Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Waddington]

My Lords, we have had a very good debate, and I would like to thank all those who have taken part. I will not detain the House for long. I am sorry to pick on the noble Lord, Lord Lester, but in his contribution, he very neatly illustrated all that is wrong with the present situation. His line was perfectly simple: “There is nothing wrong with the law, so there is no need for us to register our concern about abuses, as the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, wants to do in his amendment, and there is absolutely no need to register our concern, let alone do anything about the abuses”. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, can live quite comfortably with the injustices, but I have to tell your Lordships that I cannot. When the adoption societies were forced to close, that was in accordance with the law. It was a gross injustice. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, can live with it; I cannot. When Brighton and Hove City Council withdrew funding for a care home because it did not like the owners of the home refusing to ask people about their sexual preferences, that was a gross abuse of power. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, can live with that sort of abuse of power; I cannot. When people are sent home from work because they want to wear a cross to signify their religion, I think that that is a gross abuse of power. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, can live with it; I cannot. We have an opportunity this afternoon to show that we have not taken leave of our senses. We are concerned about these abuses. We want to make it plain to people—

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Lord Waddington]

I am going to finish now. We want to make it plain to people that there is real concern throughout the whole country. We stand for fair, not unfair, behaviour. Let us make that plain this afternoon by voting for my amendment. I am happy to press it now and I ask noble Lords throughout the Chamber to join me in the Division Lobby.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The answer is no; it is obvious. That is why I do not propose to press this amendment to a Division. It is as simple as that. That is what I was about to say. The Director of Public Prosecutions has indicated that his views will find their way into the Code for Crown Prosecutors once the legislation has been passed. We are content with that. Failure by Crown prosecutors to follow the code renders their decision-making susceptible to potential challenge by judicial review. I repeat, to make myself completely clear: I do not propose to press this matter to a Division. However, I am interested in the Minister’s response on this important, and clearly slightly divisive, question. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

If nobody else wishes to speak on this matter, I certainly will. I was very pleased to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he and the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, agree with the thrust of Clause 155. As he stated, it is absurd to allow for an arrest warrant to be issued without the consent of the DPP when a private prosecution cannot proceed without the express consent of the Attorney-General. I oppose Amendment 308A. Its purport would be to include in the legislation criteria that would tell the director how to exercise his discretion in giving consent to the issue of an arrest warrant. As we have just heard as a result of the cross-examination techniques of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, it is clear—as I understand the noble Lord, Lord Thomas—that the Director of Public Prosecutions does not wish to see his discretion confined in the legislation.

Police (Detention and Bail) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, when the three political parties, Justice, Liberty and, of course, the House of Commons all agree that this Bill deserves support, I am not going to express a dissenting opinion. But I am going to express concerns about the constitutional issues raised by the way in which the Government have proceeded. Parliament is being asked to enact emergency legislation to overturn a decision of the High Court. High Court judges, no doubt regrettably, occasionally make decisions that are perceived to be of enormous detriment to the public interest. But in all previous cases where this happened, an appeal was brought in the hope and expectation that the Appellate Committee of your Lordships’ House, now the Supreme Court, would overturn the High Court judgment, and only if that legal remedy failed was emergency legislation brought forward.

There are good reasons why emergency legislation is contemplated only if the appeal process has been exhausted. First, if the appeal succeeds, the problem disappears and Parliament does not need to become involved. Secondly, if the appeal fails, the judgment of the Supreme Court provides a much more informed basis on which Ministers and Parliament can address all aspects of the issue. Thirdly, and not least, surely constitutional propriety requires that the law should be interpreted by judges, not by Parliament. I understand that to be the point of the interventions made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It is all very well to have Members of the House confidently asserting, as they did last week, that Mr Justice McCombe’s judgment was wrong and that the Bill merely returns the legal position to what it was. It is all very well to have the noble Baroness stating today that the Bill returns the law, as she put it, to the status quo ante, but I subscribe to the apparently old fashioned view that it is for the Supreme Court to determine what was the legal status quo. Indeed, this case is even more surprising, because we are engaged in this exercise notwithstanding the fact that there is an appeal; it is pending in the Supreme Court, listed to be heard on 25 July. I shall come back to the timetable in just a moment.

The Minister said this afternoon that the decision to legislate in advance of the outcome of that appeal raises no constitutional issue, because Parliament, of course, is sovereign and competent to legislate at any time. She made the same point in her very speedy response to the report of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. I am sure that all members of that committee will be extremely grateful to the Minister for the urgency and speed with which she addressed the issues that we raised; but is it really the Government’s position that no constitutional issue about the respective roles of the judiciary and Parliament is raised when emergency legislation is introduced to overturn a decision of a lower court which is pending appeal to the Supreme Court and when the emergency legislation is being brought forward on the basis that it simply restores the previous position, which has therefore, it is implicitly suggested, been misunderstood by the High Court judge?

Of course, I understand that we cannot now wait for 25 July, because the Supreme Court may, on 25 July or very soon thereafter, dismiss the appeal and by then Parliament will be in recess, but that does not remove my concern about what has happened in this case. The vice is that nobody asked the Supreme Court to hear and determine the appeal more speedily. Appeal courts regularly hear and determine appeals very speedily indeed when it is necessary to do so. The timetable in this case is as follows: Mr Justice McCombe gave his oral judgment as long ago as 19 May. He refused permission to appeal on 25 May and on the same day he certified a point of law which enabled an application to be made to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal. That is seven weeks ago. It was not until 21 June that an application was made to the Supreme Court by the Greater Manchester Police for permission to appeal. For reasons which I still do not understand, the Government appear to have been unaware of the crucial significance of this case until about 30 June, even though Professor Michael Zander published an article pointing out the concerns on 18 June—he must have been aware of the problem some days before that.

