Independent Review of Administrative Law Update

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we are not disappointed with the report from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his team. On the contrary, it is a very good piece of work. We are consulting for the reasons I have already expressed. The panel did not say that ouster clauses should never be used; it said that, when used appropriately, they should not be seen as an affront to the rule of law. We want to consult on whether and how they should be used. The independent review of the Human Rights Act is ongoing. We will consider its results in due course. While very significant reform of judicial review might require changes to the Human Rights Act, the changes we are proposing do not.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister in public law cases. I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his review team for the very sensible and balanced report which it has produced. The Minister will have noted the wise words of the noble Lord and his colleagues at paragraph 15 of their conclusions:

“Our view is that the government and Parliament can be confident that the courts will respect institutional boundaries in exercising their inherent powers to review the legality of government action. Politicians should, in turn, afford the judiciary the respect which it is undoubtedly due when it exercises these powers.”


Do the Government agree?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly agree that the courts would be expected to respect institutional boundaries, and Parliament and the Government should do likewise. The purpose of our consultation is to make sure that we produce the best system we possibly can so that all those involved in the judicial review process—judges, applicants, Government and everyone else—is party to a system which promotes good government and upholds the rule of law.

Serious Criminal Cases Backlog

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is of course correct that delays in the criminal justice system can affect not only the defendant but others involved, including victims and witnesses. The listing of cases is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, not the Executive, so I am limited in what I can say. However, I can confirm, for example, that at the moment the majority of cases where a defendant is in custody have been listed for trial before July 2021.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, are the Government considering two possible steps that would help to reduce the unacceptable backlog of cases in the Crown Courts? The first is to reduce the number of jurors to, say, seven, making it easier to ensure social distancing in court rooms, and the second is to allow defendants who are legally represented to choose trial by judge alone in some categories of cases where juries are currently required?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, trial by jury is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction. With the support of Public Health England and Public Health Wales, we have made adjustments to more than 290 court rooms and jury deliberation rooms so as to facilitate trial by jury. Reducing the size of the jury is therefore unlikely to free up an additional amount of space for jury trials, and it would also require primary legislation. As to the other point that the noble Lord makes about trial by judge alone, that would, I think, require a significant change in our criminal justice system, and therefore very careful consideration would be required before embarking on that change.

European Union Referendum Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dobbs]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that fascinating point. So much has already been said about how we should not be chopping our constitution into pieces in a piecemeal fashion. That is something that I think the whole House, including this side of the House, should consider very carefully.

Do we today want to add weight to the views of those who regard us as unaccountable panjandrums—the unwashed, the unelected? Where will that leave us? It would be like passing around the rope to those who want to hang us. Ultimately, matters of the franchise have to fall within the privileged remit of the Commons, just like matters of finance, as matters for those who have been elected with a duty to decide. In my view, we would be overstretching our rights and certainly overstretching our wisdom if we were to take this matter further. This is one barricade we should not build. I will continue to support the cause of young people, but I cannot support this amendment. The referendum is waiting; we should get on with it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, there are many reasons for supporting the Government today, all of which were given by the Minister, but I have to say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that I do not agree that financial privilege is a reason to support the Government. It is an obscure subject, and I commend to the House the very helpful paper published by Dr Meg Russell and Mr Daniel Gover of the Constitution Unit of UCL in March 2014.

Financial privilege did not prevent the other place from addressing the merits of this House’s amendment; equally, the fact that financial privilege was asserted by the House of Commons after the certification by the Speaker does not prevent the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, from bringing forward her amendment in lieu. It does not prevent this House voting on the merits of the amendment—or, as I see it, its lack of merit.

As I understood him, the Minister accepted that that is the case. The Constitution Unit paper concludes on page 13 that,

“it is not considered contrary to the convention for the Lords to respond to financial privilege with … an amendment in lieu … for as many rounds of ping pong as it wishes”.

