European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

33: After Clause 37, insert the following new Clause—
“Implementation period negotiating objectives: security partnership
(1) It is an objective of Her Majesty’s Government within the framework of the future relationship of the United Kingdom and the EU to secure agreements that achieve equivalent outcomes to—(a) continued UK participation in the European Arrest Warrant;(b) continued UK membership of Europol and Eurojust; and(c) continued direct access for UK agencies to the following EU data-sharing mechanisms—(i) the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II);(ii) the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS); (iii) the Prüm Decisions;(iv) Passenger Name Record (PNR); and(v) the Europol Information System (EIS).(2) A Minister of the Crown must lay before each House of Parliament a progress report on each of the outcomes listed in subsection (1)(a) to (c) within 4 months of this Act being passed, and subsequently at intervals of no more than 2 months.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the Government to seek a comprehensive security partnership as part of its negotiations for the future relationship with the EU.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 33 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Ludford.

At Second Reading, I alluded to the amendment as a means of mandating the Government to deliver on their promise that the UK would be as safe and secure outside the EU as it has been within the EU by specifying what the Government should seek in a comprehensive security partnership with the EU.

Various EU measures and mechanisms that are currently available to us as an EU member state are valuable to UK law enforcement. At a briefing given to the APPG on policing in 2017, the National Crime Agency lead on Brexit outlined what these were, what the alternatives might be and the impact on the UK’s safety and security were they no longer available. They were the Schengen Information System II, sharing information about terrorist suspects, those wanted under the European arrest warrant, stolen vehicles and similar information; the European arrest warrant, allowing rapid extradition without political involvement; Europol, pan-European strategy development to counter serious and organised crime; ECRIS, sharing information about criminal convictions handed down by any court in the EU; Prüm, rapid electronic comparison of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registrations held on the databases of each EU state; cross-border surveillance, allowing surveillance of UK suspects in the EU and vice versa; and joint investigation teams under Eurojust, prosecuting pan-European crime.

He concluded that there were “workarounds”, but that these would be less efficient and effective than the existing EU mechanisms. For example, if Interpol were used instead of Prüm to try to match DNA found at a UK crime scene with DNA profiles of criminals held on EU member states’ databases, it would take months—and in some cases no response would be received at all—compared with seconds up to 24 hours using Prüm. He anticipated that extradition agreements would need to be negotiated separately with each of the remaining 27 EU states and that these would require political involvement, as opposed to the European arrest warrant where the decision is made by a judge. He concluded that the UK would be less safe and less secure if, rather than relying on existing EU mechanisms, it had to work on the basis of non-EU workarounds.

It was therefore reasonable to conclude that if these EU mechanisms were no longer available to the UK when we left the EU, alternative mechanisms would need to be put in place that delivered the same outcomes as efficiently and effectively as the existing EU mechanisms. Otherwise, the Government would have failed to deliver on their promise that the UK would be as safe and secure outside the EU as it had been inside. The amendment would require a Minister of the Crown to update Parliament on progress in achieving these outcomes within four months, and regularly thereafter.

Why do we consider this so important? First, as Andrew Marr put it on Sunday to the Security Minister, the right honourable Brandon Lewis MP, the European arrest warrant and Europol, for example, rely on the European Court of Justice to resolve disputes between participants, and it is a red line for the Government that the ECJ should play no part in UK affairs after Brexit. The Security Minister replied that Europol has United States of America involvement, and clearly the US is not a member of the EU. What he was actually referring to was an agreement between Europol and the United States to share information within strict limitations—an agreement that can be terminated by either side at three months’ notice—not active involvement as an equal partner in Europol, deciding on the nature and scope of Europol’s activities, and nothing to do with the ECJ. Neither the USA nor any other third-party country has a say in Europol’s operations.

The Security Minister did not comment on the European arrest warrant, which more clearly and obviously requires the ECJ to adjudicate between participating states where a warrant is issued but another state refuses to extradite. The Security Minister did not comment on the EAW, probably because he knows that we are very unlikely to continue to be part of the European arrest warrant after Brexit. For example, Germany changed its constitution to allow the extradition of its own nationals under the European arrest warrant, but limited extradition to other EU member states. As I mentioned at Second Reading, Iceland and Norway applied to participate in a limited variation of the European arrest warrant in 2001, but that has yet to take effect, and they are both within the European Economic Area and the Schengen area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank noble Lords for their comments. I support them in drawing my and the Government’s attention to the various elements of co-operation that are so crucial in keeping our citizens safe.

