Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 4th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the prisons are in crisis—understaffed, overcrowded, with a rising incidence of self-harm and suicide. The judiciary complains of the difficulty, delay and cost caused by the increase in unrepresented litigants denied legal aid. The magistracy is greatly concerned about the decline of local justice, exacerbated by court closures and the increasing reliance on professional district judges. An untried and risky change in the probation service is under way, beset by the loss of experienced staff and reports of confusion and disorganisation. The Lord Chancellor’s response is what can only be described as another Grayling gimmick.

Two years ago, the Lord Chancellor celebrated his arrival in office by pitchforking unnecessary provisions into the then Crime and Courts Bill, supposedly to protect householders from prosecution if they used force to defend themselves or their property from intruders. It would be interesting to learn in just how many cases that measure has been invoked. This autumn, we have a five-clause, 20-line, one-page Bill—one of the shortest on record—designed to meet another non-existent problem: the unfair or, alternatively, chilling effect of the so-called compensation culture on those who might face a claim for compensation for negligence or breach of statutory duty while,

“acting for the benefit of society or any of its members”.

From bash a burglar to hug a hero in two years.

Such was the significance of the Lord Chancellor’s proposed measure that of the 18 witnesses he invited to give evidence in support of the Bill, only five bothered to turn up. Two of those were fire authorities. The Greater Manchester fire authority was particularly exercised by the fact that it had faced two claims for compensation by people who had tripped over fire hoses in the vicinity of an accident. Quite what difference the Bill would have made to the outcome of such a curious claim is unclear. Perhaps the Minister would care to elucidate.

By contrast, all five witnesses invited by the Opposition attended. One of them, representing the Law Society, was treated to a most discourteous and offensive attack by the Minister, Mr Vara, who is clearly a graduate of the Eric Pickles political charm school. His performance only underlined how fortunate we are to have the Ministry of Justice represented in this House by the noble Lord.

The Second Reading debate occupied all of an hour and a half, with two Back-Bench speeches, one—as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd—by the distinguished former Conservative Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Garnier. The Lord Chancellor did not condescend to stay for any speeches, even Sir Edward’s. He did not even extend the courtesy of staying to hear Sir Edward speak on Report and at Third Reading. Perhaps he anticipated the forensic dissection of this flimsy foray into legislative vote-catching. Not a single government Back-Bencher spoke in the debate in Committee.

The Bill starts with the premise that volunteers are deterred from helping individuals, or society as a whole, for fear that they might be sued if things go wrong because of the alleged compensation culture which insurance companies and the media constantly denounce. There is very little evidence to support that claim. Even the noble Lord, Lord Young of Graffham, who is not in his place—that ermine-clad St George, constantly in search of regulatory dragons to slay—observed that the so-called compensation culture was more a matter of perception rather than reality. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has pointed out, that view was explicitly shared recently by Lord Dyson, the Master of the Rolls.

The irony is, of course, that banging on about a compensation culture is itself likely to create the very apprehension that the Bill purports to allay. The reality is that anyone seeking compensation has to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant has been negligent—that is, to have failed to take reasonable care—or in breach of a statutory duty, and that that has caused the damage that is the subject of the claim. Nothing in the Bill displaces that test and nor should it. If, as a result of my careless driving, a third party suffers injury, why should the fact that I may have been engaged in some voluntary service—perhaps taking an overexcited Minister to a therapy session, for example—in any way affect that third party’s right to compensation, even if he was my passenger?

The position was well summarised by the Minister, Mr Vara, in the Public Bill Committee:

“Nothing in the Bill suggests that it gives immunity from civil liability. It also does not change the standard of care that is generally applicable. That is and remains what the ordinary and reasonable person should have done in the circumstances. The Bill simply requires the court to have regard to certain factors in deciding what steps should have been taken to meet that standard of care in a particular case. It does not tell the court what conclusions to draw or prevent a person from being found negligent if the facts of the case warrant it”.

In which case, one might ask, what is the point of the Bill? He went on to muddy the waters:

“In a finely balanced case, if the court’s consideration of these provisions tipped the balance in favour of a defendant who had acted for the benefit of society, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards the safety of others … or intervened to help somebody in an emergency, we would welcome that outcome”.—[Official Report, Commons, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill Committee, 9/9/14; col. 63.]

I suspect that the welcome would not be shared by the injured party, particularly if it allowed the insurer of the defendant—if he or his employer was insured—to avoid paying compensation.

Moreover, the courts would have to engage with interpreting the wording of the Bill, which, to put it mildly, is highly problematic. Take Clause 2, which requires the court to,

“have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members”.

How would one define “the benefit of society”? Would that proviso protect somebody who negligently inflicted injury while acting for the benefit of a “member of society” who happened to be doing something inappropriate or even criminal?

