Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

I have no personal interest in this matter. I do not live in any of the areas affected; I have no connection to any of the groups which have been lobbying for this change. But it bothers me greatly as I go about my business in London that our black cabs—which are synonymous with London around the world and an important part of our reputation for quality and high standards—are forever facing more restrictions while vehicles and drivers which too often are a disgrace to our reputation are allowed to operate without having to comply with any law, regulation or rule. I look forward to my noble friend’s response, and I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has made a powerful speech, which I find entirely compelling. My only concern is that her amendments are far too modest. If the Private Member’s Bill does not proceed satisfactorily, I suggest that she brings forward on Report an amendment which makes it a criminal offence to operate such a vehicle in London without a licence.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I am probably alone on this one: some years ago I went away from my wedding service in a pedicab in London, and I rather enjoyed it.

I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from, but I think the definition in this amendment will cause a few problems. It says that a pedicab is

“a pedal cycle, motor cycle or power-assisted cycle, or such a vehicle”—

I did not know that cycles were vehicles, but maybe that is right—

“in combination with a trailer, constructed or adapted for carrying one or more passengers.”

My daughter used to take her children to school sitting in a trailer on the back of a bicycle, and that would be covered by this amendment. I do not quite see why she should not continue to do that. It was not motor-assisted, but it could have been. This needs looking at.

I think what the noble Baroness is getting at is that she does not like the look of these things. I would agree—they do not look particularly nice. The biggest problem is that many are not insured. That is a serious problem. Whether they need controlling or licensing by TfL needs a bit of debate. The black cabs obviously do not like them because they take away business. Are we in the business of protecting black cabs because they look nicer than these pedicabs that go around with not just lights flashing but some pretty horrible music coming out of them sometimes? On the other hand, are we here to regulate music and pedicabs? I do not know. The key for me is that they should have third-party insurance at the very least. Whether their fares should be controlled is a debate that is probably down to TfL to decide. Secondly, who is going to enforce this?

The other type of “vehicle”, if you can call them that, are freight cycles, which are beginning to appear in the streets of cities, London included. Sometimes they have two wheels, sometimes three or four—I do not have a clue which—but they distribute freight to outlets in the city as an alternative to trucks and vehicles, which cause a lot of pollution if they are not electric. Do we want to prevent them going around? They might be plying for hire, and the customers would be moving freight, not passengers. Whether they should be insured is debatable, because cycles are not required to be insured at the moment, and I expect we will have a debate about scooters in a couple of years’ time. But it is questionable whether a freight cycle, with or without power assistance, should be covered by this. I suggest that it should not be. This goes back to the only issue on which I think I disagree with the noble Baroness, which is insurance, because they are carrying passengers for hire. If I am carrying my family or some friends as passengers in a trailer on the back of my bike, I do not see why I should have to be insured if I do not feel like it. I think that is the same as on a bicycle.

I hope the noble Baroness will consider these issues. If she comes back on Report with a changed amendment, she should confine it to things which really matter from the safety point of view, rather than widening it to freight, family trips or something else.

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[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord explained very effectively, Clause 66 inserts a new Section 2C into the 1988 Act, introducing a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. The offence is committed by driving

“without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other”

road users. Serious injury is defined as physical harm amounting to grievous bodily harm under the terms of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. As the noble and learned Lord set out, the proposed penalties are two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine on indictment and a maximum penalty on summary conviction of 12 months and/or a fine.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I are unashamedly having two stabs at this issue. Amendment 155 takes the narrow view, introducing a test for the words “causing serious injury”. This is needed because it will be an imprisonable offence. The Government have defined “serious injury” but not “causing”. Our amendment suggests a form of words which indicates that to be found guilty of this you have to have displayed blatant disregard for the normal rules of care on the road. It is important for us to remember that driving is the one day-to-day activity by which a law-abiding citizen can kill another law-abiding citizen through simple inattention. I expect most noble Lords are drivers and, if they search their hearts and memories, I am sure they can think of an incident in their driving history when they have done something careless—when they have failed, despite perhaps taking care, to notice a cyclist or another car. Usually that is a moment that passes without anything terrible happening, but sometimes there is an accident.

If we are going to move towards imprisoning motorists for being careless, we need to be extremely careful. Criminalising motorists is a dangerous direction. Most motorists involved in accidents which result in serious injury or death are stricken by an overwhelming sense of guilt. In many cases, it wrecks the rest of their life. Rather than needing imprisonment, they need to ensure that in future they are much better drivers. Why do we send people to prison? We send them to prison to protect society. It is not likely that we need to protect society from the normal careless driver. We need to send them to prison to punish them—to be punished for simple carelessness.

