Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Main Page: Lord Phillips of Sudbury (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Phillips of Sudbury's debates with the HM Treasury
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 2 and 201. Before addressing the amendments, I crave the indulgence of the Committee in making a few general comments on the Bill and our procedures.
This is a very important Bill. Yet, as we know, it is a dog’s breakfast of amendments to earlier legislation and is, accordingly, extraordinarily and disproportionately difficult for the House to assess properly. The Treasury Committee of the other place has objected to the current construction and argues that there should be a new Bill to replace earlier legislation. Only then can that committee and, indeed, the regulated community gain a proper overview of the full import of the measures before us.
Most importantly, the Bill as currently drafted severely limits effective scrutiny by this Committee. Not only is there the question of excessive complexity in drafting but many of the most important debates on Bills take place on the Motion that Clause “X” stand part of the Bill. As this Bill is constructed, this is just about impossible, as failure to agree, say, that Clause 3 or Clause 5 stand part would not only wreck the entire Bill but render it completely meaningless by taking about 40 pages out of it. The drafting is a mess.
Secondly, there are fundamental problems with the overall structure of the Bill, identified by the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee, which could better be addressed by proper redrafting rather than by piecemeal amendment.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for interrupting at this early stage. I am sympathetic to the point that he has just made, but is not the problem one of standing orders rather than the drafting of the Bill?
I think the answer is no. The issue is the straightforward drafting of the Bill. The problems, as I said, could be better addressed by proper redrafting rather than by piecemeal amendment. For example, the appropriate structure of the governance of the Bank of England in the 21st century, a matter to which the Treasury Committee paid particular interest, should be dealt with by a full rewrite of the Bank of England Act 1998 rather than by the cumbersome and opaque clauses before us.
Thirdly and most importantly, the Treasury Committee of the other place has raised a number of major objections to the content of the Bill with respect not only to Bank of England governance but to a number of other crucial issues of economic management, especially at times of crisis. Before today, few of these had been taken on board by the Government, although we will consider their proposal of an oversight committee later today.
I was delighted to read in the Financial Times yesterday that amendments derived directly from the Treasury Committee’s report of 24 May have been tabled by my noble friend Lord McFall, a distinguished former chair of the Treasury Committee, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perhaps the most tenacious opposition speaker on Treasury affairs for many a long year—my noble friend Lord Myners has the scars to prove it. Your Lordships’ House has a fundamental responsibility to pass those amendments so that the other place has the opportunity to consider amendments proposed by its own committee. This is a valuable constitutional innovation.
I recognise that a fundamental rewrite of the Bill would take some time, but the Treasury Committee has faced up to this issue, too, arguing that the legislation is proceeding with undue haste. I agree. I recognise that the planning blight that hangs over the FSA is causing problems, but the performance of the shadow committees and authorities has already been such as to give us confidence that delay will not be disproportionately damaging.
All this adds up to the fact that the Bill as drafted is a barrier, not an aid, to effective macroprudential regulation. This is not a party political issue. I say with all due respect that the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, are not natural political allies. This is about getting the legislation right, which is what we on this side will endeavour to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, and I worked well together to improve the Bill that established the Office for Budgetary Responsibility, and I hope that we can work well together to improve this Bill, although I would not start from here. When the Minister first speaks, I think he owes the Committee an explanation as to why the Government have consistently ignored the advice of the Joint Committee and the Treasury Committee on the structure of this legislation.
I turn—to the relief of the Committee, I am sure—to the amendments in this first group. Their fundamental objective is, I hope, clear: to set in train a wide-ranging restructuring of the governance of the Bank of England. The Bill gives the Bank remarkable new powers in macroprudential and microprudential regulation and in the assessment and management of financial crises. The structure of governance and levels of accountability should be appropriate to these new powers.
A key element in the structure of governance of the Bank is the court. As many commentators have noted, the current constitution of the court, its powers and resources are simply not up to the job. The Treasury Committee has paid particular attention to the role of the court, which is currently responsible for managing the Bank of England’s affairs other than monetary policy. The committee’s evidence sessions have exposed doubts, expressed by many witnesses, as to the court’s fitness for purpose as presently structured. A distinguished former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, in evidence to the Treasury Committee, described the court as,
“an historical legacy institution that now serves no useful purpose and creates the appearance or illusion of accountability or oversight where none exist”.