Clause 3 is similarly opaque, with its reference to its requirement for the court to,

“have regard to whether the person … demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

What on earth constitutes a “generally responsible approach”? As the General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union—the members of which risk life and limb daily to protect the public—put it,

“the question of how an employer deals with … situations is not a matter of the general perception of their responsibility … The question of the employer’s general responsibility … comes down to the specifics of how they have planned, prepared and resourced the particular incident”.—[Official Report, Commons, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill Committee, 4/9/14; col. 21.]

To cap it all, we have Clause 4, “Heroism”, which appears to be the stuff of Greek legend or the annals of Boy’s Own Annual. The court is solemnly charged with the duty of having regard to whether,

“the person was acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger and without regard to the person’s … safety or other interests”.

We all salute those who risk life or limb to rescue others, whether they do so as part of their job—as fire or police officers, for example—or simply as courageous citizens, like the recent tragic case of the doctor who died trying to save others from drowning in the seas off Cornwall. But where is the evidence of claims for damages by the subjects of such brave and selfless interventions against those endeavouring to help them? For that matter, where is the evidence that the present state of the law deters such brave responses to emergency situations? And what, after all, constitutes an heroic intervention?

There is another aspect of this defective Bill which causes concern; namely, the possibility that references to breaches of statutory duty imply a potential defence for employers, or perhaps for those with other statutory duties—for example, in the realm of care—for acts which cause damage or loss. Perhaps the Minister could clarify the Government’s intentions in this respect, assuming of course that they are conscious of having any.

If, as I hope, the noble Lord can confirm that the Bill is not intended in any way to diminish the existing protection to employees or others, we are left essentially with a Bill which is designed to send a message to volunteers—a message to counteract the possible, but unproven, effect on volunteering of a reaction to the compensation culture mythology which the Government sedulously peddle on volunteering. This would in effect merely echo, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, the provisions of the Compensation Act 2006—a well intentioned but, I have to say, not particularly compelling piece of legislation on somewhat similar lines but without the surrounding hyperbole or loose phraseology. It is hardly surprising that the Delegated Powers Committee says:

“There is nothing in this Bill”—

although, in all fairness, it did go on to say,

“which we wish to draw to the attention of the House”.

The Explanatory Notes to the then Compensation Bill declared that it was intended to,

“contribute to improving awareness … of the law … and to ensuring that normal activities are not prevented because of the fear of litigation and excessively risk-averse behaviour”.

However, importantly, they also went on to stress that the provision did not alter the standard of care or the circumstances in which such a duty is owed, and they explicitly affirmed that it did not extend to cases of breach of statutory duty involving strict liability or where carelessness was not an issue. Moreover, the notes stated that the,

“provision reflects the existing law and approach of the courts as expressed in recent judgments”.

In other words, the legislation was, in effect, otiose, and this proposed legislation is doubly otiose.

Sir Edward Garnier spoke powerfully both at Second Reading and on Report. He detected in the Minister’s speech during the Queen’s Speech debate in your Lordships’ House some lack of enthusiasm in relation to this measure. Is the Minister able, in the light of the vestigial information contained in the impact assessment, to reply to Sir Edward’s inquiry as to how many High Court or county court actions would have been decided differently if this Bill had been in force?

Sir Edward’s speech was a devastating critique of the Bill. He declared:

“I really do think that the courts will treat this Bill with derision … unless we are clear … that we are doing something to improve the situation in an intellectually sustainable and coherent way. I sincerely regret the fact that so far this Bill does not do that ... I am used to bits of Bills sending messages and signals—albeit that that is an improper use of legislation ... We do not think about what is in the legislation; we just think about the flags we are running up the flagpole in order to send a message”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 697.]

It will be gathered that the Opposition are not enthusiastic about this Bill. My right honourable friend Sadiq Khan, in winding up the Third Reading debate in the Commons, observed:

“The Bill will change little, but we will not oppose it today. We tried in Committee to make something of it, and it will now fall to the other place to attempt to give it purpose”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 705.]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, feels very strongly about the Bill. He regards it as trivial and I have to say that I agree with him. However, when it comes to seeking to defeat a Bill at Second Reading, the House is traditionally cautious. I recall the two Bills that the noble and learned Lord referred to—their passage through this House occurred in the four years that I have been here. In particular, I recall the Health and Social Care Bill—a major piece of legislation affecting a huge swathe of public services and for which neither of the governing parties had made any kind of provision in their manifestos. It did not seem unreasonable on that occasion for the Opposition to move that the Bill be not read a second time.

Frankly, I do not think that a Bill as trivial as this should attract such an amendment and we will not support it. It gives a trivial Bill far too high a profile for its contents, but also it is not, in my submission, necessary to deal with the Bill in that way. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, divides on it, I will advise opposition Members to abstain. We will endeavour to make some modest improvements to this Bill in Committee. Even if we succeed in those, frankly, it will add little to the state of the law, but in my judgment that is a better process for us to follow. Indeed, in his speech, Sir Edward Garnier called on the House of Commons—mainly, as it turned out—to introduce,

“a degree of common sense into … the … Bill before the other place gives it a thorough grilling”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/7/14; col. 1204.]

