Lord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to Parosha Chandran, standing counsel to Anti-Slavery International, of which I am a patron, for her support and advice in tabling this amendment, and to Focus on Labour Exploitation for its briefing on the subject.
The point of the amendment is to provide another tool to help gain access to justice for the victims of trafficking and enslavement. In the Bill, compensation is currently limited to providing compensation as a result of criminal prosecution. Civil remedies tend to be simpler and more accessible. This amendment on civil remedies has three interrelated objectives: first, to provide an effective way of reducing the financial profitability of slavery, trafficking and exploitation by imposing civil damages against those who engage in the activity; secondly, to create a deterrent effect; and, thirdly, to enable victims to be adequately compensated for harm done.
As many noble Lords will know, the civil standard of proof is set at a different level from that required in criminal prosecutions. These cases will be judged on whether it is probable that a civil offence took place rather than beyond reasonable doubt, as is the case with criminal offences. Amendment 34 will not affect other existing remedies, such as employment law claims, other civil actions for damages or claims under the criminal injuries compensation scheme, which will still operate where necessary and appropriate. This set of new modern slavery civil liability offences will not prevent a victim’s reliance on those instruments; they will still have a job to do.
The characteristics of contemporary forms of slavery and exploitation are very diverse and include: debt bondage; the physical and psychological abuse of vulnerable people; the absence of direct physical harm; threats of denunciation to the authorities; and fear of actual or potential violence directed at the victim, their families and loved ones. The nature of these contemporary forms of slavery and the lasting harm done to victims is not always best served by the existing, more traditional routes to civil remedy. Thus the amendment seeks to identify civil law counterparts to the criminal offences of trafficking, forced labour and enslavement. This is needed because, for example, false imprisonment or harassment in civil law do not relate to the totality of the experience of being enslaved and its psychologically damaging aftermath. How can a claim be brought against a trafficker for breach of contract when there is no contract in most of these cases?
The amendment is worded to ensure that civil actions do not jeopardise criminal proceedings as the civil action may be halted pending the outcome of a criminal trial. Equally, civil actions may be pursued where no criminal investigation has taken place. In some cases, a successful civil action may be the precursor to a successful criminal investigation and prosecution. An important feature of the amendment is that individuals, organisations or businesses that escape criminal prosecution due to insufficient evidence to meet the criminal standard can be named in any civil action brought, which will serve as a powerful deterrent; for example, a civil claim for damages for human trafficking may enable compensation claims to be brought by British girls and young women against men who trafficked and sexually exploited them as children anywhere and where no commensurate compensation orders were made.
The outcome of the civil action will not be dependent on the criminal prosecution of offenders, so the victims in the recent Rotherham cases, for example, would also be enabled to bring civil claims for damages for the harm done to them by the men who trafficked them and who may never face criminal prosecution.
On the limitation period for bringing a claim, we have determined that this should be at least commensurate with contract claims—that is, six years—and that the provisions should apply for a longer period should a court find it appropriate to extend the period available in which to bring a civil action. This corresponds with the extension of time provision under the Human Rights Act 1998.
In the USA, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—the TVPA, as it is known—became federal law in 2000. The Act criminalised human trafficking and contained numerous provisions for victim protection, but did not at that time contain a civil liability offence. It was quickly recognised that the omission was detrimental to the operation of the Act, and this was remedied by the introduction in 2003 of a federal right of action for survivors of trafficking.
This autumn, it was reported that 35 individual states in the USA and the District of Columbia had chosen to introduce their own civil liability clauses within their state’s legislation, thereby enabling victims directly to claim damages against their abusers. The take-up of this method of pursuing enslavers and traffickers in the USA strongly indicates the importance and effectiveness of such civil liability clauses in reducing the profits of modern slavery offenders, deterring other perpetrators and securing appropriate redress for the victims of trafficking and enslavement-based harm directly from those who seek to profit from human misery. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will be brief. We have an amendment in this group that is considerably briefer in detail but not dissimilar in intention to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, providing for a civil remedy for a victim of an offence under Clauses 1, 2 and 4 of the Bill.
