Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this group of amendments is concerned with Clauses 74 and 75, and it relates to costs capping orders, or protective costs orders, as they were previously called. In a case that raises issues of public importance, the court has a power, before the case is heard, to set the maximum figure for the costs that a claimant will be required to pay should the claim not succeed. The object of such an order is to ensure that a claimant who raises an issue of public importance is not deterred from bringing the claim because of the risk of having to pay unquantified costs should the claim fail.

At the moment costs capping orders are a matter for the discretion of the court. They are rarely made, particularly in contexts other than environmental claims, which Clause 76 rightly recognises to raise special considerations because of an international convention, the Aarhus convention. The Minister, in correspondence, has helpfully referred to three or four cases a year of protective costs orders being made outside the environmental field. It is not a major problem. I have seen no evidence to suggest that the current exercise of the costs capping order power by the courts has caused any problems at all, other than the general problem that government departments would much prefer not to be the subject of judicial review applications at all.

Amendment 166 addresses a particular vice of Clause 74. Clause 74(3) provides that a costs capping order may be made,

“only if leave to apply for judicial review has been granted”,

but such a provision would defeat the very object of a costs capping order. If an applicant cannot seek and obtain a costs capping order in an appropriate case until leave to move for judicial review is granted, applicants will inevitably be deterred from bringing those judicial review proceedings in the public interest in the first place. They will be deterred because of the risk of having to pay an unquantified amount of costs at the permission hearing. I suggest to your Lordships that protective costs orders should remain available, if and only if the judge considers it appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case, prior to the grant of permission to move for judicial review. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry I missed the beginning of the noble Lord’s introduction of this amendment but I got called out. I simply want to speak on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our latest report says:

“We remain of the view expressed in our Report on judicial review that restricting the availability of costs-capping orders to cases in which permission has been granted would be a disincentive to meritorious public interest challenges being brought”—

that argument has been made—

“and we maintain our recommendation that the Bill be amended to remove this restriction”,

and that we explicitly support,

“Lord Pannick’s amendment … which would preserve the court’s current power to make a costs-capping order at any stage of judicial review proceedings, including before permission is granted”.

I hope that your Lordships’ House will feel able to support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, who is a colleague on the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I shall simply quote from what the committee said as I think it sums up the case now being made:

“we remain concerned, even after considering the Minister’s explanation of the purpose of the provision, about whether it is compatible with the right of access to court, the principle of equality of arms and the rule of law for the court’s power to consider a new matter to depend on the ‘consent’ of the Secretary of State. We are struck by the fact that the Government could not identify any other similar provisions in other statutory contexts”—

as the noble Baroness has already pointed out—

“which confirms our sense that this provision crosses a line which has not previously been crossed”—

I think that is a very good point—

“in relation to an aspect of a tribunal’s jurisdiction being dependent on the consent of the Minister who is the respondent to the appeal”.

There is a basic principle here about justice being seen to be done. If this provision goes through as it stands, I do not think that justice will be seen to be done. As the noble Baroness said, perhaps the answer is for the Minister to give a commitment to come back at Third Reading with an amendment that is better expressed. However, I hope that the Government are listening and will respond positively to the amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, which raises a short but vital issue of principle, which is whether it is consistent with the rule of law for one party to the proceedings to have the power to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal before which it appears. So far as I am aware there is no precedent for such provision, for the very good reason that it is objectionable in principle. It should be a matter for the tribunal to apply whatever criteria Parliament thinks appropriate to determine whether the tribunal can hear an appeal that raises new grounds. I simply cannot understand why the Secretary of State does not trust the tribunal to decide on the application of the criteria which Parliament sees fit to lay down. I, too, hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House that, in the light of the concerns expressed this afternoon, the Government will think again on this important matter before Third Reading.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to several of the amendments in this group and have also indicated my opposition to Clause 60 standing part of the Bill. I share the concerns eloquently expressed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith of Basildon and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. It is a matter for considerable regret that the United Kingdom, which has played so significant a role in the battle to reduce statelessness, should now, if the Government have their way, condone the creation of statelessness, even for people who have damaged the public good. Such people should be put on trial, punished if there is evidence of criminal offences and deported if there is a safe country to which they can be sent. However, to deprive them of nationality and thereby render them international outcasts is simply indefensible.

