Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group concern the future of the bank ring-fencing regime. I will start by setting out clearly the position that we have reached as the Official Opposition. Through our diagnostic work, we have found a consensus that the bank ring-fencing regime is no longer fit for purpose. It adds costs to banks and their customers and it has been superseded by other rules since its introduction. A regulatory regime should not be preserved simply because it exists. It must continue to justify itself against present-day risks, tools and costs. In our view, the ring-fencing regime no longer does so. The next Conservative Government would repeal the post-global financial crisis ring-fencing regime, bringing the United Kingdom more closely into line with other international jurisdictions. Amendment 160A reflects that policy.

It is worth reminding ourselves what ring-fencing is. The regime was created through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which amended FSMA 2000. The implementing regulations and orders came into effect in 2019, more than 10 years after the onset of the global financial crisis. At its core, ring-fencing is the structural separation of certain retail banking activities from activities normally conducted by international wholesale investment banks. In practice, that means a separate legal entity, with restrictions on what it can do and how it can interact with the rest of the banking group. Retail and small business deposit-taking is placed inside the ring-fence, while certain other activities must be conducted outside it.

The regime was introduced for serious reasons. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, convened after the financial crisis, identified three broad objectives: to make it easier to deal with failing banks without taxpayer-funded solvency support; to insulate vital banking services used by households and SMEs from problems elsewhere in the financial system; and to curtail implicit government guarantees, thereby reducing risks to public finances and incentives for excessive risk-taking.

Since ring-fencing was designed, the wider regulatory landscape has changed profoundly. We now have a much more developed resolution regime. We have recovery and resolution planning. We have operational continuity arrangements in resolution. We have stronger capital and liquidity requirements. We have the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. The Bank of England, the PRA and the FPC have a broad toolkit for reducing the risk of bank failure and dealing with failure if it occurs. Moreover, we have sounder management of banks as a result of the senior management regime.

That is precisely the point that we wish to highlight in our amendment. The risks that ring-fencing was designed to address are now addressed through other more modern, more targeted and more internationally coherent tools. The 2022 Independent Panel on Ring-fencing and Proprietary Trading, chaired by Sir Keith Skeoch, reported that the regime has an annual cost to the UK banking sector of around £1.5 billion, which comes from running multiple separate legal entities, duplicating governance systems and raising the cost of capital and lending conducted by non-ring-fenced bodies. This is because large retail deposits inside the ring-fence cannot be used as sources of finance elsewhere in a group to support lending and investment. That review also found that the reduction in the implicit government guarantee and progress in ending “too big to fail” were not attributable to ring-fencing but instead to the development of the UK resolution regime. Ring-fencing is therefore a good example of a broader problem in financial services regulation: rules that are introduced in response to a crisis which then remain in place long after the conditions that justified the change.

We are now left with two regimes that are not aligned in the way that they aim to address “too big to fail”. That adds complexity, cost and burden. It also risks making the United Kingdom less competitive than jurisdictions that rely on resolution, prudential supervision and capital frameworks, rather than structural separation of this kind. Clauses 39 and 40 show that the Government recognise that there is a problem. They seek to make changes to the ring-fencing regime and give the PRA more flexibility over ring-fencing arrangements, but in our view these reforms do not go far enough.

Amendment 160A would repeal Part 9B of FSMA and the core statutory ring-fencing provisions introduced after the financial crisis. It would require the Treasury, the PRA, the FCA and the Bank of England to take the necessary steps to unwind the related rules and guidance. It would require an orderly transition, with attention paid to financial stability, continuity of core banking services and the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. Consumer savings would continue to be protected. Banks would continue to be subject to prudential supervision. Resolution planning would remain in place.

This reform matters for competitiveness. Other major financial centres do not operate a UK-style ring-fencing regime. If UK banks are required to carry costs and structural constraints that their international competitors do not face, that affects the cost and availability of finance. It affects the ability of banks to deploy capital efficiently and it affects the attractiveness of the UK as a place to operate and invest in. It also matters for customers. Regulations that increase costs without delivering commensurate benefit feed through into pricing, service innovation and lending capacity.

If the Government believe that ring-fencing remains necessary, will the Minister explain precisely what financial stability objective it now achieves that is not already achieved through the resolution regime and other prudential rules? Ring-fencing was created in response to a particular crisis at a particular moment for reasons that were understandable at the time. But regulation must evolve. It must be reviewed against current conditions. It must be removed when it no longer serves its intended purpose.

