Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB) [V]]

My Lords, are the Government aware of the European Leadership Network’s call for a sustained, open-ended and regular panel on strategic nuclear risk reduction?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, if I may, I will respond to the noble Lord in writing once I understand the full context of his question. However, as I have already articulated, we are working with key P5 partners—including the key European partner in this respect, the French.

Commonwealth

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Luce on obtaining this debate. I am very glad that he mentioned the Commonwealth charter, because it seems to me that one of the great values of that charter is that it sets out very clearly the core values that unite the member nations. Two of them sprung to mind when preparing for the debate. The first is where it says:

“We will be guided by our commitment to the security, development and prosperity of every member state”.

Then, there is the second:

“We support international efforts for peace and disarmament”.

Early in my military career, I had the great privilege and pleasure of serving in the King’s African Rifles, which used to have battalions in every colonial territory in east Africa and served in both world wars, but which at that time was confined to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, which we were helping to independence. Thanks to the initiative of my noble friend Lady Flather, every year on Commonwealth Day, a number of us are able to assemble at the Commonwealth Gates and lay wreaths in honour of regiments such as the King’s African Rifles. I am always very moved that one of the things that happens is that the guard that is on its way from Knightsbridge to Horse Guards always salutes those assembled at those gates.

I say that because, since serving, I have had the great pleasure and privilege of seeing Commonwealth troops deployed in various conflict resolution positions around the world, for example in United Nations operations. I have always been struck by the particular way in which the corps of values that unites them has influenced the contributions to conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and the other aspects of conflict resolution. I well remember talking with Admiral Howe, the American commander in Somalia, and asking him if he had any wishes. After saying he wanted a British officer in his headquarters, he said that the contingents trained by us had a very much better approach to the task in hand than others, citing Malawi and Botswana.

I mention the corps of values also because, currently, I am a member of the Committee on Soft Power, which is looking at how British influence in the world might be spread by the soft diplomacy that my noble friend mentioned. Earlier this week, we had the great pleasure of taking evidence from the high commissioner from Mozambique, one of the most recently joined members of the Commonwealth. What I found very revealing was his description of what membership of the Commonwealth meant for Mozambique. He mentioned, of course, the help that it had received from the United Kingdom but also made the very pointed suggestion that it was membership of the partnership of all the other nations in different parts of the world—the Commonwealth is represented on every continent and subcontinent—that made the most difference for Mozambique and encouraged them the most.

If I may end on a slightly depressing note, I thoroughly echo the remarks made by my noble friend about the Chagos Islands. I declare an interest as one of the vice-chairman of the all-party group. Expulsion of people from their homeland is not only a contradiction of just about every human rights document that there is, from Magna Carta to the United Nations charter, but is contrary to the core values that we have mentioned and which are contained in the Commonwealth charter. Our continued procrastination over this issue is nothing less than a national disgrace and something that we really should move very quickly to deal with, if it is not to undermine our reputation among the very people with whom we wish to promote it. Can the Minister give an assurance that this issue will be tackled with urgency?

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Lord Ramsbotham]

To move that this House takes note of the prospects for multilateral nuclear disarmament, and the contribution which Britain could make.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, at the start of this debate I would like to beg your indulgence if I break with tradition. Today is a sad day for the House because, during this debate, my noble and gallant friend Field Marshal Lord Bramall, with whom I had the privilege of serving in the Royal Green Jackets, having both originally joined the Rifle Brigade, although at different times, will make his final speech on its Floor. Few people have contributed more, in so many ways, to the life of the nation than my noble and gallant friend as Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Lieutenant of London, President of the MCC and, for the past 26 years, an active Member of this House. He made his maiden speech on this subject and I look forward to hearing again the views that we share, and which he has long and consistently expressed with his customary vigour and clarity.

I hope I may also share a personal memory that I suspect he may have long forgotten. Almost 53 years ago, I first played cricket under his captaincy on our regimental ground at Winchester. Towards the end of the match, I hit the biggest six of my life, and, if I shut my eyes, I can still see the ball soaring over the trees at the edge of the ground. However, as I walked towards the pavilion, not out, I was taken aback not to be welcomed by my captain but rocketed for playing such an irresponsible shot when we were fighting for the draw that we had achieved. With such commitment to the cause, it is no wonder that he became Chief of the Defence Staff. I am sure that the whole House will join me in thanking him for his many contributions and wishing him and Averil every good fortune in the future.

