European Union Referendum Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dobbs]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that fascinating point. So much has already been said about how we should not be chopping our constitution into pieces in a piecemeal fashion. That is something that I think the whole House, including this side of the House, should consider very carefully.

Do we today want to add weight to the views of those who regard us as unaccountable panjandrums—the unwashed, the unelected? Where will that leave us? It would be like passing around the rope to those who want to hang us. Ultimately, matters of the franchise have to fall within the privileged remit of the Commons, just like matters of finance, as matters for those who have been elected with a duty to decide. In my view, we would be overstretching our rights and certainly overstretching our wisdom if we were to take this matter further. This is one barricade we should not build. I will continue to support the cause of young people, but I cannot support this amendment. The referendum is waiting; we should get on with it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, there are many reasons for supporting the Government today, all of which were given by the Minister, but I have to say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that I do not agree that financial privilege is a reason to support the Government. It is an obscure subject, and I commend to the House the very helpful paper published by Dr Meg Russell and Mr Daniel Gover of the Constitution Unit of UCL in March 2014.

Financial privilege did not prevent the other place from addressing the merits of this House’s amendment; equally, the fact that financial privilege was asserted by the House of Commons after the certification by the Speaker does not prevent the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, from bringing forward her amendment in lieu. It does not prevent this House voting on the merits of the amendment—or, as I see it, its lack of merit.

As I understood him, the Minister accepted that that is the case. The Constitution Unit paper concludes on page 13 that,

“it is not considered contrary to the convention for the Lords to respond to financial privilege with … an amendment in lieu … for as many rounds of ping pong as it wishes”.

The normal rules of ping-pong apply. Therefore, financial privilege is a distraction rather than being central to this debate. That is not to dispute the supremacy of the elected Chamber, especially on the issue of the franchise, but that is a different matter. For the reasons given by the Minister, I shall be supporting the Government in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I intervened earlier, and I would like to take up the point I made in that intervention in a moment. I begin by saying a little about the substance of the proposal about votes at 16. I remain of the view, as does my Front Bench, that this is an inappropriate vehicle to carry out such an important constitutional change. The danger is that we have had a precedent of changing the franchise in the Scottish situation, and if we were to persist and succeed on this issue this evening, it would be yet another precedent. That would prejudice a longer-term, overall survey of what we ought to do about the age at which people are entitled to vote.

Having said that, if one looks back to 1969, which is the last time we debated it, on that occasion there was very widespread consultation. If we were to have another Bill on the issue, there would have to be widespread consultation. On this occasion, to the best of my knowledge, there has been virtually no consultation whatever. Back in 1969, when the issue had been widely consulted on, I said to my secretary, “If I get a single letter”—at the time, I had 100 letters or so a day—“asking me to give the vote, I will vote for it”. I did not get a single such letter.

Nowadays, we get thousands of emails sent to us. I have not had a single email from someone in this age group saying, “I am a highly intelligent, very politically motivated person”, or even, “I voted in the Scottish referendum”, and “I would like the vote”. I have had no such representation. I believe that this is being generated inside the House itself.

I turn to financial privilege, which has been raised. I totally reject what the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, said: that this is somehow a massive conspiracy suddenly cooked up in the other place to override us, and so on. I do not think that is so. The procedure on financial privilege is well established. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs said, it has been used time and again. The reality is that if the Commons decides to reject something, as it has done very decisively on this issue several times, a committee is sent behind the Chair to look at the reasons why the Commons is rejecting the Lords amendment. That committee sits behind the Chair, it is advised by the clerks and not infrequently comes up with the proposal that it has relied on on this occasion. It is a quite normal process and in no sense a sudden new conspiracy. I am not at all sure about the point made by my noble friend on the Front Bench as to whether that is the only option that that committee has to put forward as a reason. I believe that, if it wished, it could put forward other reasons as well. But, normally, it comes up with a resolution as far as this is concerned.

What is happening is perfectly normal and not, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggests, in some sense a conspiracy. As my noble friend said a moment or two ago, we really have to consider very carefully whether it is appropriate to bounce the amendment back yet again. I believe that the answer very clearly is no, because the response that we are going to get at the other end is equally clear—it is going to be to reject whatever amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely, puts forward. So the sensible course of action is to reject Amendment A1 and accept Amendment A. That would be an appropriate thing to do.

Finally, one might consider why there is such an enormous apparent division on this issue between this House and the other place on the age when it is appropriate to vote. This is not a partisan issue and not something where everyone has clear-cut positions. It is rather curious—but perhaps this House is more expert on grandchildren and the other place is more expert on children. They have clearly taken the view that they do not think that their children should have the vote at the age that is suggested. We should respect that view, go along with the amendment proposed from the government Front Bench and reject that put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely.

Ministerial Code

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Clarification is very much in the eye of the beholder. A Minister reading the Ministerial Code might feel better or less well informed by the subsequent iteration of this code but, as I said in relation to the Civil Service Code, from time to time Prime Ministers feel that the matter might be expressed in one way rather than another. What it does not do is alter the nature of the obligation.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister assure the House that the change has absolutely nothing to do with government concern about judgments of the European Court of Human Rights with which they do not agree?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord knows only too well the Government’s obligation in relation to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. There is an obligation under Article 46 of the European convention, whereby parties to a judgment undertake to abide by the final judgment of that court, but those judgments are declaratory. We and previous Governments have been in regular communication with the Committee of Ministers over how best to reflect those judgments in our own law. That is an iterative process, which involves Ministers going from time to time to Strasbourg. At the moment, Parliament has given no indication—I suspect that this is what lies behind the question—that it wants to give prisoners the vote.

Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, but I have just received an email from a friend who is a magistrate. I shall not say where because these days one cannot do that. It is worth putting on the record. He writes:

“Courts are closing in great numbers with another 90 about to be closed and there will be more after this. Defendants and witnesses now have to travel great distances. Some cannot afford it so plead guilty when they may not be. Also, it has removed the fundamental right of citizens to be tried by their peers as the cost of the criminal court charge is so high and beyond most defendants’ means, so they are pleading guilty. It has removed the need of the CPS to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt. Not many well-off people appear in court so it is the poorest who are being hit with a double whammy”.