These concerns are especially important because of the role that the Financial Services Bill, as currently drafted, envisages for the court with respect to determining the UK’s financial stability strategy. In the context of monetary policy, where the Bank of England’s objective is to maintain price stability HM Treasury is required to write to the Monetary Policy Committee at least once a year to specify price stability and the Government’s economic policy. The annual Treasury remit letter fleshes out the concept of price stability in practical operational terms while avoiding undue rigidity. It strikes a balance between operational independence and democratic accountability.
A quite different model is proposed for financial stability. It is envisaged that the primary responsibility for determining and keeping under review the strategy for achieving the financial stability objective will reside with the court, although the court will be required to consult the Financial Policy Committee and the Treasury, and the Financial Policy Committee can, at times, make recommendations.
However, here we have a crucial difference in views—given the court’s role in determining the financial stability objective—on whether the court is up to the job. The view that the court should be abolished and replaced by a supervisory board was advanced by the Treasury Committee. In the face of the powerful arguments advanced by the Treasury Committee, the Government replied that they were not,
“at this time, minded to pursue the more radical changes to Bank of England governance recommended by the TSC, including the replacement of Court with a supervisory board. In general, the Government considers that the governance of the Bank should primarily be a matter for the Bank itself”.
This is astonishing. Indeed, it is nonsensical. As the Treasury Committee points out, the Government are the sole shareholder of the Bank, and many of the Bank’s responsibilities, functions and powers are defined by legislation. The Government do not regard the governance of private sector companies as a matter just for those companies. They really cannot wash their hands of this central issue.
Finally, the Bill grants major new powers to the person of the governor. It is important that the governor is backed up by a powerful supervisory committee to which he is accountable and is not an individual exposed on his or her own, so why a supervisory board? What is in a name? The whole point of this proposal is to recognise this necessary break with the past if we are to have a modern, effective structure of governance at the Bank of England. In the convoluted context of amendments to this Bill, we have been able to present only a sketch of what we on this side of the House have in mind, but we shall return to the matter on Report.
By accepting this amendment, the Government would acknowledge that the new Bank, with its new powers, would have a board to whom the executive is responsible and that is capable of performing an effective supervisory function. That should be its job: to supervise, to set strategy, to advise and review, not to run the Bank on a day-to-day basis and certainly not in the context of a crisis. These amendments are a signpost towards the new Bank with a new regulatory structure, and hence towards a truly effective regulatory system. I beg to move.
My Lords, I would like to make one comment on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and then make some comments on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Peston. On the way in which the amendment is drafted, I am not at all clear about how the notion of a supervisory committee fits with the language of new Section 9B of the Bank of England Act 1998 in Clause 3(1), which talks about the Financial Policy Committee being,
“a sub-committee of the court of directors of the Bank”.
I am a very long-in-the-tooth lawyer, and the normal language of sub-committees is to make them clearly subsidiary and subject to not just the oversight but the decision-making of the body of which they are a sub-committee. I put that to the Minister because we have enough confusion in the Bill already and, as has been mentioned, the name “supervisory committee” has many connotations from other jurisdictions that frustrate his desire to make this clearer.
Given that the issue of clarity and comprehensibility has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Peston, and others, this is probably the only chance I have to add to that and ask my noble friend if he will take profoundly seriously the way in which the Bill is being put to us. I venture to suggest that not one Peer in 50, however learned or experienced they are, will be able to get their head around these 168 pages. It is not just those pages, of course, since they cross-refer to hundreds and hundreds of other pieces of statutory legislation and instruments.
I hope that my noble friend will take back the undertaking that I thought I got two years ago to the effect that where we had a Bill of this nature with, as I say, constant cross-references, those of us who wanted to get our heads around it would be given the legislation that was amended by the Bill, with the amendments shown on the face of that legislation so that we could relatively quickly—I use the word “relatively” advisedly—get our head around it. I have to tell noble Lords that if they go to the Library and pull down the 1998 statute, they will find that subsequent amendments have not been incorporated into it and they will have to go off elsewhere to find them. The whole thing is totally counterproductive to the work of this House. Most of us have neither secretaries nor research assistants of any sort. It really is scandalous—I use that word—that as legislators we are not assisted as far as possible to do our job effectively.