In 1998, General Lee Butler, one time commander of the United States Strategic Command, said:

“I see with painful clarity that from the very beginnings of the nuclear era, the objective scrutiny and searching debate essential to adequate comprehension and responsible oversight of its vast enterprises were foreshortened or foregone”.

The reason why my noble friend Lord Hannay and I tabled this debate was precisely because,

“objective scrutiny and searching debate”,

on both the prospects for multilateral nuclear disarmament and the contribution that Britain could make have, for too long, been conspicuous by their absence from the agendas of successive Governments and both Houses of Parliament. This unwillingness to encourage both was exemplified by the Answer to the Written Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, on whether the Government,

“will publish their Trident review; and, if so, when”?

The Written Answer states:

“The Trident Alternatives Review will report to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the first half of 2013. There are no plans to publish either the report itself or the information it draws upon due to its highly classified nature. It remains too early to speculate about what it might be possible to say publicly about the conclusions when the review has been completed”.—[Official Report, 19/12/12; col. WA 301.]

Yesterday, the chairman of the Cabinet Office Trident review committee, Douglas Alexander, in an interview in the Guardian, lifted the veil somewhat by confirming that the main factors being considered, far from being highly classified, were very much ones that deserved scrutiny and debate. Furthermore, if noble Lords read the debate on the nuclear deterrent held in the other place on 17 January, they will find not only open discussion of the factors for and against the need for, or possible alternatives to, Trident, to which I will return later, but mention, by a former soldier, Crispin Blunt MP, that:

“We owe it to ourselves to think rather more deeply about this matter than we have done in the past … to review the policy properly, and as openly as we can”.

He refers to the lack of an undertaking to publish meaning that,

“there will therefore be no opportunity for us to examine the costings”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/13; col. 1118.]

Of course, some details of every weapon system must remain classified and there is more to replacing a so-called independent nuclear deterrent than cost alone. However, what concerns me and many others is the reluctance of successive Governments to examine the criteria that should guide the choice of any nuclear weapon system. Our original deterrent was procured during the Cold War and, given the capability of our then presumed opponent, Trident was a credible replacement for Polaris in the late 1970s, if we were to convince the Russian Politburo that a pre-emptive attack on the United Kingdom would risk a nuclear response involving unacceptable damage to the territory and people of the Soviet Union. However, we are not at war now, except in the eyes of those who accept the assertions of George W Bush and Tony Blair that we are involved in a “war on terror” and a “war on drugs”, whatever those two terms mean. No one in their right mind can think that Trident is a usable or appropriate weapon against the Taliban or al-Qaeda, so why the unwillingness to allow scrutiny and debate on an issue that affects us all?

These criteria, as with any weapon procurement, must begin with the operational requirement and include two questions of national self-interest. First, who is it that we are seeking to deter from doing what? Secondly, what level of capability is required to achieve that effect? Military choices alone cannot provide the answers to these because nuclear weapons with the destructive power of Trident are instruments for influencing the behaviour of political leaderships, not for achieving results on the battlefield.

We sit at nuclear disarmament tables not least because of our possession of nuclear weapons. However, as with France and China during the Cold War and other states that have acquired them later, we do so conscious that we are a bit player compared with the two nuclear giants, the United States and Russia. Like many others, I am absolutely at one with President Obama’s commitment in his famous Prague speech of April 2009,

“to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”,

in other words, global zero. Like him, I do not pretend that that can happen overnight and accept that the road to that end is paved not only with good intentions but with the opposite as some states without nuclear weapons contemplate changing their status. Like him, too, I recognise that although global zero requires those with nuclear weapons to give them up, achievement requires nations without them to play their part by encouraging those contemplating acquiring them not to do so.