Our amendment refers to a victim bringing a civil action against the perpetrator in the county court and states that the victim may recover damages and reasonable legal costs, with subsection (2) of our proposed new clause going on to define one aspect that damages should include.
I do not wish to repeat the arguments for having a civil remedy in the Bill, since these have been powerfully and eloquently put by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, who reminded us that the standard of proof in the civil courts is the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt. As the noble Baroness also reminded us, we need to ensure that victims of modern slavery can recover damages from their abusers and perpetrators of the offences against them.
Unlike Amendment 34, our amendment does not refer specifically to legal aid, which has sometimes on other issues been an area of difficulty for the Government. I hope that the Minister’s response to the amendments on civil remedies will be favourable and that, if the Government do not like the precise wording of the amendments, they will accept the principle that they seek to lay down in the Bill and agree to discussions on seeking wording acceptable to all relevant parties.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young, for introducing this debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for moving and speaking to their amendments, giving us the opportunity to discuss a very serious issue. I think we were all struck by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, about the delay that people are experiencing at present in getting compensation for the horrendous suffering that they have gone through in this process.
Before turning to the amendments, I want to make two points that deal with matters of principle. The first point, which runs through many of the groups that we have considered already, is that the Government’s view, right or wrong, is that we should make it a priority to secure an increase in the number of convictions of the people who have been guilty of these offences. We believe that it is a two-pronged approach. The first prong is the compensation and protection of the victims, but that is best done in the first instance by ensuring that the organised criminal gangs that are perpetrating this are brought to justice. Therefore, the second prong follows from that: we want to encourage victims, although it may be difficult and painful for them to do so, to go down the criminal justice route and secure those convictions. We have made provision in the Bill for protections and help, particularly for children and vulnerable adults, in making contributions and presenting their evidence before a court so that we can secure those convictions. That would be the first point that I would make.
Secondly—my remarks on this are of necessity briefer than they would otherwise be—I have been assisted immensely by the wise words of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. They have very effectively made the case that we have arrived at; namely, the belief that civil remedies to the civil wrongs that have been cited in this case already exist. In the particular instance where there is a need for clarification on this, my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked—in fact, I think this is the purpose of Amendment 36—whether it was possible to have a reparation order and a compensation order. The answer is yes because they would be dealing with two distinct elements. Where an offence has been committed under the Modern Slavery Bill under the group of offences highlighted in Sections 1 to 3, there would of course be a reparation order. If, however, the person had been the victim of slavery and had been subjected to rape, for example, there would be additional compensation orders as well as the criminal charges that would be brought. So in that instance there would be a case for having the two together, and I hope that helps to clarify the situation.
My Lords, may I ask the Minister for a point of clarification? I stress again that I am not a lawyer, otherwise I probably would not be asking this question. If the Government’s view is that civil remedies already exist, is he saying that they are dependent on having first achieved a criminal conviction, or is he saying that they exist without having to go down the criminal court route? If the latter, presumably his argument that the Government wish to increase the number of convictions—they want to encourage victims to go down that route, thus they are not very keen on the civil remedies—has already been weakened by the fact that, as he is saying, civil remedies already exist.
My Lords, I rise very briefly in support of the noble Baroness and thank her for tabling the amendment, which takes up one of the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We wrote to the Government about this and in response the Government stated that an explicit reference is unnecessary due to case law that establishes the principle that in the context of civil orders applying to anti-social behaviour the requisite burden of proof is the criminal standard. That was a reference to the other Bill as well. However, given that I speak as another member of the non-lawyer sisterhood in your Lordships’ House, perhaps the Minister could explain a bit more about that. Would he not accept that the principle of legal certainty is a very important one, particularly in such a charged area?