If the Minister is having sleepless nights, I urge him to look at subsections (1), (4) and (5) in new Section 9B, where the language is so—I nearly used an Anglo-Saxon expression, which would have been much more colourful—hyper-complicated. New Section 9B(1) says that this particular sub-committee is to be called,
“the ‘Financial Policy Committee’”.
However, new Section 9B(4) says,
“The court of directors must keep the procedures followed by the Committee under review”.
Given that the Bill has just said that the way to describe the new sub-committee is as the “Financial Policy Committee”, which committee is meant in subsection (4)? Then new Section 9B(5) says that:
“The court’s function under subsection (4) is to stand delegated to the sub-committee”,
which is not supposed to be referred to as that at all, so perhaps that is another sub-committee that we have not heard of and which is defined 63 pages later. And so it goes on. I do not know about anyone else, but I think that I have spent eight hours so far in trying to understand Clauses 5 and 6. I may be becoming an old f—no, I may be losing my sharpness, but I urge the Minister, not only with this Bill but with so many other Bills that we are called upon to deal with, to make the task for us legislators as readily accessible and easy as possibly can be.
My Lords, I am delighted that cleverer people than me have found this Bill incomprehensible, because I have real fears that we will get very lost in the detail of this Bill, and we will certainly get lost in the alphabet soup of acronyms contained within the Bill. However, I will return to the substantive issue.
The Bank of England is to be the pre-eminent financial services regulator. A regulator has to be transparent, consistent, and readily understood internationally. I would be delighted if, when the Minister replies, he will explain to us why it is necessary to vest such untrammelled power in the Governor of the Bank of England. The governor becomes much more powerful than the Prime Minister, who is, after all, only primus inter pares. The governor becomes completely unchallengeable. That is why the idea of a supervisory board in the amendment proposed by my noble friend is sensible.
I will not get tied up on titles. The court concept is anachronistic, and it is not readily understood by our main competitors. I am much more interested in the substance of supervision. One of the key elements of the work of the Bank of England as financial regulator will be to insist upon the best kind of corporate governance that we can get in our financial institutions. It should, therefore, be an example in itself in how it is governed. I have no confidence that that level of modern, transparent, corporate governance is in the model that is outlined in this Bill, as I understand it.
If people are tied up with the history of the Bank, which is long and distinguished, we can still have chaps running around in pink coats, and we can still have a wonderful collection of silver. However, at the end of the day, if we, as a nation, are to remain a leader in the financial services industry, we have to have a system of governance of our financial regulator that stands up to very tight scrutiny. I therefore urge the Minister, when he replies to this amendment, to give us some explanation as to why the Government have not come up with a model of corporate governance that gives that kind of confidence.
We will come to other elements when we talk about the role of the governor. I am extremely concerned about a repetition of what happened in the run-up to the run on Northern Rock. Some ill advised, perhaps unintentional, comments by the governor contributed to the run on that bank. We cannot allow ourselves to get into a situation where something like that could happen again.
It is something that used to exist and the concept is still out there in the ether, but it has fallen out of common use over the past 20 years. For this Bill, there is no Keeling schedule but there is the 658-page, fully amended version of FSMA, which is accessible on the Treasury website. It serves the purpose of a Keeling schedule and does more than that.
I am reluctant to intervene on the Minister again, but it is important that even if he does not provide a print-off of this labour of love, hard copies of this mammoth work should at least be available in the Library. Some of us find that the time that it takes to run off 658 pages on our clapped-out machines is itself unnecessary.
Finally, the Minister may find that a Keeling schedule is exactly what has been done by the Treasury in this regard. That is my understanding of a Keeling schedule.
My Lords, it may be the largest Keeling schedule ever known to this House. I will certainly make sure that the Library is aware of where to find the amended version of FiSMA, and I am sure that it will print copies off on request in the normal way.
I turn now to the substance of this clause. The amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, seek to convert the court of directors into a supervisory board. We will discuss in detail later—as has already been identified by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and others—government Amendment 13 and related amendments which, I suggest, address all the points of substance behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, by creating a statutory oversight committee. I will have a lot more to say about that when we get to Amendment 13.