One reason why my noble friend Lord Hannay and I sought this debate now and not earlier was that we hoped that we would have some indication of the nuclear disarmament intentions of the recently elected President of the United States. Sadly, we will have to wait for his State of the Union address on 12 February to hear more than a speech about fiscal cliffs and gun law. However, because the prospects for multinational nuclear disarmament are so inextricably linked with the position of the United States, I propose to comment briefly on the current framework within which any chances of their being realised are debated, conscious that others, including my noble friend, who are more expert than I will expand on individual aspects in more detail. Here I thank and commend Ian Cruse for his excellent Library note, which I am confident noble Lords will find useful, not just in this debate but in what I hope will be subsequent debates.

Leaving out the efforts to achieve a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, which is a separate although related subject, I echo the hopes that others have expressed that the president will move quickly to make progress on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty without waiting for Russia to respond; that he will re-energise focus on the United States disarmaments commitment contained in the 2010 non-proliferation treaty action plan, conscious that the 2015 review conference is getting ever nearer; that he will take an active lead of the P5 plus one negotiations over Iran's intentions, conscious that opportunities for compromise are draining away and Israel's position remains crucial; that he will use a commitment to nuclear disarmament to unblock the stalemate over agreeing a programme for the current United Nations Conference on Disarmament, particularly over the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; and finally, that he will encourage the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, originally negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament in the 1990s. Inevitably the prospects for achieving multilateral nuclear disarmament, to which all these have important contributions to make, will depend on every nation, whether it possesses, is thinking of possessing or does not possess nuclear weapons, agreeing to that aim after careful assessment of national self-interest.

As far as Britain's contribution is concerned, the credibility of its position depends as much on our past record as on our perceived intentions. For example, I have no doubt that our role in banning cluster munitions had a decisive influence in encouraging other nations to refuse to ratify a United States attempt to modify that treaty for entirely the wrong reasons, or that that influence could also be applied to making progress with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

I suggest that it is on our decision on whether to replace Trident with a similar system capable of taking out Moscow that our real credibility in the eyes of the world will rest—a credibility that is bound to include appreciation of the thoroughness of our decision-taking. Although the 1970s decision to replace Polaris with Trident was based on careful examination of the criteria, the same was not true of either the Labour Government's 2006 White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, or the coalition Government's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review or, as far as we can determine, the current Trident alternatives review. The 2006 review resulted in the decision to retain the minimum deterrent capability necessary to provide effective deterrence and work multilaterally for nuclear disarmament, while acknowledging uncertainty about possible future threats that included a major direct nuclear threat to the United Kingdom, threats from states with more limited nuclear capabilities, or threats from nuclear terrorism. Proof that all the criteria had not been properly assessed was provided by the declarations that no distinction would be made,

“‘between the means by which a state might choose to deliver a nuclear warhead … whether by missile or sponsored terrorists’”,

and that,

“a state identified as the source of the material could expect a proportionate response”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/13; col. 1106.]

However, there was no specification either of how that state would be identified or what was meant by “proportionate response”. The Strategic Defence and Security Review, endorsing that decision, added that use of nuclear weapons would only be considered,

“in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO allies”.

What do I conclude from all this? In terms of the context in which multinational nuclear disarmament is being debated, there is no doubt that 9/11 changed the nature of warfare in a way that is likely to shape the demands on every national defence strategy for years to come. The task of a defence strategist includes determining whether military force should be used at all, and, if so, with what weapons. Nuclear weapons, with the potency of Trident, were appropriate weapons in Cold War strategy but are not appropriate in the post 9/11 world. Defence strategists also have to consider current circumstances that may affect the achievement of any national aim. In this case, I believe that insufficient attention is being paid to the ever-increasing threat of cyber warfare. Cyber weapons can not only disarm an adversary before he has even begun to fight, but render sophisticated armouries and even nuclear deterrence obsolete. Furthermore, as has been proved in Estonia and Georgia, cyber weapons threaten every aspect of a nation's existence, and therefore defence against such attack must be a major requirement of every Government. As an aside, just I regret that the cost of what is essentially a political weapon—the nuclear deterrent—is now laid on the defence budget, because of its inevitable impact on required military expenditure, I hope that the same mistake will not be made with cyber, which affects not only the governance but the economy of the country.