It has never been in doubt that it is in everyone’s interest to maintain that strong relationship with the EU in this area. The political declaration provides the framework for the strong relationship, including co-operation on the specific capabilities that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has set out in his amendment. However, the precise details that noble Lords seek will be a matter for the next phase of negotiations that will be carried out, I hope with flexibility, in this and other areas. A statutory requirement to negotiate—a matter discussed quite vocally in this Chamber today—is neither necessary nor appropriate.

On the role of Parliament, I refer noble Lords to the strong commitment given by the Prime Minister that Parliament will be kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations and will have the opportunity to scrutinise any legislation required to enact the future relationship. Therefore, a reporting requirement is not needed.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made a point about Norway and Iceland and their extradition agreement with the EU. Apparently, it is now in force as of 1 November last year.

I am sorry that I cannot fill in any detail but no detail is yet forthcoming. However, I hope the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for his support and his perspective, from his experience in the Home Office, on how important this issue is. He made an important point about the Government acknowledging the weakness already of the UK criminal justice system without losing these EU mechanisms. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe.

It is all very well for the Minister to keep putting matters off by saying, “This is going to be negotiated and I can’t say what the details of the negotiations will be.” Time is running out. That excuse will not be available in less than 12 months’ time and we are concerned that our law enforcement agencies will be handicapped as a consequence of losing some, if not all, of these EU mechanisms, as the National Crime Agency lead for Brexit told us in a briefing a few years ago.

I am grateful for the correction on the modified European arrest warrant arrangements with Norway and Iceland, which apparently came into effect on 1 November last year. That means that they took 18 years to come into effect. If that is the kind of timescale we are looking at to get a similar agreement between us, as a third-party country, and the EU, we are in serious trouble. However, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Monday 13th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lords, Lord Barwell and Lord Mann, on their thought-provoking maiden speeches and I look forward to their future contributions. The time is rapidly approaching when the Government must deliver on their promises over Brexit. Among other things, they have promised that the UK will not be less safe nor less secure outside the European Union.

At a briefing given by the National Crime Agency lead on Brexit to the APPG on policing in 2017, we were told that the existing legislative framework—that is, regulatory alignment—and existing EU organisations and mechanisms, including the European Court of Justice, enabled greater and more effective co-operation between the UK and the EU when it came to law enforcement. He said that there were workarounds if we left the EU, but that these would not be as effective or efficient, and that the UK would be less safe and less secure as a result. Intelligence such as counterterrorism information tends to be shared on a bilateral basis rather than an EU-wide basis and is likely to be unaffected. What I am talking about here is the ability to act on that intelligence, bringing people such as terrorists to justice.

What is in jeopardy? The Schengen Information System 2—SIS II—and the European arrest warrant, the EAW, are in jeopardy. No non-EU state has access to the European arrest warrant and no state outside the EU, unless it is in the Schengen area, has access to SIS II. It currently enables police officers on the street in the UK to directly access databases that contain the details of all those wanted under the European arrest warrant, missing people, stolen vehicles, travelling sex offenders and those of interest to counterterrorism officers in all EU member states.

The NCA lead told us that new extradition treaties were likely to be needed with each of the 27 remaining EU states. Norway and Iceland, both within Schengen and the European Economic Area, applied to be part of a modified form of the European arrest warrant in 2001. This was agreed in 2006, but they still await implementation. The NCA lead explained that Europol produces pan-European action plans, and serious and organised crime threat assessments, and that a multiagency liaison bureau exists for each member state. Contrary to the impression given by the Security Minister yesterday, third-party states have only partial access to Europol. The UK is one of the top contributors of intelligence; there was until recently a British director, and 40% of data entries are UK-led.

ECRIS, the European Criminal Records Information System, is a secure messaging system where criminal convictions in the courts of one member country are shared across the EU. This information is used to analyse patterns of offending.