The only substantive difference, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has said, between the Government’s amendments and those in his name appears to be in the name of the Bank’s governing body. The noble Lord’s amendments do not seek to change the structure or membership of the court; it is simply, as he identified, that he does not like the term “court”. I agree with other members of the Committee that simply changing the name is not what we should be focusing on. The name of the Bank’s governing body is largely irrelevant. It is important that it is a body that is fully equipped and prepared to fulfil its role in the new structure effectively and that the non-executives on the court have a clear and explicit remit to oversee the Bank’s performance, both in policy terms and operationally. We will come on to why the Government believe the amendments to the Bill that we have put down are needed.
In answer to the questions about why we put the amendments down when we did, I listened very carefully to all the points on governance and other issues that were made at Second Reading and have come forward, at the earliest practicable date, with amendments ahead of discussion in Committee rather than after it, both in relation to oversight and growth. I make no apology, but your Lordships will appreciate that there was not much time between Second Reading and today to get some important amendments sorted out in detail. I hope that explains what we have done.
My Lords, I support Amendment 7. Looking at this amendment the casual observer might wonder why it is necessary. It makes perfect sense that you would not leave governance of the Bank of England—and therefore governance of the economy and our financial institutions—to a bunch of interested amateurs. Frankly, however, we have occasionally seen that happen with some of our financial institutions—we need only look at the trails of chaos over the years from banks such as Barings and onwards to the catastrophe of Lehman Brothers. If noble Lords wish to read a horror story they should read Michael Lewis’s The Big Short. I confess that I did not understand some of the complex derivatives being talked about until I read The Big Short, and I have spent most of my life in and around the world of economics.
It is critically important that there is a balance of knowledge, experience and expertise on the supervisory board, or whatever we choose to call it. It will need people with a wide range of competence, with experience ranging from macroeconomics to prudential regulation. It is a wide mix to put together.
The other side of the coin—a matter to which my noble friend referred—is diversity of opinion. In this case, as he pointed out, we are not talking about gender or ethnic diversity, although that would be very good to have. We heard an exchange within the past hour between two distinguished economists—my noble friends Lord Peston and Lord Eatwell—and there will undoubtedly be differences of view among any number of economists. I would love to throw behaviouralists into the mix of any supervisory board of the Bank of England. Quite apart from behavioural economics, it is how people react that can bring economic chaos.
The amendment may seem unnecessary because it is a no-brainer that you would seek to do this anyway. We have learnt along the way, however, that it is better to get such things written down. Then you will have a wee bit more of a chance of achieving them. I therefore support Amendment 7.
My Lords, I am afraid to say that I agree with the final remarks of the noble Baroness—it is a no-brainer.
I speak as a weary lawyer who is tired unto death of our legislation getting more and more prescriptive and complex as well as longer. If we cannot trust the Chancellor of the Exchequer to exercise sensible judgment in a matter of this kind then, frankly, he or she should not be Chancellor of the Exchequer. If, as it says in the amendment, the member has to add to diversity, what about integrity and independence? You could go on and on adding to and subtracting from the characteristics. I know that that is reflected in other parts of the 1998 Act but the amendment, for all its good intentions, is unnecessary and potentially disruptive.
If you want to play legalistics with this, you might ask what will happen if you have a full diversity of opinion on your board or court. Do you still have to add further diversity when you have got a full hand of diversity? As the provision is drafted here, you would. It is unpoliceable. For all those reasons, and despite its excellent intentions, I am against the amendment.
My Lords, I direct this question to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. Does he regard Amendments 122 and 123—which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and refer to persons representing the constituent parts of the United Kingdom —as helpful or unhelpful to his cause? Are they helpful because they may add to diversity, or unhelpful because you would be choosing people on the basis of their geographical representation rather than their professional expertise?
My Lords, it may be helpful if I speak early in this group because there are substantial government amendments here. The Treasury Committee’s report last November concluded that the increased responsibilities given by this Bill to the Bank of England warranted another look at the Bank’s governance arrangements. The Bank’s Court of Directors has been statutorily responsible for managing the Bank’s affairs since nationalisation in 1946, albeit with some modernising changes brought in by the Bank of England Act 1998 and the Banking Act 2009. I expect the court, as it has done over the decades, to adapt and evolve to the Bank’s changing role, which was brought in by this Bill to enable it to continue to operate as an effective governing body.