Therefore, if progress is to be made with the United Kingdom's published position with regard to multilateral nuclear disarmament, and if Britain is to make a credible contribution to achieving that aim, my plea to the Minister is that she will recognise the unease and suspicion created by the Government's apparent reluctance or refusal to examine all the criteria associated with continuing our possession of nuclear weapons and denial of objective scrutiny and searching debate, and undertake to enable a proper debate on the conclusions of the Trident alternatives review, in government time, when those are published. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply and I thank most warmly all those who have taken part in the debate. Anyone coming here and listening would have realised that this House gives the lie to the suggestion that we are not grown-up enough to be able to take part in this debate. The quality, content and understanding in what has been said show me conclusively why it is so important that the expertise in this House is deployed during this consideration of one of the most important questions that we face. It is clear that everyone in this House is committed to the cause of multilateral nuclear disarmament. I did not hear anyone suggest that the first thing to do was just to wipe all nuclear weapons off the map and take a unilateralist line. That is not practical politics and it is not sensible.

However, I was glad that a number of issues were raised during the course of the debate, which covered many points that are concerned with the review of alternatives to Trident as well as with the current position. For example, I am glad that the issue of continuous at-sea deployment was questioned, which is not just a question of practicality but also must be included in any question of the cost and development of the future weapon, quite apart from its efficacy. I am glad that the possibility of more precision weapons was represented. I am also glad that the question of cost came up, because in this connection I have always been a follower of the advice given to me by my late master, Field Marshal Lord Carver, that there are two definitions of affordability. One is, “Can you afford it?”, and the other is, “Can you afford to give up what you’ve got to give up to afford it?”. That has extreme relevance in this situation when we are considering what we need to conduct ourselves in today’s world rather than the Cold War world, compared with what we have to spend on the Trident replacement.

I was particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord King, for reminding us of why we have our seat at the table and what is actually needed to have a seat at the top table tomorrow. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for correcting me. I have to admit that I have not read the coalition mid-term agreement, and I am very sorry that I got the wrong Alexander. I will apologise personally. I shall remember the connection with the Maginot line with considerable interest.

I think that I will be reflecting the mood of the House if I conclude by paying tribute to my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall, whose last speech was memorable for the verve and clarity to which I referred at the start. We are going to miss him, and his contribution was tremendous. I know that his influence will live on.

As I say, I am grateful for what I have found an enormously interesting, instructive and, as I hope the Minister will agree, very valuable debate. I hope that she will follow this up by allowing us to have a further debate, particularly when the alternative review is published.

Motion agreed.

Older People: Their Place and Contribution in Society

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Friday 14th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, like all other noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, I thank and congratulate the most reverend Primate for obtaining it. I also pay tribute to him for all that he has done during his time in his historic office and the manner of his doing it.

After such a rich variety of speakers and the wonderful mix of wisdom and humour, I am sorry that as the final Back-Bench speaker I should end on a particular and critical note. Although the subject of the debate is,

“the place and contribution of older people in society”,

I deliberately limit my contribution to the place of one small but rising part of the whole, namely older people in prison. Their needs reflect those of older people in the community, which most of them will become on release. I speak in the context of the provisions of the Equality Act 2010, which outlaws harmful age discrimination in the provision of goods and services, and enforces a duty on all public sector bodies to promote age equality.

My interest in older prisoners was aroused by an experience as Chief Inspector of Prisons when, visiting Winchester, I was asked by its excellent doctor whether I felt strong enough to see three very dangerous prisoners. All were elderly and bedridden, one with advanced Alzheimer’s, one with advanced Parkinson’s and the third so mentally ill that he clearly had no idea where he was. The doctor explained that she had found them in the category B Kingston prison, the Prison Service categorising them as being so dangerous that they could not be in less secure custody. In view of their condition and because Kingston did not have 24-hour nursing cover, she had on her own initiative brought them to category C Winchester to die in the dignity of her care.

When I raised the issue of elderly prisoners with the Prison Service, I learned that neither was anyone responsible for them as a group nor were there any special arrangements such as nominated prisons with suitable facilities. I therefore contacted the social services director responsible for the elderly and asked him to work with me on a thematic review of elderly prisoners as part of an overall review of minority groups in prison. When I reluctantly had to abandon that review, having been forbidden by the then Prisons Minister from including race, I forwarded the report of the social services director to the director-general of the Prison Service. It seemed that the director’s comprehensive survey of the problem and sensible recommendation that social services, with their national responsibility for the elderly, should be made responsible for the oversight of conditions for and treatment of elderly prisoners in nominated prisons, required immediate attention.

