Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I have some sympathy with the intent behind these amendments. I will not go over the very interesting responses last night to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath; I would just like to make a few brief comments.

A report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee in other place states:

“We conclude the Government should seek to retain as close as possible a relationship with Euratom, and that this should include accepting its delivery of existing safeguards requirements in the UK”.


The MPs on the committee warned that the impacts of leaving Euratom would be “profound”, putting the UK in,

“a much weaker position to drive regulatory standards”,

at an EU level.

Last week, the EDF corporate policy and regulation director said:

“The UK still lacks the replacement rules needed to fuel its nuclear reactors after”,


the country quits the EU. EDF also told the House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee:

“The Euratom Treaty is currently vital to the functioning of nuclear energy generation in the UK. Failure to replace its provisions by the point of withdrawal could result in the UK being unable to import nuclear materials, and have severe consequences for the UK’s energy security”.


The UK’s Nuclear Industry Association, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, said that,

“the Bill does not provide enough certainty for the industry and the government should be pushing for a transitional agreement”.

Finally, according to City A.M., Vote Leave campaign director Dominic Cummings, in rather colourful language, lambasted government plans to leave the European nuclear agency as “near-retarded”.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a couple of questions for the Minister before he replies. First, will he answer the question that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked about the recently published—on 29 January—report of the EU committee of this House? It is hot off the press, full of information and all the substantial written evidence is available to noble Lords. Although we were covering energy security, we spent considerable time on Euratom, and there was evidence from the industry and from the ONR. Did the Minister look at any of the evidence and the report before he wrote his letter to noble Lords following Second Reading, which contradicts the evidence provided to the Select Committee?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

I was coming to the noble Lord’s amendment to make quite clear our ambitions for that future relationship and how we see it developing, before I was interrupted first by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and then by his noble friend Lord Warner interrupting him. I will now deal with how we want to ensure proper clarity on where we are going. The information I will provide to the Committee particularly relates to Amendments 2 and 16 from the noble Lord, Lord Warner.

The noble Lord will remember that we made a Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January. I am sure that he knows it off by heart by now. It included a commitment to continue to provide quarterly updates—it is information that noble Lords particularly want in this matter—addressing the progress on the wide range of issues relating to Euratom exit. That will include progress on those negotiations, but also on how they will develop into our future relationship with Euratom, as well as progress made by the ONR on establishing the United Kingdom’s domestic safeguards regime. I cannot tell where those negotiations will take place. The noble Lord will have to bear with me. What he wants, as far as I understand it from his Amendment 2 and the other amendments, is a guarantee that information will be provided by the Government. All I am saying is that we have made one Written Ministerial Statement—actually, we have made more than one—and we will continue to do so. That reporting commitment goes far further than the proposed amendment, by keeping Parliament regularly updated on the key issues that have been raised. I hope the Committee will welcome the fact that we will continue to provide further updates on those. The noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, asked for one. There will certainly be one before the Easter Recess.

I turn to Amendment 12 on our future relationship with Euratom. The Committee will be aware that in her speech on 22 September 2017 in Florence my right honourable friend the Prime Minister set out her desire for an implementation period after the United Kingdom has ceased to be a member of the EU. This is now well understood in the EU and I do not think that the amendment is consistent with this position. It remains the Government’s intention to ensure continuity for the nuclear industry and to avoid the possibility of the cliff edge that noble Lords referred to for the industry on exit day.

I hope that the Committee will not need to be reminded that the UK will not be a member after 29 March next year, whether an implementation period can be agreed with the Commission or not. That much is clear. If it is not, I will repeat from page 1 of the letter that the Prime Minister sent to President Tusk:

“I hereby notify the European Council in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union. In addition, in accordance with … Article 50(2) as applied by Article 106a of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, I hereby notify the European Council of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community. References in this letter to the European Union should therefore be taken to include a reference to the European Atomic Energy Community”.


In other words, there can be no question of separately attempting to prolong our membership of Euratom beyond the point at which we leave the EU. That is a very different matter from having an implementation period, which is something we are aiming at. That is a period after we have left the EU and Euratom, during which we continue to be covered by the EU acquis. By “acquis” we mean the regulatory framework that applies to EU member states. In exchange, the Government expect that the United Kingdom would be able to continue to benefit from its current access to the EU’s markets for the duration of the implementation period.

Again, I must emphasise that any agreed implementation period is not a way of delaying our departure from Euratom. It is a way of making the transition smooth, rather than sudden. My reason for asking noble Lords not to press their amendments is simple: the amendment does not seek to establish an implementation period after exit; it seeks a transitional period before exit. My honourable friend the Minister for Business and Energy set out on 7 February that there can be no question of separating the situation for Euratom from that of the wider EU. The two are, as we know, uniquely and legally bound. Again, I made that clear at earlier stages.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 17, which seeks to require the Government to lay a strategy for maintaining existing arrangements once the UK withdraws from Euratom and for this to be considered by both Houses before the main substantive provisions of the Bill can be brought into force. As I have said, the Government have made it absolutely clear that they will seek a close and effective association with Euratom in the future. As was mentioned in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government set out the principles on which our Euratom strategy is based, including to aim for continuity with current relevant Euratom arrangements, to ensure that the United Kingdom maintains its leading role in European nuclear research, to ensure that the nuclear industry in the UK has the necessary skilled workforce, and to ensure that on 29 March 2019 the United Kingdom has the necessary measures in place to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to operate. In respect of our future relationship with Euratom, we will also seek a close association with Euratom’s research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor projects. We will also want continuity of trade arrangements to ensure the nuclear industry can continue to trade across EU borders, and to maintain close and effective co-operation with Euratom on nuclear safety.