I share the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, about the international law implications of what is proposed, but wish to focus on the practical consequences of what the Government are suggesting. Does the Minister accept—this is the crucial question— that if British citizenship is removed from a person in this country on public-good grounds, with the result that they are rendered stateless, it will make it much more difficult to remove that person to another state? Other states are less likely to accept entry by a person who is stateless than one who enjoys British citizenship. Does the Minister therefore accept that, far from contributing to national security, the exercise of Clause 60 against persons in this country will positively damage national security by making it more difficult to remove people who are a danger to the public good?

For this reason, it seems highly likely that Clause 60 will in practice only ever be used against people who are living abroad. Does the Minister agree that, if we strip a person of British citizenship while they are abroad, thereby rendering them stateless, there is a real danger that the country that admitted them temporarily will take urgent steps to remove them back to this country, since it will not wish to be responsible for a stateless person? It is surely highly likely that the United Kingdom will be told by the country where such a person is living that it admitted that person temporarily only because the individual had a British passport. The foreign country will surely say that, now that the passport has been taken away, the United Kingdom can have that person back. There will then be a dispute with the foreign state—and some such states are our allies—about our duty to re-admit someone who was admitted to it only because they presented a British passport that has now been revoked.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has already referred to the opinion of Professor Goodwin-Gill that the United Kingdom would have an obligation in international law then to re-admit such a person. Even if there is a dispute about international law, this Government are plainly going to face considerable pressure from foreign states to re-admit such people to this country. I would be grateful for the Minister’s views on this: does he agree that Clause 60, far from assisting us to deal effectively with people who threaten the public good, will handicap this country, whether the person is here or abroad when the revocation of citizenship takes place?

Although I have added my name to a number of the amendments in this group, which I see as probing amendments, the problem with all of them, whether to secure judicial control or introduce a test of proportionality, is that they will still allow for the removal of citizenship, even though statelessness will result. My current view is that Clause 60 is so fundamentally flawed, so in breach of international law and so damaging in its practical consequences for the security of this country that it should be removed from the Bill. I am happy—and I am sure that noble Lords who have spoken and will speak in this debate are too—to meet the Minister in the short period of time before we return to this subject, as inevitably we will on Report this month, to see whether there is a possibility of making real progress on this very troubling matter.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, Amendment 76A in my name is, like Amendments 75 to 78 to which I have added my name, designed to mitigate the worst effects of Clause 60. However, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy, my preference is for Clause 60 not to stand part of the Bill, and we have heard very powerful reasons for why it should not do so.

Amendments 75, 76, 77 and 78 were recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights; first, to ensure that Clause 60 is compatible with international law obligations. This has been questioned by the JCHR, drawing on the opinion of Professor Goodwin-Gill, which has already been referred to, that the deprivation of citizenship should be,

“a necessary and proportionate response to the conduct in question”.

The JCHR noted that, in their letter to the committee, the Government said that they did not want,

“to rule out the possibility that deprivation of citizenship leaving a person stateless is necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the country”.

The JCHR said:

“It is hard to imagine the circumstances in which such a serious measure could ever be necessary and proportionate for such a purpose”.

Will the Minister help us out and give an example of the kind of situation envisaged that would not anyway be covered by terrorism? Economic well-being does not seem to be a reason for taking away someone’s citizenship and making them stateless.

The JCHR said that the best interests of the child should be taken into account and, once again, issued a plea for this to be written into the legislation to ensure that they are,

“treated as a primary consideration”.

The committee also said that the legislation should not be retrospective, which is,

“an exceptional step which requires weighty justification”.

We were not persuaded that such justification exists. I note from a Written Answer on 10 February:

“There will be no time limit, but the conduct being considered must have taken place after the individual became a British citizen”.—[Official Report, 10/2/14; col. WA 101.]

