and town halls, and some local authorities are taking the opportunity to sign up to their own community covenants. This all adds up to a wide-ranging celebration of what our Armed Forces bring to this country.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, yesterday we had a Question about discrimination against our Armed Forces, and another example has been reported in the press this morning. Earlier this week, we saw Ben Parkinson carrying the Olympic torch through Doncaster. He suffered appalling injuries in Afghanistan in 2006—the loss of both legs, and brain and back injuries, which are euphemistically described as life-changing injuries. Ben Parkinson carried the torch for 300 metres. It took him 25 minutes to complete the walk. It was an act of great determination, guts and, yes, courage.

It is so that we can express our thanks, gratitude and support to our Armed Forces and veterans, and the enormous sacrifices that so many have made on our behalf, including giving their lives, that we have Armed Forces Day. In thanking the Minister for his comprehensive reply, may I ask whether the Government will review the levels of future support that we as a nation give, in whatever form, to Armed Forces Day to ensure that the crucial role undertaken on our behalf and the sacrifices made by our Armed Forces continue to be fully understood and appreciated, including by the minority of individuals and organisations who knowingly or unknowingly still discriminate against Armed Forces personnel?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the Armed Forces will be very grateful for the Opposition’s continued support, and I share the noble Lord’s admiration for the courage of Ben Parkinson in Doncaster. With regard to discrimination, the Cabinet sub-committee on the Armed Forces covenant, chaired by Oliver Letwin, will oversee work across government and ensure that momentum on all strands of the covenant is maintained. The noble Lord asked whether we are doing enough to spread the message. Armed Forces Day now has over 1 million followers on Facebook, and this shows just how much the day has caught the imagination of people in this country. We will keep the level of assistance that we provide under review. However, one of the most remarkable features of Armed Forces Day is the way in which the lead is being taken by communities themselves, rather than here in Whitehall.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2012

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction. The Armed Forces Act 2011 introduced into law the concept of the Armed Forces covenant, as he has mentioned, and the particular requirement for the Secretary of State to prepare an Armed Forces report. I was pleased to note when that report is due to appear.

As the Minister knows, I have also tabled a Question for Written Answer about compulsory redundancies. I asked whether, in selecting personnel for compulsory redundancy, consideration was given to their immediate pension point. For the record, is the Minister able to answer this question now? There has been considerable anxiety and press coverage. There is a feeling that the Government are solely focused on achieving financial savings rather than showing understanding for the effect on the individuals involved of a sudden abrupt end to their aspirations of a lifetime career in the Armed Forces. Equally, it is a difficult time to find alternative employment in civilian life.

The effect is of course not confined to the individual but spreads to their immediate family and friends, who are as shocked, taken aback and worried about the future as the individual being made redundant. What steps is the Ministry taking to help those who are being sacked? There seems to be little in the public domain to give confidence that these individuals are being looked after with sympathy and real understanding for their plight. It would underline the value of the military covenant, and show that personnel should be considered, if a more proactive approach to the impact of redundancies on the individual were to be taken by the Ministry of Defence.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, lest any of the points I wish to make should be construed as meaning otherwise, I make it clear at the outset that we of course support this order, which enables our Armed Forces to remain in existence, by law, for at least a further year by providing that the Armed Forces Act 2006 will not expire on 3 November 2012, as currently scheduled, but instead will continue in force until 3 November 2013. As the Minister has said, the 2006 Act also brought together various orders of discipline in the Armed Forces while the 2011 Act enshrined the Armed Forces covenant in legislation.

Depending on one’s point of view, this order is either a piece of archaic ritual bearing no relevance to the way that we should be conducting the affairs of our nation, or indeed the affairs of our Armed Forces, in the 21st century or an essential constitutional prop, ensuring that anyone who might be tempted to think otherwise knows that our Armed Forces remain in existence to perform their role not because they think—or anyone else thinks—they should, but only because the representatives of the people in Parliament have decided that that should be so, with that decision having to be renewed and restated each year. As I understand it, the order that we are discussing stems from the Bill of Rights Act 1689, or 1688 by old-style dating, which restated in statutory form the declaration of right presented by the Convention Parliament to William and Mary in March 1689, inviting them to become joint sovereigns of England while further restricting the powers of the sovereign by laying down certain constitutional basic rights, in respect of which the Crown was required to seek the consent of the people as represented in Parliament. Among those basic rights was that no standing army could be maintained during a time of peace without the consent of Parliament.

