Great British Energy Bill

Debate between Lord Roborough and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Monday 13th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my register of interests, including in solar and wind energy development and ownership, as well as as an investor in energy-related equities and as a farmer and lands manager.

I shall speak in particular to Amendment 80 in the name of my noble friend Lord Petitgas, but also support Amendments 85A in the name of my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom and the amendments listed in the name of my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel. These amendments put detail to the questions I posed to the Government, in my response to His Majesty’s gracious Address, regarding financial reporting and accountability.

Great British Energy is tasked with investing taxpayers’ money to allow taxpayers to benefit from the financial returns from the energy transition, as well as to accelerate and stimulate that transition. It must be right, as with any publicly listed company, that the company is accountable to its owners for its performance. That requires high-quality financial reporting. Listed companies report unaudited financials quarterly and audited annual reports—which also include carbon emissions accountability, as my noble friend Lord Petitgas pointed out. The first effect of Amendment 80 would be to bring GB Energy in line with those requirements.

The second effect would be to introduce a more granular analysis of the returns from each investment. This is usual with investment trusts and common in private equity. I see no reason why GB Energy should not report in equally great detail. Fully commercial organisations may choose not to do so to protect commercial confidentiality. However, in GB Energy’s case, it must be desirable to highlight where returns are the greatest in order to direct more private sector capital into those areas and help achieve the primary purposes.

It is also essential that GB Energy is fully accountable to Parliament on an individual investment basis, as well as holistically. This is taxpayers’ money, which could have been used to avoid destroying farmers’ and family businesses’ desire to invest and grow. That places a heavy burden of responsibility for GB Energy to perform well. The Minister may suggest that this is too expensive and cumbersome, but I point out that listed companies measured in the tens of millions of pounds are well able to comply without issue. GB Energy appears unlikely to be an operating company but more of an investment company. That should make these obligations straightforward to comply with, while ensuring that its investee companies and projects also have to keep accurate and timely books to allow GB Energy to comply.

The Minister may suggest that UK company registration requirements to lodge accounts are enough, as has been said in previous groups. Anyone familiar with those accounts will know that they tend to be published around nine months after the close of the financial year, are annual only and contain the least possible information to comply with registration requirements. There is little here that can be helpful in assessing performance.

Amendment 80 creates financial and climate reporting discipline that will then have to be extended throughout the organisation, to all of the investee companies, to everyone’s advantage. Examples of successful government investment in the private sector are hard to find. If this Government are confident that this will be the unicorn, surely the Minister will welcome the amendment, which will create many opportunities to showcase that success.

I also add my voice to Amendment 65 in the name of my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel, and I have many of the same concerns as my noble friend Lord Howell and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington. While this may almost seem like stating the obvious, there are a number of issues around grid connection, and I would be most grateful if the Minister could update us with progress. The first is the issue of nameplate grid capacity. Does the National Grid’s £35 billion investment plan from 2026 to 2031 fully address this need? And, given the increase in the UK Government’s borrowing costs and likely impact on UK companies, does the Minister anticipate any refinancing requirements to build out this transition?

The second is the human capacity of distribution network operators to work through projects with developers, to plan and deliver the grid connection. I understand there is a lack of capacity in this area and it is possible that DNOs could be prioritising their own projects at the expense of third parties. They do not appear to be meeting obligations, which is costing developers millions in delays and cost increases. I understand the bottleneck is largely human capital, which exists in Europe but of which there is not enough in the UK. The Minister has discussed training in previous groups, but would it not be also wise to fast-track visa applications for skilled operatives? Is the Minister confident that his Government have a plan that can deliver beyond 2030, as anecdotally the grid queue analysis and action that has been taken appear to have sacrificed confidence in developments beyond that timeframe in order to meet 2030 commitments?

Under the national electricity system consultation, I understand developers have been given only three weeks to consult on up to 16 documents per project. These developers need to see more resources and more evidence of planning beyond that timeframe in order to keep a strong project pipeline alive. Can the Minister update the House on the impact these actions have had on the developer community? Is he satisfied that the capital and talent are still available in that sector to meet his Government’s objectives?

I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom’s comments on the sustainability of biofuels. Displacement of food production in favour of growing energy crops risks causing higher prices for everyone. I draw the Minister’s attention to the US blending mandate, which has been in place for several decades and has led to around a quarter of the US corn production going into bioethanol for blending with gasoline. This has had a structural impact on food prices around the world and simply displaces one problem into another.