That is the view of a serving magistrate sitting on the Bench today.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on this subject, I am on the side of the two Jeremys: the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and Jeremy Bentham. In 1795, Jeremy Bentham wrote:

“The statesman who contributes to put justice out of reach … is an accessary after the fact to every crime”.

For Bentham, such a law tax was a denial of justice. These regulations are a denial of justice, and they are a denial of justice for the two reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks. First, because the sums involved—£150 up to £1,200—may well encourage innocent people to plead guilty, and, secondly, because the magistrate or judge has no discretion to vary the charge by reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender—in particular, the offender’s means.

I will add a further point. There is a much fairer and more lucrative way forward for a Lord Chancellor who wants to help balance the books by imposing a court charge. Let the Lord Chancellor give the judges and magistrates a discretion to charge much higher court fees to defendants who are convicted of serious crimes and who can afford to pay. The drug dealers, the bank robbers and the fraudsters can be charged the true cost of their occupying the courts for weeks in trials that end in convictions if the judge or magistrate in their discretion thinks that it is appropriate to do so. The regulations could then give the courts a proper discretion not to impose on the small fry charges that may well induce guilty pleas from innocent people and may well result in the imposition of orders for payment from people who cannot afford them. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to test the opinion of the House on these regulations, he will certainly have my support in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, the points to be made against these regulations are so obvious and so strong that really they do not need to be made yet again in tonight’s debate. The problems—the total lack of judicial discretion, the obvious impossibility of recovery in so many cases and the risk of excessive pressure on defendants to plead guilty to avoid the charge escalating from £150 to £520, or, in an each-way case, from £180 to £1,000—were all foreseen by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, in Committee in July of last year. They have all since been the subject of widespread criticism by a series of distinguished legal commentators in a succession of legal periodicals such as the Criminal Law Review, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly and so forth. Professor Nicola Padfield, a most distinguished legal academic and criminologist and now master of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, described them as “astonishing” and quoted another commentator as saying that they were the most unworthy provisions on the statute book. The president of the Law Society called them “outrageous”.

Inquiries Act 2005 (Select Committee Report)

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on behalf of all noble Lords I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, for his distinguished service to this House since 1983. We wish him a very happy retirement. Noble Lords will know that his grandfather, David Lloyd George, famously described this House as,

“a body of 500 men chosen at random from amongst the unemployed”.

I cannot believe that the noble Viscount has ever not been employed on some worthwhile task. It is especially appropriate that he has played so valuable a role in the discussions on the role of this House and how to move this House—now composed of rather more than 500 men and women—to the next stage of reform.

Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, I have never had the pleasure of sharing a tent with the noble Viscount, but I am one of many noble Lords who have benefited enormously from his advice about matters relating to this House. That advice has been valued by all of us because it has been based on knowledge, wisdom, kindness—a much underrated quality—and humility, as your Lordships have again heard today. The noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, will be much missed on these Benches and around the House.

I join other noble Lords in welcoming this impressive and stimulating report. I want to focus, as other noble Lords have done, on paragraphs 243 to 251 of the report, which address warning letters. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, have mentioned, those paragraphs address the need under the current rules to send letters to those who are the subject of criticism in a draft report, giving them an opportunity to comment before the final report is drawn up and published—an obligation that adds a very substantial amount of work for an inquiry, and a very substantial delay before publication. The committee is correct at paragraph 251 to recommend that these rules need to be replaced by a discretion for the chairman as to whether to give a person who is to be criticised in a report an opportunity to respond. Given that the Inquiry Rules do not apply, as we have heard, to many inquiries, including Chilcot, the practice needs to change as well.

This issue requires consideration of a little history and a little law. The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, mentioned the Profumo inquiry. When Lord Denning inquired into the Profumo case in 1963, he acted, as he said in his report, as,

“detective, inquisitor, advocate and judge”,

hearing all the evidence in secret. This led to the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Salmon, as he then was. He understandably concluded that future inquiries should do more to ensure justice for those involved. That led to the practice of witnesses being given a “Salmon letter”, setting out before they give evidence matters of interest and concern. The process has become increasingly legalistic in the worst sense of that word. Some advocates even argued on behalf of their clients that one party to the inquiry should be able to issue a Salmon letter to another party, seeking to transfer culpability—a practice that became known as a “smoked Salmon letter”.

The practice also developed whereby if an inquiry intends to criticise an individual in the final report, that individual has to be given the relevant sections of the draft report in order that he or she can comment before publication. This process is known as Maxwellisation, and is now enshrined in Rules 13 to 15 of the Inquiry Rules. It is ironic indeed that the law and practice so commemorates Robert Maxwell because he brought a case against Department of Trade inspectors in 1974, complaining about a report critical of his business practices. The complaint was that he had not been shown the draft report before publication. The Court of Appeal rejected that complaint: Lord Denning, sitting with others, said that Maxwell was not entitled to see the draft report. Why not? It was because he had been fairly treated during the inquiry. He had had a proper opportunity to comment during the inquiry on the allegations in the case, so fairness did not require yet another opportunity at the end of the process.

This general legal principle was also stated by Lord Diplock in the Appellate Committee of this House, also in 1974, in the case of Hoffmann-La Roche. Lord Diplock pointed out—this point was made today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—that even in a court of law, once a fair hearing has been given to the witnesses, the rules of natural justice do not require the judge to present a draft judgment on which the parties are then entitled to comment before the judge hands down the final decision. If that is right in a court of law, it is all the more so when we are talking about the report of an inquiry—which, however important, imposes no criminal or civil liability on anyone. So it must be right, as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf, Lord Cullen and Lord Morris, have all suggested, that Rules 13 to 15 must go. They are far too absolute, and there should be a discretion for the inquiry chairman because exceptionally there may be cases where fairness indeed demands that at the end of the process the chairman goes back to a specific witness on a specific point—because, for example, a significant new piece of evidence has emerged or the witness had not previously had an opportunity to comment. However, subject to that, fairness during the hearing suffices.

