Health and Care Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Baroness Sugg

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 31st January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly in support of this amendment and, in doing so, I apologise that I was not here at the Second Reading, although I have followed the progress of the Bill carefully.

Last Thursday at Oral Questions, in response I think to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the Minister spoke of the importance of examining the provenance of health equipment that comes to the UK. He said his department was working

“to ensure that it is not from regions where there is slave labour, or where the Muslim Uighurs are being persecuted by the Chinese Government.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 439.]

We must of course ensure that the products and equipment in our supply chain are ethically sourced. Last week, my noble friend acknowledged that we need to do more here, and this amendment gives us the opportunity to do just that. Noble Lords speaking before me clearly and comprehensively laid out why we should avoid procurement from such areas.

All UK government departments need to do more to look carefully at their supply chains, but we must start somewhere. The DHSC, with its scale of procurement, and the reports we have seen of the prevalence of Uighur forced labour in PPE and healthcare supply chains during the Covid-19 pandemic, seems to be the right place to start.

The issue of genocide has been subject to lengthy debate in your Lordships’ House, not least during the Trade Bill last year. While a form of compromise was reached, it is limited to countries with which we will be entering free trade agreements. That is not a solution for procurement for many of the countries with which the DHSC does business. Importantly, this amendment would create a process, a mechanism, through which the UK Government could be required to assess regions for “serious risk of genocide”, and indeed publish their assessment. That process is, so far, sadly lacking in this country.

The UK has a responsibility to do all it can to protect against human rights violations and genocide. We also have a responsibility to our NHS workers and those who use the health service to make sure that we give them ethically sourced products. As my noble friend Lord Blencathra said, UK taxpayers do not want to be part of genocide.

We need to see deeds, not words. This amendment will significantly reduce the likelihood that the Government will procure goods or services from regions where there is a serious risk of genocide. It will bring the UK a step closer to developing a comprehensive framework in responding to allegations of genocide, and will meaningfully engage its obligations to prohibit, prevent and punish perpetrators of genocide. It does so in a limited, proportionate, reasonable and modest way.

I hope the Government will properly consider this amendment, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, and I know that he will have heard support for it from all sides of your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government should embrace this amendment. I want to concentrate on the traceability argument of goods, and in particular cotton imports. Without good traceability, the genocide convention obligations cannot be met.

To date, I have had two very poor replies on cotton traceability from the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone of Boscobel, at Question Time on 21 October, and a Written Answer on 24 January. Of course, as has already been said, we are miles away from the policies of the United States Government, who have taken a proactive approach to imports from regions of China where we know human rights abuses take place. As has been said, on 23 December, President Biden signed the legislation into law.

It simply cannot be left to commercial companies to satisfy themselves. It is crucial to understand the geographic origins of products and conditions of production. The two things are intertwined and they both need to be dealt with. There has to be a robust methodology that is reliable even when working with partners that may be untrustworthy or unco-operative. The use of middlemen such as commodity traders and the practice of blending fibre from multiple sources create additional difficulty.

Traceability—both what is termed as upstream, starting at the farm, or downstream, to map products back to their origins—is currently used. However, full visibility of the supply chain using these methods is impossible, and especially so in restricted areas such as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It is just impossible to do in the normal way you would look at traceability. If the Minister is in doubt about this, his department should read the report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of November last year entitled:

“New Approaches to Supply Chain Traceability (implications for Xinjiang and Beyond)”.


My conclusion from that is that paper-based traceability and supplier information is a non-starter for effective due diligence.

In addition, there is abundant evidence that the Chinese Communist Party, which owns China, actually launders Xinjiang cotton, either semi-finished or blended, into international supply chains. This is set out in considerable detail in the November 2021 paper by Laura T. Murphy of Sheffield Hallam University entitled:

“Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton is Obscured in International Supply Chains”.


In 2019, it was established that 85% of Chinese cotton was from Xinjiang. That means that cotton from the Uyghur region of China accounts for 22%—a fifth—of cotton worldwide. What was once grown or reared retains details of its origins—in a way, this is the test. However, it takes more than a paper trail to identify as such. It requires forensic work; chemical, isotope and genetic tracing and other methods that I will not list here are all crucial.

I will give a good example. From 1,000 garment samples collected across the world in high-street fashion shops involving nearly 50 brands, Oritain Global Ltd detected that in Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh, the cotton in the garments had a mixture from Xinjiang of between 6.5% and 25%. Chinese cotton was 41% consistent with Xinjiang. Some 10% of samples of products tested in the UK were consistent with Xinjiang cotton. The UK has a high rate of imports from Bangladesh, where 25% of the cotton was from Xinjiang. It is worth pointing out that India has zero consistency with Xinjiang; India has cleared out Chinese cotton fabrication.

As to the practicalities for the health service, in 2019, the UK imported furniture, bedding and mattresses from China to the tune of £2.3 billion and imported apparel and clothing accessories to the tune of £3.7 billion. Has the NHS used beds and mattresses containing cotton from China or from suppliers using connections with China or other countries known to have a mixture of Xinjiang cotton? Where did all the Nightingale equipment appear from so quickly? As I asked last week, without any warning, how much China cotton is involved in NHS uniforms and accessories? Others have mentioned face masks, but as I pointed out last Thursday, more nurses means more uniforms.

Has the NHS supply chain used Oritain’s element analysis to check, or is it just relying on suppliers’ paperwork to check what would be only part of the supply chain? Companies and Governments need a degree of independence in assessing traceability and to not rely on companies doing it themselves. Some of the supply chains are five or six levels removed, so they cannot possibly have faith in each level and know the details from manufacturers, middlemen, traders, and agents. With the best will in the world and good corporate responsibility, checking the paper trail of five, six or seven levels will not work.

As I said earlier, the way to do it is to work on the basis that a product that was once grown or reared holds signs of its origins, and today’s advanced technology can do it. The technology of element analysis used by Oritain claims that it can tell the difference between two tea estates with a dirt road between them—it is so good and effective. For those who want more, I suggest the long read in the Guardian of 16 September 2021, which is where I came across the use of the technology. I have since met with senior reps of Oritain Global Ltd to better brief myself. Modern forensic technologies must be used, as is now required in the USA. The United States is using these technologies. Why are they not being used in the UK? The NHS, as the largest employer in Europe, should have a leading role.

It is not normal for the origin of cotton to be stated on labels. Of those 1,000 products which I mentioned were checked by Oritain last year, only 3% had the information on the label and, as a warning, the higher quality a product which attracts higher prices is more likely to be consistent with Xinjiang than cheaper items, so you must be really careful what you are looking at. Non-disclosure is almost the norm and of those who do disclose there is a high percentage of non-compliance, so labels and paperwork are not the answer.

Technology is the answer, and the ball is in the Government’s court. The old-fashioned gentlemen’s agreements and systems we are used to will not work. Modern technology is thought to be 95% accurate in identifying where an item was grown or reared. Only with that degree of information can the NHS satisfy the convention obligations. Otherwise, it will not work. The Government ought to embrace the amendment and then the new technology.