Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 11) Regulations 2022

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will allow me briefly to mention the No. 11 regulations. I understand from what he said that they derive in part from discussions at the G7, and I presume that all G7 countries are in the process of putting similar ranges of sanctions in place in their own countries. Part 4 inserted by these very extensive regulations deals with chemicals and equipment—it is a very comprehensive list. Is this list the same as that being applied by other European countries? When I looked at it, I thought it might be derived from the former EU regulation on REACH, which is I think the biggest piece of legislation ever passed by the European Parliament. Are we co-operating on important measures such as this to have the effect that the Minister intends?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister knows that these measures are supported by the Liberal Democrat Benches. As when we have debated previous sanctions, I am grateful for the Minister maintaining contact and keeping us informed. He knows of our strong support for measures which aim to ratchet up the pressure on Vladimir Putin and, as is included in these elements, the wider circle of his support.

We would support moving beyond the regulations to include the United Russia party and wider elements of the Russian regime in this part of the sanctions regime. We support the Government in the extension on state entities but, as the Minister knows well enough, there has been considerable state capture of the Russian economy by the Putin regime over recent years. This means that we should include in our sanctions regime not just the political actors but, increasingly, those in the wider economy. Therefore, the banning of certain exports and the wider inclusion of some state entities is to be welcomed.

I also welcome the work of officials on the impact assessments. They are useful tools to look at what the impact could be on the wider Russian economy. This leads to my first question. We have debated many sanctions but are yet to receive what I have asked for previously: an overall assessment of the net impact of the UK sanctions on the Russian economy and regime. I understand entirely that that document will be sensitive, but we must understand what the impact has been; otherwise, we cannot judge what could well be a situation where, in the long run, we want to move away from the sanctions regime. However, that is premature, as we want to increase the pressure.

That leads to my second question, on implementation. I noted that we have seen the first prosecution in the UK of what is effectively sanctions-busting. Can the Minister indicate whether that is an isolated case or if he is aware of more areas where there are active prosecutions of UK citizens and residents who have been acting against the sanctions regime in the UK? We need to know that these sanctions are being actively policed and implemented. They are pointless unless they are implemented in full.

This leads on to my third question: no doubt the Minister will have noted, as I have when I have been travelling, that the number of Russian nationals who have been using other transport routes through the Gulf—and Istanbul in particular—to access the UK and the European Union seems to have markedly increased since the sanctions regime was put in place. Is the UK monitoring passenger levels of individuals who are coming to the UK? I know that there is live debate on visa access for Russian nationals, both to the UK and to the European Union, but I would like the Minister to reassure me that this is being actively monitored.

Turning to the particular measures, I hope the Minister will forgive me for reflecting on one of the elements in the Explanatory Notes on the No. 11 regulations, but it is connected with yesterday’s debate which he and I participated in. On Regulation 7, the Government say:

“Failure to join the international community would undermine the UK’s reputation as an upholder of international law, human rights, freedom of expression and democracy.”


The debate that we had yesterday is relevant to what we are arguing for here in relation to upholding international law, and I wanted to stress that point.

With regard to the No. 12 regulations, the Minister said that our regime is now going beyond that of the European Union. I wonder if he could say a little more, with regards to energy, on where we have departed from the European Union and have now got a stronger regime. I am not opposing this, of course, but it would be helpful to have a little more information.

With regard to the No. 13 regulations, it is helpful that there is now clarification on shipping; this was raised in previous debates, and I welcome it.

Finally, I have a broader point on which I would like the Minister’s reflections. As he will know, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and I have asked how we are working with our allies to ensure that our sanctions regime is not circumvented by friends and colleagues around the world, especially with regard to Russia accessing the very technologies and goods that we are now banning. The Minister knows well enough that Russia is very active in the wider Gulf, in Africa and in India in sourcing some of the materials that we are now banning. I previously raised the issue of concern with regard to the Indian rupee/rouble swap for purchase of energy. When I raised that question, the Minister said it was premature, but that arrangement is now in place. We are apparently only a fortnight away from signing a free trade agreement with India. At the very same time that we are banning the selling of certain goods to Russia, India seems to be increasing the selling of those goods to Russia. Could the Minister say what work we are doing with our allies to ensure that, whilst we are seeking to limit the sourcing of some of these materials to Russia, our allies are not increasing them? If the Minister could respond to these points, I would be very grateful.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I too would like to start by reiterating the backing of the Opposition for the Government’s support for the people of Ukraine, and of course these sanctions are a vital element of that support. I am pleased to see such a wide range of issues being covered in today’s measures, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has mentioned. We support these sanctions and measures, but it is only right that this House can scrutinise and understand whether the Government are properly resourcing them. It is one thing having the law; it is another thing to be able to ensure full compliance. I think a lot of my questions will echo those of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, regarding that question.

In the other place, the Minister Jesse Norman stressed —and I accept this—that

“the first instinct in a war situation is to get sanctions on the books as quickly as possible.”

I noticed what the noble Lord said regarding the Joint Committee, and of course we even had amendments to our Standing Orders to ensure that we could get these in place as quickly as possible. I reassure the Minister that the Opposition will do whatever they can to ensure speedy implementation and adoption of these sanctions.

Jesse Norman also argued that the sanctions

“have been effective because the Treasury Committee has reminded us of that, and we have plenty of other evidence that it is the case.”

I would echo the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that it would be good to have that assessment in a more political context so that we can properly understand it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all three noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I say from the outset to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Collins—both will appreciate this, as we are working at speed—on the effectiveness of comparisons with our international partners, that there is information readily available, but there is a sensitivity, if I may put it that way, in publicly sharing information. However, I will be happy to share certain information and briefings with both noble Lords and give them updates on where we are.

Both noble Lords raised the important issue of the effectiveness of co-ordination with our partners, and I know that this is of interest. While I mentioned the issue of energy vis-à-vis our European Union partners, I have always maintained that there will inevitably be a country leading—such as the US or ourselves, or the EU—in certain areas. The important element with respect to the granular detail—I do have the summaries available, which I reflect on quite regularly—is to ensure that where there is a gap, say, from our side, we ask the pointed question as to why that is the case so that we can address it, and vice versa. Actually, that is working very well. I can share some of that information and bring noble Lords up to date on that, specifically outside the Chamber.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I cannot speak for the noble Lord, Lord Collins, but I say on behalf of my noble friends Lady Kramer and Lord Fox, who take an interest in these issues, that if the Minister wanted to facilitate a private briefing with officials to give an update on the Government’s estimate of the impact on the Russian economy, we would be willing to take that. I wanted to make sure that was on the record.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I can certainly share some of these issues, on the wider and general impact, this evening. However, particularly as we are working in very close alignment with our partners, I shall be certain to provide updates and private briefings in that respect.

I again thank all noble Lords for their strong support. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, raised a question on the reach of SI 11. I confirm to him that we are co-ordinating the lists of goods covered by our export prohibitions with our G7 allies, and we are working very closely on those lists. To summarise, SI 11 covers an export ban on defence and security goods and technology, including products for internal repression; an export ban on maritime goods and technology; an export ban on additional energy-related goods and oil refining; an export ban on sterling or EU-denominated bank notes; an export ban on jet fuel and fuel additives; an import ban on revenue-generating goods, including metals, wood and chemicals, among others; and a ban on technical assistance, financial services and funds. So the SI is pretty comprehensive.