There is one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, complained in his speech that at the Scott inquiry, counsel to the inquiry, Presiley Baxendale QC “permanently scarred”—the noble Lord’s words—witnesses by the ferocity of her cross-examination. I know Miss Baxendale well. She was, before her retirement, a member of my chambers, Blackstone Chambers. A more polite and more reasonable person it would be difficult to find. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that an inquiry is there to find the facts. To do so depends on counsel to the inquiry fearlessly and without favour asking difficult questions of witnesses who may be reluctant, for a variety of reasons, to tell the full story. It is undoubtedly not a pleasant experience to be cross-examined, but Miss Baxendale was not there to make friends. She did her job. So did this Select Committee. The House is very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, and the other members of the committee.

Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

At end to insert “but that this House regrets that the draft order unfairly and inappropriately increases fees for civil proceedings above costs and so damages access to justice”.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, last week, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Grayling, told the Global Law Summit that he is,

“incredibly proud of our legal heritage”.

Today, we are debating an order that he has brought forward which will do incredible damage to the legal heritage because it will impede access to justice. As the Minister mentioned, this order will substantially increase the fees that claimants must pay when they start legal proceedings. If you want to sue for between £10,000 and £200,000, you will need to pay an upfront fee of 5% of your claim. To claim £200,000, you will need to find £10,000. That is a 576% increase on the current fee of £1,515.

The Minister is of course correct to say that Parliament approved Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which authorises the Lord Chancellor to prescribe fees above the cost of providing the court service to litigants. That is the power that Mr Grayling is now exercising. But is it a fair, reasonable or proportionate exercise of that power? Plainly not. For litigants to have to pay such substantial sums in advance of bringing a legal claim will inevitably, in practice, deny access to the court for many traders, small businesses and people suing for personal injuries.

The Government have suggested that court fees will be a small fraction of the legal expenses which a claimant will incur, but many claimants will not have to pay their legal expenses at the outset of proceedings. They will not have such a substantial sum of money available at the outset of the case, or they may be able to pay these court fees only by doing without competent legal representation. The deterrent effect on litigation will, I think, make it most unlikely that the increased charges will produce the anticipated £120 million which the Government hope to produce by this order.

The order will have further damaging consequences. Unscrupulous debtors will be far less likely to pay up if they suspect that their creditor cannot afford the court fees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He is quite right: the recital refers to the fact that there is an exercise of the power conferred by Section 92(1) and (2) of the Courts Act and the consultation in accordance with Section 92(5) and (6). There is no explicit reference to Section 92(3). However, in purporting to exercise those powers, it would be said, although not specifically recited, that he was exercising them in accordance with the remainder of that section.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken—and spoken passionately—in this debate. The Minister said that the order contains sensible and proportionate provisions. As your Lordships have heard tonight, these proposals are going to do inevitable and substantial damage to access to justice. It is simply perverse for the Government to dispute that many small businesses and many personal injury claimants are going to be unable to pay an up-front £10,000 fee as the price of access to the courts.

The noble Lord’s and the Government’s argument comes to this. Funds are needed to pay for the court system, but there is no point in having a civil court system if ordinary people are to be charged an entry fee which they cannot afford to bring basic claims for breach of contract and personal injuries. The Minister described litigation—I wrote this down, because it was a very striking phrase—as an “optional activity”, like a skiing holiday or a visit to a three-starred Michelin restaurant. As the Minister well knows from his experience as a very successful barrister, for many people—those suing for debts or to recover compensation for personal injury—litigation is often a necessity to keep your business alive or to maintain any quality of life. The Minister is absolutely right that there are already many impediments to access to justice. That is surely no justification—no excuse—for the state to erect further high barriers.

The fee remission provisions to which the Minister, perhaps somewhat desperately, referred are not going to assist other than in exceptional cases. Nor is it any answer that court fees can be recovered from the other side if the claim succeeds. Claimants need to find the fee up front.

The Minister referred to my earlier Motions of Regret with a reference to Frank Sinatra. To change the music somewhat, “Je ne regrette rien”. Happily, the courts have done more than regret. In a series of cases they have quashed Mr Grayling’s regulations which we have regretted in this House. My regret—my astonishment—that the Government should bring forward an order of this nature is mitigated only by my optimism that the courts will inevitably add this order to the long list of Mr Grayling’s regulations which have been declared unlawful in the past three years. With thanks to all noble Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment to the Motion withdrawn.

Court Fees

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

No, I do not accept that characterisation of the Government’s policies in general or the enhanced court fees. The Government are committed to providing effective access to justice and a good and satisfactory court system which is paid for by litigants. The qualification to our enhanced court fees is that the 90% who are below £10,000 will not pay increased court fees, and we believe that the cost of the court system should be borne by those bringing larger claims.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that the Lord Chancellor told the Global Law Summit that he is incredibly proud of our legal heritage? The next time the Minister sits down with the Lord Chancellor to discuss our legal heritage, will he point out that the best way to manifest that incredible pride would be to abandon regulations that will do incredible damage to access to justice because they will require traders and businesses who want to sue for £200,000 to pay an upfront fee of £10,000, which many of them will simply be unable to afford?

[Lord Faulks]

On the general point, there was reference in both questions to the Global Law Summit. Many pooh-poohed this enterprise, which noble Lords may now realise attracted more than 2,000 delegates, more than 100 Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General and representatives of more than 100 countries, all of whom came to celebrate our heritage of the rule of law. I remain an adherent to that, as I am sure other noble Lords are. Nothing about the contents of that conference in any way derogated from that principle.

As to the more specific point, there are different provisions depending on the size of the claim. As the noble Lord will know, court fees usually form a small part of the overall bill compared with lawyers’ fees, which tend to be much higher. We do not believe that the increased court fees will act as a significant inhibition on claims.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2015 Lords Chamber

I hope that I have dispelled many of the concerns regarding these reforms, and reassured your Lordships that these provisions are a sensible and proportionate means of dealing with a mischief that we intend to tackle, without undermining the discretion that should properly rest with judges. I therefore ask the House to support the government amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am very pleased that the Government have given way on the issue of principle in Motion B and have indicated that the identity of those contributing up to £1,500 funding for a judicial review will not need to be disclosed. The Minister said that our earlier debates on these issues had been highly intelligent. Without, I hope, debasing the currency, I want to make some observations.

