Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 9th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 21 April be approved.

Relevant documents: special attention drawn to the instrument by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, 13th Report. Considered in Grand Committee on 2 September.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, these regulations add more public authorities to the list of those who can access sensitive personal information in the form of communications data, such as itemised telephone bills. So sensitive is the issue that Parliament decided that additions to the list of public authorities had to be approved by the super-affirmative procedure. When these regulations were debated last week in Grand Committee, we were told that the Home Office had agreed to the addition of those public authorities on the basis of detailed business cases submitted to it by the public authorities concerned, which Members of this House have been unable, until 12.30 pm today, to see. The Minister agreed that it was not possible for this House to properly scrutinise the decisions of the Home Office without seeing the business cases, and that the business cases had not been published as they contained sensitive information, but said that she would arrange for Members to scrutinise the business cases in a private meeting.

This morning, when I saw that these regulations were due to be approved by the House, I inquired of the Minister’s office why we had not been offered a private meeting to examine the business cases. As a result of my inquiry I was emailed, at 12.06 pm this afternoon, and invited to view the business cases at 12.30. There are five business cases, and from memory, I think the Minister said that they were “lengthy”. I do not think it reasonable to expect Members of this House to scrutinise five business cases, which apparently justify giving the five additional public authorities access to sensitive personal data, in the 45 minutes between the offer being made to view them and the regulations being approved on the Floor of the House. Call me old-fashioned, but I believe that this House should be given the opportunity to scrutinise regulations properly before it approves them, rather than afterwards.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. A private meeting before this SI is approved would certainly have enabled him and others to form a view on whether they agreed with the SI in the light of the business cases they had seen for adding these further public authorities to the list. I listened with interest to the Minister and, as I understand it, that opportunity has not been made available until the last few minutes, almost literally. I wait with interest to hear what she has to say on the points that he made.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister talks about the existing 12-month wait before someone can apply to work—and then only in shortage occupations—as being to protect the resident workforce. Yet a House of Commons Library document published in January this year shows 100,000 vacancies in the social care sector, and rising. Can the Minister justify his statement that it is necessary in order to protect the resident workforce?

The Minister also said it was very unlikely that there would be refugees from an EU country. Is he not aware of the situation in Poland, where they are declaring LGBT-free zones in cities and provinces, with the Government ramping-up hate speech against LGBT people and the Law and Justice party leader saying that LGBT people are a

“threat to Polish identity, to our nation, to its existence and thus to the Polish state”?

Finally, the Minister talked about the pull factor of allowing refugees to work. A number of noble Lords said that there was no evidence of a pull factor. Indeed, the Minister was asked to provide evidence if he was going to deploy that argument. Perhaps he can comply with that request and provide the evidence to support his assertion.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I will deal with the third question first. I am afraid the evidence will flow from the review that I mentioned in my response, which will of course come to your Lordships’ House once it is done, taking into account the additional work of the Migration Advisory Committee and the review of the report by the Lift the Ban coalition.

On restricting the right to work to the shortage occupation list, as I said in my reply, it is right to restrict access to work to British citizens and others lawfully resident, including those already granted asylum. We do that under the reception conditions directive of 2003. The shortage occupation list is based on expert advice from the Migration Advisory Committee. I thought we had a useful debate yesterday on social care. If there are shortages in that sector, that is something that the Migration Advisory Committee is well placed to advise on and to dispassionately provide advice to government. The list can be updated accordingly.

Finally, on the point about Poland and LGBT rights, I do not want to reopen debates from the referendum, but I remember being told quite powerfully when I was campaigning to leave that it was the EU that somehow had created or guaranteed rights for LGBT people across Europe. I thought that was wrong then and I am surprised to hear the noble Lord raising it today. Poland is a prosperous, developed country. It is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. If the EU is good at doing the job that campaigners said it was during the referendum, it will enforce those rights. Unless that changes, we do not see a reason to change our assessment of EU member states such as Poland.

