Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Lucas

Tuesday 15th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I hear what my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill has just said, and it is a very strong point. None the less, we have to legislate for our own circumstances. I come back to the point that we cannot leave the Bill in a state where individuals can be grotesquely, viciously and intentionally defamed, where huge platforms—website operators—can grow rich in allowing that to happen with total impunity and with no possible remedy for the individuals concerned. That cannot be right. I am reminded slightly of some of the arguments about the banking sector and the banks that are “too big to fail”. We cannot get into a mentality where website operators are too big to pay. We have never had a satisfactory answer for why website operators could not take out comprehensive insurance so that, if they were sued by individuals because of the defamations of those who post on their platforms, they could pay up in the normal way.

I have great sympathy for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, put his case for Amendment 30, not least because we are all grappling with fiendish and unprecedented problems with no easy answer. Generally, I come down on the side of saying that nobody should have the right to defame others—in a way, incidentally, that will travel further and faster than any other system of publication in the history of the world—and be able to say, “Ooh, no, you can’t reveal my name; that’s a breach of my human rights”. There is another breach of human rights involved in defamation—indeed, it is worse because the defamer is doing it intentionally. I am, of course, taking the worst case. If you have to place in juxtaposition the vicious defamer on the one hand and on the other the possibility that that defamer’s particulars may have to be revealed by the website operator in the process of complying with our new legislation, I am afraid that I have to come down on the side of the person who has been defamed.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, speaking again as a web operator, I do not know any way of establishing a person’s identity just because they are posting. One could establish a web identity, but that may have a very fuzzy relationship with any individual. If someone posts, gives me an e-mail address and I verify that e-mail address, that is about as far as I can get. However, I think that we can reasonably insist on that. If we are offering website operators the protection of this Bill against being sued for what is posted on their sites, we can ask them at least to have verified a web identity. We can ask that they take some steps to have a method of communication with this person and do not just allow straightforward anonymous postings. Then, something put up on the net should come from someone with whom the website operator knows that they have an established means of communication. Whether or not that works, is fake or just ends in silence, I do not think you can ask the website operator to determine. But you can at least make them take the first step.

[Lord May of Oxford]

This is a sensitive and difficult issue but I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and others that the downside of doing this outweighs the upside. However, it was also my impression—which may just reveal that I did not understand what was going on—that quite a significant recourse is already given by what we were discussing under Clause 5.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Lucas

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Why should the expense and risk be on the side of the citizen?

[Lord Lucas]

Absolutely—the expense should be on the citizen who, having made the comment, is the target of the defamation action; but the website should not be forced to take down the comment just by the threat of a defamation action against the person who originated the comment. Otherwise, it becomes all too easy to wipe complaints off the public record. It is not that I wish the person complained against not to have any means of action but it should be against the person posting the comment and not against the website that is hosting the comment, until it has been proved to be defamation and a court order comes saying, “You must take this down”.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My noble friend is putting forward a situation which has no parallel, for example, in newspapers, or radio or television. It is no good the newspaper saying, “Well, this isn’t my letter, this is the letter of John Smith and therefore it is nothing to do with me”. Why should it be any different for the web operator?

[Lord Lucas]

We are dealing with the web operator as a conduit and not as a publisher. If I want to make a particular statement about a company that I feel has wronged me, I will do so using public media such as Facebook, Twitter or other sites on which I might post a comment. That is me making that statement. If I am identifiable, which I think is quite proper, then the action should be against me. Otherwise, it means that those who are behaving badly and wish to hide that bad behaviour can simply wipe all record of my complaint off all public websites without any risk or trouble to themselves. I would say that it is in the public interest that I make my views on this particular company known, but I am going to be deprived of all means of doing so in an electronic world because I will have no access to what becomes the medium of communication, because as soon as I say anything there the company that I have complained about can wipe it out. That seems to me an entirely unreasonable situation.

We have to recognise that we are dealing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, with a different world and a different way of doing things and that if we want news of bad practice to spread, we have to allow it to be published. Allowing it to be published means holding harmless those who are acting as a conduit. I am a publisher and recognise that if I publish something unpleasant about some school or person then I, as a publisher, take that on the chin. That is part of my remunerated business. However, the owners of Twitter are getting no benefit from the fact that I have tweeted something on it—there is no revenue with which to offset the cost of establishing that I have a right under law to say what I have said, so they will immediately take it down, if complained against, unless we provide them with some kind of “hold harmless” defence. So it is very important that the conduits, if they behave well, establish the identity and share it with the complainant, and can continue to publish until the point has been reached where it has been established in a court of law, or by agreement or otherwise, that what has been said is defamatory.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that it is very important that, where something has been said about a company or a person that is considered defamatory, a statement from the person who is being defamed should be published alongside the original statement. That is a relatively easy technical thing to do, and I do not think people should have to wait seven days. It should be relatively automatic. These days, one day—certainly one working day—is enough to do that. That should be an automatic right, because it is easy to do and balances things reasonably.

I am also interested in the question of moderation, which has been referred to. The status of moderation under this clause seems to be very uncertain. By moderating to any extent, do you become the publisher of what has been said? A lot of sites will just allow unrestricted publication, and that appears to be safe, but we and many other sites will moderate; that is, we will want to see what has been said before we decide that it can be published. If we moderate and then publish, have we assumed liability for what is said? Have we assumed a liability for checking it? If not, it becomes impossible to moderate and you are saying, “We wish the web to be entirely unmoderated and we think that the process of moderation is undesirable”. I am not sure that that is what the Government intend to say.