The Supreme Court granted permission to appeal and expedited the case so that it will be heard on 25 July, but I have made inquiries of the Supreme Court and been told that neither the Greater Manchester Police nor anyone else asked the Supreme Court to hear the appeal earlier than 25 July because of the urgency and the need for Parliament to consider emergency legislation if the appeal was not to be heard earlier than 25 July. I am also told by the Supreme Court that, if it had been asked, it would of course have considered trying to hear the case more speedily because of the need to do so. That is what should have happened in this case. As soon as the importance of the issues was understood and the possible need for emergency legislation was recognised, an application should have been made to the Supreme Court for it to hear the case last week or at the beginning of this week on the grounds that, if the appeal failed, then and only then would the Government need, or possibly need, to bring before Parliament emergency legislation. There would then have been time to consider the matter before the Summer Recess and after the appeal if it were unsuccessful.

As noble Lords will know, the Attorney-General may intervene in any court proceedings to protect the public interest. The Secretary of State does not appear to have asked the Attorney-General to apply to the Supreme Court to hear the case more urgently. If such a request was made, it certainly was not acted upon. I should emphasise that, although the Supreme Court has very helpfully given me the information that I have recounted to noble Lords—I am very grateful to Jenny Rowe, the chief executive, for that—the views that I express on these matters are mine alone.

My concern is that this Bill is a most unfortunate constitutional anomaly. Parliament should not normally be asked to consider emergency legislation to overturn a High Court judgment when there is a pending appeal on the very issue which is before the highest court in the land. That should not happen unless every effort has been made to persuade the Supreme Court to hear an even more urgent appeal.

There is simply no precedent that I am aware of, and understandably so, for what we are doing today—reversing a judgment of the High Court with retrospective effect on the basis that we are satisfied that we are restoring a status quo, even though a Supreme Court hearing is pending and no application has been made for it to hear the matter more speedily.

I have four questions for the Minister. First, is she aware of any previous occasion when emergency legislation has been brought forward to repeal the effect of a High Court decision without first appealing to the Appellate Committee, now the Supreme Court, and asking that court to hear the matter with considerable expedition? Secondly, can she explain why, before coming to Parliament, the Secretary of State apparently did not ask the Attorney-General to apply to the Supreme Court to hear this appeal with considerable expedition so that it could it take place early in July and so that, if it were dismissed, we would still have time if necessary to consider emergency legislation? Thirdly, what steps has the Secretary of State now taken to ensure that all police authorities—indeed, all other public authorities—know that if the High Court gives a judgment on a matter of public interest which causes general concern it is vital that it is communicated to central government without delay so that steps can urgently be taken, if appropriate, to ensure that an appeal is heard with great expedition? I ask that question—I do not attribute blame—because there appears to have been considerable delays in this case in communicating concerns from Greater Manchester through to Whitehall.

My fourth and final question is this: what is going to happen if the Supreme Court hears this appeal on 25 July and if the appeal succeeds? Will the Government then bring forward in the autumn a short Bill—even shorter than this one—to repeal this emergency legislation as entirely unnecessary and to remove from the statute book a most unfortunate constitutional anomaly?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, this has been a constructive debate. I welcome the support for the Bill from the opposition Front Bench. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his remarks in his opening speech. He raised some issues that I shall touch on since they were also picked up by other Members of your Lordships’ House.

I shall reiterate something about the scope of the review of bail. This was raised not only by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but by the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford, Lord Clinton-Davis and Lord Dear, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester. When we look at pre-charge bail later this year, it will be to consider the issues raised today, including the overall time limit. However, we will need to ground that review in evidence. At the moment, much of what we have heard is anecdotal. Therefore, any and all input to that review in advance of its terms of reference being drawn up will be welcome. I can tell your Lordships’ House and the wider community today that, further to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about members of the public, there is a wide community of interest in this whole area. We would welcome, even before the autumn, any written submissions that will help us to set the terms of reference for that review, which will be wide and far-reaching. I hope it is of help to the House to know that.

I was asked about what legislation might follow. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that it is a bit premature for me to identify any legislation that may come from the review. There might well be something, but until we see the terms of reference, have gathered that information and can see how to take the matter forward, it would be premature for me to say today what legislation might be needed.

A lot has been said about the Home Office and timeframe involved by several noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Pannick. I hope the House will bear with me but it might be helpful, since a lot of attention has been paid to this, if I read out for the record of the House the situation as regards the timeline. To set that in context, the wider consequences of the ruling could not be considered until the judge issued his written ruling, setting out the reasons for his decision. That judgment was issued on Friday 17 June. Most importantly, even at that stage, its wider consequences were not readily apparent. The judge himself reiterated his belief that the consequences would not be as severe as might be feared in impeding police investigations in the vast majority of cases. It was only as the complex ruling was examined early the following week by ACPO, the CPS and Home Office officials that the full consequences became apparent. However, I will, for the record of the House, read out the points in this whole process and those at which the Home Office—both officials and Ministers—was involved.

[Lord Pannick]

Can the noble Baroness explain why the Home Office was unable to understand the implications and importance of this decision on 17 June, when Professor Michael Zander was able to publish an article on this subject on 18 June and must, therefore, have understood the implications some time before that?

[Baroness Browning]

If the noble Lord will bear with me, I shall begin at the beginning and work my way through the timeline. Because we have had such a short debate, it is very important to put this on the record so that noble Lords have the full information. I will read it slowly because a lot of dates are involved.

