Lord Purvis of Tweed
Main Page: Lord Purvis of Tweed (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Purvis of Tweed's debates with the Scotland Office
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs I do not know the context and full detail of what my right honourable friend the former Attorney-General said, I can hardly answer the noble and learned Lord. But I hope that sovereignty can be reconciled with common sense and realism. Certainly that would be my objective.
There is a threat to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom which is potentially raised by the wording of these clauses, and the intrusion of new elements into them which cloud out the specific issues of principle. If a court in Scotland did overrule the power of the United Kingdom and managed to pass a judgment that said that the United Kingdom Parliament was overruled by the view of the Scottish Parliament, it would not be devolution but separation. We must not plant the seeds for such a development in this legislation.
Does the noble Lord not agree that there is now considerable case law in Scotland which has looked at the competences of the Scottish Parliament and the reach of legislation from this place? So under the existing arrangements, it is perfectly in order for UK legislation to be challenged on the extent of its interaction with devolved legislation. We currently have that practice and it does not seem to have undermined our constitution irrevocably.
That does not surprise me, because I have always taken the view that, ever since we embarked—for all kinds of reasons I will not go into in this debate—on an ill-conceived and unbalanced form of devolution, we were on the slippery slope and sliding towards separation and independence unless we were very careful. As I have said many times, this Bill carries us one step nearer to that.
In his wind-up speech at Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Dunlop said:
“The sovereignty of Parliament remains”.—[Official Report, 24/11/15; col. 667.]
That is a commendable, clear, concise statement. We also know, and have reminded ourselves today, that no Parliament can bind its successor. But my noble friend also said of this clause that it puts the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, “beyond all doubt”. In conceding the referendum point on Report in the other place, the Secretary of State for Scotland said that it makes clear,
“beyond question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/15; col. 57.]
By putting things beyond doubt, he raises doubts in all of us. The Government’s arguments are in deadlock: they hit each other head-on. That is why, at Second Reading and now, so many noble Lords have tabled amendments and why the House badly needs reassurance. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give it to us when he winds up the debate.
My Lords, I am one of the few non-lawyers who are even putting their foot into this particular hole. I stand to be corrected by the Front Bench, but Clause 2, which has been referred to, makes perfect sense if the United Kingdom Parliament remains sovereign and can legally legislate on anything, including devolved matters. But that would contradict Clause 1 if the purpose of that clause is to entrench all provisions that are unalterable. I want our Front Bench to answer that question.
I do not agree with the mood of the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, because I do not share his views on Amendment 1. I am happy that the Government inserted further clauses into the Bill. I am pleased that that was the result of cross-party consideration and that the Government responded to the Smith commission—in a difficult context—and put into proposals what I think most people in Scotland now understand: that they have two Parliaments. This is not an easy thing to do and parliamentary draftsmen have a difficult task because we now operate in a situation where we have more than one sphere of power over primary legislation. That poses considerable difficulties for some because they believe that one should be primary and one subsidiary to it. So far as primary legislation is concerned, most people in Scotland consider themselves as having two legislatures. It is even harder because we do not have a written constitution. In the absence of one, we have to rely on other measures to see how we entrench parts of our governance.
It is not the case that this has simply been dreamt up over the last couple of months, as some noble Lords have indicated. Nor it is the case that it is in response to the referendum. Nor is it the case that it is only to do with political expediency. Some of us have believed for a considerable time that it is right to reflect in statute the permanence of the Scottish Parliament in the context of a new and evolving structure of governance in the United Kingdom. I absolutely believe that that is best in a codified federal relationship, which I hope would be the result of a constitutional convention—others have a different view. However, in the absence of that, I believe that we then have to look at what has been a developing process in the United Kingdom.
With respect, I rather thought that I had answered the point made by the noble Lord, but let me reiterate it. The word “permanence” appears in the Smith commission agreement. After further consideration, it was felt that in order to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 that word should feature in the clause itself.
I return to Amendments 6 and 7 which seek to alter the basis upon which any decision would be made with regard to the provisions of Clause 1. As was observed, it is not anticipated that there will at any point in the future be a referendum upon that issue, but nevertheless as this matter proceeded in another place it was again considered that this would strengthen the political statement that is being made here. Let us be clear: the use of a referendum in this context is consistent with precedent. In 1997, the people of Scotland supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament on the basis of a referendum. In 2014, in the independence referendum they reaffirmed their wish to have two Parliaments and two Governments for the purposes of reserved and devolved administration in Scotland. Therefore, it is appropriate that any question about the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, which is not envisaged, should be based on the expression of the will of the people of Scotland in a referendum. Let me be clear: that is a theoretical point. There has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are anything other than permanent parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. That remains the case.
