Equality and Human Rights Commission: Disability Commissioner

Lord Parekh Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Parekh (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to participate in this debate, not only because it deals with an important question but because the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, was once upon a time a student of mine and this is the first time that I have had the opportunity to participate in a debate led by an ex-student.

I shall follow on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, was saying, but I want to talk about not the individuals involved but the principle at stake, which is whether the Equality and Human Rights Commission treats disability fairly and equitably. In this country, we started with dedicated commissions—the Commission for Racial Equality, of which I was privileged to be deputy chair, the Equal Opportunities Commission, and so on. Those dedicated commissions did a lot of valuable work, but as protected characteristics, as they are called, began to multiply—we now have nine—it was not possible to have separate commissions for each of them and we embarked on the path of a single Equality and Human Rights Commission. This raises an important question: is a single commission capable of doing the work of nine commissions? If so, is it able to do so with equal impartiality, justice and fairness? This is why what we are debating today is of great interest.

In the history of our country we have played with three different models for constituting a human rights commission. One would be to have each of the commissioners selected on merit—not for representing a particular disadvantaged group but simply because of their public eminence. Secondly, they might be nominated because of their capacity to represent particular groups, such as women, the disabled, or whatever. Thirdly, they might be appointed for general purposes and then be asked to concentrate on a particular area, such as women, the disabled or race.

In recent years, the Equality and Human Rights Commission seems to have opted for the first model, which seeks in the name of mainstreaming to abolish the commissioner in charge of the disabled. That is a mistaken approach because, as noble Baroness, Lady Deech, pointed out, the question is how do you mainstream something? Is the only way to mainstream through abolishing the commissioner in charge of a particular issue? Representatives of different groups ensure that their concerns and disadvantages are noticed and, therefore, recognising differences is not a way of avoiding mainstreaming. Expecting every commissioner to be concerned with all groups equally is inherently implausible and impracticable. The commission needs representatives of the diverse groups in our society for a variety of reasons.

Such a commission reflects society at large and has a great symbolic value. It also ensures that relevant groups have their own spokesmen and they feel reassured. It ensures necessary sensitivity and expertise and gives the concerns of particular groups a clear focus. This is why the absence of women or ethnic minorities, for example, on the Equality and Human Rights Commission seems extremely odd. The same applies to the disabled, whose presence on the commission is as vital as the presence of women or anyone else. Others can certainly speak for them—as, obviously, anyone could speak about race—but can they speak with the same authority, authenticity and intuitive grasp of the issues involved? They cannot. A commission in charge of human rights ought to include a diversity of groups and, therefore, a diversity of commissioners.