On 5 April 2011, the district judge refused the Greater Manchester Police’s application for an extension to a warrant of further detention in the Hookway case. On 19 May, in a judicial review, Mr Justice McCombe, sitting alone at the Divisional Court in Manchester, upheld the district judge’s ruling in an oral judgment. I should point out that he sat alone because an early hearing was requested, but only one judge was available to sit; so the request was made—a point referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. On 25 May, the Greater Manchester Police sought initial views from Ann Whyte QC, who stated that the judgment may relate only to specific cases or warrants of further detention. Yet again, the legal advice was that this might have quite a discrete interpretation in terms of its wider implementation. The following day, 26 May, the Greater Manchester Police invited Home Office officials to become an interested party in an effort to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and forwarded papers for consideration. The written judgment was not of course available at that point—26 May.

As I am reading this, I realise that it is all right for me—I have a piece of paper in front of me. For the purposes of clarity, when I have read this into the record I will also place it in the Library of the House.

On 17 June, the Greater Manchester Police, as we have heard, received the written judgment from the High Court and forwarded a copy to the Home Office on that day. That was a Friday. On Monday 20 June, the Greater Manchester Police and Home Office officials studied the written judgment, and the broad scope of the problems presented by the judgment first started to become apparent. Until that point, there had been some consideration—not only because of the QC’s opinion but because of the wording of the judge in his oral judgment—that this matter was not going to be as far reaching as it has subsequently proved.

It was on 20 June that the GMP and Home Office officials started to consider the written judgment. The next day, 21 June, the GMP invited ACPO representatives and the Home Office officials to meet to discuss the implications. Home Office officials agreed with ACPO to convene an urgent meeting to discuss the implications, which took place the following day. ACPO, the CPS and the Home Office officials met at the CPS’s headquarters. The full magnitude of potential difficulties then became quite apparent. The following day—we are talking about one day following the other—ACPO alerted the CPS chief executive, and ACPO issued notification of judgment to all chief constables. On 24 June, the ACPO lead met with the CPS director-general, and Home Office Ministers were informed at that point. ACPO commissioned advice from Clare Montgomery QC, and ACPO issued interim guidance to all chief constables. That was a Friday.

The following Monday, 27 June, Clare Montgomery QC’s advice was received in conference by ACPO, the CPS and Home Office officials. ACPO issued further guidance to all chief constables. ACPO commissioned forces to provide real-life examples of the impact of the ruling to support the case for urgent legislation. On 29 June, ACPO commissioned further legal advice from Steven Kovats QC. The following day, ACPO received that advice from the barrister and presented its case for urgent legislation to Home Office Ministers. On the same day, the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice made an Oral Statement to the House of Commons on the need for urgent legislation. To pray in aid the words of ACPO lead Jim Barker-McCardle:

“It was only when ACPO received the written judgment on 17 June, and a number of senior people were able to spend some significant time considering the issue, that the seriousness of this became apparent. As the ACPO lead on this issue, I was not going to advise Ministers that the police service needed, in exceptional circumstances, fast-track legislation until I had satisfied myself first that the legislation was necessary and that the police service could not operate effectively in light of this judgment, beyond the very short term”.

I hope that that is helpful to the House and I am sorry if it is lengthy and detailed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, I do not doubt that for one moment. I shall cite him as often as possible on behalf of the Home Office.

I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who talked about there being no precedent for the fast-track legislation in front of us. There is a precedent for this. A High Court judgment in July 2002 in the case of Hwez and Khadir held that the practice of granting temporary release, subject to restrictions, to people detained under the Immigration Acts was unlawful. The Government legislated to overturn that judgment in Section 67 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Subsection (3) provides:

“This section shall be treated as always having had effect”.

The purpose was to avoid a situation where people subject to immigration controls who do not have leave to remain but who cannot lawfully be detained were left at large without there being any way of keeping track of them. Retrospection avoided the need to reassess the cases of persons on temporary admission on an individual basis.

As a member of the Constitution Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has raised issues that replicate some of those that the Constitution Committee raised. I notice that the Constitution Committee may return to the issue after the Bill is enacted and the Supreme Court has heard the appeal by Greater Manchester Police. We will, naturally, consider carefully any further report that comes forward from the committee.

The noble Lord also asked what steps are now taken to ensure that police and public authorities report judgments to central government as soon as possible. There is an assumption there that the Greater Manchester Police should have acted quicker in alerting the Home Office to that judgment. As I pointed out in explaining the timeframe, we were aware and officials were engaged, but under a set of circumstances that was perhaps not quite clear to the House under the legal advice at the time. I do not disagree with the principle of what the noble Lord said. Timeliness is very important; lessons can always be learnt. We need to look forward to see things coming over the hill and not just wait to see what happens, when it is too late. That is my understanding of his question. I hope that I have satisfied him by outlining the timeline, but the general principle of what he asked, which is about the timeliness of information-sharing between agencies and authorities, is important, especially in issues as serious as this. I take his point; I know that, in the Home Office, we will endeavour to ensure that it is not overlooked.

On the question of the Supreme Court, although Mr Justice McCombe gave his judgment orally in May and certified the point of law, it was not possible for police counsel to prepare the appeal papers until the written judgment available on 17 June. As I have explained, an early hearing was requested but 25 July was allocated by the Supreme Court. An early date having been allocated, neither the GMP nor the Home Office believed that there was any prospect of an even earlier date being allocated.