The suspicion must be that the Government are seeking to create a new offence to catch those motorists who are charged with, but not found guilty of, dangerous driving. For 20 years, I was a magistrate. It is, and was, normal for alternative charges to be brought: careless driving and dangerous driving. I well recall occasions when the CPS simply failed to prove dangerous driving for one reason or another. I believe we are in a dangerous position if we start creating new offences to cater for the failure of prosecutors to make their case. Just as there is a difference between murder and manslaughter, there is a clear difference between careless driving and dangerous driving. In opposing that the clause stand part, we are proposing that there is no need for this new offence. As an alternative, we offer Amendment 155, which provides much-needed clarity on the degree of carelessness that must be involved.

There is a tendency to a knee-jerk reliance on custodial sentences. Most drivers, even bad drivers, do not need prison to improve their behaviour. Prison costs the public purse massive amounts of money. It destroys marriages and families and the ability of the prisoner to get a job on release. It often destroys their mental health. Prisons are not called “universities of crime” for nothing; they create better criminals. Bad drivers need more appropriate sentences. Careless drivers need more appropriate sentences, such as driving bans, retraining, which is really important, community sentences, restorative justice or fines, but not prison, except in the most extreme and persistent cases.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the suggestion that this clause should not stand part of the Bill. I agree entirely with what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, on the punishment of imprisonment. There is an important difference of principle between causing serious injury by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. The principle is that the offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving falls into the category of “There but for the grace of God, go I”. It is very difficult to see why the penalty of imprisonment should be appropriate when all the steps being taken in the criminal justice system are to recognise that we send far too many people to prison and that prison has, as the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, eloquently said, very adverse consequences for the offender, their family and society generally. The Government need to present a most compelling justification for a proposal that more people should be sent to prison in circumstances such as this.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I support everything that noble Lords have said so far. Unless the clause is significantly amended along the lines suggested, I could not possibly support it if it were taken to a Division.

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I hope I have not stirred the pot too much. I remember R v Caldwell and R v Cunningham from my university days. Now I know who to blame for the poor marks for the essay I wrote on it. I hope I have responded to the points made by the noble and learned Lord. I am happy to continue the discussion, but I hope that he will be able to withdraw. I see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moving.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

With his enormous experience of various areas of the law, can the Minister think of any example of where a sentencing court has decided that it is appropriate to send someone to prison, whether in a health or safety context or in any other context, merely because of carelessness? I ask this out of genuine innocence and ignorance.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I wonder whether health and safety is not, in fact, an example. This is not my area of the law, and I am reluctant to give examples from the Dispatch Box, but I think we have to balance the degree of culpability with the consequences. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, and as the responses to the consultation showed, it is very difficult to look in the eye the family of somebody who has been killed through careless driving, where the standard has fallen below that of a competent driver—not far below; that is dangerous—and say that the most we can do is fine the driver.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I understand the Minister’s argument. My question is whether there are any actual, practical examples of people being given a prison term because of carelessness. Maybe the Minister does not know. I entirely understand that. I would be grateful if he could write to me with an answer.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Of course, and I will write to the noble Lord with an answer. I just want to be clear what exam question he is setting me. I assume that he is excluding recklessness. He is putting that in a separate box from mere carelessness.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am considering the proposed offence of carelessness. To be clear, my question is whether there are practical examples of sentencing courts sending people to prison for acts of carelessness. Maybe the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Hope, know the answer. I do not. I suggest it may be relevant.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I would much rather the Minister answered that question.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

So I plead with the Minister, first, to think again about the statutory inquiry with powers of compulsion and, secondly, to look at my noble friend Lord Rosser’s amendment in particular, because it is not too difficult to create a statutory as well as professional duty of candour on the police—something like he has proposed. Parliamentary draftsmen will do even better, I am sure, and my noble friend has already done the thinking about the need to think about privacy, data protection and national security.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support these amendments. The statutory duty of candour is vital not just to affect the culture of the police and enhance public confidence in policing but to give confidence to those police officers who face enormous internal pressures from their colleagues not to be candid. They need support; they need a statutory regime they can point to in order to justify to their colleagues what is required.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted some of what the Home Secretary said in answering questions in the House of Commons on 15 June, and I will quote one other statement she made. She was specifically asked by Yvette Cooper about the duty of candour, and her response was that

“there is absolutely more to do here.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/21; col. 132.]