Digital Evidence

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The question of legality is good and pertinent. The ICO found that there is a complex legislative interplay in this area. Officers should be extracting data from victims and witnesses only when it is strictly necessary as part of the investigation. We are working with the police and the CPS to ensure that the proposed framework meets both the requirements of officers to fulfil their lawful duties to pursue all lines of inquiry and to meet their duties of disclosure, as well as providing clarity and transparency about the safeguards and assurances to complainants on their right to privacy.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the recent Court of Appeal case makes the issue of examination of the contents of mobile phones and other electronic devices of both complainants and accused far more complex. It is not simply a question of the police investigators receiving additional training. Quite often, the Crown Prosecution Service instructs officers to carry out further investigation. What co-ordination is taking place between the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to make sure that the training is consistent, both for the police and the CPS, and is in line with that Court of Appeal guidance?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right: there has to be consistency and training has to be sufficient across the piece. The CPS, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice are working through this together. The rape review, led by the Home Office, the Attorney-General’s office and the Ministry of Justice, is considering fully the reasons for a drop in referrals, to which the noble Lord has alluded in the past, and whether the digital disclosure is part of this.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I strongly support what was said so authoritatively about Amendment 3 by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes. We need to hear what our Constitution Committee has said, and I hope the Minister will tell us that the Government will do this.

My purpose is to say a few brief words on Amendment 61 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Before I do so, I want to say a quick word on the wider context. Admirable though the quality of this debate is, I cannot help feeling that we are fiddling while Rome burns. In Downing Street, it seems that the Government are planning to take powers in the internal market Bill to override certain provisions of the withdrawal agreement—in particular, Articles 5 and 10 of the Irish protocol. Tearing up ratified treaties is what rogue states do; sanctions usually follow. If such a proposal were put to us, I would expect us to examine it particularly stringently. I cannot recall any precedent in UK diplomatic history. What we are doing today is important, but what we might have to do then would be historic.

Turning to Amendment 61, it seems to me that it is either completely unnecessary or absolutely essential. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that it is unnecessary because the Government have no intention of making our closest neighbours stand in a queue at the frontier. If she cannot make this assurance, we must surely ask the Government to think again.

It seems highly likely that, for the next few years, the relationship with the EU will become damagingly rebarbative. That would, of course, become a racing certainty if we tore up the withdrawal agreement, but even if we do not, the disruption, the economic damage and the inevitable frontier friction—deal or no deal—is likely to drip poison into the relationship for some time to come. So we should be careful about choosing to add insult to injury. We have left the EU, but we do not need to leave Europe. If the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is right to detect a risk, we would be right to support her Amendment 61.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 61 in this group, and I am grateful for the support that it is receiving. Clearly, the Government say that EU citizens will be allowed to continue to use e-passport gates at airports after the end of the transition period, but that is the problem. From what I can see, as a result of leaving the European Union, far from ending free movement of people, the Government are effectively opening it up to the citizens of more countries outside of the European Union, the EEA and Switzerland.

I must make it clear that, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and my noble friend Lady Ludford, I am in favour of free movement. The point I am making is that lack of enforcement means that, in practice, free movement will not end at the end of the transition period.

EU, EEA and Swiss nationals have been able to use the e-passport gates at UK airports because, under European Union freedom of movement rules, they have been entitled to come to the UK without restriction. With the UK’s imminent departure from the EU, and the Government’s commitment to ending preferential immigration from the EU, the Government were faced with turmoil at the UK border if EU, EEA and Swiss nationals were not able to use the e-passport gates but had to be manually checked by Border Force staff; the queues for non-EU passport holders were already verging on the unacceptably long. Rather than remove the ability of EU citizens to use e-passport gates, the Government extended their use to citizens of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States of America, thereby delivering on their promise not to give EU citizens preferential immigration rights, as these are now shared with the citizens of some non-EU countries.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her extended explanation. She talked about electronic travel authorisations and referred to The UK’s Points-based Immigration System: Further Details document. As far as ETAs are concerned, that document talks about the “border of the future” and that it is part of a phased programme to 2025. How will EU and EEA citizens using the e-passport gates be stopped from coming in if they have not provided details in advance? If it is not necessary for them to provide details in advance, why are the Government introducing ETAs for EU and EEA citizens up to 2025?