Amendment 76A complements the JCHR’s amendments and has two purposes. First, it would ensure that the power in Clause 60 could not be used against someone when they are outside the country. This would help ensure compliance with obligations under international law and, as has already been noted, the JCHR, drawing on the opinion of Professor Goodwin-Gill, has questioned whether the clause is compliant. The committee said:

“We would be very concerned if the Government’s main or sole purpose in taking this power is to exercise it in relation to naturalised British citizens while they are abroad, as it appears that this carries a very great risk of breaching the UK’s international obligations to the State who admitted the British citizen to its territory”.

That point has already been made but it bears repetition. Will the Minister comment on this important legal point?

The JCHR also expressed surprise at,

“the Government’s refusal to inform Parliament of the number of cases in which the power to deprive of citizenship has been exercised while abroad”,

and made it clear that Parliament,

“is entitled to this information in order to assist it to reach a view as to how the new power is likely to be exercised in practice”.

I pay tribute to the tireless briefing that ILPA has provided to the committee throughout the passage of the Bill, although I fear we have not done it full justice. A freedom of information request submitted by ILPA elicited the information that, of five individuals stripped of British nationality in 2010, all were outside the UK. This has to raise alarm bells. Will the Minister give Parliament—and the committee—this information now?

At Second Reading, the Minister assured noble Lords:

“There is a safeguard of a full right of appeal”.—[Official Report, 10/2/14; col. 417.]

But how is someone who is forbidden to return to the country supposed to exercise that right of appeal? It will not be very easy. In practice that is probably a pretty empty assurance. What will be achieved apart from sullying the UK’s international reputation, as we have already been warned? Liberty suggests that the clause is based on a security fallacy, arguing that stripping someone of nationality abroad will in no way contribute to security at home. Those who threaten our security do not respect national borders; my noble friend Lady Smith has made a similar point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 79A on the role of the independent reviewer and I agree with everything that has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I have tabled two further amendments in this group. Amendment 79C has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister of Burtersett and Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno. It would require the Secretary of State to set up a code giving guidance as to the practices to be followed in any case of deprivation of citizenship. Amendment 79D, which has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, would introduce a sunset clause, and I am hopeful that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, may add her vocal support to the amendment.

There are real concerns about Clause 60, as we debated in the previous group of amendments. If we are to have Clause 60 at all, I think that we need all or some of these protective provisions—an annual review, a code of guidance and a sunset clause—to set out some criteria for the application of the clause and to ensure that Parliament can take an informed and periodic look at this matter in the light of the practical experience of the operation of the clause.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I am pleased to support these amendments. I think that I have already said more than enough about Clause 60, but I could not help but notice that no one spoke in support of it other than the Minister, and so I see these amendments as a kind of absolute bottom line. If we are going to be saddled with Clause 60, I hope that the Government will see fit to accept these procedural process amendments as a kind of minimal response to the grave concerns that have been expressed across the Committee.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Wednesday 5th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add my support to the points that have been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I shall speak to Amendment 31A, which is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.

Amendment 31A arises out of the concerns that have been expressed at paragraphs 48 to 53 by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its eighth report of this Session. The concern is that, in cases where a person is resisting deportation on human rights grounds, Clause 12 will allow the Home Secretary to certify that the person concerned may be removed from the United Kingdom because there is not a real risk of serious irreversible harm and the individual would then be able to pursue the appeal against deportation only from abroad. The Government say that judicial review will be available to such a person to challenge the removal decision while the appeal is pending.

The JCHR has expressed its concern about whether judicial review will provide a practical and effective means of challenging the certification by the Secretary of State that the appeal can be heard from abroad. The JCHR has drawn attention to the Government’s proposed changes to judicial review to restrict its availability and has emphasised the reductions in legal aid. The Joint Committee returned to this subject in its 12th report, published on 26 February.

I share the concerns that have been expressed by the JCHR, and I would add that it is more than a little ironic that the Government’s policy has hitherto been to reduce the number of judicial reviews in the immigration context on the basis that appeals are much quicker and cheaper, and yet now the Government are saying that the individual’s protection will lie in a judicial review. In the light of the reductions in legal aid and the changes that the Government are proposing to judicial review, there are real concerns about whether or not an effective practical remedy will remain available to the individual.