The noble Lord also asked why the Secretary of State did not ask the Attorney-General to hear the case earlier in the public interest. The Secretary of State was made aware that the GMP was appealing to the Supreme Court for an expedited hearing. Subsequently the police also requested that the court stay the effect of the Hookway judgment. The court gave an expedited hearing date of 25 July, which, as I have said, is earlier than the original date. The Home Secretary felt there was no reason to think that government intervention would make that hearing even earlier. That is the case and I do not think that I can add any more to that. Clearly the Home Secretary did not feel it appropriate to approach the Attorney-General because a concession had already been given with the date agreed for the hearing.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Baroness is being very patient indeed. We do not have a Committee stage on this Bill, so I hope she will excuse me if I press her slightly on this. Does she agree in principle that it is highly desirable, before emergency legislation is brought before Parliament, that every step is taken to try to ensure that the Supreme Court is asked to hear a case with very considerable expedition so as to avoid emergency legislation if at all possible?

[Baroness Browning]

I certainly do not disagree with the noble Lord on the general principle, and I will take his point back with me.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, we are proceeding in the usual orderly way of your Lordships’ House and there remain two amendments that have not yet been spoken to. The first of those is the new clause proposed in Amendment 246, which is in my name and those of other noble Lords, who have been very helpful in our approach to it. Then there is an amendment to that new clause in the name of my noble friend Lady Tonge. I say at the outset that I accept entirely her amendment to my proposed new clause. It seems eminently sensible. The proposed new clause is about giving an account to Parliament of the progress in war crimes cases. I hope the House will indulge me for a few minutes in speaking to this. I shall then say a few words about the matters that have been discussed hitherto. However, unlike my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I shall not give further details of what was designated by him to be a private conversation that took place earlier in the Bishops’ Bar.

There is a specialist war crimes team within the UK Border Agency, which is a very good thing. However, unlike many European and other countries, there is no specialist war crimes unit in either the police or the prosecution services. Other noble Lords and I were involved in all-party and non-party negotiations with the previous Government to expand the universal jurisdiction. Those negotiations were successful. However, they were successful subject to the insistence of the previous Government that what is in Clause 154 should be inserted into the law. All those involved in those negotiations accepted that at the time as being a realistic argument.

As I have said, there is no specialist war crimes unit in either the police or the prosecution service in any part of the United Kingdom. Instead, in England and Wales responsibility for war crimes is shared by SO15—Counter Terrorism Command in the Metropolitan Police—and the equivalent section, headed by Sue Hemming OBE, in the Crown Prosecution Service. The police team responsible for war crimes is also tasked with counterterrorism policing relating to dissident republican groups from Ireland. It therefore has an enormous amount of work to do and deals with a fast-moving scene, irrespective of war crimes.

What does the proposed new clause seek to do? It requires the Government to report annually on all legal action taken against suspected war criminals in the United Kingdom, and on the assistance given to other states and international criminal tribunals. I should argue to your Lordships that it is entirely reasonable and proper that the public and Parliament should be able to take stock of progress in war crimes on a regular basis. Taking stock in that way—having accountability of that kind—will ensure that the Government bestow on the relevant police section the resources that are needed to prosecute war crimes. There have been no prosecutions for war crimes since the prosecution in 2005 of an Afghan warlord who was found living in south London. However, a Peruvian was arrested in Tiverton in Devon in March 2011. He is accused of torture and crimes against humanity for his alleged role in more than 100 killings as a member of a death squad, and is currently on police bail. We hope to see some progress in that case within, of course, the usual legal proceedings.

It is remarkable, given the number of war criminals who are believed to be living in the United Kingdom, that there have been no other prosecutions since 2005. It suggests that insufficient resources are being given to the task. After all, one should bear in mind that, since 2005, the UK Border Agency has taken immigration action against 360 suspected war criminals, while the Metropolitan Police is currently pursuing 29 viable lines of inquiry. The 360 suspects come from a number of countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. The UK has also received extradition requests for four subjects from Rwanda who won their extradition proceedings and remain in the United Kingdom.

In addition to the 360, I was visited this afternoon by a representative of an organisation in Bangladesh, which is not included in the list that I enumerated as 360 cases. It is believed that there are several Bangladeshis who have been able to take refuge in this country who committed vast atrocities during the 1971 war in that country. They, too, should be the subject of investigation.

In sum, the purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that the necessary progress is maintained in dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will give some encouragement to myself and others who they put their names to the amendment in the hope that we will see more action promised and in due course taken on this front.

I now turn to the amendments proposed to Clause 154. Despite the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I am disappointed that my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven was not here to speak to his amendment this afternoon. I know that he has a busy diary and I am sure that he is doing something very important. But I am glad that we have the wisdom of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, who will inform the House of their experience.

The importance of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and his potential contribution is that he is the immediate past Director of Public Prosecutions. I am working on the assumption that he has not consulted his successor, because what is proposed in his amendment, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas, is inconsistent with what has been said very cogently to parliamentary committees by the current Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC.

I would say this to my noble friend if he were here, but were he still the Director of Public Prosecutions I do not believe that he would be prepared to support an amendment of this kind. It is quite simple in my view—I seem to be the only one from the Liberal Democrat Benches who is supporting our Government on this matter this evening—but the simplicity needs to be stated. The Director of Public Prosecutions and his senior staff make charging decisions every single day of the week. That is what they do a lot of the time and it is done at the most senior level. The suggestion that there would be a delay is a canard.