Needless to say, nothing came of that, and it was not until 2004, when my successor, Dame Anne Owers, published a review of older prisoners, No Problems - Old and Quiet—a title taken from a prisoner’s personal file—that the size and shape of the problem was drawn to public attention. She reported that although some 7% of all prisoners were over 50, few prisons were taking the special healthcare and resettlement needs of older prisoners seriously—a problem exacerbated by the tendency of prisoners to age prematurely by up to 10 years while in prison.

Older prisoners were accommodated in a regime designed for, and largely inhabited by, young and able-bodied people, supported by prison staff who were untrained for their needs. Most disappointingly, in view of my previous attempts, the review found that, in general, local authority social service departments were extremely reluctant even to carry out assessments of older prisoners, still less to offer support either during or after imprisonment. A follow-up report in 2008 found that, although there had been some improvement in healthcare arrangements, the National Offender Management Service had still not developed a national strategy for older prisoners supported by mandatory national and local standards.

That is the background to the situation today, which is that as of 30 September, although there are isolated examples of good practice, there is still no national strategy or guidance relating to the welfare of the 9,913 prisoners over the age of 50. Of those prisoners, 3,333 were over the age of 60; more than 600 were over 70; 42 were over 80 and the oldest was 92. That represents 11% of the prison population, a rise of 4% since 2004. Prisoners over 60 are the fastest growing age group in the prison estate, a rise that is not matched by a corresponding rise in the number convicted by the courts. It cannot be explained by demographic changes, or a so-called elderly crime wave. The most likely cause is harsher sentencing policies, which have resulted in longer sentences being awarded to criminals aged over 60, especially those convicted of sex offences and drug trafficking. The sole guidance is a chapter on older prisoners in a Prison Service order entitled Prisoners with Physical, Sensory and Mental Disabilities, which largely focuses on their health and mobility needs, which prisons are expected to meet by making what are called “reasonable adjustments”.

Inspection reports over the past year confirm that there are still a worrying number of deficiencies in conditions for and treatment of older prisoners, in addition to a general observation that the contrast between their treatment and that of other vulnerable groups has grown. For example, although some older prisoners may be unlocked during the day, as well as them being retired at 60—and so disqualified from earning wages—there is too often no structured activity for them and a general lack of daycare centres.

Although statistics suggest that more than half such prisoners are suffering from a mental disorder, staff training in mental health awareness is poor. Few have the ability to identify the early onset of dementia and, although most prisons have special clinics for older prisoners, few have a special lead nurse in place. A number of older prisoners with mobility problems are unable to use the showers, or have difficulty accessing top bunk beds. However, on the positive side, 85% of older prisoners state that staff treat them with respect, and 84% state that they have a member of staff whom they can turn to with a problem.

Older prisoners also need help in preparing for release, which, disappointingly, received no mention in Ken Clarke’s “rehabilitation revolution” Green Paper, Breaking the Cycle. Life on the out is nothing like life inside prison, and many will find it hard to cope, particularly those who have served long sentences and who may have lost all contact with their families and communities, or be prohibited from making contact because of the conditions of their release. Of course, age itself does not determine either capabilities or needs but, in addition to possible isolation from friends and family, older ex-prisoners are more likely to have health problems than the rest of the population, have less income and be less likely to find work. Furthermore, the frailties of age are likely to accentuate the effects of victimisation against them following their crime and punishment.

In sum, because the problems of older prisoners are often not visible and since they are less likely to complain or make trouble, it is too readily assumed that everything with and for them is satisfactory. However, it is clear from the evidence that that is far from the case and that too many of their well documented specific needs and concerns are not being recognised or met. For example, as reported in 2004, social care provisions for them are as minimal on release as they are in prison and also suffer from a lack of national direction.

Winston Churchill famously said in 1910 that the way in which it treated crime and criminals was the truest test of the civilisation of any country. Applied to the treatment of older prisoners, we currently fail that test. I know that this issue is outside the responsibilities of the Minister, but I hope that she will pass on what I have said to her colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Health, in particular. In the Advent spirit of hope, I once again thank the most reverend Primate for the opportunity to raise the issue and wish him all good fortune on his return to Cambridge.