The normal rules of ping-pong apply. Therefore, financial privilege is a distraction rather than being central to this debate. That is not to dispute the supremacy of the elected Chamber, especially on the issue of the franchise, but that is a different matter. For the reasons given by the Minister, I shall be supporting the Government in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I intervened earlier, and I would like to take up the point I made in that intervention in a moment. I begin by saying a little about the substance of the proposal about votes at 16. I remain of the view, as does my Front Bench, that this is an inappropriate vehicle to carry out such an important constitutional change. The danger is that we have had a precedent of changing the franchise in the Scottish situation, and if we were to persist and succeed on this issue this evening, it would be yet another precedent. That would prejudice a longer-term, overall survey of what we ought to do about the age at which people are entitled to vote.

Having said that, if one looks back to 1969, which is the last time we debated it, on that occasion there was very widespread consultation. If we were to have another Bill on the issue, there would have to be widespread consultation. On this occasion, to the best of my knowledge, there has been virtually no consultation whatever. Back in 1969, when the issue had been widely consulted on, I said to my secretary, “If I get a single letter”—at the time, I had 100 letters or so a day—“asking me to give the vote, I will vote for it”. I did not get a single such letter.

Nowadays, we get thousands of emails sent to us. I have not had a single email from someone in this age group saying, “I am a highly intelligent, very politically motivated person”, or even, “I voted in the Scottish referendum”, and “I would like the vote”. I have had no such representation. I believe that this is being generated inside the House itself.

I turn to financial privilege, which has been raised. I totally reject what the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, said: that this is somehow a massive conspiracy suddenly cooked up in the other place to override us, and so on. I do not think that is so. The procedure on financial privilege is well established. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs said, it has been used time and again. The reality is that if the Commons decides to reject something, as it has done very decisively on this issue several times, a committee is sent behind the Chair to look at the reasons why the Commons is rejecting the Lords amendment. That committee sits behind the Chair, it is advised by the clerks and not infrequently comes up with the proposal that it has relied on on this occasion. It is a quite normal process and in no sense a sudden new conspiracy. I am not at all sure about the point made by my noble friend on the Front Bench as to whether that is the only option that that committee has to put forward as a reason. I believe that, if it wished, it could put forward other reasons as well. But, normally, it comes up with a resolution as far as this is concerned.

What is happening is perfectly normal and not, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggests, in some sense a conspiracy. As my noble friend said a moment or two ago, we really have to consider very carefully whether it is appropriate to bounce the amendment back yet again. I believe that the answer very clearly is no, because the response that we are going to get at the other end is equally clear—it is going to be to reject whatever amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely, puts forward. So the sensible course of action is to reject Amendment A1 and accept Amendment A. That would be an appropriate thing to do.

Finally, one might consider why there is such an enormous apparent division on this issue between this House and the other place on the age when it is appropriate to vote. This is not a partisan issue and not something where everyone has clear-cut positions. It is rather curious—but perhaps this House is more expert on grandchildren and the other place is more expert on children. They have clearly taken the view that they do not think that their children should have the vote at the age that is suggested. We should respect that view, go along with the amendment proposed from the government Front Bench and reject that put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely.

Ministerial Code

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Clarification is very much in the eye of the beholder. A Minister reading the Ministerial Code might feel better or less well informed by the subsequent iteration of this code but, as I said in relation to the Civil Service Code, from time to time Prime Ministers feel that the matter might be expressed in one way rather than another. What it does not do is alter the nature of the obligation.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister assure the House that the change has absolutely nothing to do with government concern about judgments of the European Court of Human Rights with which they do not agree?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord knows only too well the Government’s obligation in relation to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. There is an obligation under Article 46 of the European convention, whereby parties to a judgment undertake to abide by the final judgment of that court, but those judgments are declaratory. We and previous Governments have been in regular communication with the Committee of Ministers over how best to reflect those judgments in our own law. That is an iterative process, which involves Ministers going from time to time to Strasbourg. At the moment, Parliament has given no indication—I suspect that this is what lies behind the question—that it wants to give prisoners the vote.

Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, but I have just received an email from a friend who is a magistrate. I shall not say where because these days one cannot do that. It is worth putting on the record. He writes:

“Courts are closing in great numbers with another 90 about to be closed and there will be more after this. Defendants and witnesses now have to travel great distances. Some cannot afford it so plead guilty when they may not be. Also, it has removed the fundamental right of citizens to be tried by their peers as the cost of the criminal court charge is so high and beyond most defendants’ means, so they are pleading guilty. It has removed the need of the CPS to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt. Not many well-off people appear in court so it is the poorest who are being hit with a double whammy”.

That is the view of a serving magistrate sitting on the Bench today.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on this subject, I am on the side of the two Jeremys: the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and Jeremy Bentham. In 1795, Jeremy Bentham wrote:

“The statesman who contributes to put justice out of reach … is an accessary after the fact to every crime”.

For Bentham, such a law tax was a denial of justice. These regulations are a denial of justice, and they are a denial of justice for the two reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks. First, because the sums involved—£150 up to £1,200—may well encourage innocent people to plead guilty, and, secondly, because the magistrate or judge has no discretion to vary the charge by reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender—in particular, the offender’s means.

I will add a further point. There is a much fairer and more lucrative way forward for a Lord Chancellor who wants to help balance the books by imposing a court charge. Let the Lord Chancellor give the judges and magistrates a discretion to charge much higher court fees to defendants who are convicted of serious crimes and who can afford to pay. The drug dealers, the bank robbers and the fraudsters can be charged the true cost of their occupying the courts for weeks in trials that end in convictions if the judge or magistrate in their discretion thinks that it is appropriate to do so. The regulations could then give the courts a proper discretion not to impose on the small fry charges that may well induce guilty pleas from innocent people and may well result in the imposition of orders for payment from people who cannot afford them. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to test the opinion of the House on these regulations, he will certainly have my support in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, the points to be made against these regulations are so obvious and so strong that really they do not need to be made yet again in tonight’s debate. The problems—the total lack of judicial discretion, the obvious impossibility of recovery in so many cases and the risk of excessive pressure on defendants to plead guilty to avoid the charge escalating from £150 to £520, or, in an each-way case, from £180 to £1,000—were all foreseen by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, in Committee in July of last year. They have all since been the subject of widespread criticism by a series of distinguished legal commentators in a succession of legal periodicals such as the Criminal Law Review, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly and so forth. Professor Nicola Padfield, a most distinguished legal academic and criminologist and now master of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, described them as “astonishing” and quoted another commentator as saying that they were the most unworthy provisions on the statute book. The president of the Law Society called them “outrageous”.

Inquiries Act 2005 (Select Committee Report)

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on behalf of all noble Lords I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, for his distinguished service to this House since 1983. We wish him a very happy retirement. Noble Lords will know that his grandfather, David Lloyd George, famously described this House as,

“a body of 500 men chosen at random from amongst the unemployed”.

I cannot believe that the noble Viscount has ever not been employed on some worthwhile task. It is especially appropriate that he has played so valuable a role in the discussions on the role of this House and how to move this House—now composed of rather more than 500 men and women—to the next stage of reform.

Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, I have never had the pleasure of sharing a tent with the noble Viscount, but I am one of many noble Lords who have benefited enormously from his advice about matters relating to this House. That advice has been valued by all of us because it has been based on knowledge, wisdom, kindness—a much underrated quality—and humility, as your Lordships have again heard today. The noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, will be much missed on these Benches and around the House.

I join other noble Lords in welcoming this impressive and stimulating report. I want to focus, as other noble Lords have done, on paragraphs 243 to 251 of the report, which address warning letters. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, have mentioned, those paragraphs address the need under the current rules to send letters to those who are the subject of criticism in a draft report, giving them an opportunity to comment before the final report is drawn up and published—an obligation that adds a very substantial amount of work for an inquiry, and a very substantial delay before publication. The committee is correct at paragraph 251 to recommend that these rules need to be replaced by a discretion for the chairman as to whether to give a person who is to be criticised in a report an opportunity to respond. Given that the Inquiry Rules do not apply, as we have heard, to many inquiries, including Chilcot, the practice needs to change as well.

