European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

No, the treaty will be a separate piece of legislation when we negotiate it. I hope I have tackled most of noble Lords’ questions and they will be able to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just ask the Minister about his comments on the European Court of Justice? Is there anything in the case law of the ECJ that justifies the Government’s reluctance for it to continue to be the dispute resolution procedure for the matters we are discussing?

[Lord Callanan]

We have been clear that respecting the Brexit vote means delivering on having control of our own laws. Our Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of our own laws and it would not be appropriate to submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of a foreign power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham]

That would have to get through both Houses, which would be at least some check on the process. The point I am making is not quite the point that my noble friend has interpreted. I am saying that, if the charter is to be incorporated into domestic law, it has to be the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and amendment, and that is the only basis on which the charter should be incorporated into domestic law.

I accept the noble and learned Lord’s point that a number of aspects of the charter are entirely irrelevant and are hinged on our membership of the Union. Articles 44, 42, 43 and 39 are examples of that. There are also articles in the provision of the charter that many of us would disagree with. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has indicated that she does not like many of them, and I happen to agree with her. I heard my noble friends Lord Howard, Lord Lamont and Lord Blencathra chuntering away, and I agree with them: there are many things in the charter with which I disagree. But I am saying that if it is to be incorporated, it should be incorporated in such a way as to enable this House to scrutinise each and every one of its provisions and amend as appropriate.

I remind the Committee that one reason many noble Lords and others wish to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights is that the judge-made interpretation of the text is incapable of amendment by Parliament. I wish to avoid that criticism being made of the charter if it is to be incorporated. The suggestion in my amendment to make the charter, if incorporated, subject to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment is perhaps the only example in this sorry business of being able to cherry pick, or to have your cake and eat it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, may I respond to some of the objections that have been raised to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with whose speech I agree entirely?

Many of the objections—those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, are typical—are to the content of the charter or to its implications. The Committee should appreciate that that is not the Government’s position. The Government’s position is not that they seek to exclude the charter because its contents or implications are objectionable. Their position is very clear indeed. If noble Lords read the debates in the House of Commons or look at the report of the Constitution Committee, they will see that the Government’s position is simply that we do not need the charter in this Bill because its contents and implications are already contained in the retained EU law that is being read across through this Bill. So many of the objections that the Committee is listening to are simply beside the point: they are not the Government’s objection to the charter. The Government’s objection to the charter—it is unnecessary because its contents are already part of retained EU law—is, I am afraid, simply unsustainable. I will not take up time on this, because the hour is late, but if any noble Lords are doubtful about it, I simply suggest they read the helpful opinion by Jason Coppel QC, in which he clearly sets out the equality and human rights position. That is the first point.

Turning to the second point, I am always reluctant to disagree with my noble friend Lady Deech, because she taught me law at Oxford, but I have to disagree with her on this occasion. Her objection, as she explained it, and I hope I do not misrepresent her, is that she is concerned that the charter will enable the courts to overturn legislation enacted by Parliament—she is nodding. But I am sure she appreciates that that is inherent in this Bill. The whole point of the Bill is to read across as retained EU law the content of existing EU law that is applicable to this country and to give it—see Clause 5—supremacy. Supremacy means that it takes priority, as in the Factortame case, over anything enacted by Parliament which is inconsistent. So the suggestion that we must oppose the charter because it gives courts that power is simply inconsistent with what the Bill does.

Turning to the third objection, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was concerned about whether the inclusion of the charter would, in some way, give a power that expands the role of the charter further than under EU law. My simple answer to that is no, of course it does not. The charter is being read across only because it is part of existing EU law, and it comes across as retained EU law. It will not have any greater force than it already has as part of EU law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

In those circumstances, does my noble friend agree that the result of that is that we are henceforth, instead of treating retained EU law as part of domestic law—having discarded the separation and shed the notion that it is a distinct body of law—still going to have to wrestle with all the difficulties inherent in distinguishing operations or actions pursued in the ambit of EU law from those that are not? Will that problem continue into the distant future?