If you allow moderation, do you allow within that any kind of editing or advice? If someone posts a comment and it appears to be a statement of fact rather than opinion, are you allowed to say to that person, “You have not phrased this as a statement of opinion. If you resubmit it as a statement of opinion, we will publish it”. Is that taking responsibility for what as been said? I think of moderation as something we should encourage. It improves the quality of the web as a whole, although it is an expensive thing to do. We should be clear in this clause about the extent to which we are prepared to support and protect the process of moderation.

Lastly, I come back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said about TripAdvisor. I think that it is barking up the wrong tree. I suggest that it employs what we have effectively used over many years and I will call the Good Schools Guide defence. If a school starts to complain about comments we have made, we merely post the fact that we are not prepared to allow comments on this school because we do not agree with the school’s policy on taking down comments. That is as good as anything. If TripAdvisor were to do that to a hotel, that would be worse than any comment that anyone could possibly publish. It would achieve the end result it wanted without pain.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Lucas

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I cannot agree with that construction of what is intended here. Mis-selling very clearly comes under new Section 1C, the consumer protection objective. We have, perhaps, teased out of this discussion that if we are talking about social responsibility in the sense that my noble friend intends and in the way he has described it, it is more linked to the consumer protection objective, rather than the integrity of the UK financial system. The difficulty may partly be in the different uses of “integrity”. We are not talking in new Section 1D about integrity in the direct sense of the behaviour of the individuals in the system. We are talking about the wholeness and stability and soundness of the financial system, which is why these particular factors are listed in Section 1D(2). They are linked to concrete actions that would be expected of the FCA, examples of which I have just given. We may be partly mixing up apples and pears here because I do not think that social responsibility fits into this clause of the Bill.

If my noble friend came back and tried to attach it to proposed new Section 1C, I would still argue that social responsibility is a matter for government. Social responsibility in the sense that he is talking about will go to the heart of what the Joint Committee will look at in response to the LIBOR scandal. The responsibility of the participants in the sector will be tackled in different ways.

I have tried to reassure the Committee—I can see that I may have given only partial reassurance—that the Government firmly believe that the financial industry should serve society. There is a big unfinished agenda and the Government will not shy away from driving it forward. The right way to do so is through different avenues but not through expecting the FCA to be responsible for these particular areas. I ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, while my noble friend is doing that, perhaps he will say something about the effect that Amendment 103 would have in a practical sense. If faced with the words “and society” at the end of the subsection, how would the FCA’s decisions be different? Under what kind of practical circumstances would it make a difference?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, that is a strictly out-of-court request at the moment. However, if the Committee will indulge the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and myself, I will give him a short answer.

I am concerned, and those who have supported the amendment and the whole of the social investment sector are deeply concerned, that there is no single recognition in 168 pages of its special nature—not one single indication. I agree with them—others have made the point—that that is a profound omission given where we are, the financial sector we have got and the innovative drive and importance—potentially more than actually—of this new social sector.

Academies Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Lucas

Wednesday 23rd June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I rise to speak to three amendments tabled in my name: Amendments 10, 95 and 120A. I am hopeful that the first two at least may improve the drafting of the Bill, though it could be that the Minister will in response say that what I think is set out in the Bill is not as I think it is.

A grouping of this size, which deals with many different, technical and difficult points, is not a way to legislate. I do not know how Members of the Committee can possibly follow a grouping of this scope and technicality. I hope that in future stages of the Bill the groupings will enable Peers who are not experts in education law—and even those who are—to follow more reasonably.

Amendment 10 seeks to insert in Clause 1(3) the phrase,

“(as may from time to time be amended by them)”.

This is an attempt to make clear that the academy agreement between the Secretary of State and the other party should be defined not only as the initial agreement but as an agreement which may be amended by them consensually from time to time. I hope that that is helpful, because without those words we might run into trouble.

Amendment 95 seeks to amend Clause 2(4), which entitles the Secretary of State to indemnify those running an academy if the agreement is terminated. The amendment simply adds the word “reasonable” before “expenditure” so that the indemnity would be in respect of reasonable expenditure. Paragraphs (a) and (b) then refer to what the indemnity may relate to. It is a prudent provision because without it lavish and unnecessary expenditure would be indemnified, and that cannot be right.

Amendment 120A seeks to amend Clause 4, which deals with academy orders. I have tabled the amendment for clarification because I do not understand what the words at the end of subsection (3)—

“or a school that replaces it”—

mean, or are intended to mean. Are they intended to cover new free schools? I do not think they are because the whole of Clause 4 is confined to existing secondary schools converting into academies.

[Lord Lucas]

I shall speak to my Amendments 31 and 34 in this very diverse group. Amendment 31 proposes that,

“substantial freedom is given to the school to innovate”.

When I am going round schools I notice how hidebound they are by the restrictions that are placed on them in trying new things. Although the previous Government introduced an ability to innovate, it was subject to applications in triplicate to the Secretary of State and an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure. I hope we will now see a pronouncement in favour of innovation. I suggest that where a school does innovate it is merely necessary to inform the Secretary of State that this has happened—this becomes a risk factor for Ofsted in its decision on when and where to inspect—and that there is a requirement on the school to keep proper records so that the benefits or otherwise of the innovation can be judged in subsequent years. The whole tenor should be in favour of innovation. There are many good and experienced teachers out there who are capable of doing a great deal of good for the system if we let them have a go.

On Amendment 34, one of the good things to come out of the past 13 years of government was an increasing interest in schools co-operating with each other. Neighbouring schools will always be a little at loggerheads, but there are good examples—both those induced by the Government and those that have occurred privately—of schools forming networks to share problems and good practice and generally to get together and get beyond the confines of what is possible within a school, particularly a primary school. I am thinking particularly of the transition from primary to secondary and how schools can work together. There have been some excellent examples of that and I would not like the process of becoming an academy to be seen as an excuse to be isolated and a star on your own. It ought to be a process of becoming more co-operative and more linked into schools generally.