The issue of principle is that the courts will now retain a power to hear a judicial review even if it is said that the alleged defect would not have made a difference in the individual’s case. I would have preferred the concession to be drafted in more generous language than an exceptional public interest, but concession it is. As the Lord Chancellor said in the House of Commons on 13 January at col. 811, and as the Minister confirmed this afternoon, it will be for the judges to decide how and when that test should apply. Indeed it will.

In applying the criterion, I am sure that the courts will have very much in mind Mr Grayling’s explanation of the purpose of the clause. He said that it is designed to prevent judicial reviews being heard when they are,

“based on relatively minor procedural defects in a process of consultation … That is what these proposals are all about”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/15; col. 812.]

I am confident that the courts will have careful regard to those explanations by the Lord Chancellor and that if the judicial review is not concerned with minor procedural defects but with allegations of systematic or deliberate wrongdoing, or errors of law in the interpretation of statutes which have a general effect, the discretion will be exercised so that the case is heard in the traditional way, as it should be.

In applying the clause, I would also expect the courts to pay close regard to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, then Lord Chief Justice, who I am delighted to see in his place today, said in R v Offen, 2001, 1 Weekly Law Reports 253. In the Court of Appeal, the noble and learned Lord was considering Section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which requires courts to impose an automatic life sentence on a person convicted of a second serious crime,

“unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances”.

At paragraph 79 of his judgment, Lord Woolf said that the meaning of “exceptional” depended on the statutory purpose, and where the statutory mischief did not exist, the case was indeed exceptional.

Applying that approach, as I am sure that the courts will do in the present context, the judges will be able to say—and I hope that they will—that the statutory purpose here is the very limited one identified by Mr Grayling of striking out judicial reviews which raised what he describes as “relatively minor procedural defects”.

Other cases, particularly those raising allegations of substantial errors of law or of systematic wrongdoing are outside the legislative aim and are therefore, on the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, exceptional. They can be heard in the normal way. For those reasons, I am confident that we have arrived at a tolerable result at the end of this saga.

We have arrived at a sensible solution because, and only because, this House was prepared twice to disagree with the House of Commons. It should be noted that the concern about Mr Grayling’s proposals was expressed across this House. My amendments were supported by a very large majority of Cross Benchers who voted; they were signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The amendments were supported by the Labour Benches, led on this occasion by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with his customary wit and fire; he signed the original amendments. There was a very substantial rebellion in support of retaining judicial discretion from the Liberal Democrat Benches; the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also signed the original amendments. Also of importance on the Floor of the House and behind the scenes, there was substantial support from noble Lords on the Conservative Benches who are wise and experienced, and respectful of the value of the rule of law, with some forceful speeches in support of retaining judicial discretion, in particular from the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I am very grateful for all that support.

I express particular thanks to the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who has assisted the House by the force and clarity—indeed, the good humour—of his advocacy as the acceptable face of the Lord Chancellor’s department at all stages of the Bill. I know that he has worked tirelessly and successfully behind the scenes to arrive at a compromise which can be agreed by the Lord Chancellor and by noble Lords concerned about this clause. That is a remarkable achievement.

I should add one further observation and I do so with regret, but it needs to be said. I regret that on 13 January, when the House of Commons considered this matter for the final time, a Lord Chancellor again expressed comments that display an astonishing lack of understanding about the role of judicial review—one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. Judicial review does not, as Mr Grayling complained at col. 819, involve public bodies being “blackmailed”. He also suggested,

“severe doubts about whether secondary legislation should be subject to judicial review”.

These doubts appear to have no basis whatever other than the fact that the courts have, on a number of occasions in the last year, held that regulations made by the Lord Chancellor were outside the scope of his statutory powers.

Furthermore, judicial review is not, as the Lord Chancellor again suggested,

“now overtly used by campaign groups and third parties to seek to disrupt the process of government”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/15; cols. 819-20.]

Such comments make no sensible contribution to the debate. They demean the office of Lord Chancellor because they disrespect and undermine the vital role of judicial review in ensuring that the business of government is conducted lawfully.

However inconvenient and embarrassing it is to Mr Grayling to have his decisions repeatedly ruled to be unlawful by our courts, however much he may resent the delays and costs of government illegality being exposed in court and however much he may prefer to focus on the identity of the claimant rather than the substance of their legal complaint, it remains the vital role of judicial review in this country to hold Ministers and civil servants to account in public, not for the merits of their decisions but for their compliance with the law of the land as stated by Parliament. The discipline of the law plays a vital role in promoting the high standards of administration in this country that we are in danger of taking for granted. It helps to concentrate—and rightly so—the mind of a Minister or civil servant taking a decision whose legality he or she will be answerable for in public before an independent judge.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a very powerful speech. The Bill as it stands seems to me to involve no lack of clarity whatever. Clause 1(1) is perfectly clear:

“A person who is terminally ill may request and lawfully be provided with assistance to end his or her own life”.

What does assistance mean? Clause 4(1) is perfectly clear:

“The attending doctor of a person who has made a valid declaration may prescribe medicines for that person to enable that person to end their own life”.