Let the grilling commence.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, I agree word for word with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said in moving his amendment, and indeed with what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has just said.

Costs in Criminal Cases (Legal Costs) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Did the noble Lord intend to let the Government off the hook when he said at the beginning of his speech that the cost of these cases was one-half of 1%? Lawyers are not good at maths, but I think I am right in saying that it is not 0.5 of a per cent; it is 0.005 of a per cent. It is a tiny sliver of £2 billion. I just wanted to help the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

[Lord Beecham]

At this hour of the night, I am quite prepared to accept any correction of the arithmetic. The Government, of course, are never prepared to accept a correction of their arithmetic.

Growth and Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Monday 22nd April 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I join others in welcoming the Government’s partial, if deathbed, conversion to doing something about these proposals. I certainly endorse many of the comments that have been made about the problems that remain apparently unresolved. I particularly join the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in strongly urging the Government to look again at the issue of conservation areas, unless it is capable of being clarified that the proposals will not apply to conservation areas.

I draw particular attention to the wording of Amendment 7B, where in the preamble it says to insert:

“Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a development order may include provision for ensuring”,

the safeguards to which the Minister referred. Why is that “may”? Why is it not the case that the development order will include these provisions rather than there being an option? It seems to me that it would be all too easy to evade the consequences of the partial progress that the amendment produces if it remains an option simply not to provide that in the subsequent development order.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, very briefly, in my 26 years as legal eagle on the “Jimmy Young Show” on Radio 2, there was no issue more sensitive and more repeatedly brought up than neighbour disputes relating to the extension of premises. It causes immense angst among our fellow citizens. People have mentioned rights of view and rights of light; there is no right of view, of course, and rights of light are notoriously difficult to judge and adjudicate on. I am entirely in favour of my noble friend the Minister trying to ensure that what comes out in the wash—I am thinking particularly of the subsidiary legislation—leaves minimum room for aggravation and disagreement.

For example, can anything be done about defining,

“the curtilage of a dwelling house”,

and the boundary of this? Those sorts of details may not seem important to us here because, I suspect, most of us live in rather spacious houses with gardens, but in terraced accommodation par excellence these issues are of huge importance. I am delighted to hear that the notice period is going to be 28 days but, to be honest, it needs to be 56 because these things can move very slowly and it takes less sophisticated mortals a long time to find out how to deal with some of these matters.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Amendment of Schedule 1) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 27th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, the speech we have heard from noble Lord, Lord Bach, is very sobering, and although he put it forth in no spirit of partisanship, some of the language was, if I may say so, overcoloured. I do not think that to accuse the Government of spite is reasonable, but I accept that for us apparently to deprive those covered by the Motion, who have suffered at the hands of a First-tier Tribunal where there has been an error of law in the decision, seems, to accept the noble Lord’s word, perverse.

I used to have an office overlooking the Old Bailey, and I never forget the motto over the portal of the Old Bailey. It reads:

“Defend the children of the poor & and punish the wrongdoer”.

If ever there is a category of cases where the children of the poor are likely to be engaged, it is this one: welfare law cases.

I shall listen very carefully to what my noble friend has to say in response to the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. My mind is not finally made up, but I must be frank with my noble friend. This seems an extraordinary error of both judgment and justice. We boast endlessly in this country about our justice system, on the whole with reason. I cannot begin to get my head around denying people who have suffered a reverse in the welfare tribunals legal advice on a point of law. I hope that my noble friend will have a compelling argument to bring forth. In particular, it would be very helpful for the House to know just what the cost is, or would be likely to be, if the provision were withdrawn. I very much hope that if the Minister cannot give a satisfactory riposte, the Government will think again, even at this late stage. Sometimes numerically small issues mark a culture, a society, a Government, and this seems to me to be laden with that significance.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this debate consists of two parts. The first is the regret Motion tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, which deals with a particular decision. I do not want to say any more about that other than that I entirely support the magisterial rebuke that he administers not to the Minister, who of course does not have a free hand in these matters, but to the Government at large for denying a modest concession to about 300 people, the cost of which, to refer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, must be minimal, in what can only be described as a governmental fit of pique.

Having said that, I turn to the second more general issue that is encompassed in the broader merits regulations and the position of welfare law claimaints in general, who are significantly affected by the changes that are now under way. Hitherto, about 30,000 people have benefited from welfare legal aid and advice, usually, although not exclusively, provided by voluntary organisations, notably the citizens advice bureaux. I place on record my gratitude to the bureaux for furnishing the information that I am about to relate, in part at least, to the House. The situation now is that instead of 30,000 people getting that advice, 3,200 will receive advice and support in respect of Upper Tribunal matters only. There will be no assistance in their case at the first tribunal. There are two aspects to this, a supply side and a demand side, and I shall begin, rather perversely, with the second, which is the demand side.

