Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Earl of Lytton

Wednesday 24th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Lytton]

My Lords, I had intended to add my name to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wills. I regret that probably I advised the clerks too late for that to happen. I start, therefore, by apologising to the noble Lord.

As did the noble Lord, Lord Tope, I declare my interests as a newly polished and appointed vice-president of the Local Government Association and a possibly somewhat more tarnished president of the National Association of Local Councils. The issue is one of not adding unnecessarily to costs, as the noble Lord pointed out. Part of me says that whenever locally—or at whatever level—a greater throughput of taxpayers or public money is being used, it is right that the level of scrutiny is proportionate. The reference to “significant private companies” is perhaps slightly less than I would have liked. I would have liked the figure itself to have been objectively significant rather than the company providing the service being significant. I am not sure that I know what a significant company is in this context, whereas I am clear as to what a significant figure might be.

However, it is right that auditors should have a degree of discretion in looking at this. As I said at an earlier stage in the Bill, we may be looking at quite small organisations that, for whatever reason—perhaps because of some project they are undertaking—may be responsible for deploying fairly significant sums. It is right that those should be subject to scrutiny. There is no place here for opacity in the way in which figures are presented. Therefore I very much support the principle of this amendment.

I will digress, if I may, onto the freedom of information issue. I am aware that one of the get-outs in relation to providing freedom of information data is when the request is considered to be vexatious. The standard of “vexatious” as a term of art seems to be a matter of self-assessment to a degree by the body that is providing that information; at least, that is how it seems to me. The noble Baroness opposite is shaking her head slightly; if I have got it wrong, I apologise. However, it seems to me that that is capable of a degree of latitude. I certainly have seen evidence of “vexatious” used as a reason for not providing information—although not in the context of local government—and the term ought to be made a little clearer. In general terms, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Wills, has put forward and am grateful to him for continuing to bring it to the attention of the House.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, first, I declare an interest as the current chairman of a local authority audit committee. I shall chair a meeting later this evening. I shall add a touch of reality to the comments made by other noble Lords.

The first subsection of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, states that the local auditor is to have right of access to the books and records of contractors. In the real world, any local authority worth its salt has in all its contracts a clause allowing it access to the documents of its auditors or the processes that those local auditors use. If a local authority does not have that, shame on it. What we are perhaps trying to do here is to put into legislation something that is a normal commercial attitude that local authorities or corporate bodies should do anyway. As my noble friend Lord Tope said, commissioning is coming on in so many local authorities, and the measure and size of some of the contracts will be very significant. With these large commissioning items, it is not the legislation that should be relied on but the normal contractual terms between the local authority and the contractor. The Government and the noble Lord, Lord Wills, are right to highlight that local authorities should deal with this with their contractors. As my noble friend Lord Tope said, when the Government review these matters, even after this Bill is passed, they should perhaps seek to encourage that within local authorities.

Subsection (3) of the amendment states:

“A local auditor must make available on request any audit documents, obtained under … the Freedom of Information Act 2000”.

That worries me somewhat because, if something is too rigid and too demanding, the net result in practical terms is that people do not put it down on paper in order not to be subject to freedom of information. That might discourage the local auditor from carrying out its job in a deep way. I am all for transparency, but it should be transparency as the auditor feels is right rather than being enshrined in law. Although I understand where the noble Lord, Lord Wills, is coming from, and I appreciate the amendment, I hope that it will encourage the Government to review matters before the Bill becomes law.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Earl of Lytton

Monday 15th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, this is a very interesting amendment. I just wanted to add one other perspective. Any local authority worth its salt, particularly in this time of outsourcing, when so much is being outsourced to outside companies and bodies, will insist—as I have always insisted in my own local authority—that it has a right within the contract with the outside contractor to be able to audit the documents of the outside contractor. The place to do all the things that my noble friend has suggested is very often within the contract between the local authority and the contractor.

How that works in practice is that the local authority and its internal auditors need to see what the audit processes are within that outside contractor. The idea that the auditor of the local authority will go in on a normal basis and delve into the detailed books and records of the outside contractor is probably stretching the imagination a bit. The trouble with audits—this is where the noble Lord, Lord Wills, really hits the nail on the head—is that they are, in general, historical and you are looking at what went wrong. The noble Lord, Lord Wills, gave two good examples of what went wrong. The question to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, is: if the Government or the local authority had the ability to go in and audit the sort of companies and organisations the noble Lord described, would they have found these particular problems at that stage?

The noble Lord, Lord Wills, is on to a very important point. But I believe—as I hope that my noble friend the Minister will tell your Lordships’ House—that those protections of being able to audit should be more properly contained within the contract between the local authority and the outside body to which it is contracting.

[The Earl of Lytton]

My Lords, I have some knowledge of procurement issues. I, too, declare my interest as a vice-president of the LGA, but my knowledge comes mainly from the All-Party Group for Excellence in the Built Environment, which last year looked at the question of public sector procurement.

One of the things that we identified was the difficulty that many local authority and public sector bodies have in getting these very complicated contractual arrangements right. If they were not got right, you had some form of mission creep. You had this wall of contractual arrangements that could not be looked at until long after the event; for instance, the provision of a sports centre or a school over quite a number of months. Things had gone wrong in a number of cases because there was not the ability to oversee the thing properly or the knowledge of these very complex matters within the particular procuring body—not necessarily local government—to get a real grip on these things. The question was raised as to whether there should be an external procurement adviser to steer the body through. As I say, it might have been a local authority or it might have been a charity or something like that.

The noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Palmer, have hit on a very important point here: at which point can you see through into the detail and at which point do you get to “thus far and no further” in terms of the audit not running into some sort of mission creep? It is plain to me that there must be safeguards. Some very significant sums of money are involved. The earlier that problems are picked up and the process can look at structures and get feedback, the sooner they can be put right or something put in place to limit damage.

If not necessarily for the same reasons, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wills, has raised an extremely important point, and I hope the Minister will feel able to respond positively to that.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Earl of Lytton

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Lytton]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 14ZAA and its co-runner Amendment 14BZA, both of which are in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Tope.

The principle behind these two amendments is relatively simple; they seek to allow for a measure of delegation of the duty to appoint an auditor so that the actual procurement of auditors and their formal appointment can be made by another body on behalf of the authority. The issue arises by virtue of Clause 7(1), which states:

“A relevant authority must appoint an auditor”.

This, if taken literally, could be taken to mean the direct appointment of a named auditor in person on an exclusive and non-transferrable basis. I am sure that it is not intended to be quite as tight as that. It is certainly felt by the LGA, and others who have briefed me on this matter, that this might prevent any appointment as authorised proxy by an external person or body.

In reality, a firm is appointed to the task and nominates one of its number, often a partner or director, to head up a small team to handle the matter. The appointment of an auditor, to use that singular term of art, and as a specific named individual, is in any event customarily carried out per pro the authority by this means. For instance, most small charities and similar bodies appoint a firm rather than an individual. In the realms of a collective appointment via a national or sector-led service, this becomes more important. A large consultancy firm bidding for a sector-led contract will ultimately make an appointment itself of the named auditor as overseer and signatory to the auditor’s report

The gist of Amendment 14ZAA is quite simply to provide for the procurement of an auditor by way of a duly authorised proxy, including a large firm, a sector body or other similar large concern dealing with possibly several authorities. It does not make this mandatory, simply an option.

Amendment 14BZA follows from this. If the procurement is by way of another body charged with meeting the requirements of the Bill and thus delegated from the authority, it is unnecessary, or should be unnecessary, to have an audit panel, because the oversight of the auditor is carried out in accordance with the relevant rules of engagement via the proxy. The authority always remains responsible for whatever measures it has put in place. The appointed procurer of the audit service must observe all the criteria in the Bill for that activity.

The LGA, as I said, provided a useful brief on this and it is worth picking out a few salient points. The amendments would be consonant with the authorities’ need to have flexibility to procure their audit nationally, or in some form of grouped manner. It would make collaborative audit procurement more attractive and produce, as we heard on the previous day of this Committee, the potential for significant savings. That would be to the direct benefit of local finance. Some of the reasons why this is so have already been rehearsed, including the Audit Commission’s own modelling and its calculated saving of between £205 million and £250 million over a five-year period.

The Government’s own impact assessment does not refute this. Indeed, it concedes that local appointment may not procure the level of savings secured by the Audit Commission during its last procurement round. It seems obvious to me that each authority procuring its own auditors on a recurring basis replicates a cost base. There is an opportunity to save money here.

I will not go into the other details that have been discussed before, save to say that I agree that local appointment does not necessarily increase competition or cut costs. I have no proof of this, but my hunch is probably that not many firms would undertake a municipal audit in the first place. In reality one is probably looking at one of the larger firms, a point that we have heard before. I register the point made by the Minister on Monday. A paraphrase of her words is that there will be no recreation of the Audit Commission by the back door, but if the reality of this Bill’s proposals is to create some form of suboptimal procurement with waste by duplication, I have to say that I am against that as a principle. I hope the Minister will feel that subject to any safeguards that might be necessary to eliminate the risk of a “son of” Audit Commission coming about, the principle is acceptable, in which case we can work out the detail as we go forward. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, I will speak to these amendments, although sitting next to me is my noble friend Lord Tope, in whose name Amendment 14ZA stands. I hope the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, will confirm that we have already dealt with the collaborative basis and the fact of buying centrally. Even I was a late adherent to this, but I think we agree that in one form or another that is the way to go forward, however it can be arranged, although there were numerous alternatives. As the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, has said, there are going to be significant savings, which is something that we cannot ignore.

I have one question about a sentence in Amendment 14ZA on the appointment of a new auditor, or the re-appointment of an existing auditor, to,

“audit its accounts for a financial year not later than 31 December in the preceding financial year”.

Both the Bill and the amendment say that that appointment should be made not later than 31 December in the preceding year. I cannot work this out in practical terms. Let us say that KPMG is the auditor of a local authority or group of local authorities; it has not finished its accounts and the accounts will not be signed off until, at the earliest, the end of January the following year. That company could be under notice, according to the amendments, that it may not be, or could not be, the auditor for the ensuing year. While KMPG is finishing off its audit—the accounts will not have been finished and signed off by the relevant person in the local authority, who in my local authority is me, so I am told; I have done it three years in a row—a new auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, perhaps, will have been appointed.

I worry about how that will affect the mindset of the auditor who is being replaced. Enshrining within the Bill that the auditor has to be appointed by 31 December within that year will cause moral, and sometimes practical, difficulties. Perhaps the Minister will take this issue back and consider whether the wording should be “could be appointed by 31 December” or “as soon as possible by that date”. I worry how the changeover, if there be a changeover, will affect the performance of the outgoing auditor.