However, we should not—and I am already clear from our Second Reading debate that we do not as a House—underestimate the court’s task. It must effectively oversee the transition to the new arrangements, ensure that the Bank is adequately resourced to meet its new responsibilities, and at the same time provide a vital link of accountability to Parliament.
Recognising this challenge, in January the court published its response to the Treasury Committee’s recommendations, proposing the creation of a new oversight committee made up of the court’s non-executive directors. The court accepted the Treasury Committee’s recommendation for retrospective reviews of policy, proposing that the oversight committee commission these reviews from expert external bodies. The court also accepted that an ex-post review or reviews be published, subject to the need to maintain appropriate confidentiality. In line with the Treasury Committee’s proposals, the court proposed to give the oversight committee the papers from the meetings of the MPC and FPC.
Some hours ago, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, somewhat mischaracterised the Government’s approach to governance. The Government’s position has been that governance is in the first instance for the Bank itself, but we have not sought to distance ourselves. We listened to the Treasury Committee’s and then to the Bank’s response and have come forward, in the light of those responses and the Second Reading debate, with these amendments.
Subsequent to both the Treasury Committee’s and the court’s response, the Chancellor agreed with the governor and the chairman of court that the oversight committee’s remit would be extended to encompass the commissioning of internal reviews of the Bank’s policy performance. Finally, as part of our response to the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee that scrutinised the Bill in draft, the Government committed to considering further whether the proposed reforms ought to placed on a statutory basis.
My honourable friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury restated this position in another place. As I said during Second Reading, the Government have now determined that that should be done, and we are tabling these amendments.
Amendment 13 writes the new oversight committee into the Bill, simplifying the governance structure of the Bank by subsuming the role and responsibilities of the existing committee of non-executive directors—the so-called NedCo—into the new oversight committee.
Subsection (2)(a) of new Section 3A provides that the oversight committee will be responsible for keeping under review the Bank’s performance in relation to its objectives and strategy. This includes both monetary policy and financial stability, including the responsibilities of the MPC and the FPC.
Subsections (2)(b) and (c) give the oversight committee responsibility for overseeing the Bank’s financial management and internal financial controls, and subsection (4) lists a number of additional responsibilities in relation to the procedures of the MPC and the FPC and the terms and conditions and remuneration of key posts within the Bank. I hope that when we hear from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, he will accept that that provision fulfils the purpose behind his Amendment 29, which would make the non-executive committee of court responsible for overseeing the activities as well as the procedures of the FPC.
The oversight committee will be made up of all the non-executive directors of court, but in some cases it may be inappropriate for particular directors to have an active role in certain of the oversight committee’s functions. For example, a director of court who is also an external member of the FPC—as is the case with Michael Cohrs at present—should not have a role in directly overseeing the FPC’s performance. Subsection (4) of new Section 3B therefore allows the oversight committee to delegate any of its functions to two or more of its members.
New Sections 3C and 3D give the oversight committee an express power to commission and publish external and internal performance reviews. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, whose Amendment 11 is also intended to implement the Treasury Committee’s recommendation for retrospective reviews of the Bank. In fact, in a number of respects, government Amendment 13 in the names of the noble Lord and my noble friend Lady Noakes goes further than that. Amendment 11 relates only to reviews carried out by the court itself; whereas Amendment 13 provides for reviews to be commissioned from an external person, such as an academic or independent expert, or from an officer or employee of the Bank itself.
I also note that Amendment 11 is limited to reviews of past conduct; whereas government Amendment 13 allows reviews of current practice to be carried out that may be appropriate to the functions of the oversight committee in the financial management and internal financial controls of the Bank.
Consistent with the Treasury Committee’s recommendations, subsection (5) requires the oversight committee to ensure that sufficient time has elapsed before commissioning any review, to allow it to be effective and to avoid impeding the ability of the Bank to continue to operate effectively while the review takes place.
In line with the Treasury Committee’s recommendation and the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, new Section 3D would require the oversight committee to publish its reviews, unless publication would be against the public interest. Published reviews will also be laid before Parliament. Where publication of all or part of a review is delayed, the oversight committee must keep that decision under review and publish that material as soon as the sensitivity has reduced.