We are dealing nationally with a group of significantly disadvantaged people. I am informed by the bureaux that some 68% of current welfare legal aid users have a disability. In addition, there will be many with literacy and other problems and vulnerabilities; indeed, they are a significantly high proportion of those who seek advice. They seek advice about their entitlement, but also about the processes that are, to put it mildly, complex. I can illustrate that with one of a number of cases the bureaux have briefed me and my noble friend on. I shall pick the shortest so as not to delay your Lordships any further than necessary.

In one case, a Welsh bureau advised a 57 year-old woman with multiple disabilities who received employment and support allowance and council tax benefit. She made a claim, did not seek advice when completing it and as a result underestimated her needs, in particular her mental health issues. Here, again, I underline the point about the degree of vulnerability of some of these claimants. She attended a medical assessment and was judged to have scored no points. She appealed that, attended a First-tier Tribunal in 2012 and was awarded nine points, but was not awarded any help with the mental health conditions, despite a letter from a GP saying she had a long-term mental health condition and despite the fact that the letter said she was suicidal some months before that decision. The bureau then advised her on looking for options for appealing the decision to the Upper-tier Tribunal. She would have had no help at all from the bureau in the present circumstances if the bureau’s capacity to give it was limited, as it is likely to be.

In effect, legal aid and advice is now limited to the second stage, the onward appeals tribunal. This is not consistent with the intention Parliament originally expressed in respect of first-tier cases where at least basic advice and support on a number of procedural issues, such as a request for a statement of reasons from a first tribunal, seeking leave to appeal from the first tribunal and other aspects—lodging documents and so on—should be covered. Unless these stages are included within regulations, it is unlikely that anybody seeking to appeal, assuming they know of their rights to appeal, would be able to progress from the first tier to the second tier unassisted. That is the second stage.

I now turn to the supply side. There is a growing crisis in the sector. There is no doubt about that. Citizens advice bureaux and other organisations are suffering significant reductions in funding from national and local government, the latter of course having been awarded a further 2% cut in government grant in the recent Budget, so things are not going to get any better for some time in that context. The problem now is that bureaux are disposing of staff. My bureau in Newcastle has had to rid itself of the equivalent of three and a half full-time legal advisers, the bureau in Gateshead is closing, and this pattern is being repeated all over the country. It has to be said that some bureaux continue to provide pretty much a full service, but increasingly the pressure is resulting in a substantial decline in the capacity of the organisations to meet the demand, which is likely to rise, not least with the Welfare Reform Act changes that are about to strike hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people.

The process now is that the contracts to provide this service for the only part that is to be covered by legal aid, the Upper Tribunal, are being let in a very curious system. I did not know about this until a couple of days ago. Apparently there are to be only four areas in which these contracts will be granted for the whole country. I am not sure whether Scotland is included, but certainly England and Wales are divided into four areas under which a contract will be let. A tendering process will commence and it is intended to be completed in October.

What is to happen in the mean time, between April and October, given the pressure on the budgets of the CAB and other advice agencies, remains to be seen, but there must be a significant worry that there will be difficulties in dealing even with appeals to the Upper Tribunal pending the allocation of contracts. Certainly there is a good deal of concern in the sector about that, because in the mean time several hundred welfare law contracts, which are not currently distributed on the basis of just four contracts for the whole country, will come to an end. So there is a really significant problem immediately on the supply side.

The four areas—it is clear that Scotland is not included—are the north, the Midlands and the east, the south-west and Wales, and London and the south-east. These are huge geographic areas. The CAB says that the contracts will require that:

“The applicant must be able to provide face to face services from locations and access points across the whole area, as well as delivering remote advice”—

that says it all, really—

“and interacting with the civil legal aid (CLA) helpline; no subcontracting is submitted and the applicant must be a single individual”.

A very strange market is going to develop in which only four organisations will be involved. One imagines that organisations such as Group 4 and Atos, which have covered themselves in glory in recent years, will be rushing forward to supply this important and sensitive service.

The contracts themselves are very limited. For London and the northern procurement areas, only 1,035 cases are assumed to be included in the contract. The other two areas have 600 and 90 each. That is minimal in the face of the likely demand. It certainly does not take us beyond the current 3,200 people who get legal aid and advice for the Upper Tribunal. There is no flexibility in that. If you have only that small number of cases you will have only two or three specialist advisers covering areas as vast as those that I have described. Remoteness is indeed going to be evident. How on earth can two or three people sensibly look to face-to-face contact with appellants over an area as wide as that? Yet that is what the contracts are heading towards.

Will the Government look again at support for the advice sector, and the contract in particular, first, to ensure that services are maintained on the present basis between 1 April and the date on which the new contract comes in? That will be difficult because people will be looking for alternative employment. If the contracts are going to involve only 12 people nationally, people who are currently engaged locally on this kind of work are going to be looking for other work. I hope that the Government will provide some temporary support at least for the continuation of that service. Secondly, will they look again at this ridiculous pattern of four huge areas served by a handful of people? I cannot believe that the Government seriously think that this is the way to support people of the kind that the CAB describes, which I related to the House, who desperately need personal contact if they are to have their cases heard.