There is no lack of clarity there. We may disagree over whether this is a desirable or an undesirable Bill, but the idea that people in the country do not understand the issues because of the wording of the Bill is simply fanciful.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, with great respect to my noble friend Lord Pannick, I disagree, and totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. There is another issue beyond clarity here. One of the issues that was raised at Second Reading and, I think, on the first day in Committee was the concept that fragile and possibly deranged, angry and distressed elderly people coming into hospital have of the nature of their status as patients. The use of the word “suicide” brings clarity for them, because it makes a very big difference to medical and nursing practitioners, who can quite clearly see that they will not be involved in a process of assisted dying. It is, effectively, suicide, and that limits any notion of how they might feel when they feel that somebody is not really worth supporting in hospital. This is a major problem and will become an increasing one. We see the increasing difficulties in the health service when dealing with cancer care at the moment and the provision of drugs. There will be pressures on budgets and increasing pressures on patients who will feel under pressure to take a decision that is not entirely theirs. I therefore support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I see that I have spoken for 12 minutes and want to bring my remarks to a close.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Well, I would bring my remarks to a close, but my admiration for the noble Lord who has just stood up is almost unallayed, and I shall therefore give way.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful. I just want to ask for clarification. The noble Lord’s Amendment 13, as I understand it, would specify the identity of the doctors who may make the relevant declaration for Clause 2 purposes. However, what if those doctors, for whatever reason, are opposed to the Bill, or Act of Parliament, and do not wish to participate? Should the patient then be prevented from taking advantage of this legislation?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Uncharacteristically, the noble Lord makes an entirely false point. The first response is that my amendment does not specify any doctor. The second response is that for those who are registered with general practitioners—I guess, the vast majority of the population—there are almost no single-handed practitioners left in this country. Therefore, within the group of general practitioners with whom the patient is registered—the right word is “registered”—for this purpose, there will be a choice of doctors. In any event, the noble Lord knows well that it is intended that there should be a conscience clause placed in this legislation, and there will be doctors who will simply, out of conscience, not certify that patients have the diagnosis required for the gateway.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

1: Clause 3, page 1, line 10, leave out “activity” and insert “act or omission”

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. It raises a drafting point, which will encourage even more noble Lords to leave, but it is a drafting point of some significance on this curious Bill.

The purpose of Clause 3, as the Minister explained on Report, is to make clear that the court, in considering a claim of negligence, must take account of the context in which the alleged negligence occurred. Of course, that is already what courts do—but we have had that debate. On Report, concern was expressed that the word “activity” in Clause 3 is too broad. The reason for the concern is very simple. We all agree, including the Minister, that it is not the intention of this clause that, when a doctor is sued for negligence for cutting off my right leg because I had a pain in my left leg, it should then be open to the doctor to plead in his or her defence, “I have been treating legs for 40 years and have never before made such a mistake”. We all agree that the doctor should not be able to rely on such a matter in the defence. What the claimant is concerned about, and what the court must address, is what happened on the specific occasion when that claimant was treated.

The Minister confirmed that that is indeed the Government’s intention. He said on Report on 15 December, in answering questions about a hypo-thetically negligent accountant, that,

“it would be the particular tax return or the particular piece of advice”,

which mattered. He added:

“It would be no good for them to say, ‘In the 99 other years in which I did this particular act”—

accountants have a very long professional career—

“I did a good job’”.—[Official Report, 15/12/14; col. 37-38.]

So we all agree that that should remain the law. The problem is that the word “activity” in the first line of Clause 3 suggests the contrary. It requires the court to have regard to “carrying out the activity” in the course of which the alleged negligence occurred. However, the word “activity” might suggest the general practice of medicine, accountancy or whatever function is performed by the defendant. Since we all wish that the court should continue to focus on the treatment of this claimant on the occasion when the alleged negligence occurred, I suggest that the words “act or omission” are much more appropriate than the broader term “activity”.

Amendment 2, in the name of the Minister, would replace “generally” with “predominantly”. That is an improvement to Clause 3 that I support, but it does not address the problem that I am concerned about, caused by the inappropriate use of the word “activity”. I beg to move.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because, speaking as a judge of 28 years’ experience, it concerns me that judges in future are going to have to deal with the Bill in its present form. It would be so much easier and less muddling for them if we managed to make the amendment for which we are contending today. Everyone agrees that Clause 3 is the only part of the Bill that is intended to effect any change whatever to the law. Its essential purpose was set out by the Minister at some length on Report, but really one can simply cite this passage:

“If a defendant was really predominantly doing all that he or she could reasonably be expected to do to look after the safety of an individual, why should there not be some reflection of that fact in the determination of liability?”.—[Official Report, 15/12/14; col. 36.]

So far, so good—in all events, it is too late now, at Third Reading, to question the desirability of making this sort of change without taking any soundings from, for example, the Law Commission, a point that was stressed strongly on Report by my noble and learned friend Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe—but the real difficulty with the present wording was crystallised on Report in the exchange between the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has already made some reference to that exchange, but perhaps it is worth setting it out at a little greater length. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, raised the question of what would arise if, say, someone sued their accountant for negligence with regard to the completion of their tax return, and he suggested that under Clause 3 in its present form the accountant could say:

“‘The activity that I carry out is doing people’s tax returns and advising them on that; I have done it for the last 10 years and I am now going to tell the court about my record’. How do the words in the clause prevent that from being done?”.

The Minister responded by saying that,

“the Bill is concerned with the activity in question, so it would be the particular tax return or the particular piece of advice, because that is what the Bill says”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in turn said:

“It would not be this tax return, surely, but the activity of advising on tax returns generally”.

The Minister’s response—this is the final quotation from that exchange—was:

“I respectfully disagree with that interpretation because it is concerned with the activity in question, ‘in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred’. It would not therefore, deal”—

the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has cited this—

“with the 99 years of accurate tax returns but would focus on the particular tax return that is the subject of the claim in negligence. That is the correct interpretation of the particular clause”.—[Official Report, 15/12/14; col. 37.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to this entertaining debate. I remain concerned about the width of Clause 3 but I am not going to divide the House. To use the Minister’s analogy, there is no point in crying over spilt yoghurt.

Mr Grayling, the Lord Chancellor, has told us—and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, has confirmed from his Antarctic experience traversing crevasses—that men and women up and down the land are standing ready to volunteer for social action. They are preparing themselves for acts of heroism, waiting only to receive the message that Parliament has approved this Bill to remove the concerns that they otherwise have about litigation. Then off to the youth clubs and old-age homes they will go to volunteer and into the lakes they will dive to rescue those in danger, and in those circumstances it would be irresponsible of me to delay the Bill any longer.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was less than complimentary about the Bill, but surely, so long as negligence cases are brought in this land, it will stand as a monument to the jurisprudential and policy achievements of Lord Chancellor Grayling. It is a fitting testament to the Lord Chancellor:

“Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”.