I disagree with my noble friend Lord Hamilton on green hydrogen, unfortunately, as its cost simply seems to be too high for most applications. Around one-third of the energy is lost in electrolysing water into green hydrogen, and another third is lost in turning it back into electricity, giving it a structural disadvantage versus other forms of energy.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I want to offer a slightly different perspective on this group of amendments. All the amendments in this group, and indeed some later groups, involve a series of rather worthy things—for which there are to be reports or other consequences—to be achieved by giving a direction to Great British Energy. While I support the amendments on the basis that they are probing amendments, I find it difficult to support the structure of the amendments themselves.

It seems to me that, by using the power of direction in Clause 6, the amendments would undermine the nature of that power and subvert the effectiveness of the power of direction, which is a long-standing feature of the control framework for public corporations. Powers of direction for nationalised industries were commonplace when nationalisation took hold from the 1940s onward. I do not know whether they existed before that, but they certainly have a pedigree of nearly 80 years. The first one of which I am aware is in relation to the Bank of England Act 1946, which nationalised the Bank of England. They have been a feature of public body legislation ever since, except in relation to bodies which are created as regulatory bodies.

The power of direction was never conceived as a mechanism for giving routine instructions to public bodies, which is what all the amendments in this group and the subsequent groups are trying to do. In fact, throughout the history of nationalised industries, the power of direction has almost certainly not been used. In relation to the Bank of England, I asked the previous Government fairly recently whether they would like to give up the power of direction over the Bank of England and whether they had used it since 1946; the answer was that they had never used it since 1946, but they definitely wanted to keep it. The fact that a power has not been used does not necessarily have any meaning, because it is designed as a backstop power for use in extreme circumstances. The mere fact of its existence can be a powerful weapon in the hands of the Government of the day.

It should be an uncontested fact that the Government ultimately call the shots in relation to public corporations, however much operational independence they claim to be handing over to them when they set the bodies up. The board of a public body should be very wary of not following the wishes of the Government of the day, unless those wishes conflict with their legal and statutory objectives.

I will always defend the ability of the Government to give directions to a public body, because public bodies should not be above the Government of the day. I think there are far too many public bodies, but if we have to have them, we must have an effective power of telling them what to do when necessary. I would definitely not want that core power to be diluted by being cluttered up with a lot of more day-to-day matters, which is partly what the amendments in this group and subsequent amendments do.

The concerns of my noble friend on the Front Bench and indeed other noble Lords who have drafted these amendments would be better met by placing specific requirements in the Bill, rather than by cluttering up the power of direction which has a very special place in the control framework for public bodies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments in this group. It is clear from this and other groups that the mood of the Committee is in favour of fuller accountability to this House of the activities of GB Energy. This is not micromanaging; it is simply accountability and transparency. How the actions that are taken by GB Energy are directed, as is addressed by Amendment 66 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and addressed more fully in Amendment 87 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, is an essential part of that.

Financial markets have periods of irrational exuberance where greed triumphs over caution and experience. Most recently, we have seen the ill-fated wave of SPACs: special purpose acquisition companies. They are generally launched with great excitement and fanfare and with very loose objectives and end in disappointment. GB Energy is clearly a serious undertaking and its chances of success will be greatly aided by rigorous discipline and concentration of force. Applying strong parliamentary oversight of its directions can only aid that.

Amendment 86 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, and Amendment 86A in the name of my noble friend Lord Trenchard, will help in the rigour of those directions. The clause as drafted is simply too vague, as has been pointed out by other noble Lords. There is great and relevant knowledge in the five bodies nominated between these two amendments. It would seem essential for all directions that the Secretary of State should access this knowledge to ensure that these directions are as beneficial as possible.

I ask the Minister: how specific do his Government intend those directions to be? Will they prioritise jobs, bills, net zero or the commerciality of GB Energy itself? Having such directions is vital to ensure that GB Energy does not drift off course and stays aligned with the Government’s will. But the risk of conflicting objectives is confusion and muddle.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I do not support Amendments 66 and 87 in this group, for similar reasons to those that I gave on the first group that we debated today, in that they would weaken the role of the power of direction. The noble Earl, Lord Russell, referred to the fourth report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. I am not sure that that report stands up to close scrutiny. It is a very brief report with relatively little argumentation, and it is difficult to understand what the underlying logic really was. I suspect that the committee did not fully take account of the historical role of powers of direction in relation to public corporations, and it may well have reached a conclusion on the basis of a partial understanding of the role of public corporation powers of direction as they are designed.