New Section 3E requires the oversight committee to monitor the Bank’s response to the report and ensure that it fully implements recommendations that it accepts. That gives the oversight committee an explicit role in ensuring that reviews translate into real action, and that the Bank fully takes on board the lessons learnt.
The Treasury Committee recommended that non-executives have access to all papers considered by the MPC and the FPC. New Section 3F implements that recommendation and goes even further by allowing members of the oversight committee to attend all MPC and FPC meetings in order to observe their discussions.
The remainder of the new clause and government Amendments 28, 30, 33, 91 to 96, 98, 99 to 101 and 145 to 147 make consequential amendments to implement the new oversight committee, and I do not intend to take up the Committee’s time by making any further reference to them.
In conclusion, the Government fully recognise the importance of strong lines of accountability for the Bank, given its expanded responsibility and powers. The amendments represent the most significant legislative reform of the governance arrangements of the Bank of England since nationalisation, and on that basis I hope that the Committee will support them.
My Lords, in the provisions setting up the oversight committee, which obviously has a hugely important and wide-ranging job to do, my noble friend mentioned the right of delegation in new Section 3B, but that is limited to two or more of its members. He mentioned under new Section 3C the right of delegation of a review to a person whom the committee can appoint. May there be wisdom in having a slightly wider power of delegation, so that one could under new Section 3B have an outside person or persons as part of that sub-committee and, in new Section 3C, more than one delegated reviewer? There may be occasions when that would be helpful.
My Lords, I think I have covered the point but perhaps I can reflect on that and respond to it, because I suspect that the Committee might want me to respond to other points after we have heard the debate.
My Lords, I, too, support the burden of this amendment. It is a subject that a lot of us spoke about during Second Reading, and this is an important part of strengthening the governance of the Bank of England, which we have been speaking about for much of the afternoon. The things set out here have the ability, over time, to change quite substantially the relationship between the non-executives and the executives at the Bank. I think we all agree that that will provide a better balance, given the wide-ranging powers that the Bank of England will have. The proposed new section sets out some of the important issues about making reviews of policy performance, which lie at the heart of this, and the engagement of the non-executive directors in what has been happening from a policy perspective within the Bank. The suggestions about publication and handling recommendations would also be extremely helpful.
The very same question raised by the noble Lords, Lord Flight and Lord Hodgson, also came to my mind. Why does one need a separate oversight committee for this, rather than handling it within the board itself? I have sat on a lot of boards by now and I have never found a problem with engaging with this kind of activity. Within a unitary board, people know the occasions when they must remain silent or absent themselves and who is in a position to do that. It is very much about commissioning reviews, as set out here. It is not as if one is suggesting that the directors themselves would be conducting the reviews, but they are going to be commissioning them, either from inside or outside the Bank.
It seems to me that the only argument arises from the scepticism that we have heard from many noble Lords about the entrenched position of the executives relative to the non-executives of today. Therefore I understand why the Government might think that this is a way of bringing confidence to this process. However, over the long term, I hope that it could be done within the remit of the board as a whole, because that gives confidence within a unitary board; confidence between the executives and non-executives that, together, they can review what has happened in the past and can learn the lessons of the past so that an attitude of confrontation does not develop between one set of people reviewing the performance of another set. However, I understand why it might be right at this point.
Is the noble Lord not assuaged in his point about the unitary board by the fact that it explicitly says here that the oversight committee is a sub-committee of the court?
The committee consists only of the non-executive directors; the executive directors will be there, in a sense, only in attendance. It can work. Normally within a board, if it was doing this kind of review, it would be the non-executive directors who were in the lead and making the running. I have found from experience that one should do everything one can to keep the executive and non-executive directors together when one is handling these kinds of issues and trying to learn lessons from the past. We do not want a situation where one part of the board feels that it is being picked on by another. However, given the level of distrust that we have heard this afternoon from many noble Lords about this, I can understand the concerns that, if the Government had brought forward the proposal in the sense that a number of us suggested, they would have come up against the pressure of saying, “Well, it will simply be controlled by the executive directors, in the end, if it is done that way”. Over time, however, a well functioning board should be able to handle these kinds of policy reviews within the whole of the board. That is the best way of learning longer term lessons from these experiences.