This always was and it remains the most ridiculous piece of legislation approved by Parliament in a very long time. However, I pay genuine tribute—I emphasise “genuine tribute”—to the Minister, who has applied his formidable skills of reason and eloquence, and has done so with consummate courtesy, to a text that would barely muster a pass mark in GCSE legal studies, if there is such a thing.

When the noble Lord was appointed to his position on the Front Bench, he would no doubt have looked forward to debating important issues of law and justice, and I doubt that he expected that he would be the straight man in Mr Grayling’s comedy routine, requiring courts to consider whether a defendant has acted heroically. Well, the Minister has heroically dived into the lake created by Mr Grayling’s conference speech. He has rescued this pitiful creature of a Bill—and it is a pitiful creature—and has emerged from the lake with his hair still dry and his suit entirely uncrumpled, he is not even out of breath and he has done it all with a straight face. If I may say so, that is deeply impressive, which is more than can be said for this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, we have had our fun on this Bill at Second Reading and in Committee. I, for my part, cannot remember a legislative proposal that has been the subject of more sustained ridicule and derision. We now come to the serious business. I have been studying and practising law for 40 years—not as long as many noble Lords, but a long time—and I cannot remember a more pointless, indeed fatuous, piece of legislation than Clause 2 of this Bill, with the possible exception of Clauses 3 and 4 of this Bill. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has explained and as we have previously discussed—and as is not in dispute—Clause 2 will not change the law. Courts already have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. I referred to the leading cases at Second Reading. The Minister has at no stage suggested that there are any cases in which courts have ignored such obviously relevant factors.

What then is the point of Clause 2? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has already explained, the Lord Chancellor, Mr Grayling, has been very clear. He wants Parliament to send a message. But if the object of the legislation is to encourage people to volunteer and to encourage heroism without people being concerned about possible litigation—the objective referred to a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts—Mr Grayling should buy a half-page advertisement in the Sun or the Daily Mail or, if he wants to reach younger citizens, open a Facebook page or set up a Twitter account, and simply tell people the obvious truth, that the law is already on their side. That would be a much cheaper and more effective way in which to communicate a message than to take this sad Bill through all its stages in Parliament.

It is simply ridiculous for the Government to suggest that people who are currently inhibited from volunteering by a fear of litigation are somehow going to step forward when they hear—if they do—that we have approved Clause 2 of the Bill. Mr Grayling cannot seriously think that around the dinner table tonight, or in the Dog and Duck public house, or anywhere, people will say to themselves, “I see that Clause 2 has passed its latest stages in the House of Lords. I look forward to its speedy enactment next year because then I will be much more willing to volunteer and act like a hero, my concerns about litigation having been removed”.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It is not just people in the saloon bar of the Dog and Duck who are influenced by this; it is also the professional advisers. In the example that we discussed in Committee, the problem was that many solicitors offering advice to people actually provide advice that might be changed by this legislation.

[Lord Pannick]

With great respect, there is even less justification if we are going to ask the question about professional advice from solicitors, because we are surely entitled to assume that solicitors are capable of understanding basic law. This is not complicated law: it is trite, obvious law that already protects those who volunteer and act as heroes.

It has been said at previous stages of the Bill that we often legislate in the hope of changing people’s behaviour. Reference has been made, for example, to the Race Relations Act. But what is different and what is exceptional about Clause 2 is that it does not purport to change the law one jot or iota. All that it will do is enable Mr Grayling to say that he is in favour of social action; and when we come to Clause 4, he will be able to say that he is in favour of heroism, as if the rest of us were not. I object to legislation being used by the Government to send what is no more than a political message.

In paragraph 125 of its excellent report, published last week, on the office of Lord Chancellor, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee stated that the Lord Chancellor should have,

“a clear understanding of his or her duties in relation to the rule of law and a willingness to speak up for that principle in dealings with ministerial colleagues, including the Prime Minister”.

The Lord Chancellor ought to understand that it is part—an important part—of the rule of law that the statute book has a role and a purpose: it is a purpose distinct from a party conference speech or a party election broadcast. Clause 2 simply debases the parliamentary currency and it therefore undermines the rule of law. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, decides to test the opinion of the House on Clause 2, he will certainly have my support.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke in Committee in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I am not going to repeat what I said then. I might take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about this matter being discussed in the silent halls of the Middle Temple. If you give ordinary police officers, firemen and ambulance crews two sets of words about the same thing, you are going to cause a lot of confusion a long way before it gets to the Middle Temple.

In the gap since we spoke about this in Committee, this law has achieved something that I have not seen in this House before. I know I have not been here that long, but I have never heard of a particular statute being used as an example in another discussion altogether when it has not even been passed. In the debate put forward on 4 December by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, about the procedures and practices of the House, this Bill got not just one but two mentions. It was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who is in his place next to me, and by the noble Lord, Lord Dykes. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, said that,

“we might be saved from legislation such as the absurd Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill”.—[Official Report, 4/12/14; col. 1495.]

Later, the Bill was described as,

“a badly drafted, silly Bill that is all to do with ‘manifesto-itis’ rather than any deep legislative urge on behalf of the Executive”.—[Official Report, 4/12/14; col. 1499.]

I do not think we should proceed with this matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, less than a week ago we debated the Government’s amendments to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, and inflicted defeats in relation to proposals affecting young offenders and, even more significantly in terms of their constitutional importance, two changes to the procedures for judicial review.

Today we return to this Bill, a piece of vanity legislation if ever there was one, which, except for Clause 3—as we have heard—adds nothing to the provisions of the Compensation Act 2006, which, by implication, it purports to amend. I concur entirely with the critique of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others of this muddled attempt to deal with a problem for whose very existence there is a complete lack of evidence—a Bill that is very badly drafted, in any case.