This issue requires consideration of a little history and a little law. The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, mentioned the Profumo inquiry. When Lord Denning inquired into the Profumo case in 1963, he acted, as he said in his report, as,

“detective, inquisitor, advocate and judge”,

hearing all the evidence in secret. This led to the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Salmon, as he then was. He understandably concluded that future inquiries should do more to ensure justice for those involved. That led to the practice of witnesses being given a “Salmon letter”, setting out before they give evidence matters of interest and concern. The process has become increasingly legalistic in the worst sense of that word. Some advocates even argued on behalf of their clients that one party to the inquiry should be able to issue a Salmon letter to another party, seeking to transfer culpability—a practice that became known as a “smoked Salmon letter”.

The practice also developed whereby if an inquiry intends to criticise an individual in the final report, that individual has to be given the relevant sections of the draft report in order that he or she can comment before publication. This process is known as Maxwellisation, and is now enshrined in Rules 13 to 15 of the Inquiry Rules. It is ironic indeed that the law and practice so commemorates Robert Maxwell because he brought a case against Department of Trade inspectors in 1974, complaining about a report critical of his business practices. The complaint was that he had not been shown the draft report before publication. The Court of Appeal rejected that complaint: Lord Denning, sitting with others, said that Maxwell was not entitled to see the draft report. Why not? It was because he had been fairly treated during the inquiry. He had had a proper opportunity to comment during the inquiry on the allegations in the case, so fairness did not require yet another opportunity at the end of the process.

This general legal principle was also stated by Lord Diplock in the Appellate Committee of this House, also in 1974, in the case of Hoffmann-La Roche. Lord Diplock pointed out—this point was made today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—that even in a court of law, once a fair hearing has been given to the witnesses, the rules of natural justice do not require the judge to present a draft judgment on which the parties are then entitled to comment before the judge hands down the final decision. If that is right in a court of law, it is all the more so when we are talking about the report of an inquiry—which, however important, imposes no criminal or civil liability on anyone. So it must be right, as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf, Lord Cullen and Lord Morris, have all suggested, that Rules 13 to 15 must go. They are far too absolute, and there should be a discretion for the inquiry chairman because exceptionally there may be cases where fairness indeed demands that at the end of the process the chairman goes back to a specific witness on a specific point—because, for example, a significant new piece of evidence has emerged or the witness had not previously had an opportunity to comment. However, subject to that, fairness during the hearing suffices.

There is one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, complained in his speech that at the Scott inquiry, counsel to the inquiry, Presiley Baxendale QC “permanently scarred”—the noble Lord’s words—witnesses by the ferocity of her cross-examination. I know Miss Baxendale well. She was, before her retirement, a member of my chambers, Blackstone Chambers. A more polite and more reasonable person it would be difficult to find. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that an inquiry is there to find the facts. To do so depends on counsel to the inquiry fearlessly and without favour asking difficult questions of witnesses who may be reluctant, for a variety of reasons, to tell the full story. It is undoubtedly not a pleasant experience to be cross-examined, but Miss Baxendale was not there to make friends. She did her job. So did this Select Committee. The House is very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, and the other members of the committee.

Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

At end to insert “but that this House regrets that the draft order unfairly and inappropriately increases fees for civil proceedings above costs and so damages access to justice”.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, last week, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Grayling, told the Global Law Summit that he is,

“incredibly proud of our legal heritage”.

Today, we are debating an order that he has brought forward which will do incredible damage to the legal heritage because it will impede access to justice. As the Minister mentioned, this order will substantially increase the fees that claimants must pay when they start legal proceedings. If you want to sue for between £10,000 and £200,000, you will need to pay an upfront fee of 5% of your claim. To claim £200,000, you will need to find £10,000. That is a 576% increase on the current fee of £1,515.

