Horn of Africa Debate

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Department: Leader of the House
Lord Polak Portrait Lord Polak (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for initiating this debate and for his collaborative nature, involving us in these discussions. I look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Harman, who I am sure will play a full part in your Lordships’ House.

I must question the title of today’s debate. Although His Majesty’s Government may not formally recognise Somaliland, failing to acknowledge its 6.2 million people does not make them invisible. To speak of tensions in the region while omitting the most democratic and stable society within it is, in effect, to disregard an entire nation from our discourse. Somaliland’s people are committed to democratic principles that outshine any of its neighbours, yet they find themselves absent from the very title of our discussion.

We find ourselves addressing a matter of both immediate and long-term consequence in the Horn of Africa. Specifically with regard to Somaliland, there exists a unique opportunity for the United Kingdom to act in accordance with our moral responsibilities and strategic interests. As I said, Somaliland’s democratic development offers a stark contrast to the persistent instability of its neighbour, Somalia, and it presents a prospect for stability across a region long beset by conflict. With our support, Somaliland could contribute to the security of one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to democratic governance. This is not an abstract ideal but a tangible process, evidenced by elections such as the one poised to be held on 13 November 2024—in two weeks’ time. This is its fourth presidential election since 2003. This commitment to democratic values must be viewed against the backdrop of rising tensions in the broader Horn of Africa.

The region is marked by significant security challenges, including the influence of the Houthis in Yemen, al-Shabaab and ISIS, all of which threaten stability. The ongoing Houthi conflict, fuelled by Iranian arms, disrupts shipping routes across the Gulf of Aden and now poses an increased threat, as the Houthis have begun collaborating with al-Shabaab, arming it with Iranian weapons to extend its reach across borders. Al-Shabaab continues to present a major threat, particularly in regions close to Somaliland’s borders, such as Sool, where the group exploits weak governance for recruitment and cross-border incursions.

Furthermore, ISIS has established a presence in Puntland, raising alarms about potential infiltration into Somaliland’s contested areas. These security dynamics are exacerbated by the region’s fragile governance and the vulnerability of marginalised populations, whom terrorists of course exploit for recruitment. Here, the UK’s engagement in counterterrorism and governance enhancement is not merely beneficial but essential.

Moreover, the geopolitical landscape is complicated by the actions of key players in the region. Djibouti, a strategic nexus hosting military bases for countries such as the United States, China and France, plays a crucial role in supporting the economic stability of landlocked Ethiopia. However, Djibouti faces challenges in balancing relationships with these foreign powers while managing regional refugee flows. Eritrea, under President Afwerki’s one-party state, has seen a normalisation of relations with Ethiopia since 2018, yet remains embroiled in human rights abuses and regional conflicts, notably in Tigray.

Ethiopia itself is beset by internal conflicts, including in Tigray, as I have said. In Somalia, the persistent threat of al-Shabaab, coupled with political instability and corruption, further complicates the regional landscape. The reliance on the African Union mission underscores the need for a concerted international effort to address these governance challenges.

At the heart of these rising tensions are territorial and border disputes, for example between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and clashes over contested regions, such as Sool and Sanaag, between Somaliland and Puntland. The dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea over the Dumeira mountain and island further illustrates the fragility of regional stability. Internal ethnic tensions in Ethiopia, exacerbated by the Tigray conflict and violent clashes among various groups, pose additional risks of escalation.

Somaliland, amid these challenges, continues to seek international recognition and investment, highlighting its relative peace and democratic governance compared with Somalia. The recent provision of iris biometric technology by Taiwan marks a commendable step toward ensuring electoral transparency, and Somaliland faces considerable challenges from foreign interference in its elections. Both neighbouring states and external actors see these elections as opportunities to advance their geopolitical interests. Thus, it is critical to support Somaliland in strengthening its electoral integrity and ensuring transparency and fairness while preventing undue foreign influence.

Additionally, external influences from Middle Eastern powers, such as the UAE and Qatar, further complicate local politics. China’s expanding presence in the region, particularly its military base in Djibouti and strategic investments, highlights the competing interests of global powers. As these dynamics play out, we must remain vigilant against the potential for escalating conflicts to ignite broader regional wars, which would of course have devastating humanitarian consequences, including famine, disease and mass displacement.

In this complex context, I believe that the United Kingdom, with its historical ties and global standing, is uniquely positioned to play a constructive role in Somaliland’s future. Recognising independence would not merely acknowledge a political reality but would strategically align with our objectives in the Horn of Africa. Such recognition would signal our commitment to supporting democratic governance, reinforcing stability and ensuring secure trade routes. Critics may argue that such recognition could destabilise the region, yet we must question whether adherence to outdated paradigms serves the cause of peace and progress. Supporting Somaliland’s independence is not just a matter of principle; it aligns with our strategic interests in a region marked by volatility and uncertainty. I spoke in your Lordships’ House on 25 July about the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, which the noble Lord referred to. I hope it will turn into a full-scale agreement.

I will end as I began. The people of Somaliland should not be invisible, especially here in the UK, and while we do not officially recognise their home country, we owe it to them to recognise them and support their most basic human rights, wishing the country well in its democratic elections in two weeks’ time.