My Lords, we have a great deal of common interest here that would advance the position of the court. We have two rival schemes, one in Amendment 11 in this group, the other tabled by the Government. We can mix and match here. The sense is that we prefer the Amendment 11 reference to the court, but we prefer the amendments in the government group, particularly about whether these amendments are made using internal or external resources, or whatever. If we put these two things together, we have a rather good scheme.
My Lords, I want to enlarge on the question I asked my noble friend just before he sat down. The point has been made from different quarters of the House about the desirability or otherwise of having yet another committee. However, whichever way that argument goes—and I note the rather odd situation that this oversight committee is to be a sub-committee of the court, and the composition of the court and the composition of the oversight committee are precisely the same—
I see:
“There is to be a sub-committee of the court of directors … consisting of the directors of the Bank”.
It is not all the directors, some of the directors. I have got you.
I have been restraining myself from clarifying a number of other points, but I think that there is perhaps a point that will help the Committee. A director, as defined, is a non-executive director, so the executive members—the governor and the deputy governors—do not, under the definitions here, count as directors. It is only the non-executive directors, which may help my noble friend.
I am grateful for that, and I apologise for the error. However, I want to reinforce the importance of extending the power of delegation under new Section 3B. That could be very important to the work of the committee and strengthen it because it would bring in outside voices and give strength to its deliberations. I hope, therefore, that the Government may review this and decide to extend the power of delegation, not just to members but to outsiders as well. Subsection (3) already provides that outsiders can attend and speak at meetings of the committee, but to be members of a delegated body is crucial, as, indeed, in the review structure under new Section 3C, it would be helpful on occasions to have more than a single person appointed to conduct a review. If it is a complex review, there could be a lot of point in having a small team of three. At the moment that is not permitted by the wording of new Section 3C.
My Lords, I welcome Amendment 11, which is the Treasury Select Committee amendment, put down by my noble friend Lord McFall and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I also welcome the government amendment, which is taking us forward on this vexed issue of the governance of the Bank of England. I regard that as a general welcome, notwithstanding any criticisms or questions I may later have about some particulars of the amendment.
However, before getting into the discussion of Amendments 11 and 13, I reiterate the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, with respect to Section 241 of the Banking Act 2009, where it appears that the chair of the court is in the gift of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There is nothing in that clause to suggest that the chair must be one of the non-executive members.
I am grateful to the noble Lord because I think that we are getting into very detailed drafting points. I will certainly have a look at those points and write to the noble Lord and copy the letter to others who have spoken in this debate, just to check that nothing has gone astray in the drafting here. We will take that on board.
I hope that my noble friend agrees that the noble Lord, Lord Burns, had quite a point. It harks back to earlier discussions about the complexity of drafting. It is the fact, as I hope my noble friend will confirm, that the definition of Court of Directors in Clause 1 of the Bill includes the four executive directors and “not more than 9” non-executive directors—which makes 13. The interplay of the phrase Court of Directors and the new body that is the subject of the government amendment makes for extraordinary complexity in understanding. One thing that my noble friend might consider for the next stage is that when the Bill and his amendment refer to non-executive directors they say non-executive directors, because there are four executive directors—the governor and three deputy governors. They are directors too.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. It has been a very interesting debate. I had more of an idea what things are about at the beginning of my speech than I did at the end and whether it is the oversight committee or the court. Perhaps the Minister could just clarify whether the chair of the court will chair the oversight committee and whether the oversight committee will be composed of non-executives, with no officer of the Bank on the oversight committee. I cannot see that detailed in the Bill.
I agree with noble Lords in asking why we need another committee. The reason why I asked the Minister questions earlier was that the Treasury Committee in another place is very firm that this proposal does not plug the gap. In the light of the debate, there needs to be a review from the Government and they need to come back to us on Report so that we can get some clarity when it goes back to the other House. The core of this is corporate governance. If we get good corporate governance on the court, there will be no need for the oversight committee at all.
The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, had a very good suggestion. Why do we not combine my amendment with the Government’s amendment and then we can come back to this matter, look at it and, I hope, all agree? I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.