Channel Crossings in Small Boats

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd September 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I would never wish to finish someone else’s sentence, but what I can say about the clandestine channel threat commander, Dan O’Mahoney, is that he has been appointed, as the noble Lord says, and has overall operational and policy responsibility for this rather serious problem. Since there is a multiagency responsibility here which requires working with the French authorities and UKVI, we felt that it needed a single person empowered and accountable to seize control of that situation and get it fixed. What I assume will be in the joint action plan is an explanation of how the multiagency response will work. Of course, these things work best in a multiagency way.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree that the best way to stop the criminal exploitation of those desperate to seek sanctuary in the UK and to ensure that they do not risk their lives crossing the channel is to enable refugees to claim asylum without being physically in the UK and to provide safe and legal routes into the UK?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am glad that the noble Lord recognises the need for legal routes. Of course, we have a number of those. Under Dublin, someone can claim asylum in the first safe country that they arrive in, which is of course all the states of the EU. We have our national resettlement scheme, under which we have resettled more people than any state in the EU, and 46,000 children have received our refuge since 2010. We also have family reunification visas, of which we have issued 29,000 in the past couple of years. That is not to say that what is happening is right; it absolutely has to be tackled. With what has been happening with small boats, the only people who benefit are people traffickers and criminals.

Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) (Relevant Public Authorities and Designated Senior Officers) Regulations 2020

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for outlining these draft statutory instruments to the Committee. I find it a little disconcerting being back in London, having been away for such a long time.

Bearing in mind the comments of the noble Lords who have spoken before me, I was beginning to wonder whether I had read the wrong statutory instruments; perhaps that is all to do with my disorientation. However, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, was reassuringly in line with some of my concerns. I am also grateful to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for drawing to the special attention of the Committee the first of the statutory instruments in its 13th report. If the Minister will bear with me, I will take the statutory instruments in the order in which they are on the Order Paper rather than in the order that she spoke to them.

As noble Lords will remember, the Investigatory Powers Act was controversial—not going quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—when it passed through your Lordships’ House. One of the few reassuring aspects of the legislation was the fact that a number of public authorities, most notably local authorities, had their power to access communications data revoked. It is therefore somewhat concerning that three public authorities that had their authority to access communications data removed under the 2016 Act have now had that power reinstated. My understanding is that was at the time that these public authorities had their authority removed, rather than anything to do with the coalition; I think it was post coalition.

Even more concerning is the fact that the Home Office have agreed to add these and other public authorities on the basis of new business cases, changes in circumstances and work with local police forces that the Home Office has evaluated and that it has decided to grant the powers to. I accept that the Home Office has provided a memorandum explaining the purpose and effect of the regulations, but there is only one brief paragraph on each provision. Again, the Minister was very brief in explaining why there had been a U-turn on three of these public authorities and the basis for granting the powers to the others, including this eavesdropping body—nobody has heard of it, although when I Google searched it, there it was.

These regulations are laid under the enhanced affirmative procedure of Section 268 of the 2016 Act, and yet the detailed reasoning for adding these public authorities, including the three that were previously moved, has not been made available to us. How is Parliament to properly assess whether these public authorities have made a sufficient case, so that the grant of these powers is “necessary and proportionate”? Where is the parliamentary oversight?

Can the Minister explain how many public authorities in total have sought these powers under the Investigatory Powers Act? What proportion of requests made to the Home Office have actually been granted, and how many of them have been turned down? Can the Minister explain the process for evaluating such requests, and what consultation takes place with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner before such requests are agreed to?

I understand that the complexity of crimes these public authorities investigate may have increased, and that their specific expertise and experience often make them a better place to investigate crimes in the first instance, before handing over to local police forces. However, what is to stop joint investigations with local police forces applying for the communications data required, rather than separately authorising these organisations? These are significant powers to access sensitive personal information, and the case for each public authority to access them should be made out in more than a few-line summary.

The second statutory instrument relates to the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act 2019—another controversial piece of legislation—and the controversial data access agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. I will not rehearse the concerns expressed in your Lordships’ House about data being provided by UK communications service providers to US law enforcement agencies, under this agreement, which could result in the accused being convicted in a US court and sentenced to death.

However, can the Minister remind the Committee what the effect of Article 8(4) of the agreement is in practice? It looks to me like a case-by-case provision rather than a death penalty assurance. Are the Government reviewing this part of the agreement in light of recent Supreme Court cases?

I am reassured that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has been involved in the drafting of this statutory instrument, but what additional resources are being given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to ensure proper compliance with the agreement and the periodic review of each party’s compliance with the terms of the agreement, as set out in Article 12(1)? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this Bill is heralded as the UK taking back control, not least by ending the free movement of people under retained EU law. Noble Lords will also remember the promise that EU citizens will no longer have any advantage over citizens of non-EU countries. And then Brexit dogma hits reality.