Finally, I would add that whatever changes are made, it is right to have a proper process of consultation with business and stakeholders and a follow-up report to Parliament. That is the purpose of my Amendments 159 and 174.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I may respond to that, I had thought until recently that what we were debating was a response to the Skeoch commission established by the last Government, but we have new amendments now, it seems—Amendment 160A and the abandonment of clauses—that are really throwing ring-fencing out. I guess that they are tabled in response to a speech by the leader of the Conservative Party, Kemi Badenoch—a speech underpinned by a policy document from her party. That speech, the policy document and this amendment are not asking to think things through further from the Skeoch report: they have made their minds up. Kemi Badenoch announced that a future Conservative Government will end ring-fencing—definitive end of discussion. That, I believe, would be a bad idea. So did the review by Keith Skeoch, who was commissioned by the Conservative Government to opine on this and whose recommendations we are now trying to take forward.

Worse still, the evidence for Mrs Badenoch’s statement is based on really questionable claims, numbers and Mickey Mouse logic. For example, the claim was that the Skeoch report reckoned that the cost of ring-fencing was £1.5 billion. In fact, the report notes that that figure was presented to the review and that

“it has not been possible to draw a strong conclusion based on aggregating these costs”.

The report recognises that there are some costs to ring-fencing, but notes that that was expected and acknowledged by the Independent Commission on Banking, which said that that would not be a cost to the economy, but rather

“a consequence of returning risk to where it should be—with bank investors, not taxpayers—and so would reflect the aim of removing government support and risk to public finances”.

The policy paper has a Mickey Mouse logic that costs should be placed on the taxpayer, when they should be paid by the banks and the investors in the banks.

We should of course be in favour of reviewing the ring-fencing regime to be sure that it is properly doing its job. This is what Skeoch did and, now, if this Bill follows that report, I ask the Minister to ensure that we are careful with definitions in the implementation. For example, we should ensure that, within the growth allowance, the definitions are very carefully drawn up. We do not in future want the taxpayer subsidising proprietary trading—what many refer to as “casino capitalism”.

Badenoch suggests that her reforms would release £450 billion in capital—another number from nowhere. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, will not have a lot of time to sum up, but I would be grateful if she might write afterwards on how these numbers have been derived and what reduction in bank equity capital they assume. If these numbers do not stack up, that pulls the rug from under the policy document and the speech that was made by the leader of the Conservative Party.

The policy paper suggests that we should abandon the Financial Ombudsman Service. In this industry, which represents 8% of GDP but attracts 42% of corporate fines, Mrs Badenoch has decided that the front-line institution that protects consumers should be abolished. We could say that this does not matter and that Kemi Badenoch is unlikely any time soon to be Prime Minister, but it should matter to us. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has pointed out, there is considerable expertise in financial services across all parties in the House. Although we have differences, we are united, I hope, in trying to set a framework for the industry that allows it better to serve its purpose: to serve the outside world; to help get money from point A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed; to keep our money safe; to help us transact; and to help us share risk.

If the Opposition Benches feel mandated to follow the policy documented last month, we have a problem. I could not find a single reference in that document to any input from any consumer group anywhere. It felt like a lobbyist document from the City, but I have talked to at least one lobbyist who said “No, it goes way further than we would ever suggest”.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

In Committee, it is normal to address the amendments and not opposition parties’ policy documents.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

The amendment has been put to us at the last minute. The points that it relates to have been there for weeks, indeed months, but I would argue that what has triggered the amendment is the speech by the leader of the Conservative Party and the policy document that underpins it. If the noble Baroness thinks, like me, that the policy document is lacking, I would be pleased to hear it because, as she knows, it would abolish the FOS and seek to mandate regulatory changes that come close to invading the independence of the regulator.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I did indeed talk to senior members of the Skeoch commission before writing my speech, and what I said is completely consistent with the conclusions of the Skeoch commission, which was set up by the previous Conservative Government, as I said.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I am just reading the conclusions from the report, my Lords. They make it very clear that the continuation of ring-fencing made sense at the time the report was written, but the commission clearly envisaged that it might not be needed over the passage of time. I also remind noble Lords that Glass-Steagall was abolished some 25 years ago with no detriment to the American banking system. I say this just to make the point that it is not so obvious.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I find it difficult to believe that someone has told me that the withdrawal of Glass-Steagall, which took place 13 years before the global financial crisis, had no detriment to the American banking system. As I say, I have read the Skeoch report and discussed it with senior members of Skeoch, and I believe that what I said is entirely consistent with the recommendations that they made to the Government and this House, which is recognised in the Bill.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I also draw attention to the abolition of FOS, which the noble Lord mentioned. I draw the Committee’s attention to Amendment 172A, which discusses the changes proposed to FOS. It is to be abolished and replaced with something called the financial adjudication service, which is a broadly similar methodology to give redress to consumers and private clients, in the event of problems with the firms that serve them. While it is a change, it is a reform to FOS with an organisation with a different name, but it is not a straightforward abolition of that very important process. This will be dealt with in that later amendment—not in my name, I might add.