I want to add one specific point to those that have been made by the JCHR. In cases of this kind, a claimant for judicial review will vitally depend on information and representations from interveners; that is, expert bodies that regularly assist the court—sometimes in writing, sometimes through oral submissions—for example, by explaining to the court the practical conditions in the foreign state to which the person concerned is going to be deported.

Your Lordships will know that Clause 51 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, which is currently before the other place, will oblige the court, other than in exceptional circumstances, to order an intervener to pay the costs incurred by the other parties as a result of the intervention—surprisingly, whether or not the intervention assists the court and, indeed, whether or not the party seeking costs from the intervener has succeeded in the judicial review. Does the Minister share my concern that, unless amended, Clause 51 of that Bill will inevitably deter interventions, which are vital in this type of case, and make it much more difficult for a person covered by Clause 12 of this Bill to bring an effective claim for judicial review? What assurances can the Minister give the Committee in response to my concerns and those set out more fully in the JCHR’s reports?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 31A. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for speaking to it on behalf of the JCHR. As he has shown, he is much better placed to do so than I would have been as a non-lawyer. There is not much more to say about it. I will just underline what the JCHR said, which was:

“In the absence of legal aid, we do not consider that an out of country appeal against deportation on the grounds that it is in breach of the right to respect for private and family life is a practical and effective remedy for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR and Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8”.

Support also comes from the briefing we have received from ILPA, which underlines that for those who are unable to pay for legal representation and are therefore left to pursue their appeals by themselves, seeking to do so from outside the UK would be especially and in many cases prohibitively difficult. The absence of a legal representative at the appeal hearing and to assist in the collection, preparation and presentation of evidence is likely to spell the end of what little prospect there may have been in the small minority of cases where removal pending appeal had not itself spelt, in Lord Justice Sedley’s words,

“the end of the appeal”.

My preference would be for our amendment to prevail but, as a fallback, I would certainly support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in respect of children. I will be speaking about children’s best interests in a moment, but a very good case has been made for this amendment by the Refugee Children’s Consortium and others. I will quote a case study that the consortium has provided, which states:

“The Home Office detained and planned to deport Christine, a single mother who had served a criminal sentence. Her two children were left in the care of their elderly and seriously ill grandfather. Her 15 year old daughter ‘Beth’ left school and missed her GCSEs while caring for her brother and grandfather. She struggled to look after her seven year old brother, who has very limited motor control and severe behavioural problems. A children’s services assessment found that the younger child was at risk of emotional and physical harm; he was later hit by a car while playing alone in the street. The children’s welfare was not taken into account by the Home Office, but after the mother’s release on bail she was reunited with her children and successfully appealed her deportation through the courts”.

The point made is:

“If Clause 12 becomes law, parents in Christine’s situation may be deported before they can appeal and her children would be separated from their mother”.

That is a horrendous example. If she had been deported, what would have happened to that family?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Baroness Lister of Burtersett

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I was a member of the National Equality Panel, and one of the most shocking of our findings was the degree of educational disadvantage among Gypsy and Traveller communities. Reading the very helpful briefing that we have had from Community Law Partnership reminded me of the importance of this. A number of noble Lords have made the point about educational disadvantage and children’s need for education and security. Of course, access to justice is that much more important for a community which suffers high levels of illiteracy and educational disadvantage. As Community Law Partnership points out, we are talking about some very complex areas of law. I therefore hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the amendments, which would protect one of the most vulnerable minority-ethnic groups in this country.

[Lord Pannick]

When the Minister comes to reply, will he clarify how these provisions will operate? Notwithstanding the provisions that are being debated today, is it the case that Gypsies and Travellers will remain entitled to seek legal aid to challenge acts or omissions of public authorities under paragraph 17 of the judicial review, and remain entitled to challenge under paragraph 20, which relates to convention rights, in the same way as other litigants? Is it the case that the provisions we are debating will not prevent Gypsies and Travellers claiming legal aid if they have proper grounds for contending that they are not trespassers? I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify those matters, because they have a considerable bearing on the fairness of the provisions that are under challenge through these amendments.