I very much hope the Government will accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, if they do not, what more are they going to do in this area?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I rise briefly to support both amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks at this from the position of the victim. It is, of course, right to acknowledge the huge progress that has been made over the last 20 or so years in improving the position of the victim—but we have not got to the end of the road. The important point of his amendment is that it gives further protection to the victim at two important stages: first, where things have gone wrong and there is an inquiry, and secondly and much more importantly, in the victim exercising the right of review where there has been a failure to prosecute. It seems to me, therefore, that the duty of candour is yet another step in putting the victim—as is so often said by politicians on both sides—at the heart of the criminal justice system.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, looks at this from a broader perspective, which encompasses the position of the defendant and the greater public interest. We should think of experiences over the years. One can go back, for example, to a problem that arose in Tiger Bay in Cardiff over 30 years ago, where the inquiry into the Lynette White murder investigation went on and on. One cannot help feeling that, if there had been a duty of candour, it would have brought that very damaging case to an end.

I say nothing about the undercover policing inquiry as it is still ongoing, but it seems that there is ample evidence that we need to enshrine this duty of candour to protect the position of the defendant and the wider public interest by making it absolutely clear that the police owe that duty—and they should be grateful to have that duty imposed on them, because we need to restore, above all, confidence in our constabularies.

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I thought: “That is so encouraging; we are really getting there.” But no. She then said that she would have to wait for the next part being put forward by the Law Commission. I know this House is full of lawyers. This House probably has many lawyers who sit on the commission—I do not know. Forgive me, but I think the commission does not always act at speed. What we really want is some speed on this, because we have a problem. We can sort this problem—or help to sort it. We have this opportunity, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, and we should take it, because we need the next generation to have the best start to life, and we know it is in our hands, to some extent. So, I strongly support this amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, despite being a lawyer, it is a great pleasure to follow three such excellent speeches. I have added my name to this amendment, in part to emphasise what is obvious—that this is a matter of concern not just to women who breastfeed but to men, particularly men who are fathers, husbands and fathers-in-law, all of whom are affected by this subject.

When the Minister replies, I think he will express two concerns about these amendments, unless he is prepared to accept them, which I hope he will. He might say there is a concern that Amendment 131 is too broadly drafted. I do not understand such concern, because the drafting is very simple. It ensures there is a criminal offence only where the woman concerned does not consent and—this is vital—the defendant photographs or videos the breastfeeding for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, or to cause humiliation, distress or alarm.

That is a very limited mischief. It is properly drafted, since it adopts in its definition the ingredients of the offence of upskirting, which is already on the statute book, so it is a confined mischief. There is no question of capturing someone who innocently takes a photograph, and, in the background, there happens to be a woman who is breastfeeding. However, as we are in Committee, if the Minister thinks that the drafting can be improved, I, and the other signatories to this amendment, I am sure, would be very happy to see an improved version.

The other concern, which I know that the Minister will express, and which has already been addressed, is that the Law Commission is due to report on the law relating to intimate image abuse. It had a consultation which closed in May. The report is awaited. We certainly will not see it this year. The Committee may be interested to know that it is a consultation paper that covers 423 pages of material, a wide range of subject matter and complex issues. After the commission reports, sometime next year, there is no possibility of any legislation being brought forward for months, and that is optimistic. Who knows when the Government may reach a conclusion on any of these topics, particularly the specific narrow topic that we are discussing today? Who knows—the Minister does not—when there will next be a legislative opportunity to bring forward proposals such as those promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman?

It is time to address this because the case for a change in the law on this specific subject is simply overwhelming for all the reasons that the Committee has heard. There is no question of delay here because the conduct is every day causing great distress to the victims. We already have the model legislation in the upskirting provisions that Parliament has approved, which have been enacted and which are working very well.

In July, this Government announced their intention to take steps to protect women from violence and harassment. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, provide an opportunity for the Government, at no financial cost, to take a small but important practical step.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I support this Amendment and agree with every word that noble Lords have said. My strong advice to my noble friend the Minister, bearing in mind that this is a policing Bill, is to come quietly. The alternative is to have another 45 minutes on Report, lose a Division and get into ping-pong. It is much easier to agree in due course.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Attlee indicated that I should come along quietly. I am not going to do that; however, I hope that I will come along realistically and clearly in setting out the Government’s position. There is no dispute in this Committee that the behaviour we are talking about is absolutely abominable and indefensible. I therefore appreciate why a proposed new clause on this distressing subject of breastfeeding voyeurism has been tabled for debate. I start by expressing my unequivocal support for the mothers who have experienced this sort of appalling behaviour.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, we have heard a number of really outstanding speeches, some of which were very personal in terms of people’s history and families. I respectfully endorse the point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Brinton, that this is not just a matter of protecting privacy or preventing distress; it is also important because we want to promote the very real benefits of breastfeeding. I take all the points made in that regard on board; I also take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, on the bonding time—the quiet time, if I can put it that way—that breastfeeding provides. On whether breastfeeding also benefits fathers because we do not have to get up at night, on that I will—if, as a Minister in a UK Government, I am allowed to dip into a foreign legal system for a moment—plead the fifth amendment.

To pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, I assure the Committee that, depending on the specific circumstances, it may be possible—I underline “may” because I accept that it will not be possible in all circumstances—to capture this sort of disgusting behaviour under some existing offences, including public order offences and offences dealing with harassment and stalking, along with the common-law offence of outraging public decency. However, this is not a complete answer; I do not put it forward as such. We recognise that the law in this area is not always clear, and that consideration should be given to improving it. That is why we asked the Law Commission to review the law around the taking, making and sharing of intimate images without consent, to identify whether there are any gaps—or, rather, what the gaps are—in the scope of protection already offered to victims. The review looked specifically at voyeurism offences and non-consensual photography in public places, including whether the recording and sharing of images of breastfeeding should be included in the scope of “intimate” images for the purposes of any reformed criminal law.

However, a change in the law here will not be straightforward. I will explain why in a moment. With an amendment such as the one moved by the noble Baroness, there may be a variety of situations in which it is still not an offence to take a picture of a person breastfeeding. That is why the Law Commission’s review is looking into intent, the definition of “image” and other circumstances relevant to this issue. As the Committee is already aware, the Law Commission’s work has gone at some pace. It obviously has an important eye for detail; that is why it is there. It intends to publish its recommendations by the spring of next year, so we are certainly not trying to kick this ball into the long grass. We are proactively considering what more can be done to tackle this behaviour and protect mothers now, ahead of the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform of the law in this area.

However, I respectfully disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that this issue is clearly defined in her amendment. I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if I may; we have had the benefit of some discussions. A number of points look like drafting points but are not, because they really go to the question of the scope of the proposed amendment and what it is seeking to encompass. Let me give a couple of examples, without turning the Committee into a legislative drafting session. Here is example A; I will try to use the initials from the amendment. A takes a photo of his wife, partner or girlfriend on a beach in her bikini, intending to use that image for his own sexual gratification. Another woman, B, is on the same beach, breastfeeding her baby, and is unintentionally caught by A in the picture. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I respectfully suggest that this would be caught by the proposed amendment. A would have no defence as, first, he intended the picture for sexual gratification and recorded the image for that purpose. Secondly, he would have no defence of consent by B because B did not consent. A would also not be able to have the second defence of reasonably believing that she was giving consent because he had no idea at all that she was in the picture.

That is one example, but this goes further than drafting. Let us say that A was aware that B was caught in the background of the photo but was not aware that she was breastfeeding. Again, A would not be able to say that B had consented or that he reasonably believed that she had consented. Further, would an image of someone breastfeeding that did not actually include the act of breastfeeding—for example, a photograph capturing only a breastfeeding mother’s face—be captured under this amendment? What parts of the body, if I can put it that way, would we require the image to capture? As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, explained, this is different from the upskirting offence because the law there condescends to particular parts of the body that must be captured in a photo. Would we wish to capture images taken of breastfeeding regardless of whether it is in a private, semi-private or public setting?

I underline to the Committee that I do not raise these matters as drafting points or to be difficult. On the contrary, it is because this issue is so important that we must get the nature, boundaries and scope of the offence absolutely correct.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Does the Minister accept that his second potential problem would easily be dealt with by a drafting amendment to make it clear that the offence relates to a photograph or video of a breast? It would not be difficult to draft that. In relation to his first concern, which, as I understood it, was that if someone takes a photo of their wife or girlfriend breastfeeding for the purpose of sexual gratification and there is some other woman in the background—oh, I am sorry, have I misunderstood?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Before the Minister answers that question, does he not also agree that we have perhaps seven or eight weeks before we get to Report, so the pettifogging points he is making could plainly be dealt with if we all sat round a table and agreed a draft?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In drafting legislation, the first thing we need to do is make sure that we agree on the nature and scope of the amendment. I have tried to make it clear that I am not putting these points forward as pettifogging points of drafting. There are important points underlining this about what we want the amendment to cover. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was about to rise again; should I give him an opportunity to do so?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It may be thought by the Committee that the first example that the Minister gave was somewhat esoteric and unlikely to occur in practice. The risk of such esoteric events occurring is more than outweighed by the actual mischief that this amendment seeks to address. In any event, the same objections—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, called them pettifogging; that is his word, but I understand why he said that—could well be raised in relation to upskirting, in that pictures could be taken in whose background there is some other unfortunate woman. Perhaps the Minister might wish to reconsider these matters. We would all be happy to sit round a table and agree a draft that meets these points.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House for nearly 30 years. I have seen plenty of examples where, eventually, the Government have given way on an issue and parliamentary draftsmen have been able to draft far more complex provisions than these.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Sandhurst. In the light of their comprehensive description of the purpose of these amendments, I can be brief.