Of course, we are not voting on the regulations as such. I believe that the Minister will be sympathetic to the issues I have raised. I hope he will take this back to the department and that we can have some changes: first, some reconsideration, preferably with proper discussion with the sector about how it might work; and, secondly, a review of whether the contracts should go ahead on the present basis. I certainly hope that the Government will have second thoughts about this matter.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I understand my noble friend Lord Taylor’s point, but I also understand fully the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. We bring our Chamber into disrepute if we try to deal with 80 pages of amendments in the course of this afternoon and evening, including, as has been said, 20 pages of not just brand new but highly complex legislation on which we ought to consult outside this Chamber. The issues concerned could not be of greater importance.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I endorse what has been said by noble Lords, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. We have here a situation that is uncomfortably analogous to that which applies to the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Bill, whereby these Commons amendments are, in effect, being treated as if they were emergency legislation. Admittedly, they do not have retrospective effect, which I suppose is welcome, but the timetabling aspect is extremely unsatisfactory. This House does not have an opportunity to consider the amendments fully. There are a great many matters that your Lordships will wish to discuss, not least around Leveson, which itself has come late in the day—although one understands the reasons for that. There is no particular reason why the measures to which the noble and learned Lord referred must be dealt with today. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that it is asking too much of your Lordships’ House to deal with this matter sensibly, fully and thoroughly—as it needs to be—at such short notice, particularly when considering everything else that we have to discuss today.

Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 26th February 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I have only one simple point to make. It is a question to the Minister regarding the Conditional Fee Agreements Order, particularly the 25% cap, which does not apply to any future losses. In proposing this legislation, the Minister rested his case heavily on proposals made by Lord Justice Jackson in his review. Is the Minister aware of a lecture Lord Justice Jackson gave on 29 February last year? In this lecture, he made a point, which appears in the footnote, stating:

“The Personal Injuries Bar Association (PIBA) and the Bar Council have recently sent to me forceful submissions that the 25% cap should apply to ALL damages, as it did before April 2000. I can see the sense of allowing that dispensation in appropriate cases provided that the success fee is only payable by the client as it was pre-April 2000”.

That seems reasonable and it seems doubly reasonable given that the author of these proposals, Lord Justice Jackson, himself had second thoughts which he expressed in public last year. I am wondering, therefore, why the limitation to past losses survives into this statutory instrument and whether the Minister could take this away and follow the latest thinking of Lord Justice Jackson, which is supported by the Bar Council and, I suspect, the Law Society.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I always like to be consistent and it certainly would be inconsistent of me not to begin with a complaint about the process here. These regulations come to us some five weeks before they are to take effect. The Bar Council has drawn attention to this, rightly stressing that a major change in the law, particularly in relation to DBAs, is being introduced with very little time before they come into effect for people to work out how they are going to be applied.

As the Minister has said, it has always been permissible for damages-based agreements to be implemented in non-contentious matters in tribunals. As he has also said, these were extended by regulations to employment cases. That opened the way to the revival of what used to be called “champerty” in previous times, which of course was unlawful. We are now legalising it under the new nomenclature of damages-based agreements and I can see that there is a case for doing that. Nevertheless, significant issues and questions arise from the Government’s proposal.

Reverting to the timescale, it should be pointed out that other changes affecting contentious litigation are in hand. These include changes to the Road Traffic Act portal and small claims limits in cases, including, potentially, personal injury cases. With all that happening, one might have thought that it would be sensible to bring all the changes together and to do it at a time which allows the parties and the professions to prepare adequately. I hope that the Minister will look again at the timetabling with a view to deferring implementation of whatever regulations finally emerge for six months until October of this year. I am particularly indebted to those who have briefed me, and no doubt other Members of your Lordships’ House and perhaps of this Committee, in relation to these matters, including the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, the Bar Council, the Law Society and, especially, Professor Rachael Mulheron.

A number of issues arise and I hope that the Minister will be patient while I list them. If he is not able to reply to them all today—he may well not be—I hope that he will take these matters back and consider them. I was going to raise the question of the cap, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. I, too, identified the change of mind by Lord Justice Jackson, to which the noble Lord referred. It is notable of course that the 25% cap in terms of damages-based agreements applies only to personal injury cases. It is a 35% cap in employment cases, which can equally be quite substantial, although not, I guess, running into the millions of pounds of the exceptional cases of clinical evidence and the like to which the Minister referred. Nevertheless, it certainly can be comparable with many ordinary personal injury cases. In those cases, the cap is 35% including future loss, so there is a serious question about the composition of the figure against which the percentage is to be calculated.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, sits down, does he agree that in his own extremely eloquent exposition on these two statutory instruments, and indeed in my own offering, there was a notable absence of reference to the basis upon which I suspect he, and certainly I, put forward our points—that is, access to justice? The majority sitting in this Grand Committee are lawyers, and we take it so much for granted that what we are seeking to amend in these regulations is exclusively for the benefit of improving access to justice. I invite him to concur with me that anyone reading Hansard who saw no reference to that in the course of our two offerings should know that this underpins everything that we have said.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for making explicit what was certainly implicit in what he and I were saying. Access to justice is certainly the core argument here. I should perhaps also have declared an interest in that from time to time as we have discussed these matters I have put in time as a now unpaid consultant with the firm of solicitors in which I was formerly a partner.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, Amendment 56A in this group is tabled in my name. I am afraid that it is a manuscript amendment and I hope that noble Lords have got it, but for those who were not given a copy when they came in, it is an addition to Clause 10 which is about the general provisions under Section 6 proceedings. It requires that the:

“Rules of court under subsection (2) shall only diverge from rules of court pertaining to proceedings outside the scope of this Act to the extent necessary to prevent disclosures of information damaging to the interests of national security”.

The whole point of the amendment is to put some constraint on the otherwise unacceptable breadth of the provisions in Clause 10(2) which allow rules of court to be made. Perhaps I may briefly give noble Lords a gist of the breadth of this provision-making power. The first set out in paragraph (a) is,

“about the mode of proof and about evidence in the proceedings”.

There are no qualifications, there is no limitation, guidance or definition, so they can just make rules about the mode of proof and evidence in the proceedings; paragraph (b) concerns whether the proceedings shall have a hearing attached to them at all; paragraph (c) concerns whether there shall be legal representations in the proceedings; and paragraph (d) concerns whether the person against whom the proceedings are launched shall have full particulars of the reasons for the decision reached in those proceedings, and so on.

I do not understand why the Government have produced a rule-making power relating to a highly sensitive and important clause with no constraint, limitation or definition. All my amendment seeks to do is to put a lasso around what I believe are unduly wide powers. It would provide that, in effect, the only use of these powers shall be,

“to prevent disclosures of information damaging to the interests of national security”,

which is what this part of the Bill is principally all about. I have put the amendment forward in the hope that the Government will accept it or, if the wording is not to their liking, that they will undertake to bring new wording back at Third Reading.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, for the avoidance of doubt, I should say that the Opposition support Amendment 56. My noble friend Lady Kennedy beat me to the Public Bill Office in putting her name to it. As she and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, have said, it is important that the press and the media generally should have notification of applications of this kind. It complements a later amendment that will require the regular reporting of the number of applications that have been made, so to some degree the two things flow together.

The manuscript amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has arrived very late in the day and, given the other excitements we have been enjoying, I confess that I personally have not given it sufficient attention. I will be interested to hear the views of the Minister if she is replying to that particular amendment in due course. I would also be interested to learn the views of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on it, if he is able to give them. On the face of it, the amendment seems fairly persuasive, but it has been brought forward so late that I am finding it difficult to come to a decision, although other noble Lords may find it easier to do so. But certainly so far as Amendment 56 is concerned, and indeed the original amendment in this group, the Opposition are fully supportive.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their remarks. I will speak generally and respond to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has not said anything about his amendments in this group but what I will say applies to those as well.

The Bill does not seek to change the rules in relation to civil proceedings, save where this is necessary to have a closed material procedure; we are not otherwise changing the ordinary rules in civil procedures relating to disclosure of evidence. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, in speaking to his manuscript amendment, talked about adding a lasso. We believe that the Bill already provides a lasso. We agree with the thrust of the points he makes but do not think it is necessary to accept his amendment, because the Bill provides for the essence of this point in Clause 9, where it says that, subject to securing closed material procedures, the ordinary rules of disclosure must otherwise apply. The way that his amendment is worded may also be a potential source of confusion in that it is unclear what is meant by the word “necessary” in the amendment in a particular case. More specifically, we are already providing for the concerns that he has raised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, in relation to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, would it be a way forward for her to take that back so that it might be raised, if necessary, at Third Reading? It is very late and the Minister is in difficulty—I think that we are all in difficulty—in terms of understanding the implications of the amendment, so this may be a way through the dilemma.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful for that suggestion. I do not want to keep apologising, but I do think, if the Minister agrees, that that is the way to deal with this.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

I am talking about public perception, which might well be less grounded in those more fundamental objectives than we might give it credit for when debating it in this environment, dominated as it is—looking around the Chamber—by lawyers. We have to carry the public with us. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, is aghast: unfortunately for the legal profession, perhaps, the lawyer gene apparently did not pass from his grandfather. We have to take public perception on board and it is in that sense that I use the term.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, forgive me for speaking after the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, but I hope to add a few words to what he said because I was slow on the uptake and did not realise that the last amendment on this schedule is in this group. I endorse 100% the argumentation of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for the five-year review. I think I am alone in this House in being fiercely opposed to the whole schedule on principle. I understand the extremely persuasive arguments advanced by all who have spoken tonight—shortly to be enlarged upon by my noble friend Lord McNally—but I am profoundly concerned that we are stepping into a realm that we have no past experience of and which could work out to be far from the hopes of the Government in advancing this proposed plea-bargaining regime.

