Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2022 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Ponsonby of Shulbrede
Main Page: Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede's debates with the Home Office
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I might ask the Minister a couple of questions arising out of this. First, am I right in thinking that, to satisfy the court judgment, we must pass these regulations before the beginning of January? Perhaps he could clarify that. Secondly, looking in more detail at the position of the Security Service in particular in dealing with organised crime, I think I am right to say that the only change made by these regulations to satisfy the court judgment is that the urgency procedure would be able to address serious crime communications bids only if there is a matter of urgency, otherwise they would need to go through the normal process.
What slightly puzzles me about that is that I would expect the Security Service, which makes an enormous contribution in dealing with serious crime, to work in close conjunction with the police and, presumably, the National Crime Agency. Would it not be the police leading many such investigations? Would they not themselves be in a position to make the urgent request for communications data? I ask that simply for clarification, not out of any criticism of the fact that the Government have implemented the court’s decision.
Clearly, this restriction will not apply to other areas in which the intelligence agencies work. They will be able to make their own applications on their own initiative, even if it is not an urgent case, because it is within their core areas of activity. But when it comes to serious crime their responsibilities are shared with other bodies, which might be expected to take a lead on the requirement to use communications data.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his opening comments. He has outlined what the statutory instrument does. These changes come as a result of the High Court ruling in June this year in the case of Liberty v the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for the FCDO.
This SI will allow for the internal authorisation of the acquisition of communications data solely for serious crime purposes in urgent situations, as prescribed by Section 61A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I understand that parts of the wider case were dismissed. However, the High Court ruled in favour of Liberty on one key point—namely, deeming it to be unlawful for the security services to obtain individuals’ communications data from telecom providers without having prior independent authorisation in certain circumstances.
In preparing for this debate, I read the blog of Neil Brown, who says he is an internet, telecoms and tech lawyer. He commented:
“I suspect, absent an appeal, there will be a tweak to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to provide for independent authorisation of requests by security or intelligence agencies before obtaining communications data, retained under Part 4 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for the applicable crime purpose.”
This SI is indeed the tweak he refers to. He goes on:
“While important, this decision is unlikely to have a material impact on telecommunications operators, whether it applies to all communications data or only communications data retained by a telecommunications operator under Part 4. This is because it relates to what happens ‘behind the scenes’ before a Part 3 authorisation or notice is served on a telecommunications operator. The impact of a Part 3 authorisation or notice has not changed, nor has the obligation to provide data in response to a notice. I suppose that it might have an impact in the short term on the volume of requests, if OCDA”—
the Office for Communications Data Authorisations—
“is to have an increased workload—presumably, if that is the case, there would be a plan to increase OCDA’s staffing.”
My questions for the Minister arising from those comments are, first, does he believe that Neil Brown is accurate in his assessment that there is likely to be a lack of impact on the telecommunication operators through this SI? Secondly, is there a plan to increase the OCDA’s staffing if necessary?
We welcome the Government’s corrective action through this SI. We recognise that there needs to be an appropriate balance between our civil liberties and the fast-changing threats posed by serious and organised crime.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who participated in this short debate for their considered views on the regulations. To go back to where I started, it is vital that the public have confidence in the discharge of the important powers contained in the investigatory powers regime and that these organisations can carry out their statutory duties to keep us all safe.
The noble Lord, Lord German, asked me about the relevant pieces of retained EU legislation or case law that pertain to the High Court decision. These particular pieces of law are: the Parliament and Council directives—I shall not go into the numbers as there are a lot of them—as implemented in the UK by Parliament in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003; Privacy International v the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Secretary of State for the Home Department —again, a load of numbers which I will not bother repeating; and a third one which is in French, and I am afraid my pronunciation powers prevent me having a go.