The Minister is of course correct to say that Parliament approved Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which authorises the Lord Chancellor to prescribe fees above the cost of providing the court service to litigants. That is the power that Mr Grayling is now exercising. But is it a fair, reasonable or proportionate exercise of that power? Plainly not. For litigants to have to pay such substantial sums in advance of bringing a legal claim will inevitably, in practice, deny access to the court for many traders, small businesses and people suing for personal injuries.

The Government have suggested that court fees will be a small fraction of the legal expenses which a claimant will incur, but many claimants will not have to pay their legal expenses at the outset of proceedings. They will not have such a substantial sum of money available at the outset of the case, or they may be able to pay these court fees only by doing without competent legal representation. The deterrent effect on litigation will, I think, make it most unlikely that the increased charges will produce the anticipated £120 million which the Government hope to produce by this order.

The order will have further damaging consequences. Unscrupulous debtors will be far less likely to pay up if they suspect that their creditor cannot afford the court fees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He is quite right: the recital refers to the fact that there is an exercise of the power conferred by Section 92(1) and (2) of the Courts Act and the consultation in accordance with Section 92(5) and (6). There is no explicit reference to Section 92(3). However, in purporting to exercise those powers, it would be said, although not specifically recited, that he was exercising them in accordance with the remainder of that section.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken—and spoken passionately—in this debate. The Minister said that the order contains sensible and proportionate provisions. As your Lordships have heard tonight, these proposals are going to do inevitable and substantial damage to access to justice. It is simply perverse for the Government to dispute that many small businesses and many personal injury claimants are going to be unable to pay an up-front £10,000 fee as the price of access to the courts.

The noble Lord’s and the Government’s argument comes to this. Funds are needed to pay for the court system, but there is no point in having a civil court system if ordinary people are to be charged an entry fee which they cannot afford to bring basic claims for breach of contract and personal injuries. The Minister described litigation—I wrote this down, because it was a very striking phrase—as an “optional activity”, like a skiing holiday or a visit to a three-starred Michelin restaurant. As the Minister well knows from his experience as a very successful barrister, for many people—those suing for debts or to recover compensation for personal injury—litigation is often a necessity to keep your business alive or to maintain any quality of life. The Minister is absolutely right that there are already many impediments to access to justice. That is surely no justification—no excuse—for the state to erect further high barriers.

The fee remission provisions to which the Minister, perhaps somewhat desperately, referred are not going to assist other than in exceptional cases. Nor is it any answer that court fees can be recovered from the other side if the claim succeeds. Claimants need to find the fee up front.

The Minister referred to my earlier Motions of Regret with a reference to Frank Sinatra. To change the music somewhat, “Je ne regrette rien”. Happily, the courts have done more than regret. In a series of cases they have quashed Mr Grayling’s regulations which we have regretted in this House. My regret—my astonishment—that the Government should bring forward an order of this nature is mitigated only by my optimism that the courts will inevitably add this order to the long list of Mr Grayling’s regulations which have been declared unlawful in the past three years. With thanks to all noble Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment to the Motion withdrawn.

Court Fees

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

No, I do not accept that characterisation of the Government’s policies in general or the enhanced court fees. The Government are committed to providing effective access to justice and a good and satisfactory court system which is paid for by litigants. The qualification to our enhanced court fees is that the 90% who are below £10,000 will not pay increased court fees, and we believe that the cost of the court system should be borne by those bringing larger claims.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that the Lord Chancellor told the Global Law Summit that he is incredibly proud of our legal heritage? The next time the Minister sits down with the Lord Chancellor to discuss our legal heritage, will he point out that the best way to manifest that incredible pride would be to abandon regulations that will do incredible damage to access to justice because they will require traders and businesses who want to sue for £200,000 to pay an upfront fee of £10,000, which many of them will simply be unable to afford?

[Lord Faulks]

On the general point, there was reference in both questions to the Global Law Summit. Many pooh-poohed this enterprise, which noble Lords may now realise attracted more than 2,000 delegates, more than 100 Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General and representatives of more than 100 countries, all of whom came to celebrate our heritage of the rule of law. I remain an adherent to that, as I am sure other noble Lords are. Nothing about the contents of that conference in any way derogated from that principle.