[Lord Pannick]

My answer is very simple: yes, of course. The whole point of the Bill is to read across the EU law which currently applies to this country and for it to continue to apply. That is the Government’s objective. It is their objective because they—very sensibly, in my view—wish to ensure legal certainty and clarity on exit day. That is exactly the legal position. It is not my idea; it is the Government’s intention in this Bill.

As to all the concerns about what the charter might or might not do, one should bear in mind that the charter has been applicable in the courts of this country for many years. No one has suggested that there is some case or principle which is so objectionable that we need now to make an exception for the charter, when the Government’s intention in the Bill is to read across all retained EU law to ensure a functioning statute book that preserves the legal position and ensures clarity, certainty and continuity. That is what this Bill is about.

[Lord True (Con)]

There is, I think, a fourth question. As a layman, I have been listening for 51 minutes to extensive legal argument on these questions—and who am I to judge, in a sense?—and I was persuaded by the distinguished arguments of two former Law Lords that I heard. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to three arguments but there is surely a fourth argument which has not been adduced by any of the noble and learned Lords who have spoken, and that is that 17.4 million British people voted to leave the European Union, and that means coming out from under the jurisdiction of entities which are not subject to the Crown, Parliament and UK law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, smiles and laughs. All the arguments that we have heard in this Chamber over the past two days in Committee come from those who do not wish that to happen, but the fact is that the British people sought a future in which they and their Parliament will make UK laws, and UK judges, under the Crown, will judge those. We have no need of any charter which has been made outside, something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, argued for repeatedly when he was Attorney-General.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The reason I am smiling is that he clearly has not read this Bill. The Government’s Bill reads across the entire content of EU law that applies as at the exit date; it becomes part of our law. It is the whole point of the Bill.

[Lord True]

If I may—

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry; let me complete the point. The noble Lord has made a point and he is simply wrong. The Government’s Bill reads across the whole of EU law. It removes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice—I do not suggest to the contrary—and the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has absolutely nothing to do with the role of the European Court of Justice. It will be the role of our courts and our judges to decide from now on the meaning and effect of the retained EU law which this Bill reads across. It will then be in later legislation for Parliament, as it sees fit, to amend or repeal that law. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, indicated, the Prime Minister said that this Bill is not an occasion for changing the law, it is an occasion for ensuring that on exit day we have a workable, certain, continuing system of law. The real question is why this Bill should make an exception for one element of European Union law, the charter. There is no justification for that whatsoever.

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, it does the opposite of what my brilliant former pupil the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. The inclusion of the charter brings with it uncertainty. It is a Trojan horse because if you carry on applying it, its meaning depends on the evolving case law of the ECJ, which has an objective of bringing further integration and other objectives to do with Europe that are not our objectives. Our judges have said that they want certainty after Brexit, but to include the charter, which is evolving all the time, without our scrutiny will give our judges sleepless nights because they will have to follow the twists and turns in EU law. I come back to the fact that the nub of this is that it will plainly give our judges the right to set aside and invalidate UK law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, mentioned with approval the Benkharbouche case, where part of our sovereign immunity law was set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of charter supremacy. That was actually dangerous because if other countries start setting aside immunity law when dealing with our diplomats, we will be in a very difficult situation indeed. I would not assess the Supreme Court by the outcome of what it says; we assess courts by the way they are appointed and the integrity of our judges. The retention of the charter is a recipe for confusion, uncertainty and the setting aside of British law according to ECJ judgments.