I do not think that I have to declare an interest—indeed, it would be sexist to do so—when I say that my wife works in a senior position for the Crown Prosecution Service, but living with a shared telephone I am well aware of the urgent decisions that are considered in great depth and taken at all kinds of unsocial hours and on all matters of urgency. The suggestion that there would be a delay is simply quite wrong. Furthermore, the Director of Public Prosecutions and his senior staff have enormous experience in making charging decisions. They make all the important charging decisions that take place in this country—or almost all; they should make all, if they are referred to them by their junior staff. In so doing, they apply the Crown Prosecution Service code.

These amendments, particularly that spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, attempt to fix in statutory stone something that is much more evolutionary—and needs to be. The Crown Prosecution Service code has gone through many changes. It is reviewed and changed regularly. Since Keir Starmer QC became DPP, it has been changed again and there may be good reasons for changing it in future. Furthermore I hope, and indeed apprehend, that the Director of Public Prosecutions would want to consult widely on the universal jurisdiction and might well wish to issue a code of practice. That might involve some changes to the current code. After all, the Crown Prosecution Service has a special code for dealing with rape cases which is non-statutory. It would be extremely foolish to make it statutory because it would be prevented from change. The same applies to the universal jurisdiction.

I say to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, in the kindest possible way, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with a single kick scored a hat trick when he demonstrated that the amendment put forward by my noble friend, and indeed by my noble friend the former Director of Public Prosecutions, is fundamentally flawed in its text. It shows exactly the danger of attempting to put into tablets of stone this sort of provision, even when it has been drafted by lawyers as distinguished as they.

I say to noble Lords who have tabled amendments to Clause 154 that we have a responsible Crown Prosecution Service, that we have a responsible and able Director of Public Prosecutions, and that it has been decided that this should be done not by the Attorney-General but by the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is a completely apolitical figure. It seems that the Government have got this exactly right. I hope that the Minister will not budge in his determination that Clause 154 should be unamended.

[Lord Pannick]

I was a witness to the discussions in the Bishops’ Bar between the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Carlile. I will not give evidence; I claim immunity. I welcome Clause 154. It will remedy a serious anomaly in the current state of our law. The anomaly is that although a prosecution in this sensitive and important context requires the consent of the Attorney-General, a person may be arrested and detained without any consideration as to whether such consent is likely to be given. It has been suggested in this debate that there have been very few cases of that. So what is all the fuss about? Why do we need to change the law? The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, made that point in opening and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, made the same point.

I declare an interest. Over the past few years, I have advised, pro bono, a number of individuals who have been deterred from visiting this country by reason of the state of our law. They have been deterred even though there was no realistic prospect whatever of the Attorney-General giving consent to a prosecution. These people would not have been protected by diplomatic immunity because that applies only to certain very senior Ministers. They were deterred from coming to this country because of the risk that material would be put before a magistrate at an urgently convened hearing which might result in them being arrested and detained for a couple of nights, with all the inconvenience and embarrassment that that would cause, until this unhappy matter could be sorted out by the Attorney-General confirming that he or she did not intend to prosecute. So it is quite wrong to suggest that the current law has no serious effect. I should also mention that I have also advised, again on a pro bono basis, Jewish community groups in this country concerned about this aspect of the law.

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[Lord Campbell-Savours]

As a non-lawyer, I wonder whether I can ask the noble Lord a lay man’s question. What kind of considerations would the public interest considerations be in the application for a warrant in a case like this? What would the DPP have in mind?

[Lord Pannick]

The DPP dealt with that matter in the evidence that he gave to the Public Bill Committee. He was very reluctant to address hypotheticals but said:

“There may be a case where there is a very powerful argument … the example that is given by others and therefore not from my mouth is where you have a fraught and difficult peace negotiation that has to take place in 24 hours in a country and you need international leaders there. I do not know. There may be a situation where you would have to carefully consider the arguments one way or the other”.—[Official Report, Commons, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Committee, 20/1/11; col. 134.]

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I—

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[Lord Pannick]

I will just finish my answer, then I will happily give way to the noble Lord. If he is saying that public interest has no role in this area then his quarrel is with the code for Crown prosecutors, but his amendment does not address that.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

When the noble Lord said that the DPP was totally independent, he appeared to be saying that they would not have political considerations in mind. If peace negotiations were about to take place, surely that is a political consideration. It is precisely those sorts of areas that might cause the public some concern, even though the justification may be merited.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is of course the experience of all those who have held the sensitive and difficult office of Director of Public Prosecutions and Attorney-General—we are fortunate to have two former Attorney-Generals here—that they have to address these sensitive and difficult questions. There is nothing unusual about this area that singles it out from the problems that are faced, if not on a daily basis then I am sure on a weekly or monthly basis, by those who hold that office. I am sure that they will be able to assist the House regarding this matter.

My point is that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to give an advisory role to the DPP in relation to a matter that the magistrate simply has no role under existing law to determine. I suggest with respect that that is not a sensible way to proceed, nor would it be sensible to confer on the magistrate a new role, which the magistrate has never had, of having to consider the criteria in the code for Crown prosecutors of whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction or whether the public interest justifies a decision being taken.

The other amendment, Amendment 245AA, would include in the legislation criteria that told the DPP how to exercise his discretion. It would be quite unprecedented for Parliament to tell the DPP what criteria to adopt in exercising his functions, nor do the courts do so. Indeed, it was highly controversial that the Appellate Committee of this House decided in July 2009 to require the DPP even to publish guidelines on whether he would prosecute for assisting a suicide. I declare an interest as counsel for Mrs Purdy in that case. Parliament and the courts have, for good reason, preferred to leave the DPP to develop his own criteria in the code for Crown prosecutors. Amendment 246 raises very different issues—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does the noble Lord agree that it would surely be right that the DPP should apply the same standards when he is considering one of these cases that come from abroad as he would for a person within the domestic jurisdiction?