Noble Lords will remember when e-passport gates at UK airports were restricted to UK, EU and EEA citizens only: you simply scan your passport and you are free to enter the UK. Compare this with the often vast queues for other passport holders, whose reason for entry is questioned and whose passports and visas are checked manually by Border Force officers. Of course, the Government cannot continue to give preferential treatment to EU citizens, so the enormous number of EU and EEA visitors to the UK would surely have to queue with those from the rest of the world. After all, we are taking back control of our borders, are we not? Well, no, because the system would grind to a halt if that happened.

So what are we doing now? The Government’s solution is to let citizens of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States also use e-passport gates, as well as EU citizens—then, of course, the Government cannot be accused of giving EU citizens preferential treatment. These visitors can come to the UK for six months, do a day trip outside the UK and then come back to the UK for another six months—no visa, no fee, and no way of tracking where they are, how long they stay or whether they have left again. The Government say that

“they may not live in the UK by means of repeat visits”,

but there is no way of checking, unless the Minister can enlighten us; I will listen to her response with interest. Rather than taking back control of our borders, we have thrown them open to even more people.

If you go to the United States of America as a UK citizen, Homeland Security officers at the border will assume that you intend to stay and work illegally until you convince them otherwise. Your photograph and fingerprints are taken and you have to record where you are going to stay and when you intend to leave. When a US citizen comes to the UK, they swipe their passport at the e-passport gates and waltz through the border. It may be a trivial example but, across a wide range of issues, the dogma of ending free movement will result in a detrimental impact on the UK, ranging from staffing our NHS and social care systems to ensuring that our crops are harvested.

Knife Crime

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st July 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

I call the noble Lord, Lord Young of Norwood of Green. Lord Young? I will move on to the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, whatever is happening now, it is clearly not working. Research by the College of Policing shows that high levels of stop and search had barely any effect on violent crime. Instead, it can destroy trust and confidence in the police among the very community that the police need active support and co-operation from if they are to be effective in tackling knife crime. Will the Government consider bringing together police leaders and community leaders to discuss a way forward?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Home Secretary already meets policing leaders and other stakeholders on tackling crime. On the noble Lord’s first point, safeguards are in place to ensure that stop and search is used lawfully and not based on race or ethnicity. On his point about the increase in knife crime and the link to stop and search, I can say—and this is not a defensive point—that the rate of increase has slowed. However, I agree that we have so much further to go, and that working together across different departments and with different stakeholders is absolutely right.

Metropolitan Police: Racism

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Paddick]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they have had with the Metropolitan Police Service about the steps being taken to address racism within its ranks.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government condemn racism and racists. Racism is abhorrent and has no place in our society. This Government remain committed to working with policing to broaden representation and enhance accountability to help the police make their relationships with the public even stronger. The drive to recruit 20,000 officers over the next three years gives us a significant opportunity to support the police to become more representative of the communities they serve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the chair of the Metropolitan Police Federation is reported in the Guardian as saying that the reason why black people in London were twice as likely to be given lockdown fines by the police was because

“anyone out in the first four weeks was a drug dealer”.

I checked the accuracy of the officer’s remarks with the journalist before making a formal complaint. The Metropolitan Police Directorate of Professional Standards refused to look into the matter. The Metropolitan Police Federation did not reply when I asked it about what the officer is reported as saying. What does this say about the culture of the Metropolitan Police, and what action do the Government intend to take to change it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, several things are happening at this point in time. The NPCC announced its intention to develop an action plan on 18 June, on the back of the Black Lives Matter protests. The College of Policing has also reviewed and applied positive action to the senior national assessment centre and its strategic command course for chief officer candidates. The recruitment of those 20,000 police officers gives us a golden opportunity to increase diversity of representation within the police.

Reading Terrorist Attack

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I express our sincere condolences to the families of the three victims of the atrocity in Reading on Saturday. Our thoughts are very much with them, at what must be a heartbreaking and mind-numbing time. We send our very best wishes for a speedy recovery to our fellow citizens who were injured in the senseless attack, knowing that they are in the safe and caring hands of our magnificent NHS staff. It is clear that all the emergency services reacted to the sickening events on Saturday evening with speed, professionalism and a lack of regard for their own safety—in that final regard, particularly the unarmed police officer who apprehended the individual now under arrest. I express our appreciation of the courage and concern for others of members of the public at the scene who assisted those who were attacked.