At Second Reading, I acknowledged that the House is properly cautious about declining to give a Second Reading to Bills emanating from the Commons, and there is a similar reluctance totally to destroy Bills in the way in which the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, would achieve if passed, which would leave the Bill consisting of only its title. However, if we were to go so far on a Bill as feeble as this, it would actually strengthen the hand of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the vastly more important and damaging provisions of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, which we have sent back to the Commons with our amendments. I fear that he would not hesitate to cast this House as a recalcitrant and obstructive group, placing us alongside the left-wing pressure groups and campaigners which he conjured up as the phantom proponents of judicial review and opponents of his attempts to undermine it. It would, I suggest, make it more unlikely for the Lord Chancellor to exercise political responsibility in relation to the amendments on secure colleges and JR by accepting them, or, should he fail to do so, for MPs on the Government Benches to demonstrate political heroism in a just cause by voting for them.

For those reasons, I regret that I cannot advise opposition Members to support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment to Clause 2, nor his amendment to Clause 4—in any case, the Government have tabled an amendment to it that reflects one moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in Committee, to which I added my name. I do that with regret because I share entirely the noble and learned Lord’s criticisms of the vacuous nature of the Bill; but it seems to me, for the reasons that I have given, unwise for the House to join him in the Lobbies. I say that with the more trepidation as I understand that he is the chairman of the East Sussex Rifle Association; I fear that I may end up as a target—if not for the noble and learned Lord, then for some of the members of that association.

There is nevertheless a serious issue as to the role of the House in these strange circumstances. However, in relation to Clause 3, I will be asking the House to agree that it should not stand part of the Bill, essentially because that clause seeks to effect a change in the law that is unacceptable for reasons which I will adduce when we come to debate that amendment. However, I fear that I shall not be joining the noble and learned Lord in the Lobby—

[Lord Pannick]

Is the noble Lord saying that the Opposition are not going to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Berwick, because, although they think that Clause 2 is absolutely terrible, it is not the worst legislative proposal that Mr Grayling has brought forward in this Session?

[Lord Beecham]

There is a lot of competition in that respect. I merely say that on this Bill it is not worth the House taking a position that is a departure from its normal practice. I genuinely fear that the Lord Chancellor will use such a vote to muster support against the much more serious amendments that we have sent back for the Commons to consider. That will not help us in sticking to those amendments, should they come back to us. That is why I will not be in either Lobby this evening if the noble and learned Lord decides to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I think I know what the most reverend Primate means. With respect, as I said on a previous occasion, describing a statute as sending a message is too simplistic a way of explaining what we do in Parliament. We do not legislate in a vacuum. For example, we identify particular issues, whether they are modern slavery or revenge porn, which became part of an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. We pass laws which serve the purpose of clarifying the law but they also reflect what people in society think we ought to be doing in Parliament. I rely on what my noble friend Lord Hodgson said about the desire for neighbours to be unshackled. We need more volunteers; we need people to be unshackled. This law may make a modest contribution and I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I may ask him whether there is any precedent that he can cite for our legislating not to change the law but to provide reassurance.

[Lord Faulks]

I am not sure that off the top of my head I can think of a particular legislative provision that provides reassurance, but part of the function of much legislation is to provide reassurance and protection to the vulnerable. There is nothing novel about producing a piece of legislation which, in a difficult area, provides some clarity and a modest degree of reassurance in an area of considerable uncertainty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, Clause 3 is the one clause in the Bill which the Government acknowledge embodies a substantive change in the law. In Committee, I moved an amendment to remove “generally” from the requirement on the court to consider whether,

“the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty … demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

Neither at Second Reading nor in Committee did the Minister define the meaning of “a generally responsible approach”, and in replying to the debate in Committee he acknowledged that the term was “unusual” in statutory terms. Indeed, he indicated that he would,

“consider carefully whether and to what extent it adds anything to what is in the clause at the moment and whether, on balance, it takes the matter any further”.—[Official Report, 18/11/14; col. 414.]

We await with bated breath the outcome of the Minister’s deliberations along with his response to the amendment tabled by his noble friend, who is seeking to ratchet up “generally” to “predominantly” in the proposed clause.

I have to say that neither term is satisfactory in terms of either definition, which is entirely lacking, or effect. Why should someone suffering damage through an act of negligence or breach of statutory duty be denied compensation on the grounds that the act or omission was in effect a first offence, or at any rate a rare offence? What, for that matter, constitutes a “responsible” approach? How does the Minister define those terms? Moreover, and crucially, the clause is not limited to social action, responsibility or heroism, terms which are in themselves undefined and undefinable, or to personal injury cases. We are dealing not just with safety but, in terms of the clause, with other interests. As I reported in Committee, the Minister in the House of Commons, Mr Vara, affirmed that the clause,

“could in principle be applicable in relation to other instances of negligence such as damage to property or economic loss where issues of safety may not necessarily be relevant”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 693.]

Why should a negligent builder, medical practitioner, accountant, surveyor or even solicitor—I declare my interest—escape liability for what might even be catastrophic damage because he has been hitherto “predominantly” responsible? Negligence can lead to large losses outside the realm of personal injury. Is not the reality that this badly drafted clause is yet another concession to the insurance lobby, which ordinarily would of course stand behind the defendant in such claims?

Many Members of your Lordships’ House will have received an e-mail today from one of those pressure groups which so exercise the Lord Chancellor in relation to judicial review. In this case, the pressure group is one which we can be confident he entirely approves of: it is the CBI. Its curiously worded communication supports Clause 3 on the grounds that it,

“provides better protection against accidents for those firms—particularly the small and medium sized companies that already have good health and safety processes in place”.

Of course, it does nothing of the sort. It provides “better protection” against claims for negligence arising from accidents and it extends, of course, to large employers as well as medium-sized and small employers.

The e-mail goes on to suggest that,

“this clause will encourage the courts to recognise that safety is a shared responsibility”,

as if the courts do not already do so, and do not make findings of contributory negligence when a claimant fails to take proper precautions, or dismiss a claim when he is wholly responsible. Of course, again, the CBI ignores the fact that the clause extends to all types of negligence, including by small and medium-sized businesses which might well find themselves a victim of negligence other than of the kind leading to personal injury.