There are a number of unknowns here that could, in the event, show that, overall, Schedule 17 works against the public interest. There should be a pause after five years so that that can be looked at very clinically, impartially and clearly so that we can take stock of what is a revolutionary change in our criminal law. Let us make no bones about it: this is one of the greatest revolutions in our criminal law system in 100 years. It is not a change that has been signalled well to the public. There has been extraordinarily little comment in any of the broadsheets, magazines or television programmes. In fact, I have not seen reference to this innovation anywhere. For those reasons and many others, I hope that my noble friend the Minister will accede to the amendment. After all, if the Government are right in their arguments for Schedule 17, they have nothing to fear in a five-year review.

Trusts (Capital and Income) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 25th April 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating the Minister on the clarity of his exposition of this intrinsically complex area, and in congratulating the Law Commission on producing the report. As the Minister reminded us, the process began eight years ago, so it has not quite reached the proportions of Jarndyce v Jarndyce. The commission has certainly done a thorough job.

My acquaintance with the rules of apportionment began with my law degree and effectively ended with the solicitor’s final examinations to which the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred, save that I learnt to take the precaution of ensuring that the rules were excluded from any will I subsequently drafted. Of course, that will now no longer be necessary. It will be a case of opting in rather than opting out, for which the commission and the Government should certainly take credit.

This afternoon I find myself visited by a slight sense of déjà vu. Many years ago I found myself acting in a divorce case and waiting for my case to be called on behalf of my petitioning client. I sat next to the counsel in the preceding case, a delightful if somewhat eccentric individual. For the avoidance of doubt, it was not the Minister on that occasion. At one point counsel turned to me and said, “Mr Beecham, where is the petition?”. I had to reply, “I am not instructing you”, to which he replied, “I know, I know, but where is the petition?”. Around three weeks ago, my noble friend Lord Bach said to me, “You are to be in charge of this Bill”. It was a visitation that was quite unlooked for. Nevertheless, I am here today to represent the Opposition on this matter and to welcome the simplification that the Bill embodies, in relation to both the rules of apportionment and, in particular, the position in respect of charities and the question of total return. I declare an interest as a trustee of the Trusthouse Charitable Foundation, which already operates a total return policy.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to the Law Society briefing, for which I am very grateful. The Law Society is a body to which President Kennedy’s memorable injunction is often thought by solicitors to apply: “Ask not what the Law Society can do for you, but what you can do for the Law Society”. On this occasion, the Law Society has done us all a service in a briefing that contains the recommendations that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, referred to in respect of Clause 3, where it suggests a new subsection and some clarification. I hope that can be shared with the Minister following this Second Reading, if he has not yet seen those proposals. They seem to make sense in exactly the way that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips described.

Other of your Lordships have made points particularly in relation to the position of charities and, in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in respect of cathedrals. Those matters seem to be worth pursuing. I had the same question in my mind as the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, about whether it is necessary to include a reference to existing trusts in the Bill. That is a matter that I am not qualified to make a judgment about, but it might usefully be considered, because if it is not currently possible for existing trusts to modify the rules then it would seem that they ought to be given that opportunity. They would not have to take it but it might be relevant. That is perhaps, again, a matter that we could return to in Committee.

In principle, and so far as the thrust of this short Bill is concerned, we are completely at one with the Government and look forward to concluding this matter rapidly for the benefit of trustees, beneficiaries and charities.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I should have declared an interest earlier, which I need to do now. I am the founder of, and am still a consultant to, a firm of charity lawyers, Bates Wells & Braithwaite. I should have said that and apologise for not so doing. I will not enumerate the charities of which I am a trustee.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Monday 23rd April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I went to the other place to hear our amendments debated. As I am not a former Member of the other place, perhaps my noble friend will take it from me that its consideration of some of our amendments was cursory—and that is putting it quite generously. I admit to being very disappointed that, on such an important Bill as this, the other place allowed so little time for consideration of these amendments that one cannot say that they scrutinised the amendments with the seriousness with which we try to scrutinise.

Having said all that, I am still mystified by this amendment. I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks, and consequently with my noble friend—well, he is a friend but he is not a friend—Lord Pannick. It seems clear—indeed it was part of the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that there is no prospect of judicial review, and he has designed this amendment to cut out that prospect. However, to the extent to which he has been successful—and I think he has been—it makes the clause ineffectual. It has absolutely no practical effect. I am afraid that it is admirable in sentiment but ineffectual in purpose and therefore should not be in the Bill.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hart inadvertently stole my opening line about the time we have spent debating this amendment. I could also point out that we will take little less time to vote on this amendment than the other place took to discuss, and allegedly debate, all four of the amendments about which we have heard.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has entertained the House by conjuring up a vision of an army of devious lawyers mining the rich seams of the potential availability of legal aid for the purpose of pursuing claims for judicial review. Others of your Lordships have rather demolished the thrust of that argument, which in any case might be thought to be somewhat fanciful, especially in the light of the quite appropriate reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to the fact that the amendment incorporates specific reference to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, there really is no substance in his objection to the amendment as it has been moved.