The police have arrested an individual under terrorism powers. There are media reports that those who were murdered were members of the LGBT community and that the individual under arrest had mental health problems and was known to the security agencies. This is, however, an ongoing police investigation, and I appreciate that the Minister is constrained in what she can say, about either the specifics of this awful incident or the individual who is under arrest. But any further factual information she is able to provide would be helpful.

This is not the first violent attack by a lone individual, but rather an addition to what is a succession of recent such horrific incidents of this nature. In November, we had the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall, and in February at Streatham; now, in June, it is Reading. The public want answers about these appalling incidents.

We understand that the security services have some 30,000-plus people known to them, and a very much smaller, but nevertheless significant, number of people in whom they have to take a much closer interest on our behalf and in the interests of our safety. We are indebted to our intelligence and security services for the work they do to protect us all, and recognise that many acts of potential or threatened terrorism are thwarted thanks to their diligence and expertise. The murderous attacks that do occur will inevitably, and not surprisingly, always receive much more publicity than the very much larger number of potential or threatened acts of terrorism that are stopped and prevented.

If the investigation into the Reading atrocity, particularly in the light of the other, very recent incidents, reveals that more resources are needed by our counter- terrorism, intelligence and security agencies, I hope the Government will ensure that those additional resources are provided.

The atrocity at Fishmongers’ Hall raised issues surrounding the release of people from prison. The individual under arrest under terrorism powers following the Reading attacks had, it has been reported, served a short prison sentence. At some stage, questions will have to be asked about the nature and extent of risk assessments carried out in respect of people leaving prison who are known to the security services; levels of supervision, or otherwise, following release; and the workloads of probation officers, inside and outside prison.

Lessons will need to be learned from Saturday’s deeply distressing atrocity. That can only be done following a full investigation, but can the Government say in general terms whether any lessons have been learned and put into practice from either the Fishmongers’ Hall or Streatham attacks, and indeed from one recently in a prison, apart from the legislation enacted or being enacted regarding prison sentences, early release and controlled procedures? If any lessons have been learned from those earlier attacks it seems that they will not yet have been shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee, since the Government have not taking the necessary steps since the election at the end of last year to enable it to be reconvened. I hope that does not indicate a lack of the Government’s prioritising ensuring parliamentary oversight of security issues and our security agencies, particularly at the present time. When do the Government expect the committee to meet again?

There is also the continuing delay over establishing the review of the Government’s Prevent strategy. I believe that the closing date for applications for the post to lead the review was yesterday. We need real progress here too because legislation alone will not be enough. We have to take a thorough look at deradicalisation in our prisons, how people who pose a threat are risk assessed and how different agencies can work together to safeguard against tragedies and horrors of the kind witnessed in Reading on Saturday.

Community policing has been cut, yet the intelligence gathering it does as the eyes and ears of our society is vital. Will the Government commit to now build again the capacity required for law enforcement?

What is the position with the serious violence task force, which apparently has not met for a year? Does it still exist? If not, can the Minister at least refresh my memory as to when its demise was announced, and why?

More information will come to light as the police investigation continues and I hope that the Minister can commit to keeping the House updated, including on the lessons that need to be learned. Many issues will need to be considered and addressed in the weeks ahead, but we stand with the wider community in Reading at this desperately difficult time and remember particularly those who tragically lost their lives.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this was a dreadful attack on innocent people, and we condemn it. Our thoughts are with the families and friends of those who lost their lives, the injured, and the police officers, ambulance crews and members of the public affected by this terrible incident.

There has been much discussion in recent weeks about policing, in both this country and the United States. This incident, where unarmed officers ran towards, tackled and detained a dangerous and armed suspect, reminds us how police officers put their lives on the line to protect us every single day. It is right to ask probing questions, but it is also right to remember that we rely on the police for our safety. Our thanks should also go to the members of the public who supported the emergency services by administering first aid while waiting for paramedics to arrive.

The matter is under investigation, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, and I know the Minister will not respond to questions about the suspect. So, despite any reservations I may have, I will continue on the basis that this was a terrorist attack, rather than it being the result of mental illness or motivated by prejudice.

