Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, made a powerful speech. I will say a word in response to it. I am sorry that the noble Lord thinks that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and I were focusing on the “periphery” last week and supporting a “fudge”, as he put it. Your Lordships need to focus on the noble Lord’s amendment. It provides that, after 28 days, there would be no possibility of detention of a person for immigration reasons other than in exceptional circumstances. Last week I found that not to be something that I could support and I still cannot support it, because a person can be detained only for the purpose of removal and only for a reasonable period for that purpose. There is nothing exceptional about it taking longer than 28 days to remove a person who has been detained for immigration reasons. There has to be discussion with the country to which the individual will be removed and persons being removed often do not co-operate with their removal. There is nothing exceptional about it taking longer than 28 days. Of course, the individual concerned is also entitled at any time to require a judicial assessment of whether it is appropriate for them to continue to be detained for immigration purposes. I am pleased that the Government have moved to a four-month period and I think that is the right result.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support Motion A. I will confine myself to three comparatively brief points. First, as has been made plain, the Government have already moved from the earlier proposal of six months down to four. Yesterday, as those who have read the debate in the other place will know, there was barely a voice and no vote whatever against that proposal.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has few greater admirers than I in this Chamber but, as I suggested earlier, his amendment goes altogether too far. One defect is that it is internally inconsistent. I mentioned this on Report but did not think it necessary to do so in the last round of ping-pong, though I rather regret that now. On its face, it refers in new subsection (1) to detention under any of the relevant powers. These are defined in new subsection (6) and include two dealing with detention pending deportation. However, looking at new subsection (4) of Amendment 84, it does not apply in cases where the Secretary of State is determined that there will be deportation. This is an internal inconsistency.

I suggest that four months properly protects against any risk of what can seriously be called arbitrary detention. One must remember that it is a safeguard over and above the intrinsic ability of those who are detained to seek bail—a safeguard I acknowledge to be appropriate and necessary, not least in the case of those with mental health problems. The proposal in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that there should be exceptional circumstances to justify detention beyond 28 days, is unworkable. The Minister gave reasons and illustrations, as did the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

A shorter period, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—of whom, again, I am a great admirer—is, frankly, impracticable. Tribunals are already hugely busy and overworked. They really must not be overwhelmed.

Trade Union Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Wednesday 16th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, in supporting this amendment I will repeat, very briefly, a point that I made in Committee. I might not have done this if the Minister had dealt with the matter in her reply. But, tantalisingly, just as she said:

“Perhaps this is the point at which I should respond to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown”,—[Official Report, 8/2/16; col. 2026.]

the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, interrupted—perhaps I mean intervened—to raise a different question and the Minister never came back to it.

At all events, the point was simply this: while I support the turnout requirements in these clauses, it should be noted that certain bizarre consequences could, at least theoretically, follow from these provisions. Assuming a bargaining unit of 1,000 union members—the illustration used in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill—if 499 members voted in favour of industrial action and none against, a strike would be unlawful. However, if 499 voted in favour and one against, because at least 50% of those eligible would have voted, a strike would be permissible—so, too, of course if 499 voted in favour and 498 against.

Doubtless, such possible anomalies as these are inevitable in any scheme which combines, as this one does, a minimum turnout requirement with the principle of a simple majority decision. But my point is that surely this underlines the imperative need to ensure that the best and most effective way is found of achieving a maximum turnout of those eligible to vote. This amendment will surely facilitate the search for that better way, and plainly nothing can be lost by it. It prejudges nothing: if electronic balloting were to prove ineffective or insecure in addition to postal voting, it simply would not be adopted. But we should at least let such an independent review be held.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, and for one further reason, which I mentioned in Committee: promoting electronic voting will make it much less likely that any legal challenge to the new thresholds would succeed if such a challenge were brought in Strasbourg. It is very simple: the less balanced the provisions in the Bill, the greater the danger that the Government will not secure their objectives, and I support their objectives in relation to the ballot thresholds. The Minister mentioned a few moments ago that the Bill is concerned to strike a fair balance. So is this amendment.

Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Wednesday 14th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on this subject, I am on the side of the two Jeremys: the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and Jeremy Bentham. In 1795, Jeremy Bentham wrote:

“The statesman who contributes to put justice out of reach … is an accessary after the fact to every crime”.

For Bentham, such a law tax was a denial of justice. These regulations are a denial of justice, and they are a denial of justice for the two reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks. First, because the sums involved—£150 up to £1,200—may well encourage innocent people to plead guilty, and, secondly, because the magistrate or judge has no discretion to vary the charge by reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender—in particular, the offender’s means.

I will add a further point. There is a much fairer and more lucrative way forward for a Lord Chancellor who wants to help balance the books by imposing a court charge. Let the Lord Chancellor give the judges and magistrates a discretion to charge much higher court fees to defendants who are convicted of serious crimes and who can afford to pay. The drug dealers, the bank robbers and the fraudsters can be charged the true cost of their occupying the courts for weeks in trials that end in convictions if the judge or magistrate in their discretion thinks that it is appropriate to do so. The regulations could then give the courts a proper discretion not to impose on the small fry charges that may well induce guilty pleas from innocent people and may well result in the imposition of orders for payment from people who cannot afford them. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to test the opinion of the House on these regulations, he will certainly have my support in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, the points to be made against these regulations are so obvious and so strong that really they do not need to be made yet again in tonight’s debate. The problems—the total lack of judicial discretion, the obvious impossibility of recovery in so many cases and the risk of excessive pressure on defendants to plead guilty to avoid the charge escalating from £150 to £520, or, in an each-way case, from £180 to £1,000—were all foreseen by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, in Committee in July of last year. They have all since been the subject of widespread criticism by a series of distinguished legal commentators in a succession of legal periodicals such as the Criminal Law Review, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly and so forth. Professor Nicola Padfield, a most distinguished legal academic and criminologist and now master of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, described them as “astonishing” and quoted another commentator as saying that they were the most unworthy provisions on the statute book. The president of the Law Society called them “outrageous”.