Governments, like some businesses, are very good at locking the stable door after the horse has bolted. Our reaction to 2008 was an example of just that. But we are now 18 years on and the banking sector has been solid during that time. However, as we know, growth has flatlined, despite many years of ultra-low interest rates. I am not suggesting that we are an exception here; there has been a similar experience across most of Europe. But we now have a substantial cost of capital for business to bear, with interest rates stuck at 3.75% and sadly not much prospect of a reduction in the near term.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have some experience of ring-fencing as, in my capacity as the chairman of the risk committee of a major bank, I oversaw the implementation of ring-fencing. At that time, it was a significant risk to the bank that we would not be in compliance with the ring-fencing legislation and therefore this required considerable oversight.

I am clear that ring-fencing has been a very expensive element of the post-financial crisis reforms. The Skeoch report, which has been referred to, put the upfront cost at £2.9 billion and the ongoing cost at £1.5 billion, which amounts to about £14 billion to date. The noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, tried to undermine those numbers, but, from my experience, I do not doubt that order of magnitude. More importantly, the implementation, and, to a lesser extent, the ongoing element—

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

There were two points, one of which is that the Skeoch report says that the numbers given are not its numbers. The report is clear that whatever the cost of ring-fencing, it is not a cost to the economy—this is what the Vickers report said earlier —and that, by removing ring-fencing, it suddenly becomes a cost to the taxpayer rather than to the bank’s investor. That is the key point that Skeoch is bringing to our attention.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the point that the noble Lord is trying to make, but I argue that the risk of the taxpayer picking up the tab is now considerably lower, which means that it is reasonable to re-examine whether ring-fencing should be an ongoing part of the regime.

I was about to say that, in addition to the cash costs, there was during the implementation, and to some extent on an ongoing basis, considerable diversion of scarce management resource, which will have damaged the banks in a number of ways. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe has registered her opposition to Clauses 39 and 40 standing part of the Bill. I support Clauses 39 and 40 on the grounds that any improvement in the ring-fencing regime is better than none. The flexibility that will come with letting the PRA handle some of the changes via rules is a constructive solution. The PRA is, however, heavily invested in ring-fencing and no one should be under any illusion that the power will be used by the PRA to make significant changes to the regime. That is why I believe that we need to make provision to go further and I support the other amendments in this group.

As we have heard, since the implementation of ring-fencing, the parallel and very expensive requirement to maintain and develop resolution plans has been implemented, and the Bank of England has confirmed that the major banks are resolvable. In addition, bank capital levels are significantly above the levels that they were immediately after the financial crisis and well above regulatory minima. Regulatory capital is expensive and can restrict the ability of banks to lend to support the economy. I am always extremely sceptical about claims that reducing capital requirements on banks will immediately lead to masses of extra lending by the banks—there is some element of truth in it, but the effect is not as great as might be claimed.

We are hugely proud of the robustness of our financial regulation and what we do in the UK is often copied abroad. No one anywhere else in the world has ever copied ring-fencing and that is for a very good reason: it is a very expensive solution to a problem that can be and has been addressed in other ways. That is why I support the amendments from my noble friend, which pave the way for eliminating ring-fencing. It cannot be done away with overnight, so I support the measured approach taken in my noble friend’s Amendment 160A.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to have the debate, and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, for raising questions which have encouraged debate, but I support my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s opposition to Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I also support her Amendment 160A about ring-fencing.

Clause 39 gives the Treasury powers to loosen the ring-fencing scheme. It has been anticipated, as others have said in this debate, by a number of announcements and reports, not least the Skeoch report—I hope I have pronounced it rightly, in the Celtic way—and the announcements this year by the Treasury itself. All of these point to and address a real problem. The question before us today is whether the Government’s solution in their Clauses 39 and 40 is sufficient to deal with the problems raised by reviews and announcements going back to the 1 March 2022 independent review of the working of the scheme.

I have a concern. The clause may seem to be the answer to some of the serious questions raised in that review and other concerns, and allow for the mitigation of problems arising from the ring-fencing regime—to allow for “proportionate” changes, to use a word which continues to recur throughout the assessments of how the scheme is working. However, in essence, it protracts the dominance of the regime and the regulators in what should be business decisions under good law, which is the spirit of the common law. It is a law which is permissive of risk-taking rather than prohibitive of the spirit of enterprise, or looking over the shoulder to the precautionary principle.