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to say to the noble Baroness that that is exactly what this Bill achieves in relation to all other retained EU law which is read across. This will be under the control of British judges. Under the Bill it is entirely a matter for them what weight, if any, they choose to give to judgments of the European Court of Justice. The charter of rights is no different from any other provision of EU law in that respect. The noble Baroness mentioned certainty. What I think provokes uncertainty for judges is the approach in this Bill. It is not simply that the charter of rights is excluded by Clause 5; the clause goes on to say that undefined,

“fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the Charter”,

are retained. There is a conflict in the approach taken on this issue. I suggest to noble Lords that the correct approach is that which has been recommended to the Committee and to the House by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: that there is no justification whatever for distinguishing between the charter of rights and all other aspects of retained EU law. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in what he said.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 35 standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which would leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert the words as set out in the amendment. The objective of Amendment 35 is to retain the charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act. It has similar objectives to some of the other amendments that have been proposed. I must admit that I address the House on these issues with some trepidation because I am not a lawyer, although I have taken the advice of lawyers in drafting this amendment.

The amendment provides for what I hope is a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice rights and protections on the altar of ideology. Removing the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from EU retained law runs counter to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to facilitate the wholesale transfer of EU law into the domestic statute book. It also contradicts the Government’s assurances that the same rules will apply on the day before exit as on the day after. The Government’s justification for this anomaly is to claim that the charter is unnecessary and that its omission will not result in any loss of substantive rights protections.

In an attempt to support their public assurances to that effect, the Government have since published a right-by-right analysis that they say demonstrates that each right can be found in domestic law. The analysis is unpersuasive. According to Liberty and Amnesty International, it is perfectly possible to retain the charter and deal with any redundant sections after exit just as with the rest of retained EU law, as has already been mentioned. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has obtained the opinion of senior counsel Jason Coppel QC on the Government’s analysis of the charter. His advice is that the loss of the charter will lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the UK. This is because, first, there will be gaps in protection, for example in relation to children’s rights, data protection and non-discrimination. Secondly, many rights will no longer be directly enforceable, leading to further gaps in protection. Thirdly, many remaining rights could be removed by Ministers exercising delegated powers.

A particular concern that I would like to highlight is that Brexit will remove any children’s rights and safeguards currently offered by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which imposes a constitutional obligation on member states to adhere to children’s rights standards when implementing EU law. The EU’s Court of Justice now routinely refers to the charter when adjudicating on cases involving children.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Against the noble and learned Lord’s will. There was also an attempt to get an opt-out, which the European Court of Justice said was not valid. I see that the Minister is agreeing with me. I believe that is a correct account of what happened. It was struck down. The case in which it happened was, I think, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson.

[Lord Pannick]

Would the noble Lord accept that there are many areas of EU law which this country has opposed but which have nevertheless become part of EU law? This Bill seeks to exclude none of them from retained EU law, other than the charter. Why is that?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

That is very much my argument. For reasons that I wish to develop, I agree very much with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and what was said by my noble friend Lord Faulks about the confusion and conflict that this will cause between the role of the European Court of Justice and our own courts. The President of the Supreme Court has already called for further clarification of the relationship the Supreme Court will have with the European Court of Justice. It seems to me, for reasons I am about to give, that this would be made even worse if we incorporated the charter into the Bill and into UK law.

The retention of the charter would lead to real problems of uncertainty and confusion. Above all, retaining the charter would give the ECJ even more continued influence over our courts. I accept what the noble and learned Lord has said, that there is going to be a relationship for a while with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, but incorporating the charter will give much more opportunity for what people have called judicial adventurism from the European Court of Justice, as it continues to expand the interpretation of the charter. This is not an obsession of Conservatives. I draw the Committee’s attention to what the late Lord Bingham, I think, said in evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee in 2016. He said that although,

“the European Court of Human Rights is a very benign institution … the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices”.

That is a reference to the expansionist activities of the ECJ. The charter, as many people know, is extremely loosely worded. The risk of leaving the charter in place is that it allows the ECJ, while it still has jurisdiction over us and our Supreme Court, to expand the charter into new areas. I am not suggesting that the rights we have are frozen for ever or should not be expanded, but merely that that is something that should be decided in this country by our Parliament.