Much of the data with which the amendments are concerned relates to freedom of expression. Views are expressed or opinions are stated which offend or annoy other people but do not constitute criminal offences. The views or opinions may relate to religion, transgender issues, Brexit or a whole range of other sensitive and controversial questions. Sadly, many people have lost the willingness to discuss and debate; to say, “I disagree with what you say but I will defend your right to say it.” In today’s world a more typical reaction to opinions with which you disagree is to take offence, to demand a safe space, or to complain that your identity has been challenged or that your truth has been denied. Even though no crime has been committed, the police are asked to record the grievance and to retain the data.

I agree with the noble Lords that for the police to have an unregulated power—that is what it is—to retain and use data about such exercises of free speech deters the vigorous debate and discussion on which a free society thrives. It may be appropriate, in some circumstances, for such data to be retained and to be used. None of us is disputing that. But that should be according to law, authorised by Parliament and not just by the discretion of police authorities which choose to apply, or not to apply, guidance from the College of Policing.

I hope that the Minister will consider these amendments constructively and that she will be able to give them the Government’s support, whether in a revised version or otherwise, on Report.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support the proposed new clause and I will give it all the support I can. The arguments put forward by my noble friends are, frankly, unarguable against.

There are three propositions that I think are affronted by this notification of non-crime hate incidents. The first is the chilling effect on free speech. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, illustrated that very clearly. One has to be assured of the right to express one’s views without the risk of having this notification made against one.

Secondly, one has to recognise that these are very long-standing notifications, which can have a seriously prejudicial impact on individuals. That is thoroughly undesirable, especially as the individual has no right of appeal or an effective way of challenging. Judicial review, for most people, is not an effective way of challenging.

Thirdly, there is the point made by all noble Lords who have spoken so far. There is no statutory guidance; it is local police policy which influences the way these notifications are made. That is inherently unjust, having regard to the impact that this could have.

Finally, I welcome very much that the regulations are to be made by the affirmative procedure. However, as I have said in this House and elsewhere on many occasions, while that is a good thing in the sense that the comments made by your Lordships and those in the other place can be heeded, we do not have the power to amend the statutory instrument. I have long argued that this House and Parliament in general should have the power to amend the contents of statutory instruments. This is a good example of where that would be beneficial.

Libel and Defamation Cases: Cost to Public Funds

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the Government always take action to protect freedom of expression to safeguard the work of journalists. The forthcoming online safety legislation will enshrine in law protections for journalistic content and free debate. We will, however. also keep a very close eye on what is called the SLAPP jurisdiction. My noble friend mentions Australia and Canada; she may also wish to read a recent judgment from the Western Cape High Court, the case of Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd, in which Deputy Judge President Patricia Goliath set out in very clear terms the advantages of a SLAPP jurisdiction. This may be the first occasion of a David praising the work of a Goliath.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the Written Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, focused on the cost to public funds, which the Minister fully answered. The Oral Question contains an attack on barristers and solicitors for representing clients. Does the Minister agree that any litigant, whoever they may be and wherever they may come from, is entitled to legal advice and representation, and that it is the job of the judge to decide what the legal rights and wrongs are?

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

They have vested interests.

Independent Review of Administrative Law Update

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, we are not disappointed with the report from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his team. On the contrary, it is a very good piece of work. We are consulting for the reasons I have already expressed. The panel did not say that ouster clauses should never be used; it said that, when used appropriately, they should not be seen as an affront to the rule of law. We want to consult on whether and how they should be used. The independent review of the Human Rights Act is ongoing. We will consider its results in due course. While very significant reform of judicial review might require changes to the Human Rights Act, the changes we are proposing do not.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister in public law cases. I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his review team for the very sensible and balanced report which it has produced. The Minister will have noted the wise words of the noble Lord and his colleagues at paragraph 15 of their conclusions:

“Our view is that the government and Parliament can be confident that the courts will respect institutional boundaries in exercising their inherent powers to review the legality of government action. Politicians should, in turn, afford the judiciary the respect which it is undoubtedly due when it exercises these powers.”


Do the Government agree?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly agree that the courts would be expected to respect institutional boundaries, and Parliament and the Government should do likewise. The purpose of our consultation is to make sure that we produce the best system we possibly can so that all those involved in the judicial review process—judges, applicants, Government and everyone else—is party to a system which promotes good government and upholds the rule of law.