The Committee will be fully aware that the nature of our future relationship with Euratom is part of the next stage of negotiations, which is yet to begin. An implementation period may well be agreed and we hope that it is, but there are no guarantees. In any case, without such a period the United Kingdom will legally leave the EU and Euratom in March 2019. The Bill and the regulations made under it are crucial to make sure that we can establish that domestic nuclear safeguards regime to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards when Euratom’s safeguarding arrangements no longer apply in the United Kingdom. From that point, the United Kingdom will be responsible for its safeguards, including having its own state system of accounting and control.

[Lord Rooker]

In that case, are we not all wasting our time? Could the Minister say whether the International Atomic Energy Agency has already agreed in the discussions that have taken place that the contents of the Bill lead it to believe that the safeguards office will be able to demonstrate the independence it requires? If not, we are wasting our time.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, before I set out the context surrounding, and the key features of, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, I think it would be helpful to explain again the meaning of nuclear safeguards. Investing a little time in this will, I believe, help with our discussion of this important but rather technical issue.

Nuclear safeguards are about non-proliferation and demonstrating that the United Kingdom is a responsible nuclear power. Nuclear safeguards are the reporting and verification processes that nuclear states use to demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. The Bill has a very specific purpose in a very technical area: it ensures that the United Kingdom can put a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime in place.

It is important to make clear at the outset, as it is key to understanding the subject matter covered by the Bill, that civil nuclear safeguards are entirely distinct from nuclear safety and nuclear security. Nuclear safety concerns the prevention of nuclear accidents, and nuclear security concerns physical protection measures. Both nuclear safety and nuclear security are already the responsibility of the Office for Nuclear Regulation and are unaffected by the Bill.

As a responsible nuclear state, the United Kingdom is a committed member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which provides international oversight of civil nuclear safeguards. The United Kingdom has voluntarily accepted the application of international safeguards through agreements with the agency and is seeking to conclude new agreements with the agency that follow the same principles as our current agreements. We were a founder member of the IAEA back in 1957 and we continue to be at the forefront of its activities. Leaving Euratom will not change that.

The United Kingdom’s nuclear safeguards regime is currently provided primarily by Euratom with some support from the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The European Union and Euratom are uniquely legally joined, so when the Prime Minister formally notified our intention to leave the European Union, she also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. The United Kingdom therefore served notice of its intention to withdraw from Euratom at the same time as withdrawing from the European Union. The Bill therefore enables the United Kingdom to ensure that a domestic nuclear safeguards regime can be put in place when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to the UK.

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions. Maintaining the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and international partners is a key priority for us. We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation, including safeguards, and the United Kingdom will remain a committed member of the global architecture that provides the framework for non-proliferation.

Civil nuclear safeguards and reporting, by assuring the international community about the proper use of certain nuclear materials, underpin international civil nuclear trade. Alongside the consideration of this Bill in the House of Commons, the Government have been engaging in negotiations with the European Union, the IAEA and third countries. The United Kingdom has held several rounds of discussions with the European Union in the first phase of negotiations and there has been good progress on Euratom issues.

Negotiations with the IAEA on future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the United Kingdom have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. Substantial progress has also been made in negotiations to put in place new nuclear co-operation agreements. In particular, constructive progress has already been made in discussions with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.

It is clear that we need continuity and must work to avoid any break in our civil nuclear safeguards regime if we wish to support the United Kingdom’s nuclear industry and its nuclear research community. A civil nuclear safeguards regime and safeguards agreements with the IAEA are critical for the continued operation of our civil nuclear industry and research. As set out in the Written Statement laid on 11 January, our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom is two-fold: first, to seek, through our negotiations with the European Commission, a close association with Euratom; secondly, and simultaneously, to put in place all the necessary measures to ensure that the United Kingdom can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one. This is vital to ensure continuity for industry, whatever the outcome of negotiations.

We will also seek to include Euratom matters within any negotiated implementation period. The Government also made the commitment to report back to Parliament every three months, by way of further Written Statements, about overall progress on this strategy, including in respect of negotiations. We have been working closely with the Office for Nuclear Regulation to ensure that it can be ready to take on new responsibilities for a domestic safeguards regime, in place of Euratom’s current regime.

As my predecessor, my noble friend Lord Prior, set out in a Written Statement on 14 September 2017, our intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard the international community would expect from the United Kingdom as a member of the IAEA. The Government are aiming to establish as soon as possible after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union a robust regime that is as comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but this issue was raised recently in the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee inquiry into energy security. The ONR cannot be independent in the same way that Euratom was. The accounting officer is appointed by the DWP accounting officer. The chair of the ONR is appraised by the DWP. How can it be sold to the IAEA that the ONR is as independent as Euratom?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will take advice but my understanding is that the IAEA does not have concerns about this issue, which is part of the ongoing discussions with that body. As I said, discussions have taken place and they will continue. The Bill will be considered in this House for some weeks and in due course, I will give a further reassurance to the noble Lord to make sure that he and others are satisfied that the ONR can perform this role.

Perhaps I may continue with my remarks. Currently, under the Euratom treaty, all members including the United Kingdom subject their civil nuclear material and facilities to nuclear safeguards inspections and assurance which is carried out by Euratom. Euratom then reports specific information on member states to the IAEA, which has international oversight for those nuclear safeguards. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill ensures that the United Kingdom can put this domestic regime in place and it will enable the ONR to oversee nuclear safeguards when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to this country.

To ensure continued international verification and oversight of the United Kingdom’s safeguards, as I have said to the noble Lord, we will continue in our discussions with the IAEA to agree replacement voluntary safeguards agreements that reflect the fact that the Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom. This Bill provides us with the ability to implement those new agreements as well as the new domestic regime that underpins them.