As to the more specific point, there are different provisions depending on the size of the claim. As the noble Lord will know, court fees usually form a small part of the overall bill compared with lawyers’ fees, which tend to be much higher. We do not believe that the increased court fees will act as a significant inhibition on claims.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2015 Lords Chamber

I hope that I have dispelled many of the concerns regarding these reforms, and reassured your Lordships that these provisions are a sensible and proportionate means of dealing with a mischief that we intend to tackle, without undermining the discretion that should properly rest with judges. I therefore ask the House to support the government amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am very pleased that the Government have given way on the issue of principle in Motion B and have indicated that the identity of those contributing up to £1,500 funding for a judicial review will not need to be disclosed. The Minister said that our earlier debates on these issues had been highly intelligent. Without, I hope, debasing the currency, I want to make some observations.

The issue of principle is that the courts will now retain a power to hear a judicial review even if it is said that the alleged defect would not have made a difference in the individual’s case. I would have preferred the concession to be drafted in more generous language than an exceptional public interest, but concession it is. As the Lord Chancellor said in the House of Commons on 13 January at col. 811, and as the Minister confirmed this afternoon, it will be for the judges to decide how and when that test should apply. Indeed it will.

In applying the criterion, I am sure that the courts will have very much in mind Mr Grayling’s explanation of the purpose of the clause. He said that it is designed to prevent judicial reviews being heard when they are,

“based on relatively minor procedural defects in a process of consultation … That is what these proposals are all about”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/15; col. 812.]

I am confident that the courts will have careful regard to those explanations by the Lord Chancellor and that if the judicial review is not concerned with minor procedural defects but with allegations of systematic or deliberate wrongdoing, or errors of law in the interpretation of statutes which have a general effect, the discretion will be exercised so that the case is heard in the traditional way, as it should be.

In applying the clause, I would also expect the courts to pay close regard to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, then Lord Chief Justice, who I am delighted to see in his place today, said in R v Offen, 2001, 1 Weekly Law Reports 253. In the Court of Appeal, the noble and learned Lord was considering Section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which requires courts to impose an automatic life sentence on a person convicted of a second serious crime,

“unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances”.

At paragraph 79 of his judgment, Lord Woolf said that the meaning of “exceptional” depended on the statutory purpose, and where the statutory mischief did not exist, the case was indeed exceptional.

Applying that approach, as I am sure that the courts will do in the present context, the judges will be able to say—and I hope that they will—that the statutory purpose here is the very limited one identified by Mr Grayling of striking out judicial reviews which raised what he describes as “relatively minor procedural defects”.

Other cases, particularly those raising allegations of substantial errors of law or of systematic wrongdoing are outside the legislative aim and are therefore, on the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, exceptional. They can be heard in the normal way. For those reasons, I am confident that we have arrived at a tolerable result at the end of this saga.

We have arrived at a sensible solution because, and only because, this House was prepared twice to disagree with the House of Commons. It should be noted that the concern about Mr Grayling’s proposals was expressed across this House. My amendments were supported by a very large majority of Cross Benchers who voted; they were signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The amendments were supported by the Labour Benches, led on this occasion by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with his customary wit and fire; he signed the original amendments. There was a very substantial rebellion in support of retaining judicial discretion from the Liberal Democrat Benches; the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also signed the original amendments. Also of importance on the Floor of the House and behind the scenes, there was substantial support from noble Lords on the Conservative Benches who are wise and experienced, and respectful of the value of the rule of law, with some forceful speeches in support of retaining judicial discretion, in particular from the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I am very grateful for all that support.

I express particular thanks to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who has assisted the House by the force and clarity—indeed, the good humour—of his advocacy as the acceptable face of the Lord Chancellor’s department at all stages of the Bill. I know that he has worked tirelessly and successfully behind the scenes to arrive at a compromise which can be agreed by the Lord Chancellor and by noble Lords concerned about this clause. That is a remarkable achievement.

