Energy Prices Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Lennie

Committee stage
Monday 24th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lennie (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments is all about making various clauses subject to the affirmative procedure in your Lordships’ House. I give notice that we intend to divide the House on Amendment 25.

The amendments affect Clauses 2, 3, 6, 7 and 16, and Schedules 1 and 2, making them subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government seek to justify some of the use of the negative procedure by pointing out that the Secretary of State already has the power to modify or revoke the schemes in Clauses 2 and 3, and Clauses 6 and 7 for Northern Ireland.

Clause 16, which confers powers to make it a temporary requirement on electricity generators to make payment regulations, uses the affirmative procedure on first use and the negative procedure thereafter. The Government’s justification for a temporary requirement represents a significant intervention in the electricity market. This clause will define the main parameters of the scheme. After this, the Government believe that interest will wane, with only minor or technical amendments likely to occur, therefore justifying the negative procedure thereafter.

The justification for the Schedule 1 powers is that, although the Government recognise that the powers are significant, they are necessary to allow the schemes for relief of GB businesses. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, established in haste last week, says that by including paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 1 the Government have completely ignored the recommendation contained in its report:

“No attempt has been made to limit the powers or to ensure that they will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.”


Nor was any “compelling justification” offered to support the Government taking these powers. Schedule 2 powers relate to Northern Ireland, where a similar provision is proposed.

In Clauses 21 and 22, the subject of Amendment 25, the Government assert that their approach would include a fuller period of consultation with relevant stakeholders providing suppliers with earlier certainty. However, what guarantee is there that these steps will ever be taken? The department also considers that any delay could have negative consequences for those who were to benefit from the scheme. However, there are enough examples of regulations being scrutinised after the fact—for instance, those relating to Covid—and even after this primary legislation, which, as it stands, took effect from 1 October 2022. I cannot see why this cannot be applied here.

The pace of things is another justification offered by the Government. The affirmative procedure would not allow certainty that the licence modifications would follow and this in turn would inhibit suppliers making required operational changes, slowing delivery this winter.

There does not seem much justification for the Secretary of State taking these overwhelming powers. Clause 22 applies similar powers to Northern Ireland, also without the same compelling justification. It allows the Secretary of State to tackle barriers to delivering implementation of the schemes as necessary. There appears no justification for this at all. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is firmly of the view that any power conferred by Clause 22 is inappropriate and that the Government should act by,

“imposing a time limit on the exercise of the power which is commensurate with other time limits contained within the Bill.”

I beg to move.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to some of the amendments in my name in this group. This is the only time I shall intervene. Although I have tabled amendments in the second and fourth groups, I do not propose to speak to them. What I am about to say covers the same points.

I declare an interest as a member of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I do not speak for the committee; the report does that. Over the weekend, I read the Government’s inadequate response to the report. I am grateful for the speed with which the Government responded, as I suspect other committee members are. That was useful but their response was completely inadequate. It is significant that the government response makes no mention at all of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report from November 2021, Democracy Denied? The Urgent Need to Rebalance Power between Parliament and the Executive.

Clause 22(5), which is not referred to in the government response, is the subject of Amendment 28. According to paragraph 14 of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report, Clause 22(5) is, in effect,

“a Henry VIII power because it allows the effect of legislation, including primary legislation, to be modified by a direction.”

Paragraph 14 also says:

“There are no limits on the kinds of requirements which may be imposed through the directions power.”


Paragraphs 14 to 18 say firmly that the powers in Clause 22 are inappropriate. Clause 22 brings in what is referred to as “disguised law”. This was referred to in the November 2021 report as “camouflaged legislation” and an “unacceptable ploy”.

The Delegated Powers Committee report on this Bill refers to the memorandum supplied with the Bill, particularly paragraphs 154 to 162. Referring to the government memo, the report says that it

“does not explain the full range of the things which can be done”.

It goes on to say, in paragraph 16:

“We are also not convinced by the reasons given in the Memorandum for the power not being subject to parliamentary scrutiny.”


As such, the Delegated Powers Committee report says that the Government appear

“to have completed ignored the recommendations”

in the committee’s report of November 2021.

I want to make a more general point, which I shall not repeat on the other group of amendments. I was not a member of the Delegated Powers Committee when its November 2021 report, Democracy Denied?, was published, in tandem and in co-operation with a report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House, entitled Government by Diktat: A Call to Return Power to Parliament. Both reports—that from the Delegated Powers Committee and that from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee—were about Parliament and the Executive. They were not about this House and the elected House of Commons. Parliament and the Executive are what this is about.

Both reports were debated in this House on 6 January under a Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish of Little Venice. I have no criticism of the Minister or his team for reasons I shall make clear. I do not expect he has read either report; I am not sure any Minister has. I do not hold the Minister responsible. He and his government colleagues are taking advantage of the slack role Parliament has played to bequeath powers from Parliament to the Executive.

On Wednesday 20 July this year—a significant date because it was the day before the Summer Recess started—both the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, including Peers who had been members of those committees last year when the reports were prepared, took evidence on the reports from the then Leaders of both Houses and First Parliamentary Counsel. There was no sign that anybody had read anything about the 6 January debate on both of them. It was abundantly clear that neither of the then Leaders had even been briefed on the views of this House.

Parliamentary counsel have clearly continued to draft Bills, such as this Bill, which have “completely ignored” the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, Democracy Denied? Why have they done this? Repeatedly, parliamentary counsel are producing Bills which transfer powers from Parliament to the Executive. It is parliamentary counsel doing this—they draft the Bills.

During the exchanges on 20 July in respect of what is referred to as Question 16, I asked the First Parliamentary Counsel, Dame Elizabeth Gardiner, about her saying during our evidence that day that counsel

“have that discussion on a daily basis with the teams and with the Ministers about the nature of what they are asking for”.

I pointed out that, in my time as a Minister, in both Houses, over 12 years—it is in the minutes—

“I understood … that parliamentary counsel took instructions from the department’s lawyers and Ministers never got involved with parliamentary counsel.”


Dame Elizabeth’s answer was:

“I think things have changed a lot ... Probably we do meet policy officials and Ministers more frequently on Bills than we would have done 30 years ago”.


I have checked on this. I think this change, or breach of convention, has happened in the past 12 years. My experience, particularly in two departments, as I recall, when I served in this House—there were four altogether, but two in particular—was that it was specifically said to me when I joined, because Bills came up, that in general the Government accepted most of the recommendations from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was the norm to accept the majority. I was repeatedly told that. I think this change, or breach of convention—it is certainly a lapse in the accepted standards of conduct—has happened only since 2010, when somebody started playing wild with parliamentary procedures, and the House of Commons was blindsided by it. That, I think, is very dangerous.

I am prepared to say that I think the old way was best. If lawyers gave instructions for policy officials so that the policy officials would have to say to department’s lawyers, “This is what we want to do, and what our Ministers want to do”, the lawyers would then use the legal structures to put that case to parliamentary counsel. By and large, the system worked. I think it would be far less likely that clear recommendations made by Parliament would be “completely ignored” if the lawyers were the ones who gave the instructions to parliamentary counsel, as was the case up until 2010.

I trust the lawyers here to follow the conventions. Quite clearly, parliamentary counsel work with the Government—let us make no bones about it. These days, they do not even have their own office block in Whitehall, to which I was once invited to when I was a Minister in the other place. I know the way they work; they are now ensconced inside the Treasury. They work for the Government; they are not independent.