Officials and regulators can be very intelligent, competent and talented people, but it is not part of their skill set to drive through an entrepreneurial idea from the drawing board to production, sale, expanding their markets, developing a business, taking risk, and hiring and training people—which is an additional cost—while all the time keeping on top of the services sector, one of the fastest growing sectors in the UK and a jewel in the crown. Enabling officials to decide which activities should or should not be prohibited, and under which circumstances, does not tackle the fundamental problem to which the ring-fenced regime has given rise: the artificial and contrived structure. We are dealing with a structural problem—an artificially separated structure.

This structure inhibits the financial services sector from functioning in the best possible way, as an enabling hub for the whole UK economy, to allow small businesses, in particular, to grow and credit to flow. It is unlikely to remedy what we are dealing with, the fundamental problem of risk aversion imposed by ring-fencing law on businesses and the endemic risk aversion in the operation of the law.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I wonder whether there might be some confusion here. The thing about the ring-fence is that there are activities within it that the Government are promising to bail out. Those things are being insured. By the way, the move in the ring-fence proposed by the Government will extend these a little, but they include lending to the small businesses that the noble Baroness has talked about. The question is: are we going to be rid of that? Is it the case that the implicit guarantee that the Government are giving can go to any other activity that the bank decides that it wants to undertake? That could include, although Skeoch would say it is not a problem right now, the sort of proprietary trading that brought the American banks down in 2008—of course, they had been allowed to do that because Glass-Steagall had been removed 10 years earlier. What we are talking about here is: how much of bank activity will the Government stand behind? As Mervyn King said, we must make sure that it is just the very most important things.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, but it is about where the line is drawn in law, so that businesses can be certain and have predictability, because activities change day by day.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

With respect, that is what Skeoch is recommending and what is being allowed in what we are being asked to accept here—there is an extension of the ring-fence. He is saying, “Look, there are other important activities that go beyond the ring-fence that are administratively complicated for the banks. Please can you move this? Also, can you move this in a way so that it doesn’t need to go to primary legislation any time it needs to change, because all these things are moving?” What we are trying to do here is recognise that the independent commission is run by a senior financial businessperson—he used to run Standard Life—whom we are going to back. He indeed said that, in the long term, you may want to think about how ring-fencing goes together with the resolution regime, but that is not for now. He certainly did not say that we should abandon it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, but he was speaking about 2022, which was light years away for the financial sector. Things have moved on and have changed. We have different regimes in place now. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has explained, the banks are now resolvable. There are other schemes that will avoid the problems for the taxpayer. That should be borne in mind.

I had better finish quickly. That is my objection. It is about who decides for businesses. If you have a ring-fence, ultimately, no matter how much you relax it, the Government are never going to have the knowledge of the sector, and the detailed tactical and strategic ability, to be ahead of the game and make businesses grow. They will always play slightly safe, but maybe they are over-safe.

I will finish on why we need to repeal the ring-fence, not just why Clause 39 is not good enough. In a sense, we are seeing the inhibition of risk-taking and a structure that inhibits it. As other noble Lords have pointed out, we do not have parallels in other economies. I know that there is the Volcker rule in the US, but Switzerland has solved its “too big to fail” problem without a ring-fence and it has a very instructive banking sector. France and Germany have it individually but not the EU, which rejected it. Australia reviewed it again in 2019 and rejected it on the grounds that noble Lords have mentioned. It is well worth going back to the famous Skeoch review, which contends that, in the longer term, we will not need the ring-fence and we will have resolution schemes in place. For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill and her Amendment 160A.

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The corporation is, however, unlike any other local authority in the UK, not least because the 8,500 residents of the City of London are dwarfed by the over 600,000 people who work there and whose interests also needs to be considered. There is no other municipality that contributes over £100 billion annually to the UK economy and is the centre of our world-leading financial and professional services sector. It is therefore right that the corporation should use its convening power to promote this sector, which is at the heart of its success, including through engaging with the FCA and the PRA. If noble Lords have specific concerns about a particular interaction between the corporation and the regulators, the right response is a specific question to the Treasury or to the regulators, or even to the corporation itself, rather than the statutory review panel with a long process that is being considered in this amendment. We do not legislate for a review every time a body engages constructively with a regulator, and we should not seek to do so here.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has suggested that we inquire into the City of London’s role with the regulators and regulation. My noble friend Lady Bi summed it up well: there is no direct role there. But I wonder whether we could send a message to the City of London, perhaps a little more collegiate and, as a result, more effective. We all recognise that the role and constitution of the City corporation is quite difficult to defend from 21st-century principles. Why does one square mile of the country have these unique privileges? It has billions of pounds worth of property and investment, and the Lord Mayor of London has the status of a Cabinet Minister, apparently, when he or she goes on trips abroad. Why is it charged with the powers of a local authority but also with promoting Britain’s financial services industry? I point out that your Lordships’ House bears witness to the fact that historic institutions can—and often do—do good and important work. I wonder whether, harking back to the traditions of the City of London, there is one that we could help revive, in the spirit of what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, may want to happen.