Middle East

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Friday 16th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the Minister on the masterly introductory tour d’horizon to what has been an excellent and wide-ranging debate. Lord Acton once said that hindsight is the privilege of the historian. I begin my single-issue contribution with two pieces of hindsight.

Thirty-eight years ago, I was realising the dream of every regular commanding officer, being in command of my regiment and was faced with two operational requirements. One was to prepare it for an operational tour in Belfast later that year. The other was to prepare our shooting team for the Central Treaty Organisation shooting competition in which we were representing the United Kingdom against the other member nations: the United States, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. I knew Ali Nashat, the captain of the Iranian team, because he had been at the staff college with me. He had also been part of the Iranian contingent that took part with us in Oman’s war against the Yemeni insurgents in the Dhofar. I was to speak to Ali once more when I was sent to Tehran in November 1978 on one of the least successful military missions in history. He was commanding the Shah’s guard, and I had been sent to advise the Iranian military authority on minimum force methods a few weeks before the Shah was overthrown. I was able to speak to him on the telephone, but was not allowed to meet him. Sadly, he was among the first people murdered in the revolution. As we know, CENTO, too, did not survive that event, but I often wonder what would have happened had it still been the NATO of the Middle East.

Secondly, six months before the second Iraq war, to which I have always been strongly opposed, a number of us wrote to the Prime Minister. I was in Oman when a senior Omani army officer reminded me that it was our oldest ally in that part of the world, and had built a 74-gun ship for Nelson’s navy. He said that he hoped that we would not ask for Oman’s help in our deployment against Iraq. True, Saddam and his family had to be removed but that was a matter for the Iraqis, not for us. In our letter to the Prime Minister, we referred to two definitions of affordability: can you afford something; or can you afford to give up what you would have to give up in order to afford it? We did not think that the United Kingdom could afford to put at risk, in the present or the future, the relationships that it had painstakingly built up over many years in the Middle East.

I emphasise this last point because of its relevance to one of the key ingredients in the all-important peace process—namely, the proposed weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone, about which my noble friend Lord Hannay has already spoken. I agree with everything that he said, particularly about the need for a more flexible approach to Iran. Indeed, we would do well to respond swiftly and positively to Ayatollah Khamenei’s positive response to President Obama’s call for diplomacy, not war, to direct efforts in that part of the world.

Reverting to the weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone, I briefly remind the House of its history. The objective was first put forward by Egypt in 1990, building on a 1974 UN General Assembly resolution from Egypt and Iran that called for a nuclear-free zone in the area. In 1995, after the NPT states had resolved on its adoption, Egypt encouraged all non-signatory Arab states to become parties. Frustrated by the lack of progress, it then worked with the League of Arab States and civil society on a proposed action plan, which was negotiated at the 2010 NPT review conference. It was agreed there that a facilitator would be appointed and a conference held in 2012 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and the three NPT depository states, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. The aim would be to involve all states in the Middle East in the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Ambassador Jaakko Laajava was appointed facilitator in October last year and his country, Finland, will host the conference. However, time is running out, and the latest information I have about the conference is that, owing to the American presidential election, January 2013 has been awarded honorary 2012 status so that the timeframe can be extended.

However, as with so many other problems in the area, the position and view of Iran and Israel are critical to further progress. As we know, Israel remains the only nuclear weapons state in the region—a situation that questions the applicability of the traditional doctrine of deterrence. The possession of nuclear weapons is made more acceptable because of their pre-eminent role in the prevention of aggression by others. Throughout the Cold War, the key word was “uncertainty” because neither side was certain whether the other would resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, in logic, should Iran not be allowed to develop such weapons so that the doctrine of deterrence can apply to its relations with Israel? However, as we all know, such possession is vehemently rejected by many, not least other actual and potential nuclear players in that part of the world, such as Pakistan—the former member of CENTO—Saudi Arabia and, of course, Israel.