We have the best police and security services in the world. I was part of the Metropolitan Police Service for over 30 years and I was awestruck by the capabilities of the security services when I was briefed on the Investigatory Powers Bill by representatives of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. We have also seen numerous pieces of legislation over the years to extend the powers of the police and security services, and the powers of the courts to sentence those convicted of terrorism offences and to prevent their early release. Indeed, there is legislation before the other place as we speak. Yet lone wolf terrorist attacks appear to be increasing. As my right honourable friend Alistair Carmichael said in the debate on the Statement in the other place,

“if the answer to this problem were to be found in a formulation of the law, we would have found it by now.”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/6/20; col. 1089.]

The problem is this. Too many people—some traumatised by their experiences in war-torn parts of the world, but many British-born young men—are being radicalised, either in prison or online, and there is not enough collaborative work with communities to address the problem. It is neither possible nor proportionate to keep all of the thousands of people who may be of concern to MI5 under surveillance, and the overwhelming majority will do no harm. The tiny minority who decide to carry out so-called “lone wolf” attacks can change from “harmless” to “dangerous” overnight, and almost always only close friends, relatives or community members who are around them will notice that change.

In the same way that policing by consent relies on the public being the eyes and ears of the police so that we do not need a police officer on every street corner watching for criminal activity, so communities, friends and relatives need to be the eyes and ears of counter- terrorism. In the same way that policing by consent relies on the public having trust and confidence in the police, communities, friends and relatives must have confidence in the Government’s counterterrorism strategy generally and the Prevent programme in particular.

I have referred to him before and I do so again: my friend and the former head of the anti-terrorist branch, John Grieve, said that the police and security services cannot effectively tackle terrorism alone; they need the help of the public. As the current head of counterterrorism policing said today:

“If you see any suspicious activity, don’t hesitate to ACT—report it.”


Trust and confidence in the police and security services comes from genuine and comprehensive community policing, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, whereby concerned communities, friends and relatives feel safe in passing on their concerns to officers they trust. Trust and confidence in the police and security services comes from communities, friends and relatives feeling it is safe to pass on their concerns to the Prevent programme.

My two questions to the Minister are these. When will the Government reintroduce the genuine community policing that they have decimated over the past decade not just with drastic cuts in the number of police officers, which they are going some way to addressing, but with the devastation of police community support officers, so that there can be a dialogue of equals between the police and the communities they are supposed to serve, rather than the police simply explaining the policing they are imposing on those communities? When will the Government appoint an independent lead for the review of the Prevent programme, in whom communities have trust and confidence, to produce a programme that communities can feel safe passing their concerns to? Unless the police, community services and communities work together, these lone-wolf attacks will continue to be very difficult to stop.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I join both noble Lords in expressing condolences to the families of those killed and in wishing a speedy recovery to those injured. I also join them in praising our emergency services, who ran towards danger to help those people whose lives were in danger, in particular the unarmed policeman who went to help. The noble Lords are both right to point out that I am very constrained in what I can say, and I thank them for understanding that constraint. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the point that we have the best police and security services in the world. I wholeheartedly agree, as I do on policing by consent.

Both noble Lords pointed out that this was yet another lone attack. There have been 25 terrorist attacks thwarted since 2017, which is a tribute to the police involved.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about more resources. He will have heard my right honourable friend the Home Secretary say yesterday that an additional £90 million will be in place this year for CT policing, because we need the resources in place for police to be able to respond to these dreadful events. As for other types of policing, 20,000 additional police officers are due to be recruited over the next few years. On community policing, it is the PCC who decides on the type of policing required for a particular area; it is a decision at local level, and that is absolutely right.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked about lessons learned from Fishmongers’ Hall and cited the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill; that is one thing. In February this year the Security Minister announced plans to introduce the legislative Protect duty. The proposals would require certain operators of public venues and organisations to consider their preparedness for and protection from a terrorist attack.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned on a couple of occasions the need for community engagement, and I could not agree more. This problem cannot be solved by any one agency or by government. As the noble Lord said, it is not just about legislation; we need interventions at all levels of society, including public vigilance and confidence in reporting to the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the Serious Violence Taskforce. In the last few months it was replaced by the National Policing Board, which is an excellent forum for these sorts of things—the interventions we can make for our communities—to be not just discussed but actioned.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked when the Government will appoint an independent reviewer of Prevent. The process is under way and we aim for that review to be complete in September next year.