I should add one further observation and I do so with regret, but it needs to be said. I regret that on 13 January, when the House of Commons considered this matter for the final time, a Lord Chancellor again expressed comments that display an astonishing lack of understanding about the role of judicial review—one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. Judicial review does not, as Mr Grayling complained at col. 819, involve public bodies being “blackmailed”. He also suggested,

“severe doubts about whether secondary legislation should be subject to judicial review”.

These doubts appear to have no basis whatever other than the fact that the courts have, on a number of occasions in the last year, held that regulations made by the Lord Chancellor were outside the scope of his statutory powers.

Furthermore, judicial review is not, as the Lord Chancellor again suggested,

“now overtly used by campaign groups and third parties to seek to disrupt the process of government”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/15; cols. 819-20.]

Such comments make no sensible contribution to the debate. They demean the office of Lord Chancellor because they disrespect and undermine the vital role of judicial review in ensuring that the business of government is conducted lawfully.

However inconvenient and embarrassing it is to Mr Grayling to have his decisions repeatedly ruled to be unlawful by our courts, however much he may resent the delays and costs of government illegality being exposed in court and however much he may prefer to focus on the identity of the claimant rather than the substance of their legal complaint, it remains the vital role of judicial review in this country to hold Ministers and civil servants to account in public, not for the merits of their decisions but for their compliance with the law of the land as stated by Parliament. The discipline of the law plays a vital role in promoting the high standards of administration in this country that we are in danger of taking for granted. It helps to concentrate—and rightly so—the mind of a Minister or civil servant taking a decision whose legality he or she will be answerable for in public before an independent judge.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a very powerful speech. The Bill as it stands seems to me to involve no lack of clarity whatever. Clause 1(1) is perfectly clear:

“A person who is terminally ill may request and lawfully be provided with assistance to end his or her own life”.

What does assistance mean? Clause 4(1) is perfectly clear:

“The attending doctor of a person who has made a valid declaration may prescribe medicines for that person to enable that person to end their own life”.

There is no lack of clarity there. We may disagree over whether this is a desirable or an undesirable Bill, but the idea that people in the country do not understand the issues because of the wording of the Bill is simply fanciful.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, with great respect to my noble friend Lord Pannick, I disagree, and totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. There is another issue beyond clarity here. One of the issues that was raised at Second Reading and, I think, on the first day in Committee was the concept that fragile and possibly deranged, angry and distressed elderly people coming into hospital have of the nature of their status as patients. The use of the word “suicide” brings clarity for them, because it makes a very big difference to medical and nursing practitioners, who can quite clearly see that they will not be involved in a process of assisted dying. It is, effectively, suicide, and that limits any notion of how they might feel when they feel that somebody is not really worth supporting in hospital. This is a major problem and will become an increasing one. We see the increasing difficulties in the health service when dealing with cancer care at the moment and the provision of drugs. There will be pressures on budgets and increasing pressures on patients who will feel under pressure to take a decision that is not entirely theirs. I therefore support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I see that I have spoken for 12 minutes and want to bring my remarks to a close.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Well, I would bring my remarks to a close, but my admiration for the noble Lord who has just stood up is almost unallayed, and I shall therefore give way.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful. I just want to ask for clarification. The noble Lord’s Amendment 13, as I understand it, would specify the identity of the doctors who may make the relevant declaration for Clause 2 purposes. However, what if those doctors, for whatever reason, are opposed to the Bill, or Act of Parliament, and do not wish to participate? Should the patient then be prevented from taking advantage of this legislation?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Uncharacteristically, the noble Lord makes an entirely false point. The first response is that my amendment does not specify any doctor. The second response is that for those who are registered with general practitioners—I guess, the vast majority of the population—there are almost no single-handed practitioners left in this country. Therefore, within the group of general practitioners with whom the patient is registered—the right word is “registered”—for this purpose, there will be a choice of doctors. In any event, the noble Lord knows well that it is intended that there should be a conscience clause placed in this legislation, and there will be doctors who will simply, out of conscience, not certify that patients have the diagnosis required for the gateway.