Serious Criminal Cases Backlog

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is of course correct that delays in the criminal justice system can affect not only the defendant but others involved, including victims and witnesses. The listing of cases is ultimately a matter for the judiciary, not the Executive, so I am limited in what I can say. However, I can confirm, for example, that at the moment the majority of cases where a defendant is in custody have been listed for trial before July 2021.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, are the Government considering two possible steps that would help to reduce the unacceptable backlog of cases in the Crown Courts? The first is to reduce the number of jurors to, say, seven, making it easier to ensure social distancing in court rooms, and the second is to allow defendants who are legally represented to choose trial by judge alone in some categories of cases where juries are currently required?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, trial by jury is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction. With the support of Public Health England and Public Health Wales, we have made adjustments to more than 290 court rooms and jury deliberation rooms so as to facilitate trial by jury. Reducing the size of the jury is therefore unlikely to free up an additional amount of space for jury trials, and it would also require primary legislation. As to the other point that the noble Lord makes about trial by judge alone, that would, I think, require a significant change in our criminal justice system, and therefore very careful consideration would be required before embarking on that change.

European Union Referendum Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dobbs]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that fascinating point. So much has already been said about how we should not be chopping our constitution into pieces in a piecemeal fashion. That is something that I think the whole House, including this side of the House, should consider very carefully.

Do we today want to add weight to the views of those who regard us as unaccountable panjandrums—the unwashed, the unelected? Where will that leave us? It would be like passing around the rope to those who want to hang us. Ultimately, matters of the franchise have to fall within the privileged remit of the Commons, just like matters of finance, as matters for those who have been elected with a duty to decide. In my view, we would be overstretching our rights and certainly overstretching our wisdom if we were to take this matter further. This is one barricade we should not build. I will continue to support the cause of young people, but I cannot support this amendment. The referendum is waiting; we should get on with it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, there are many reasons for supporting the Government today, all of which were given by the Minister, but I have to say to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that I do not agree that financial privilege is a reason to support the Government. It is an obscure subject, and I commend to the House the very helpful paper published by Dr Meg Russell and Mr Daniel Gover of the Constitution Unit of UCL in March 2014.

Financial privilege did not prevent the other place from addressing the merits of this House’s amendment; equally, the fact that financial privilege was asserted by the House of Commons after the certification by the Speaker does not prevent the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, from bringing forward her amendment in lieu. It does not prevent this House voting on the merits of the amendment—or, as I see it, its lack of merit.

As I understood him, the Minister accepted that that is the case. The Constitution Unit paper concludes on page 13 that,

“it is not considered contrary to the convention for the Lords to respond to financial privilege with … an amendment in lieu … for as many rounds of ping pong as it wishes”.

The normal rules of ping-pong apply. Therefore, financial privilege is a distraction rather than being central to this debate. That is not to dispute the supremacy of the elected Chamber, especially on the issue of the franchise, but that is a different matter. For the reasons given by the Minister, I shall be supporting the Government in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I intervened earlier, and I would like to take up the point I made in that intervention in a moment. I begin by saying a little about the substance of the proposal about votes at 16. I remain of the view, as does my Front Bench, that this is an inappropriate vehicle to carry out such an important constitutional change. The danger is that we have had a precedent of changing the franchise in the Scottish situation, and if we were to persist and succeed on this issue this evening, it would be yet another precedent. That would prejudice a longer-term, overall survey of what we ought to do about the age at which people are entitled to vote.

Having said that, if one looks back to 1969, which is the last time we debated it, on that occasion there was very widespread consultation. If we were to have another Bill on the issue, there would have to be widespread consultation. On this occasion, to the best of my knowledge, there has been virtually no consultation whatever. Back in 1969, when the issue had been widely consulted on, I said to my secretary, “If I get a single letter”—at the time, I had 100 letters or so a day—“asking me to give the vote, I will vote for it”. I did not get a single such letter.

Nowadays, we get thousands of emails sent to us. I have not had a single email from someone in this age group saying, “I am a highly intelligent, very politically motivated person”, or even, “I voted in the Scottish referendum”, and “I would like the vote”. I have had no such representation. I believe that this is being generated inside the House itself.

I turn to financial privilege, which has been raised. I totally reject what the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, said: that this is somehow a massive conspiracy suddenly cooked up in the other place to override us, and so on. I do not think that is so. The procedure on financial privilege is well established. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs said, it has been used time and again. The reality is that if the Commons decides to reject something, as it has done very decisively on this issue several times, a committee is sent behind the Chair to look at the reasons why the Commons is rejecting the Lords amendment. That committee sits behind the Chair, it is advised by the clerks and not infrequently comes up with the proposal that it has relied on on this occasion. It is a quite normal process and in no sense a sudden new conspiracy. I am not at all sure about the point made by my noble friend on the Front Bench as to whether that is the only option that that committee has to put forward as a reason. I believe that, if it wished, it could put forward other reasons as well. But, normally, it comes up with a resolution as far as this is concerned.

