Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Report stage
Wednesday 9th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, this group raises two important but distinct questions: how the prudential framework should treat lending that supports employee ownership, co-operatives and mutuals; and when regulators should use skilled person reviews under Section 166 of FSMA. The Government have carefully considered the case made for each amendment, but do not believe that these changes should be made through legislation.

Amendments 63 and 66 seek to create a bespoke prudential framework for lending to co-operatives and mutuals, including through lower risk weights. The Government recognise the valuable contribution that co-operatives and mutuals make to the UK economy and are undertaking a multiyear programme of work to support the growth of the sector. This includes making amendments to the Building Societies Act 1986, which we debated last week, to align it with company law and give societies greater funding flexibility.

However, prudential capital requirements should reflect the underlying risk of a lending activity rather than the ownership structure of the lender. Prudential requirements are generally set by the Prudential Regulation Authority through its rules, rather than being prescribed in legislation. This allows the framework to respond to evolving risks and market developments, while operating within a statutory framework established by Parliament. The Prudential Regulation Authority has clear statutory objectives and is accountable to Parliament for the exercise of its functions. It is therefore the appropriate body to assess risk characteristics and determine the appropriate prudential treatment of different exposures. The Government therefore do not consider it appropriate to prescribe preferential prudential treatment for particular business models through legislation. Such decisions should remain matters for the independent Prudential Regulation Authority. For these reasons, I am unable to support these amendments.

Turning to Amendment 64 concerning Section 166 skilled person reviews, I agree that these reviews should be commissioned only where appropriate and proportionate. However, the Government are not persuaded that a further statutory threshold is necessary. As we discussed in Committee, regulators already consider the circumstances of the firm, the costs involved and the availability of alternative supervisory tools before commissioning a skilled person review. The FCA and the PRA have established supervisory processes for doing so. Requiring the regulators to satisfy an additional statutory test could delay supervisory action and make it harder to intervene before problems occur that could damage the interests of consumers or affect the functioning of markets.

I know that a concern has been raised about there being more and more Section 166 reviews. I reassure noble Lords that the FCA’s use of skilled person reviews has been broadly consistent over the past 10 years. In 2025-26, only 31 were commissioned, which is the second-lowest usage since 2016. I am happy to send the figures to Members if they are interested.

In their letters to me, which have been shared with interested Members and laid in the Library, both regulators set out details of their approach to delivering proportionality, with the FCA explaining how its approach to supervision is proportionate, risk based and targeted. They also commit to ongoing engagement with parliamentary committees on their approach. I hope that this reassures the noble Baroness about the process and proportionality of Section 166 reviews and therefore ask her not to press her amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, for supporting my Section 166 amendment. With regard to my Amendments 63 and 66, the Government have interpreted this exactly as I said it was not: I said that it is not telling the PRA what to do, but to consider a prudential distinction. I did not tell it what to do with it. Of course, it has that power anyway, and the purpose of the amendment was to draw attention to a very important sector. I will take the measure up with the PRA directly. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

If I would be the relevant person to talk to on this matter, I would be happy to meet. If not, perhaps I can direct the noble Baroness to appropriate officials.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. There is nothing in my amendment that is intended to stop pursuit of things that are wrong, but the evidence is that the guidance is not understood. I welcome the opportunity to have a meeting with HMRC officials so that we can explain more clearly where the problems lie and see if a solution can be found. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this is the third of the trio. Clause 18 is a deletion clause, the final clause in the trio that removes consideration of the regulatory principles from the context of actual rule-making. It strips out the guidance duties, reporting duties and consultation hooks that once gave Parliament visibility into how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Let us look at what is being systematically dismantled here. There is some overlap here with some of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has addressed.

Clauses 18(1) and (2) delete the FCA’s and PRA’s guidance about their objectives—the very provisions which, as the Explanatory Notes admit, required the regulators to explain how they advanced those objectives. It is not a question that they still have to explain now; that has gone. Clauses 18(3) and (4) remove the explanations required on directions on consolidated supervision and authorised decisions. Clause 18(7) removes the FCA’s obligation to notify, consult or explain when issuing guidance relating to its objectives. Clauses 18(9) and (10) delete large parts of the FCA’s and PRA’s annual reporting requirements, one of the most sensible and accessible ways for Parliament to understand how objectives were dealt with in practice and would ideally be built upon. Clauses 18(12) to (14) remove linkages to other Acts of Parliament, including the auditor engagement duties that once provided an additional source of supervisory insight.

What is left? Guidance? Gone. Explanations? Gone. Participation? Gone. Annual reporting? Gone. Audit? Gone. These were the exact mechanisms through which Parliament and others scrutinised how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Clause 18 removes them all. It is the inevitable consequence of the Clause 16 and 17 shift: the practical reality of decoupling principles from operational effectiveness and removing Parliament’s line of sight. It leaves us with no checks and absolutely no balances. For these reasons, I oppose Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 93 and 94. I have not audited a bank or sat on a bank board, but I was a member of the Sharman committee that looked at the problems with auditing following the global financial crisis. I sat on the board of one of the big four auditors, chairing its public interest committee, and I talked to a number of partners who audited the banks.

I think that we agree that audit is absolutely a foundation stone for the integrity of the capital markets. For those who are interested, it was part of the settlement following the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 that we would have audits of limited liability banks. It is particularly critical where entities are highly geared or where there is a considerable element of judgment in determining their value. If we look at the banks, they are hugely geared. People like to talk about the common equity tier 1 ratio, but if we look at the gearing that most companies use, it is the equity versus the liabilities. For a typical bank, equity is about 6%: on the back of that, you can borrow £94 and lend £100. That means that, if you have overvalued your assets by 3% and undervalued your liabilities by 3%, you end up with no equity whatever.

This is a really sensitive calculation and, historically, it would have been made with a degree of prudence and conservatism. Prudence and conservatism have now gone as guiding principles, and valuations are done neutrally. For example, this would allow a bank to declare a profit on a zero-interest credit card, on the grounds that it can bring forward the profits it thinks it will make in future. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has been great in raising these issues for some time.

There are of course huge temptations to optimism. Indeed, it is surely testament to the professionalism of our bankers, and the independent agents we employ to monitor and control bank behaviour, that banks have not got into greater trouble. There are four such agents: the independent non-executive directors; the auditors; the investors and the regulators. Many more resources are devoted to auditing banks than to regulating them, and vastly more than fund managers devote to their role as stewards. The auditors have inside knowledge and huge expertise, and it is precisely that insight, given independently, that regulators need in order to play their role.

I think that that was recognised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, when she suggested that the PRA “may” ask to speak to the auditors. The problem is that the auditors have a delicate job: they are referees. The report is done for the investors, but they need the trust of the audited entity. Indeed, they are, in effect, appointed by the audited entity, and they even sometimes describe the audited entity as a client. They are unlikely to go to the regulator without having profound concerns.

Regulators may find it helpful to call in the auditors because of problems that are visible to them: the known knowns. Under those circumstances, this amendment would of course work. However, what the regulator really needs to know is the unknown knowns: something that is known by the auditor, who has gone inside, but not known by the regulator. That is why it makes sense to mandate that the regulator “must” talk to the auditor to hear their concerns, to pick up potential emerging problems before they become critical, and to understand how the auditor judged the numbers to be true and fair.

The audit is the foundation of the integrity of our capital markets. For auditors to have material knowledge of a bank’s position that is relevant to the stability of the system and for that not to be known by the regulator seems to be completely perverse and potentially very dangerous. With that perspective, I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might be content with Clause 18, on audit reporting, to remain as it stands.