In relying once again on financial privilege—when it could have been waived and substantive arguments put in the form of a Motion asking this House to reconsider the amendment—the Government seem to be succumbing once again to the temptation of relying on this way out of a difficulty. They are becoming addicted to the use of financial privilege as a reason to reject amendments from your Lordships’ House, and that cannot be a satisfactory basis for dealing with significant matters of this kind. Therein lies the strength of an argument about financial privilege when, in dealing after a fashion with the amendment in the House of Commons, the Minister, Mr Djanogly, made one of his principle objections: that the Government,

“are concerned that the amendment replicates what is already in place”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/4/12; col. 201.]

If it replicates what is already in place, how can it conceivably add to the Government’s expenditure? It is a ludicrous proposition in an attempt to have it both ways.

For that matter, those who argue that judicial review is something to be avoided seem to have forgotten that when we were discussing the position of the director of legal aid casework—the DOLAC amendment; we will come later to a welcome acceptance of an amendment in that respect—it was argued that judicial review would be available to those who sought to make a case for legal aid in exceptional circumstances. At that point, it was to come to the rescue of people who were being denied legal aid and was something to be embraced. Today, however, for the purposes of this amendment it is an issue that could be deployed against the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

There is no question that the purpose of this amendment is clear. It is declaratory, but it is important to be declaratory about important principles, and for that reason the Opposition wholly support the amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 1st February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

I do not think it is necessary to confine the payment to precisely the basis that the noble Lord identifies.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

In the new, highly commercial context within which soliciting is carried on today, and in an era when we have these alternative business structures where we can be owned by virtually anybody, does the noble Lord not think that there is a real risk that some of these new ABSs will, as a matter of business, solicit work if they can then pass it on subject to a substantial referral fee? I can see that in the offing.

[Lord Beecham]

I can see a case for regulating the fees. I am not an enthusiast for alternative business structures as the noble Lord has defined them. But in any event, we are not discussing soliciting as such—despite the noble Lord’s use of the phrase. We are talking ultimately about a system that has been used successfully from the point of view of trade unions, charities and their members, as well as the professions, for some time. The Bill is seeking to intervene because of a different set of circumstances and set of relationships, with different causes and consequences. If there is no movement on this we will have clearly have to return to the matter on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 10th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

I am glad to have given the Minister the opportunity to buy one group of amendments and get another free. I am sorry that he has not accepted the offer. He twice used the pregnant phrase that this does not “preclude” consultation. If I may say so, that is a very negative way of looking at the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor and a rather worrying phrase. It is not a question of not precluding; the Bill should lay down what is expected of the Lord Chancellor and what he should do.

The Minister has repeatedly objected to the substitution of “must” for “may” in my amendments. The word “must” is in Clause 1, which states:

“The Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this Part”.

In some ways, this is a mirror image of another debate that I am involved in, with other Members of your Lordships' House, on the health Bill. Many of us, including some on the government Benches, have been trying to secure that the Secretary of State for Health has the duty to provide health services. That aspiration is one which, in respect of legal services and legal aid as defined in the Bill, is embodied in the government's wording.

Given that, it is not enough for the Minister to say that the LSC has those powers now. After all, the LSC effectively disappears. The Lord Chancellor becomes the authoritative body for the provision of legal services. It seems to me sensible and in fact desirable to protect the Lord Chancellor from succumbing to the temptation not to consult properly or to do things in perhaps a rather rushed or narrow way either of his own volition or at the behest of the Treasury or other organs of government, looking, for example, to make savings very quickly and perhaps very radically. I dare say that that may not be the intention of the present Lord Chancellor but it would be better to protect him from the possibility of judicial review, to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred, in the first place by providing a clear responsibility.

I was rather worried by the Minister’s reference to market forces. This is, I suppose, a reference to the sort of Tesco law that we are beginning to see happening. It rather worries me that, particularly in relation to Amendment 104, which deals with the criminal justice aspect, market forces might be deemed to be fit and proper effectively to run the legal aid service, whereas in the particularly important area of public policy and justice there is no requirement to consult such responsible bodies and persons as the Lord Chief Justice, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the three legal professions. I do not think it is good enough just to say that any Lord Chancellor would do this. One would hope that that would be the case but I am not sanguine enough to accept that it is proper in dealing with these matters to leave it to the potential good will of a future Lord Chancellor.

I would hope that the Minister would recognise that there ought to be a duty here. It is something that, in the absence of any movement before Report, we will have to come back to, as we might with regard to some of the other aspects to which he referred—in particular, the issue of charging for accreditation. I can see some case for making charges but I can also see a strong case in the realm of the voluntary sector for a different scheme. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Does the noble Lord not take some solace from the view expressed by my noble friend Lord Carlile and the noble Baroness on the Cross Benches that a Minister who ignored the obvious consultees would be susceptible to an effective judicial review? Is that not the best assurance that the noble Lord needs in order to rely on the present wording?