Supporting Disadvantaged Families

Debate between Lord Rooker and Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall

Thursday 12th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, has withdrawn her name, so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, what is happening about the decline in the number of health visitors in respect of the youngest children in disadvantaged families? If the Government, as was said in the Statement, are taking a long-term holistic approach, why has there been no national health inequality strategy since 2010? Is this why life expectancy in England has stalled since 2010—something that has not happened since 1900, according to The Marmot Review 10 Years On?

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Naseby and Lord Cormack, have withdrawn. I therefore call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

I was attracted to speak to this group of amendments by Amendments 5, 11 and 53, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and, as I have listened to the debate, I have begun to wonder even more why the Bill is required in the first place. At the risk of upsetting my good and noble friend Lord Foulkes—and I certainly do not want to get involved in Scottish internal politics; that is my caveat for what I am about to say—as a Minister in MAFF, Northern Ireland and Defra, and as chair of the Food Standards Agency, I worked very closely with several Ministers in the Scottish Government, and I always found them totally professional and focused on the issue at hand at the time.

Nobody has asked me to make a speech today on this matter, but I am going to raise matters raised by Food Standards Scotland in consultation in August and in the recent letter in October. The very reason the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland exist is to ensure that policy formation, regulation and enforcement in relation to protection of consumers’ interests are clearly separated from those responsible for food industry growth and promotion. Food Standards Scotland says the Bill blurs that distinction, which has been in place since the FSA was formed after the BSE crisis in the 1990s. Both the FSA and the FSS have a legal duty to

“protect public health from risks which may arise in connection with the consumption of food”.

That comes from the Food Standards Act 1999 and the Food Scotland Act 2015.

Only a few weeks ago, the UK Government confirmed in their report on the common frameworks that the powers they have to restrict devolved competence under Section 12 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop—had not been used precisely because

“significant progress is being made across policy areas to establish common frameworks in collaboration with the devolved administrations.”

No party has ever expressed the need for, or provided evidence in support of, a statutory framework to regulate the UK internal market in the way that this Bill tries to do.

It is worth pointing out that the current internal market makes provision to allow the devolved Governments to impose conditions such as labelling and composition requirements or price mechanisms on food business operators in order to meet a public health objective, provided that the proposal meets an overriding public interest test. The Bill makes no equivalent provision and, indeed, makes clear that business cost is the primary driver, with no consideration of either public health costs or non-financial consumer interests and protection. The Bill does not advance the protection of consumers, other than in cost reduction. If consumer interest is defined solely by cost, it is inevitable that it will drive down standards, because lower standards are less costly.

I will briefly deploy three examples of existing responsible policy-making that is fully in line with current UK market issues and industry pressures. They are all evidence based, taking account of industry impacts as well as consumer interests. These three examples of why the present arrangements work were all given in August to the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, by Food Standards Scotland—to which he has never responded.

The first is the fortification of flour with folic acid to improve pregnancies affected by neural tube defects. This policy has been advocated for some time by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition and I have raised it in your Lordships’ House on several occasions since November 2013. In the absence of UK Government action, Food Standards Scotland was asked by the Government there to carry out an assessment for Scottish Ministers. It did, and concluded that the nature of the UK market was such that all flour would require fortification and differentiation in product lines was not possible. Food Standards Scotland concluded that a separate Scottish solution should not be followed. UK-wide action is currently under consideration, of course.

The second example is the prohibition of the sale of raw drinking milk in Scotland. The original wide ban has been continued in Scotland, based on illness and deaths and the advice of the Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food. Controls in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are less restrictive than in Scotland, so different rules apply. The current system works, and Food Standards Scotland is at a complete loss to understand why the Bill appears to save the existing unique provisions; it is clear that future provisions introduced on public health grounds are not protected. In other words, what will be saved now would not be protected if further provisions were introduced. The Government are making assertions that, without legislative underpinning, unnecessary regulatory barriers could emerge between different parts of the UK. The Government have given not a shred of evidence to support this assertion.

The third example concerns allergen information for consumers on “prepacked for direct sale” foods—that is a unique type of food. Working with Defra, the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland developed proposals to improve information following the tragic death of a teenager eating a baguette containing undeclared sesame seeds. Four options were considered as part of a UK-wide consultation. In short, option 4 was recommended as in the best interests of consumers, even though option 1 was the cheapest for industry. Under the Bill, if, for example, one of the bodies had opted for option 3—slightly less than option 4—the body that had chosen option 4 would have to go for option 3. Worse still, using the Competition and Markets Authority, it is likely that option 1, which was simply aimed at raising consumer confidence without regulation, would be chosen. It would be the cheapest for industry but the most unsafe for the consumer. These three examples of responsible policy-making show that the current common frameworks system should be used, and be shown to fail, before we move to the mutual recognition system outlined in Clause 2.

Finally, as was referred to earlier, diet conditions might in future require labelling of, for example, high fat and high sugar on public health grounds. This can work perfectly well under the current arrangements. Under the Bill, however, one part of the UK could be lobbied to reduce information on packaging which other parts would be required to follow. I cannot support the lowest common denominator; it is unsafe for consumers. I hope that, in due course, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will press his solution.