As the CBI’s response eloquently exemplifies, this whole Bill has all the hallmarks of being drafted by the Lord Chancellor on the back of a small envelope. This clause, in particular, is deeply objectionable. Unless the Minister is prepared to abandon the clause, I shall invite the House to divide and consign the envelope to the parliamentary waste bin.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I add my support to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Clause 3 is very troubling for two reasons. First, the defendant may have shown a partially irresponsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others, that partially irresponsible approach may be the cause of the accident and it may be entirely inexcusable. Why, then, is the generally responsible approach of the defendant in other respects of any relevance whatever? The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, would not cure this defect.

The second troubling aspect of Clause 3 is that it does not appear to be confined to the subject matter of the Bill, social action and heroism. I would be very grateful if the Minister would explain whether Clause 3 was intended to be confined to the subject matter of the Bill, or whether, as its wording suggests, it is to have a broader aspect. For these reasons, if the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, divides the House, he will have my support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

The answer is yes. There are lots of different circumstances in which two defendants may find themselves sued. They may be sued on the basis that one is much more likely to be liable than the other. The other defendant may be sued because his insurance arrangements may be considered more satisfactory. There will be circumstances in which one defendant is much more likely to be culpable than the other—in which case very often there will be, pursuant to the 1970 civil liability Act, a division of responsibility between those two defendants. A judge will have to perform that process.

By the same token, a particular defendant in a factual scenario, where an accident is caused, might have, on a particular day, been wholly reckless about the cause of the accident insofar as that particular defendant is concerned. Another defendant might have been predominantly or generally extremely careful for the welfare of that individual. I am not saying that that is necessarily a likely scenario, but it is certainly one within the realms of the many possibilities of claims that the noble and learned Lord and I have been involved in, where a judge has to pick his way through a number of different defendants and try to find a fair answer on the facts. My answer to him is that that particular process, difficult though it is, performed by skilful judges, will not be made significantly more difficult by these provisions.

As I explained earlier, the approach that we have taken does not rewrite the law in detail, but it represents a change to the law in that it does not currently oblige a court to consider whether a person took a generally responsible approach to safety during the activity in question. We wish to ensure that the courts take a slightly broader view of the defendants’ conduct in these circumstances, by looking at whether his approach to safety, taking into account all that he did or did not do, was generally a responsible one. I suggest that that would very much tally with what a number of members of the public might think was fair. If a defendant was really predominantly doing all that he or she could reasonably be expected to do to look after the safety of an individual, why should there not be some reflection of that fact in the determination of liability? Why should it be ignored altogether? The court would be obliged to weigh it in the balance—that is all—when considering the ultimate question of whether the defendant met the required standard of care.

[Lord Pannick]

Is there some time period over which the court is expected to assess the generally responsible approach of the defendant? How far does this go back? Has the department made any assessment of how much longer court cases are going to take and how much more expensive they will be if the judge has to assess all those matters?

[Lord Faulks]

With great respect to the noble Lord, considering the activity in question focuses the judge on the activity that is said to have caused the particular injury, or tort, which has eventuated.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I also have an amendment in this group. It may be convenient if I say what I have to say now. In many ways, Clause 4, which we are now dealing with, is the oddest of these three clauses. As drafted, it was strongly criticised by the Fire Brigades Union, St John Ambulance and the Red Cross, among others. To take the instance of the Fire Brigades Union, the clause goes directly contrary to advice that it has given for many years to people involved in a fire: to get out of the way of the fire as quickly as they can and to stay out. If they intervene to try to rescue somebody, then they are only likely to put in greater danger the firemen, who will have to come to their rescue as well.

This was pointed out as a difficulty—indeed, as a serious objection—in the other place, but no notice was taken of that criticism until at a very late stage in this House, when the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, gave notice of his amendment to leave out the last 11 words of the clause. Leaving out the last 11 words of this clause is undoubtedly a great improvement, but leaving out half a clause to save the rest of a clause is an unusual thing to do. It only demonstrates that the clause, like the rest of the Bill, was never properly thought out in the first place. In Committee I suggested that it looked like a clause drafted on the back of an envelope. I now think that that may be going too far in its favour. It must surely have occurred to someone at some stage that a clause that protects someone who takes no thought for his own safety, but does not protect someone who takes some thought for his own safety—that, as it was put elegantly, as always, by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick,

“protects the instinctive hero but not the thoughtful hero”—[Official Report, 18/11/14; col. 416.]

—is surely inherently ridiculous. Be that as it may, the objection to Clause 4 is essentially the same as that to Clause 2. The substance of Clause 4, as it will stand if the noble Lord’s amendment is accepted, is already covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006.

It is difficult to imagine a,

“person … acting heroically … to assist an individual in danger”,

who is not by that very act engaged in a “desirable activity” as envisaged by Section 1 of the Compensation Act. If so, this clause adds literally nothing to the existing law. If the noble Lord in his reply can think of a single example where the point I have made is not valid because something would be covered by this clause and not by Section 1 of the Compensation Act, I hope he will tell us. In the mean time, I submit that it adds nothing and should be rejected on that ground. In due course I will move my amendment too.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, there is a further reason why Clause 4 is pointless and that is, of course, because it adds nothing to Clause 2. It is very difficult to understand in what circumstances a person is acting heroically in an emergency when they are not also,

“acting for the benefit of society or any of its members”.

Perhaps the Minister can tell the House of a theoretical case that would not fall within Clause 2 that falls within Clause 4. There is no doubt that the removal of the final words of Clause 4 is a distinct improvement. We must be grateful for small mercies.

I have a further concern that when courts have to apply Clause 4 there is ample room for no doubt lengthy debate as to what is meant by “heroically” and “emergency”, neither of which is defined in the Bill.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for the same reasons as I indicated in respect of Clause 2. It adds nothing. If you ask a simple question whether there is a court in the land which would not, under the common law,

“have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger”,

the question answers itself—of course there is not. I ask the Minister to say what is added by the words “acting heroically by”. Why could it not just be, “when the person was intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger”?

Apart from ramping up the rhetoric—that is essentially what this whole business is—what actually is added by “acting heroically by”, except for another hour of the court’s time if eventually it has to apply this clause?