What is happening is perfectly normal and not, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggests, in some sense a conspiracy. As my noble friend said a moment or two ago, we really have to consider very carefully whether it is appropriate to bounce the amendment back yet again. I believe that the answer very clearly is no, because the response that we are going to get at the other end is equally clear—it is going to be to reject whatever amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely, puts forward. So the sensible course of action is to reject Amendment A1 and accept Amendment A. That would be an appropriate thing to do.

Finally, one might consider why there is such an enormous apparent division on this issue between this House and the other place on the age when it is appropriate to vote. This is not a partisan issue and not something where everyone has clear-cut positions. It is rather curious—but perhaps this House is more expert on grandchildren and the other place is more expert on children. They have clearly taken the view that they do not think that their children should have the vote at the age that is suggested. We should respect that view, go along with the amendment proposed from the government Front Bench and reject that put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely.

Ministerial Code

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Clarification is very much in the eye of the beholder. A Minister reading the Ministerial Code might feel better or less well informed by the subsequent iteration of this code but, as I said in relation to the Civil Service Code, from time to time Prime Ministers feel that the matter might be expressed in one way rather than another. What it does not do is alter the nature of the obligation.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister assure the House that the change has absolutely nothing to do with government concern about judgments of the European Court of Human Rights with which they do not agree?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord knows only too well the Government’s obligation in relation to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. There is an obligation under Article 46 of the European convention, whereby parties to a judgment undertake to abide by the final judgment of that court, but those judgments are declaratory. We and previous Governments have been in regular communication with the Committee of Ministers over how best to reflect those judgments in our own law. That is an iterative process, which involves Ministers going from time to time to Strasbourg. At the moment, Parliament has given no indication—I suspect that this is what lies behind the question—that it wants to give prisoners the vote.

Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, but I have just received an email from a friend who is a magistrate. I shall not say where because these days one cannot do that. It is worth putting on the record. He writes:

“Courts are closing in great numbers with another 90 about to be closed and there will be more after this. Defendants and witnesses now have to travel great distances. Some cannot afford it so plead guilty when they may not be. Also, it has removed the fundamental right of citizens to be tried by their peers as the cost of the criminal court charge is so high and beyond most defendants’ means, so they are pleading guilty. It has removed the need of the CPS to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt. Not many well-off people appear in court so it is the poorest who are being hit with a double whammy”.

That is the view of a serving magistrate sitting on the Bench today.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on this subject, I am on the side of the two Jeremys: the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and Jeremy Bentham. In 1795, Jeremy Bentham wrote:

“The statesman who contributes to put justice out of reach … is an accessary after the fact to every crime”.

For Bentham, such a law tax was a denial of justice. These regulations are a denial of justice, and they are a denial of justice for the two reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks. First, because the sums involved—£150 up to £1,200—may well encourage innocent people to plead guilty, and, secondly, because the magistrate or judge has no discretion to vary the charge by reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender—in particular, the offender’s means.

I will add a further point. There is a much fairer and more lucrative way forward for a Lord Chancellor who wants to help balance the books by imposing a court charge. Let the Lord Chancellor give the judges and magistrates a discretion to charge much higher court fees to defendants who are convicted of serious crimes and who can afford to pay. The drug dealers, the bank robbers and the fraudsters can be charged the true cost of their occupying the courts for weeks in trials that end in convictions if the judge or magistrate in their discretion thinks that it is appropriate to do so. The regulations could then give the courts a proper discretion not to impose on the small fry charges that may well induce guilty pleas from innocent people and may well result in the imposition of orders for payment from people who cannot afford them. If the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wishes to test the opinion of the House on these regulations, he will certainly have my support in the Division Lobby.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, the points to be made against these regulations are so obvious and so strong that really they do not need to be made yet again in tonight’s debate. The problems—the total lack of judicial discretion, the obvious impossibility of recovery in so many cases and the risk of excessive pressure on defendants to plead guilty to avoid the charge escalating from £150 to £520, or, in an each-way case, from £180 to £1,000—were all foreseen by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Marks, in Committee in July of last year. They have all since been the subject of widespread criticism by a series of distinguished legal commentators in a succession of legal periodicals such as the Criminal Law Review, Criminal Law and Justice Weekly and so forth. Professor Nicola Padfield, a most distinguished legal academic and criminologist and now master of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, described them as “astonishing” and quoted another commentator as saying that they were the most unworthy provisions on the statute book. The president of the Law Society called them “outrageous”.