[Lord Pannick]

I certainly agree that the DPP should apply the same standards in the sense that he asks whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction and whether the public interest justifies a prosecution. The application of those principles, though, will inevitably depend on all the facts and circumstances of the individual case. It would be unprecedented for Parliament to tell the DPP in detail how to apply his discretion, and there is nothing in what the DPP said to the Public Bill Committee that should cause concern to noble Lords about the manner in which he proposes to exercise this new power if he is given it.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I think it is fair that I ask the noble Lord this. He has said several times now that the consent of the Attorney-General to one of these prosecutions is required. My understanding, and I want to get this quite clear, is that the Attorney-General can issue a nolle prosequi that his consent is not required.

[Lord Pannick]

It amounts to the same thing. If the Attorney-General takes the view that it is inappropriate for a prosecution to continue, they will say so. The purpose of the provision of English law is to ensure that the Attorney-General is able, in this sensitive and important context, to take a view on whether it is appropriate.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, to pursue the point, there is a vast difference, with respect, between getting the consent of the Attorney-General as a prerequisite and the right of the Attorney-General to intervene by way of nolle prosequi. The noble Lord is mistaken in what he draws from that.

[Lord Pannick]

My understanding is that consent is required. In any event, with great respect, I do not see the practical difference. Other noble Lords will assist the Committee in that respect.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, this is a delicate and sensitive matter and I will spend a few moments on it. I entirely understand why noble Lords who have spoken have raised the points that they have. There are some footnotes as well, but two major things emerge from the debate so far. First, it is interesting that, despite the fact that certain noble Lords have said, “Let’s leave the system exactly as it is, there’s nothing wrong with it”, everybody who has spoken so far has proposed a change to the present system, either by supporting the Government or by tabling amendments as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has done—

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Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Cathain]

No, I am not. Please listen to what I have said. The self-righteousness coming from the other side is quite sickening.

I abstained in the debate because I felt that there was a moral justification for the money to be repaid to the people who were conned by those opposite into spending money on ID cards. There is no point in denying that by trying to be the people who support everybody out there and by adopting a high moral tone and self-righteousness. Rubbish.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I hope that I will not be accused of being self-righteous if I say that I share the concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Howarth of Newport.

Behind the moral issue and the issue of principle, I think that there is a legal issue. The Minister will recall, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that it was suggested to her on the previous occasion when we debated the matter that she might wish to take specific advice from the law officers as to whether the Government’s approach is consistent with this country’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. The concern, which is very simple indeed, is that the Bill removes a property right without any compensation, in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and, therefore, that the amendment that noble Lords approved was not only wise but necessary.

When we last debated this matter, the Minister’s answer was that the ID card remained the property of the Government and therefore there was no difficulty. With respect, however, that is no answer at all. It is very well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights—indeed, it is common sense—that, when the Government grant a licence or an authorisation to do something, that of itself establishes a property right. If that licence or that authorisation is then removed by the Government, contrary to the expectation that has been created, the Government have a duty, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, to pay compensation. That legal obligation is precisely consistent with the substance of our debate on the previous occasion and with the amendment that was approved by noble Lords.

I therefore join the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, in asking the Minister to explain whether she has indeed taken specific advice from the law officers, to deal in more detail with the substance of this concern and to explain to noble Lords how it can be that what the Government intend to do is consistent with this country’s international obligations.

[Lord Campbell of Alloway]

If there is a breach of human rights, of course that is a worry, but it is the job of the Court of Human Rights to put it right. If we are concerned with a matter of principle—I understand what the noble Lord is saying—surely the policy of a previous Government cannot be constitutionally binding on the next Government. Whether it is unfortunate and whether there is criticism, the policy of this Government was in fact accepted by this House. If we have got it wrong and the noble Lord is right, that will not affect the validity of this piece of legislation in this country. However, if an application is later made to the Court of Human Rights, it may decide that the point of principle here is that this Government—I do not always agree with them or, indeed, with any Government—have the entitlement in constitutional principle to reject the advice of the previous Government.

[Lord Pannick]

I have, of course, enormous respect for the knowledge and judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, but on this occasion, with respect, I do not agree with his opinion. It is part of the law of this country that the Minister, like all other Ministers, has a positive duty under the Human Rights Act to confirm to this House and the other place that the legislation that the Government are bringing forward is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is the law of this country. I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to tell this House, consistent with her duty under the law of this land, why she is confident—if she is—that this proposal is consistent with our international obligations.

[Baroness Hamwee]

On all previous occasions when we discussed this matter, I was honest with the House that I had some difficulty with it, but is what was the substantive issue then in fact the issue for today? I have been waiting to hear some comment on the Commons reason for disagreeing with this House’s amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, addressed the issue of financial privilege and suggested that we should not accept it. However—and this is an entirely personal view—I think that this may well be an issue that goes to heart of the relationship between the two Houses. I have grave doubts as to whether we should tackle that convention on the back of this Bill. This is an important, stand-alone issue, but it is not one that we should seek to overturn in this manner.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I repeat to the House that the Government believe that this legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. I do not think that I am obliged to say whether or not we have consulted the law officers, nor to say what legal advice we have taken. However, we believe it to be compatible with the convention. As we take our duties seriously, that is a clear statement to the House that we believe that we are acting lawfully.