It is unusual, but not wholly exceptional, for a clause of a Bill such as this to contain a political statement, an affirmation of the status quo, a declarator that it will not change, and that is the fundamental purpose of Clause 1.
I am grateful to the Minister because I feel that he may well be making my point for me on the subject of new Section 63A(3). If the Government’s position, which I support, is that there can be change only if the people of Scotland make it in a referendum, does that not adjust the absolute sovereignty of this place, which can make an unfettered decision?
Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.
If I can complete the journey around the houses that the noble and learned Lord has begun on that point: it appears that new subsection (3) simply underlines the political structure—the declaratory statement contained in the clause as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed that of course it goes a step further in so far as it introduces conditionality to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, which I acknowledge. As to it being,
“a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”,
that term is capable of clear and objective definition in due course. Respectfully, however, it appears that that wording is sufficiently clear for these purposes.
Just to carry on a little around the House: the Minister did not make it clear at the Dispatch Box when he said that the people of Scotland would not necessarily be sovereign if this Parliament did not adhere to the result in that referendum. That is absolutely contrary to the Edinburgh agreement that the Prime Minister signed, which stated that the Government would respect that view. The sovereignty of the people should be absolute, not anything else he may say at the Dispatch Box this evening.
I cannot agree with the interpretation of sovereignty the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, puts forward. At the end of the day, if there was a referendum—and we are talking about a theory, not political reality—it would be necessary for there to be legislation to implement the outcome of that referendum if it involved the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. No one in reality is contemplating the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make clear the permanence and the recognition of the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has to recognise that the outcome of any referendum could be implemented only by way of legislation that went through this, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. That is the only point I seek to make.
I do not accept that expression of the position. As I said at the outset, the whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make a political statement that reflects the terms of the Smith commission agreement, which determined that there should be an expression to the effect that the Scottish Parliament is permanent. We acknowledge that, and that is the political statement being made. It is a declaration of will. However, we also recognise, as I believe this House will recognise, that the United Kingdom Parliament is ultimately sovereign and supreme. I am seeking to make that point. At the end of the day, this Parliament is sovereign, and it cannot disclaim that sovereignty.
In that case, can the noble and learned Lord expand on the meaning of the Government’s wording in this clause? It states that,
“the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”.
Therefore, if the people of Scotland vote in a referendum and make a decision, and the Government or Parliament then disregard the view and the decision of the people of Scotland, does that mean that this clause has no purpose at all in legislation? If that is the case, what is the point of this wording being in the Bill?
I was going to continue by saying that, the amendment having been tabled, I would look to its substance, which is that the heading should be, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. I am reminded of Voltaire’s observation about the Holy Roman Empire, that it was,
“neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”.
Clause 2 is not about competence; nor is it about the Scottish Parliament. It restates in statutory terms the procedural convention of the United Kingdom Parliament with respect to its legislation for devolved matters. If we were to have a heading, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament” when in fact we are dealing with a matter that concerns the legislative competence of the United Kingdom Parliament, in my respectful submission, we would not only puzzle historians but confuse everyone else with regard to the content of the relevant clause.
I note what has been said about the present heading. I will reflect upon the observations made about that heading. But given that it is strictly a matter for the draftsmen, I go no further at this time. I hope that my noble friend will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
I am neither a lawyer nor a historian so I wonder if the noble and learned Lord can help me with his interpretation of this. As this is an amendment Bill to the 1998 Act, once this clause takes effect, if Parliament approves it, will this title actually exist in the amended 1998 Act? If it does not, is this not all rather academic?
As I understand it, the title will not exist in the amended 1998 Act. The title is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen but, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth observed, the amendment was put on the Marshalled List and therefore it is addressed. As I say, I will reflect upon his observations, but at this stage I urge him to withdraw the amendment.
In view of the time, no.
Amendment 11 would clearly impact on the ability of the United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland. To that extent, it would modify Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act. The effect of that amendment could be interpreted as an attempt to limit the sovereignty of this Parliament, a point that I believe the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, acknowledged, and the Government would not be prepared to accept such an amendment.
Amendment 13, conversely, seeks to state in the Bill that Clause 2 places no limits on the sovereignty of Parliament. We would say that if you say that expressly in one part of the Bill, you have to take care as to the impact that it will have on other parts of the Bill, and that it is appropriate to acknowledge that nothing in the Bill impinges on the sovereignty of Parliament.