What could or should the United Kingdom be doing about this? Oh for a CENTO and that we could be certain of our Middle East relationships. However, I do not believe that all is doom and gloom. Last year, the United States tried to negotiate a new protocol for the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which the United Kingdom had played a major role in securing. The protocol was designed to allow certain munitions to be used. However, as a result of the strong line that the Government took at a diplomatic meeting last November, this was successfully resisted, which suggests that our voice in such areas still carries weight. Therefore, my question to the Minister is whether, based on the standing that we enjoy in the region and our status as one of the three NPT depository states, the Government are prepared to take a similarly strong line over the 2012 conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone, so that at least and at last some progress can be made to improve the long-term security prospects in the Middle East.

British Indian Ocean Territory

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Tuesday 14th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I do not think that I can comment on the WikiLeak gossip that has circulated around the globe. Much of it is very inaccurate or taken completely out of context, so I would not like to comment further on those matters.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

I declare an interest as the vice-chairman of the all-party group that was described by a foreign official in WikiLeaks as being persistent but non-influential. The Minister mentioned defence. In our last meeting with Mr Henry Bellingham on 15 November, I mentioned to him a letter that we had had from Mr Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defence in America, who said that there was no good national security reason for not allowing the Chagossians to return to Chagos, including Diego Garcia. Is that the view of the Foreign Office as well?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The view of the Foreign Office is embodied in the fact that we are involved in the case at the European Court of Human Rights, and we are really not in a position to comment further except to say that we stand by the arguments and the justifications that lead us to remain in that position in the legal process. As I said, my right honourable friend has said in another place that we continue to examine this in detail and to look at the policy, but I cannot offer the noble Lord anything other than to say that the case is before the European Court of Human Rights, that the arguments are on the table there and that this matter has to be resolved there.

Kabul Conference

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Wednesday 21st July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I thank my noble friend for his wise words. He is right, of course, that part of the battle is against young men who are near the homes where they were brought up, which makes it a local battle and not a nationwide battle at all. As to driving out al-Qaeda, there is evidence that there may be some al-Qaeda training units left in Afghanistan, but they have dispersed. People ask whether, in that case, we will look at other areas where they may have gone—Yemen, Somalia and so on. We have to watch these things carefully, but it is fairly clear that al-Qaeda is more dispersed and that the comfort that it originally had, using Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban for its operations, has been significantly disrupted to the benefit of our security and that of the wider world.

We are contributing more resources and we are looking to our allies to make similar contributions—obviously, the Americans are making a substantial contribution. We think that this money can be focused on the real needs of the Afghan people, although I repeat that we should not underestimate the fact that in some areas—not all—very remarkable progress has been made in recent years. There are signs of the return of real economic growth and growing prosperity for a people who have suffered very greatly in the past.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I presume that the clearly stated NATO aim in the Statement applies also to all other countries that are at this moment helping and supporting Afghanistan. We hear quite a lot about Pakistan and its involvement but we hear little about India, yet there are reports of considerable and growing Indian influence within Afghanistan. Can the Minister tell the House whether India was represented at the Kabul conference and whether it is a signatory to the motives behind the NATO objective?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I am pretty sure that India was represented at the Kabul conference, as were the other regional powers. We are concerned to see that regional co-operation is strengthened. As to the particular documents that India signed, I will have to write to the noble Lord with the details, but clearly India is a key part in this. I have absolutely no doubt that, when my right honourable friends visit India in considerable numbers the week after next, this issue will be high on the agenda.

Queen's Speech

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I intend to speak only about two aspects of defence: first, the full strategic review mentioned in the gracious Speech; and, secondly, picking up a phrase from the Speech, in support of our “courageous Armed Forces” and what is called the military covenant. Before doing so, I join in the tributes paid, quite rightly, to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, on his appointment as Minister; I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Astor, whose appointment reflects the enormous amount of hard work that I know he put in as a spokesman in opposition.

I shall focus on generalities rather than detailed analysis because that will come when we have the debate on the review. If I had a magic wand, as I have mentioned in a previous debate on the probation service, I would like the clocks now not to say “0.00” but “PANT”, which stands for “People are not things”. I say that because I invite the House to remember, when considering our Armed Forces, that despite all the technical wizardry now available to them our Armed Forces consist of men and women.