[Lord Pannick]

Does the Minister appreciate that the question is not simply whether or not the Government are satisfied that the Bill that they are putting forward is compatible with the convention? Will she address the point that on the previous occasion, and in the debate today, a specific concern has been raised about why it is feared that the Government’s position is incompatible with the convention? That is why it was suggested to the Minister on the previous occasion that specific advice should be taken from the law officers on this precise point. I am sure that it would assist the House if the Minister were at least able to say whether she went back to the law officers in the light of the debate on the previous occasion, and in the light of the specific concern that was raised, in order to assure herself and noble Lords that that point had been considered and the Government were satisfied with regard to it.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I do not think that I am able to enlighten the House any further on the question of taking legal advice. We believe our actions to be lawful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

This is a matter for the House, but I should like to answer the other points that have been made.

[Lord Pannick]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness but she really has not answered the substance of the concern. I suggest that the only way she can do that is by telling the House whether or not the law officers have been consulted. It is a matter for the House what step to take but I suggest to the noble Baroness that the appropriate step for it to take is to adjourn further consideration of this matter until she is able at least to assure it that the concerns that have been expressed by a number of noble Lords have been considered by the law officers. I entirely accept that there is no obligation on the Government to tell the House what the advice of law officers is but it must be assured that they have been consulted on this matter. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness to accept that the appropriate step is for further consideration to be adjourned.

[Earl Attlee]

I think that it is appropriate for the Minister to carry on with the rest of her speech, answer the other questions that noble Lords have asked and wait to see whether further inspiration arrives.

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Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I will speak briefly about two issues. We certainly accept the convention that the noble Baroness is under no obligation to tell the House what the advice of the law officers was. However, I am surprised, not least in the light of the earlier observations by my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Aberavon, to hear her assert that she is under no obligation to tell the House whether she received advice from the law officers. I wonder whether part of the reason for her difficulty earlier in the afternoon was that the advice of the law officers was not consistent. Perhaps they disagreed among themselves, which put her in an embarrassing and difficult position. Perhaps she would be willing to cast any light on that; if she would, I think that the House would be interested.

The second issue is the one that I raised earlier. I am genuinely unclear, from what the Minister said this afternoon, whether the Government are asserting financial privilege and hiding behind a ruling of the Speaker and whether they are content that this extension of the doctrine of financial privilege to cover matters of expenditure as well as measures concerned with revenue raising is an appropriate new doctrine for them to espouse and to use for their political convenience. As I suggested earlier, if that is the case, there are large implications for this House, which we should ponder and take seriously. Will the Minister tell us in plain terms whether the Government consider that this is a matter of financial privilege and therefore outside the authority and competence of this House to vote on?

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords—

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, perhaps I might remind the House that we have in a sense invented procedure this afternoon to assist the Minister to make a statement of explanation. Noble Lords will understand that of course we expect a noble Lord on the opposition Front Bench to be able to put the opposition view. Other noble Lords might wish to put very brief questions. We allowed a little latitude to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. Perhaps we might now return to the normal convention of making brief interventions so that my noble friend can return to the assurance, which she has given very clearly to the House, that at all times she has taken the appropriate legal advice and, as she has tried to assure the House, that the Government have acted properly. Of course I understand that matters of parliamentary procedure and privilege, and constitutional issues, have been raised by the opposition Front and Back Benches. I also understand that these will be debated on another day. Our minds today are concentrated on one Bill and one or two Motions.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I shall confine myself to brief questions. First, the Minister indicated that legal advice had been taken. Will she accept that there is a difference, which concerns noble Lords, between taking legal advice on these matters and taking legal advice from the law officers?

The second matter arises out of the noble Baroness’s statement that it is a convention that Ministers do not confirm whether or not legal advice has been sought from the law officers. Does she accept that it is a different matter if she has given a specific assurance to the House that legal advice will be sought from the law officers and that it is entirely appropriate that she should confirm to the House whether her own assurance has been fulfilled?

My third and final question is: will she also accept that it is not a universal rule that the Government do not tell the House whether legal advice has been sought from the law officers? There are many, many examples of the Government telling this House and the other place that legal advice has been sought from the law officers. Professor Edwards’s book, Law Officers of the Crown, gives many examples, the most recent of which, of course, relates to the legality of the invasion of Iraq.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, it is not clear to me how much more help I can be to the House. I have tried very hard to be of help. Perhaps I can take up the points that have been made. I was asked in the House—I am looking at Hansard—whether the advice was from the law officers. I said that I was not sure but would seek to confirm it. That is indeed what I undertook to do. I am advised that I am not in a position to disclose either the fact of seeking that legal advice or its contents. That is why I am not able to take what I have said to the House this afternoon any further. The only way that I could do that would be—

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Wednesday 17th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my name is on Amendment 2. I led the opposition from these benches to the Identity Cards Bill. I spent a good deal of one year of my life opposing it. I am therefore utterly delighted that this Bill is before the House. However, I have to say that, for me, it is slighted by the denial of reimbursement of the fee paid by 12,000 of our fellow citizens when they took out this card. Had they been told at the time they took out the card that they were in danger of losing the card and not being reimbursed, then that would be different. Had the coalition partners in their election manifestos said not merely that they would revoke the whole of the ID card scheme, but not compensate those who had taken cards in the interim, then that would be different. But neither of those circumstances prevails. I really do not think that it is remotely acceptable, for the reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, laid out in moving the amendment. It simply is not acceptable to say, “Ah, but they should have realised”, which is what it boils down to.