Historically, the City of London was responsible for the good conduct of the trades in the city, ensuring that the goods produced could be trusted to be of high quality. Indeed, I believe that Elizabeth I even had the goldsmiths of London check that the coinage that the Mint was producing was of a high enough standard, because the goldsmiths were more professional than the people at the Royal Mint.

Over time, that role of policing good conduct has passed to professional bodies and then to regulators, but we often forget that it is the professionalism that we need. Regulators cannot replace professionalism, for which so many people from Britain and around the world come to use Britain’s financial services industry. Professionals, whether individuals or institutions, are a disciplined group possessing special knowledge and skills in a widely recognised body of learning. They are prepared to apply this knowledge and exercise these skills in the interests of others. That professionalism, both for individuals and for institutions, harks back to that old role of the City of London: not regulation but professionalism. It is and should be the core and unique selling point of the UK financial services industry. I sense that that is what we in this Room would like to achieve.

The City of London promotes financial services, but surely, if it does that, it must be sure that the services it promotes—maybe not every financial service—serve a purpose in the world. There is still enormous room for the City to identify and help to encourage good practice, not just to promote financial services generally but to ensure that all the services it promotes deliver benefit to the customer and the world. That may, from time to time, involve talking to a regulator—I do not see that as a problem—but it should seek much more to ensure that professional good practice becomes a norm. The City already does some of this, but it could be so much clearer about its focus and role. There would be no better way to promote the success of financial services in Britain.

I have one last coda on this and a more immediate thought. Spokespeople from the City of London Corporation like to explain—correctly—that they represent the whole financial services industry of Britain, two-thirds of which works outside London. But those who work to promote the industry are exclusively employed in the square mile, and it is difficult to express the level of frustration that I have felt among some that the City talks the talk about employment around the country but maybe needs to walk the walk in its own practices on where people are employed. I hope that might be a constructive suggestion about how this venerable institution might serve its country better.

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

My Lords, I fear that Amendment 172C strays beyond the purpose of the Bill, which is concerned with improving the regulation of financial services and markets. It is not, in my view, the appropriate vehicle for reopening broader questions about the role and governance of the City of London Corporation. This amendment takes us into a rather different debate—it asks us to examine the role and function of the City of London Corporation—whereas the purpose of the Bill is to strengthen the UK’s financial regulatory framework, ensuring that it is effective, proportionate and capable of supporting growth, investment and innovation, while maintaining high standards. Our focus should remain on achieving those objectives.

It is important to be clear about the respective roles of the organisations involved. The City of London Corporation is not a financial regulator. It does not authorise firms, supervise markets or enforce regulatory rules. Those responsibilities rest with the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England, all of which are independently accountable to Parliament.

The City corporation performs a different, but none the less valuable, function. It acts as a convenor of expertise, an advocate for one of the United Kingdom’s most important industries and a champion of the UK as a global financial centre. Through its international engagement, it promotes inward investment, supports exports of financial and professional services, and works with industry to help maintain the UK’s reputation for high standards and innovation.

I question whether the amendment has demonstrated that there is a genuine accountability gap requiring statutory review. Before Parliament creates a new review mechanism, we should be satisfied that there is evidence of a problem that the existing arrangements have failed to address. I have not yet heard that case made. The City corporation is already subject to established governance and oversight arrangements, while the regulators are independently accountable to Parliament.

At a time when the Government are rightly seeking to promote economic growth and strengthen the United Kingdom’s competitiveness as a leading international financial centre, I am concerned that this amendment risks creating uncertainty without identifying a clear public benefit. Our efforts should be directed towards ensuring that regulators can carry out their duties effectively, while organisations such as the City of London Corporation continue to play their distinct role in supporting the wider success of the UK’s financial and professional services. For those reasons, I believe our attention should remain firmly on the purpose of the Bill: strengthening the United Kingdom’s financial regulatory framework. I cannot support Amendment 172C.