I am also concerned, because of this and the expansion of activities of the ECJ, that if the charter were incorporated our courts would acquire the power to strike down statute on the basis of incompatibility with the charter, which is the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, was making. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to the Factortame case, which was a notorious example where an Act of Parliament was actually struck down. We do not want to create another situation in which domestic courts can strike down Acts of Parliament.

It is the European Court of Justice that interprets what the charter means within the European Union, so if the charter is incorporated into law, what relationship is then going to exist between the Supreme Court and the ECJ? As the ECJ continues to develop its interpretation of the charter, we would be on a road where we had to take it more and more into account. On the basis of what has been said, we must avoid that confusion.

If there are gaps in the rights, we have an opportunity to incorporate them with primary legislation. For example, people have been saying in some of the debates that there are various matters relating to the environment that are not covered. However, we will have a new environment Act and a new environment agency. That seems to me to be the way to cope with any rights that are not fully covered, and it is far better to avoid the confusion of incorporating the charter into UK law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I am being persistent this evening because I want to point out the glaring contradiction in the views that have been put forward in support of the Government and of the Bill as it currently stands. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, says the Charter of Fundamental Rights is a pernicious and dangerous document—“dangerous” was her word—that would lead to courts in this country setting aside laws that they did not like, which would be scandalously contrary to British traditions of constitution and law. On the other side, we have had people, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, is the latest example of this, saying the reason why we cannot have the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Bill and transferred into English law is that it is unnecessary and would be confusing because all the rights are there and some of the rights are already in the corpus of British law. Noble Lords must make up their minds: they cannot say something is a radical and pernicious measure with substantial negative consequences but at the same time say that it has no effect at all and is merely otiose. There is a fundamental contradiction there. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noticed the same thing but was not quite so explicit about it as I have been.

[Lord Pannick]

I did my best.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

There is a confusion in this country that comes up quite frequently. We like to think—we are brought up to think it—that we do not have a written constitution in this country and we do not have constitutional laws. That is totally untrue: the Bill of Rights is a constitutional law; in my view the Bill that we are now trying to repeal, the European Communities Act, is a constitutional law; and the Human Rights Act is certainly a constitutional law. By “a constitutional law”, I mean a law that is generally regarded as foundational and is prayed in aid before the courts and referred to in court judgments across a whole range of subjects. Because of that contradiction, we do not really recognise what is going on and we get ourselves into a frightful confusion.

Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, I am not shocked and offended by the idea that a court could put aside a Bill that was contrary to existing law. The remedy, of course, is quite simple: Parliament can change either the existing law or the previous one. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, my Lincolnshire neighbour, came out with the right solution when he said that the check and the important constitutional protection against a Government with a parliamentary majority acting entirely irresponsibly or even tyrannically is that any Bills they put forward would have to go through both Houses. In that context, one hopes that the House of Lords would act as a guardian of the constitution and be prepared to stand up to the Government and wait for them, if necessary, to bring in the Parliament Act to override it. That would be a considerable check and balance, and it is a very important role of this House that we are there as a long-stop in such circumstances. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, came up with the right solution and I am sorry that I did not sign his amendment, but I certainly approve of it very much, and if he comes forward with something like it at Report, I shall be happy to support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost.

Clause 5(5) makes it clear that, notwithstanding the non-incorporation of the charter, retained EU law will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent with the underlying rights. I hope that addresses to some extent the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. Interpretive provisions will retain a means by which we can look at these rights in the proper context.

With regard to those who have expressed concerns about this Bill resulting in a loss of substantive rights, I repeat—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has done, at least prior to his recent Pauline conversion—that it is not necessary to retain the charter to retain those fundamental rights. If we see that there is a potential loss of such fundamental rights, we will address that, and that is what we have indicated.

[Lord Pannick]

I put it to the noble and learned Lord that there is no other area of retained EU law where the Government have carried out this exercise or said that we do not need to read across a particular provision because it is already in domestic law. Why are they making an exception of the charter?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because this is the only case in which we have identified that situation. There is no other reason for proceeding in this way except for that.