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lady Lister have made reference to the views of the Joint Committee. Of course, reference has been made also to the fact that similar amendments were discussed in the other place. As we know, the response of the Minister in the other place was that, although the orders would be obtained through civil proceedings, the Government accepted that the threshold would be akin to the criminal standard of satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, in line with relevant case law. The Minister in the other place went on to express the view that since the relevant clauses in the Bill already met the evidential threshold that appeared to be being sought in the amendments that were discussed in the other place, the amendments were not needed.
Naturally, I am assuming that the reply that we are going to get from the Minister will be in line with the response that was given by the Minister in the other place, but I hope that the Minister will respond also to the point that has been made about why there is a reluctance to put this on the face of the Bill so that there is no doubt at all about it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for speaking to this amendment and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for tabling it. It gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach to safeguards in slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, and in particular the standards of proof required for the orders to be made. The purpose of these orders is to ensure that law enforcement bodies and the courts have appropriate powers to restrict the behaviour of persons who are likely to cause harm to another by committing a slavery or trafficking offence. For the prevention orders in Clause 14 and the risk orders in Clause 23, the courts must be satisfied that there is a risk that the individual may commit an offence, and that the order is necessary to protect a person or persons from the physical or psychological harm that would likely be caused by that individual committing a slavery or human trafficking offence.
These amendments seek to ensure that the court is required in each of these circumstances to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in criminal courts, as has been mentioned. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect the rights of individuals on whom these orders will be imposed. I recognise the importance of ensuring that these orders, breach of which would be a criminal offence, are not made lightly.
Reference has been made to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of that committee. There has been mention of the report that it has published recently. The Government are reflecting on that report carefully.
In this context, protecting the rights of the defendant is important. We have sought to draft these provisions to provide these protections and reflect the need to protect potential victims and remove the risk of harm to them, which is paramount. Although the proceedings by which these orders are obtained are civil proceedings, I put on record that the high burden of proof which applies by virtue of relevant case law in this area ensures that the threshold must in any event be akin to the criminal standard, as my noble friend said. This is the position in respect of existing orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which have been used effectively for more than 10 years, and the new sexual harm prevention order and sexual risk order, and is therefore very well established. For these reasons, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary. Courts and practitioners are familiar with the existing evidential test. Departing from the established approach for these orders could cause uncertainty among practitioners and the courts, which may well reduce their effectiveness. There could also be a perception that, by expressly including a different and more rigid test in the Bill, we want these orders to be judged by a different standard from that applicable to the other orders, which would call into question why different approaches are taken in areas notwithstanding the similarities between them.
Under the system I have described, the court has flexibility in determining the standard to be applied and can take into account and balance all the circumstances of the case—for example, the seriousness of the risk posed by the defendant, the degree of relevance of each fact which must be proved by the applicant and the effect on the defendant of making the order. In the sex offending context, the courts have been able to carry out this exercise for many years in a way which protects the rights of both defendants and those persons at risk. Prescribing the standard as the criminal standard would deprive the courts of this necessary flexibility.
My noble friend made a comparison with the anti-social behaviour regime, to which she made a similar amendment. I think your Lordships will agree that, while anti-social behaviour can cause harm to both individuals and communities, it is not as serious as the horrific abuses of modern slavery. That is why we have modelled these orders on those which tackle sex offenders. Those orders do not prescribe the criminal standard of proof in legislation and were recently approved by Parliament.
I assure the Committee that there are several further safeguards as well as the standard of proof to ensure these orders are used appropriately. The type of harm to be prevented is specified and relates to very serious offences. Statutory guidance will be issued, which will describe risk factors and categories of restriction which may be contained in an order. In determining what measures are necessary, the court must have regard to the rights of both the person at risk and the defendant under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government will also ensure that defendants have the same access to legal aid as is applicable to other civil order regimes.
Legal aid was raised on an earlier amendment. Individuals concerned will have the right to appeal the making, variation or extension of an order and apply to vary or discharge an order if circumstances change. Given that clarification, the substantial safeguards to ensure appropriate use of the orders and my assurance that we shall, of course, continue to reflect on the valuable work of the Joint Committee, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this amendment but hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw it.