Governments must set an example of the standards they expect of private industry. Had private industry engaged in a tactic of this sort, noble Lords on all the Benches would have been up in arms, and rightly so. I feel probably more strongly than I ought to that there is a simple, basic issue of fairness in this. Since this coalition launched itself as a coalition on the basis of fairness, I felt compelled, contrary to the wishes of my Whips, to put my name to this amendment, and I have done so with some conviction.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I support noble Lords who have spoken. Will the noble Baroness tell the House whether she disputes that the card is property for the purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights? Its cancellation is therefore a deprivation of property and compensation is payable. It would be most unfortunate if those whose cards are being taken away need to litigate this matter.

[Lord Maxton]

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, I supported the introduction of ID cards. I still oppose this Bill in abolishing them. But certainly I think that the Government are being very petty in terms of refusing compensation to those who bought the cards, particularly as it appears that they are paying compensation to contractors which supplied machinery, software and everything else to set up the ID scheme. They will be paid full compensation. The argument is that they have a contract between the Government and them.

I would argue that the people who bought ID cards equally have a contract between themselves as individuals and the Government from whom they purchased the card. If that is the case, they are as much entitled to compensation as the companies which are being compensated for loss of earnings and profits as a result of the card scheme being cancelled. Will the noble Baroness spell out exactly what compensation is being paid to these companies? I gather that the computers holding the information will be physically smashed up. Will she also include the cost of that smashing up? There must be a cost to the public purse involved in all of that. Perhaps the noble Baroness will spell some of that out during her speech.

Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2010

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Monday 19th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I want to comment on the interesting statement by the Minister. I speak as the chair of Justice, which is the UK-based human rights and law reform organisation whose mission is to advance access to justice, human rights and the rule of law. It is also the British section of the International Commission of Jurists. This House will know that that international commission set up a panel of eminent jurists who reported last year on the issue of terrorism and in February 2009 produced a report, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights, in which it recommended that there should be a review of counterterrorism legislation in this country because of its concern that there had been so much erosion of civil liberties and of some of the protections and safeguards that are so important to our system, which is admired around the world.

We therefore welcome the Government's review. The steps they are taking to reinstate many of the liberties that we saw eroded are greatly welcomed by human rights lawyers. However, we are concerned that the Government are still going to continue with the 28-day pre-charge detention relating to terrorism, even for six months. In our view, with great care taken to look at the evidence, we are confident that 28 days is not necessary. We make the argument that it is not necessary because plainly it is at odds with the right to liberty. Also, the period is far longer than any other western democracy has in place, and there is a lack of effective safeguards.

I remind the House of a number of the facts of the cases that have come before the courts in recent times. Our review of the use of the 28 days over the period since 2006, when 14 days was raised to 28 days, found that six suspects had been held for as long as 27 or 28 days. Three of those were released without charge. Three were charged with terrorism offences but, of those three, two were acquitted and only one was convicted. In that one instance where there was a successful conviction, it appears that the great majority of admissible evidence was already available to the police at the time of arrest; it was certainly available before the 14 days were up.

We have also seen that five of the six suspects held for up to 28 days were arrested in the context of Operation Overt, the liquid bomb plot. I should declare that I was one of the counsels in that case so I am familiar with it in some detail. Indeed, all three men who were ultimately convicted were charged within 12 days of their arrest—the 28 days were not necessary in that case either.

Justice urges the House that to defer a decision on this matter even for six months is too long. I remind noble Lords that in other western democracies, particularly in common law countries, there is nothing like this erosion of safeguards and protections. In Canada, there is a requirement to charge within a day; in the United States, it is two days; in South Africa, it is two days; and in New Zealand, it is two days. Even in other parts of Europe which do not have the common law system, to which I am so committed, the position is different. For example, in Germany the period is two days; in Spain, it is a maximum of five days; and in France, it is a maximum of six days. Charging is expected to take place within those limits.

We are concerned that there is an incompatibility with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. We think that it is highly likely that Schedule 8, the authorisation procedure, will be found incompatible with the requirements of Article 5. We ask the Government to look again at whether there is even a need to have the six months’ extension which is now being considered.

However, I say all of that in the context of our view that the Government are taking the right steps in having this inquiry into what is needed. Clearly, no country should roll over in the face of terrorism and special steps have to be taken, but it is our view that the extension to 14 days, which was introduced, is adequate to the challenges that we all face.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I appreciate that we are debating this issue in the context of the Government’s very welcome announcement that they will conduct a review of the 28-day pre-charge detention limit. However, I am unpersuaded that there is any basis for continuing this power, even on a temporary basis.

There are three points which your Lordships will wish to have well in mind. First, this is an extraordinarily exceptional power. English law normally requires that suspects be charged or released within four days. The pre-charge detention limit for terrorist cases was limited to seven days until 2003, when it was raised to 14 days. English law jealously restricts the power of the state to detain people without charge, and rightly so. It is only when charged that the person concerned has the right to be told the accusation against him and to respond to it. For the state to hold a person without charge for up to four weeks is inevitably a very substantial interference with their freedom and inevitably has a very damaging effect on their work, family relationships and reputation in the community.

Secondly, there must, therefore, be a very heavy onus on the Government to justify such an interference with basic liberty. The real question is whether they can meet that heavy onus. I suggest that they have failed to identify any practical experience whatever which establishes, or indeed even suggests, that a 14-day limit would not suffice. This is, of course, not a new problem. The Home Office has all the relevant information. Will the Minister in her reply please identify for the House whether there are any cases in which pre-charge detention after 14 days was necessary to the successful prosecution of a terrorist suspect? It is surely not sufficient for the noble Baroness to assert—and who can disagree with the assertion?—that it is impossible to be sure that there might never in the future be an occasion when more than 14 days might be required, as she put it.