When considering the selection of an aim for something like a defence review, various factors have to be considered. One is uncertainty, which will never be satisfied; and the second is affordability, which is a reality which must not be ducked. There are two definitions of “affordable”: one is, “Can you afford it?”; and the other is, “Can you afford to give up what you have to give up in order to afford it?”. I fear that in the past that second definition has been too often disregarded.

Military equipment has to be robust because it has to withstand the ravages of war and is therefore built to last. This means, inevitably, that today’s commanders are saddled with expensive, out-of-date equipment, planned for a different circumstance, which costs men and money to maintain. Would that we were in a “clean sheet of paper” situation, which we are not and never can be.

The previous two defence reviews were conducted in the shadow of the Cold War and the equipment that was ordered during the Cold War period. Our national outlook now, since 9/11 and with the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, is very different from what it was in 1998 when the last review was conducted. This suggests that a major review is both timely and essential and that no sacred cow should be excluded from it—even the existence of three separate Armed Forces—if it is necessary to produce what is required in the national circumstances of today.

In an interview for the Times on 22 May, Dr Liam Fox, the Secretary of State, said that the review was,

“an opportunity to totally reset what we think of as Britain’s global role. First, the MoD must work out what threats the country faces”.

While I welcome those statements, as I do the formation of a National Security Council, I contend that the review should not be an internal MoD exercise but should be conducted by a team representing all aspects of both our global role and our defence and security needs.

However, before such an exercise is embarked on, one other important decision needs to be made which will affect the outcome. I refer of course to the nuclear deterrent. I and many others, including my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall, have spoken out about the proposal to replace the expensive and unusable Trident system instead of opting for a less costly alternative. We are disappointed that, as in 1998, it appears likely to be excluded from the review. To exclude it is not only illogical but also denies the Government the opportunity presented by the review to take a step that has long been needed. Possession of a nuclear deterrent is a political issue, as is its use. The defence budget is currently unbalanced by the nuclear deterrent being included in it. I do not envy those with the task of conducting the review, a task made more difficult by the inclusion of the cost of the nuclear deterrent. Surely that cost should be taken out and put elsewhere, allowing the defence budget to concentrate on non-nuclear requirements.

The term “military covenant” did not exist when I was serving. In essence, the covenant means the nation’s repayment of the debt that it owes to the members of the Armed Forces in return for their preparedness to lay down their lives for the nation. Its most obvious public expression is in the frequent tributes sadly paid to the returning dead at Wootton Bassett and in response to the Help for Heroes appeal. Within the military, it is reflected in the loyalty borne upwards by service men and women to their political and military masters in the expectation that that loyalty will be reflected downwards to them.

I have therefore found it very distressing that this downward loyalty has been in question during recent years. Too many senior officers have resigned complaining of shortage of resources. Promises made by Ministers that all operational needs would be provided have gone unfulfilled. The Ministry of Defence has been required to pay back money made available to satisfy urgent operational requirements. There have been many complaints from families about living conditions. Two senior officers, General Sir Sam Cowan and Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger, were traduced in a published inquiry for their alleged responsibility for cuts that were part of the Strategic Defence Review and were held to have played a part in the tragic loss of a Nimrod in Afghanistan. The Armed Forces are accustomed to taking the rough with the smooth, but they are made up of people. They are not things and should not be treated as things.

I draw attention also to the position of veterans. I commend the previous Government for the appointment of a Minister for Veterans but regret that he was placed in the Ministry of Defence and not in the Cabinet Office. In America, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs is in the Cabinet. My alarm at the growing number of veterans in prisons has alerted me to the inadequacy of the systems and organisations that could have prevented them being there by helping their resettlement into civilian life. A Minister with the authority of the Cabinet Office would be better able to influence all those organisations that can help with this process. I urgently ask the Government to consider such an appointment.

It is inevitable that the Strategic Defence Review will focus on money and things, but I hope that the Government will not forget their obligation to the courageous men and women who make up our Armed Forces under the terms of the military covenant. My ancestor, Sir John Moore of Corunna, laid down the ethos of the Light Division as being a mutual bond of trust and affection between all ranks, which the officers had to earn. Unless government earns the trust of their Armed Forces by honouring their obligations, I fear that they could respond with their feet, which would be calamitous for the defence and security of our great nation.