My Lords, there are two amendments in this group and perhaps I may explain the purpose behind them.
Amendment 63A removes the maximum amount of the financial penalty that can be given for the breach of a slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order, as laid down in Clause 30(3)(b). Amendment 102A is in response to the Delegated Powers Committee report published last week on the power in Clause 30(5) that allows the Secretary of State to amend Clause 30(3)(b),
“to increase or remove the limit on the amount of the fine”.
Clause 30 sets out the penalties that could be imposed on an individual for breaching a slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk or prevention order. The penalties are,
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years”,
on conviction or indictment, and,
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding £5,000 or both”,
where there has been a summary conviction. In the other place we questioned the need for the £5,000 limit, both in relation to the limit and how appropriate it would be and the relationship between this and the provision that is coming into force in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which would remove any upper limit on maximum fines in the magistrates’ courts.
In respect of the first amendment, while a prison sentence is adequate and serious, we are concerned that the £5,000 limit is too low. People trafficking is a profitable business where criminals make large sums of money at the expense of victims, and in order to tackle slavery and human trafficking we need to ensure that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent.
The Delegated Powers Committee was concerned about Clause 30(5) on penalties, since it confers a power on the Secretary of State,
“to increase or remove the limit on the amount of the fine”,
by regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The Government have said that this power has been included in order to allow for the removal of the limit on the fine when Section 85(1) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 comes into effect. That section removes the £5,000 upper limit for fines which may be imposed on summary conviction in respect of offences that have been enacted before the date on which that subsection is brought into force. But that subsection has not yet been brought into force and the Minister in the other place said that the subsection would come into effect before this Bill receives Royal Assent and that this is why Clause 30(5) contains the provision in question in order to bring the Bill into line with the new policy.
However, the Delegated Powers Committee considers that,
“it is only justifiable to rely on section 85(1) for the use of the negative procedure where the power is exercised within a reasonable period of the commencement of that provision. Accordingly, we consider the power under clause 30(5) to increase or remove the limit under subsection (3)(b) should only be subject to the negative procedure where it is exercised during the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which section 85(1) is brought into force. In any other case, the power should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.
Achieving that is the thrust of our Amendment 102A, which I appreciate refers to the regulations being made,
“12 months after the passing of this Act”,
rather than 12 months beginning with the day on which Section 85(1) is brought into force, which is what I think the Delegated Powers Committee was seeking. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept either the terms of our amendment on this point or alternatively—and we would certainly be quite happy with this—the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendation, to which I have already referred. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for bringing this amendment forward.
As the noble Lord said, Amendment 63A seeks to remove the limit to the fine that can be imposed on summary conviction for not complying with a slavery and trafficking prevention or risk order. As he set out, these maximum fines have been set in line with existing limits on fines commensurate with the offence committed, and are in line with equivalent provision in relation to the sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order, which were passed in the previous Session of Parliament as part of what is now the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
To ensure that the measure can respond flexibly to future changes in sentencing policy, Clause 30 also provides for the Secretary of State to amend or remove the maximum amount of the fine which may be imposed for summary conviction for breach of an order.
The Committee will be aware that, as the noble Lord has set out, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 includes a provision which, when commenced, will remove an upper limit on maximum fines in the magistrates’ courts, which are on the commencement day set at £5,000 in the type of circumstances covered by this provision. We anticipate that by the time that the Bill reaches Royal Assent, the limit on fines imposed in the magistrates’ court will have been removed under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which would make this amendment unnecessary. So I do not believe that we need to remove the £5,000 limit at this point.
Amendment 102A would make any future amendment to the level of fine by regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure if it takes place more than 12 months after Royal Assent. As the noble Lord said, this is in line with a recent recommendation of the report by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. We welcome that report and will consider it carefully ahead of Report, including the recommendation on this provision.
Given that clarification and my assurance that this matter will have further consideration, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw this amendment.
I thank the Minister for that response. I am more than happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.