I am not sure that the people of this country are quite as suspicious, in the 21st century, of a reigning monarch deploying a standing army as they were in the 17th. While other countries have suffered and do suffer from military dictatorship, I am not convinced that it is the existence or knowledge of the requirement for this Armed Forces Act continuation order to be agreed each year by Parliament that is preventing or deterring a takeover of this country by the military. There may just be other, rather more powerful and influential factors and considerations at play. Having said that, is it literally the case, as I understand it, that if this continuation order was not approved our Armed Forces would cease to exist from early November, or is there in reality other legislation or a decision of Parliament that would enable them to continue in being?

I make these points seriously to understand what failing to renew the Armed Forces Act 2006 for a further year—I stress that this is not a road I am suggesting we go down—would mean in practice, as opposed to theory. We have an Armed Forces Act every five years. If there is a continuing widespread feeling, as is presumably the case, that Parliament should have to make a regular decision in order for our Armed Forces to continue in existence, one wonders whether there is still a need for this to be done every year as opposed to, say, every five years in the Armed Forces Act. The debate on this annual order does not seem to be regarded as an opportunity for having a wide-ranging discussion or debate, no doubt because there are other, better ways of having more frequent and lengthier discussions and debates on our Armed Forces in your Lordships’ House. It is presumably also the case that if the other place had reservations or concerns at any time, it could bring things to a head—not least by declining to agree to the necessary expenditure needed to maintain our Armed Forces for the following financial year. Nor does it seem likely that your Lordships’ House, as an appointed House, would decide to vote down an order on such a major issue as retention of the Armed Forces, and surely not when the other place, the elected House, had voted for the order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their support in the debate today. The noble and gallant Lord asked about compulsory redundancy. When selecting personnel of the Armed Forces for compulsory redundancy, no consideration was given to the proximity of the immediate pension point. As we reduce the size of the Armed Forces, our priority is to ensure that the services maintain the correct balance of the skills and experience across the rank structures that are required to deliver operational capability now and in future. It is that which has determined the redundancy fields.

The noble and gallant Lord asked whether we were focused just on financial saving. The department has gone to great lengths to carry out these redundancies as sensitively as possible. We fully understand that making the transition from the Armed Forces into civilian life can be daunting and we remain committed to helping service leavers in taking this important step. The Ministry of Defence offers service leavers a wide range of activities that help to facilitate the transition to civilian employment. The support offered is built around preparing the service leaver for future employment in terms of accessing appropriate opportunities for reskilling as well as accessing suitable civilian job opportunities.

The majority of resettlement provision is contracted out to the career transition partnership—the partnering relationship between the MoD and Right Management Ltd. The contract is successful as 97% of eligible service leavers use CTP, 93% of whom tell us that they succeed in becoming settled or gain employment within six months of leaving. That figure increases to 97% after 12 months, and 57% will have had two jobs.

I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He asked whether, if we did not approve what we are doing today, the Armed Forces would cease to exist. He also asked whether there was other legislation or a more appropriate way of doing this. A change was proposed by the Ministry of Defence in the Armed Forces Bill in 2005 but was resisted by the Defence Committee and the Select Committee that considered the Bill. Both committees favoured retaining the present arrangements and the Ministry of Defence amended the Bill accordingly. What would the effect be if the order were not made? Unless the Armed Forces Act 2006 is continued, there would not be lawful authority for the disciplinary system that governs the Armed Forces. I hope that that addresses the issue.

[Lord Rosser]

Can I be clear, at least in my mind, that the only effect of not continuing this order would be the impact that it would have on the disciplinary system and not on the reality of our Armed Forces continuing to exist?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I think I need to write to the noble Lord. The disciplinary issue is pretty important but it is quite complicated, to the extent that I probably do not have time to provide an answer now, but I shall write to the noble Lord. If I may, I shall study the Hansard record of the points that have been raised and write to the noble and gallant Lord and the noble Lord if I have anything to add to these exchanges.

Defence: Trident Replacement Programme

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, this will be one of the issues that the alternative study overseen by my colleague, the Armed Forces Minister, will be looking at. As I said earlier, the study will report to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister by the end of this year.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, from the opposition Front Bench I extend sincere condolences from this side to the families and friends of the five brave members of our Armed Forces who lost their lives in Afghanistan recently in the service of our country. We support retaining our independent nuclear deterrent and are strong advocates of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We believe that multilateral disarmament is the route to securing the collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As has been said, the Government set up a Liberal Democrat review on alternatives to the replacement of the Vanguard class strategic submarines carrying the Trident missile. The Minister has indicated when he expects the review to be published, but can he also confirm that the cost of delaying the final decision on the renewal of the Trident programme until after the next general election, purely for internal coalition government political reasons, has already cost the nation’s taxpayers £1.4 billion?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for the shared consensus that the nation’s security should be above party politics. So far as concerns the costs of any delayed decision, there are no costs at all, as the main gate decision will not be taken until 2016.