Inquiries Act 2005 (Select Committee Report)

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 19th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, on behalf of all noble Lords I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, for his distinguished service to this House since 1983. We wish him a very happy retirement. Noble Lords will know that his grandfather, David Lloyd George, famously described this House as,

“a body of 500 men chosen at random from amongst the unemployed”.

I cannot believe that the noble Viscount has ever not been employed on some worthwhile task. It is especially appropriate that he has played so valuable a role in the discussions on the role of this House and how to move this House—now composed of rather more than 500 men and women—to the next stage of reform.

Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, I have never had the pleasure of sharing a tent with the noble Viscount, but I am one of many noble Lords who have benefited enormously from his advice about matters relating to this House. That advice has been valued by all of us because it has been based on knowledge, wisdom, kindness—a much underrated quality—and humility, as your Lordships have again heard today. The noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, will be much missed on these Benches and around the House.

I join other noble Lords in welcoming this impressive and stimulating report. I want to focus, as other noble Lords have done, on paragraphs 243 to 251 of the report, which address warning letters. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Woolf and Lord Morris of Aberavon, have mentioned, those paragraphs address the need under the current rules to send letters to those who are the subject of criticism in a draft report, giving them an opportunity to comment before the final report is drawn up and published—an obligation that adds a very substantial amount of work for an inquiry, and a very substantial delay before publication. The committee is correct at paragraph 251 to recommend that these rules need to be replaced by a discretion for the chairman as to whether to give a person who is to be criticised in a report an opportunity to respond. Given that the Inquiry Rules do not apply, as we have heard, to many inquiries, including Chilcot, the practice needs to change as well.

This issue requires consideration of a little history and a little law. The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, mentioned the Profumo inquiry. When Lord Denning inquired into the Profumo case in 1963, he acted, as he said in his report, as,

“detective, inquisitor, advocate and judge”,

hearing all the evidence in secret. This led to the 1966 Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Salmon, as he then was. He understandably concluded that future inquiries should do more to ensure justice for those involved. That led to the practice of witnesses being given a “Salmon letter”, setting out before they give evidence matters of interest and concern. The process has become increasingly legalistic in the worst sense of that word. Some advocates even argued on behalf of their clients that one party to the inquiry should be able to issue a Salmon letter to another party, seeking to transfer culpability—a practice that became known as a “smoked Salmon letter”.

The practice also developed whereby if an inquiry intends to criticise an individual in the final report, that individual has to be given the relevant sections of the draft report in order that he or she can comment before publication. This process is known as Maxwellisation, and is now enshrined in Rules 13 to 15 of the Inquiry Rules. It is ironic indeed that the law and practice so commemorates Robert Maxwell because he brought a case against Department of Trade inspectors in 1974, complaining about a report critical of his business practices. The complaint was that he had not been shown the draft report before publication. The Court of Appeal rejected that complaint: Lord Denning, sitting with others, said that Maxwell was not entitled to see the draft report. Why not? It was because he had been fairly treated during the inquiry. He had had a proper opportunity to comment during the inquiry on the allegations in the case, so fairness did not require yet another opportunity at the end of the process.

This general legal principle was also stated by Lord Diplock in the Appellate Committee of this House, also in 1974, in the case of Hoffmann-La Roche. Lord Diplock pointed out—this point was made today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—that even in a court of law, once a fair hearing has been given to the witnesses, the rules of natural justice do not require the judge to present a draft judgment on which the parties are then entitled to comment before the judge hands down the final decision. If that is right in a court of law, it is all the more so when we are talking about the report of an inquiry—which, however important, imposes no criminal or civil liability on anyone. So it must be right, as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf, Lord Cullen and Lord Morris, have all suggested, that Rules 13 to 15 must go. They are far too absolute, and there should be a discretion for the inquiry chairman because exceptionally there may be cases where fairness indeed demands that at the end of the process the chairman goes back to a specific witness on a specific point—because, for example, a significant new piece of evidence has emerged or the witness had not previously had an opportunity to comment. However, subject to that, fairness during the hearing suffices.

There is one other matter. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, complained in his speech that at the Scott inquiry, counsel to the inquiry, Presiley Baxendale QC “permanently scarred”—the noble Lord’s words—witnesses by the ferocity of her cross-examination. I know Miss Baxendale well. She was, before her retirement, a member of my chambers, Blackstone Chambers. A more polite and more reasonable person it would be difficult to find. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that an inquiry is there to find the facts. To do so depends on counsel to the inquiry fearlessly and without favour asking difficult questions of witnesses who may be reluctant, for a variety of reasons, to tell the full story. It is undoubtedly not a pleasant experience to be cross-examined, but Miss Baxendale was not there to make friends. She did her job. So did this Select Committee. The House is very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shutt, and the other members of the committee.