Something else at risk is Prüm, which provides rapid electronic comparison of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registrations across the EU. For example, a DNA profile found at a UK crime scene can be compared with profiles of those convicted across the EU. Checks take from seconds up to 24 hours. Alternative arrangements under Interpol take months, and some inquiries are never replied to.

The NCA lead went on to say that cross-border surveillance arrangements enable UK criminals to be kept under surveillance in other EU countries and EU suspects to be kept under surveillance in the UK. For every request that EU countries make under this scheme, the UK makes seven requests of the EU. This, too, is under threat. There are also joint investigation teams through the Eurojust process.

We know from the experience of Norway and Iceland with the European arrest warrant that some of these ways of keeping the UK safe and secure are unlikely, if not impossible, to secure in the short to medium term, if at all. The Government will no doubt say that everything is subject to negotiation. The time has passed for us to say that the UK will be less safe and less secure if we leave the EU; we are leaving. The time has come to hold the Government to account to ensure that they deliver on their promise that we will be just as safe and secure outside the EU.

We will bring forward a probing amendment in Committee requiring the Government to negotiate with the EU to produce outcomes equivalent to those provided by these European Union systems and processes. If they fail to deliver equivalent outcomes, they will have failed in their promise to keep us as secure and safe outside the European Union as we were inside it.

Brexit: Appointment of Joint Committee

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, asked for facts. In January 2017, the National Crime Agency warned the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Policing and Security what would be lost if we left the EU without a deal. Being a trained police officer, I took contemporaneous notes. These are the facts: we would lose the Schengen Information System, meaning that police officers would no longer be able to carry out checks via the police national computer on people and vehicles on the streets of the UK, for those wanted under the European arrest warrant, for missing people, for travelling sex offenders, or for those suspected of being involved in terrorism, anywhere in the EU.

We would lose the European arrest warrant. Norway and Iceland want to be part of the European arrest warrant. They will not get full access to it, because it is against the constitution of countries such as Germany to extradite their nationals to non-EU states. They applied in 2001 and agreement was reached in 2006, but it is yet to be implemented.

We would no longer be a member of Europol, to which the UK is one of the biggest contributors. It currently has a British director and 700 staff producing pan-European action plans and organised crime threat assessments. Third-party countries have only partial access and play no part in its leadership. The UK would become a third-party country.

We would lose ECRIS, a secure messaging system where criminal convictions in the courts of one country are shared across the EU. It is also used to analyse convictions to determine patterns of offending. It will be far more difficult for us to stop foreign criminals entering the UK because we will not necessarily know that they have convictions.

We would lose Prüm, a system that rapidly compares DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registrations across the EU; for example, a DNA profile found at a UK crime scene can be compared with databases of those convicted across the EU within a few seconds or up to 24 hours. We would have to fall back on alternative arrangements under Interpol, which take months; some are never replied to.

We would lose access to cross-border surveillance where suspected criminals are kept under surveillance in other EU countries and EU suspects are kept under surveillance in the UK. For every one request from the EU, the UK makes seven requests for such assistance to the EU. We would also lose joint investigation teams that operate under the Eurojust process to tackle pan-European crime.

The existing legislative framework—for example, common data protection standards and the European Court of Justice to resolve disputes—enables greater and more effective law enforcement co-operation. A no-deal Brexit, as my noble friend Lord Newby said, would result in the UK being less safe and less secure. I am confident that a Joint Committee will confirm these facts.

UK-EU Security Partnership

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I am sure that the Chief Whip has taken careful note of the noble Baroness’s comments.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that there is no existing precedent for a non-EU member to be part of some of the most important aspects of the proposed security partnership? Germany would have to change its national written constitution to enable the UK to be part of the European arrest warrant if we left the EU. On a scale of one to 10, how likely does the Minister think that is?

[Lord Callanan]

There is no precedent for what we are proposing. That is why it is an unprecedented proposal for a new partnership. Indeed, there is no precedent for countries leaving the EU, apart from Greenland. These discussions will be difficult and complicated. There are a number of impediments to agreement but we are negotiating in good faith. We hope that many of these issues can be resolved and we are working to do so.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I support Amendment 30, which seeks to ensure that before exit day all necessary action has been taken to ensure that we continue to co-operate on issues of internal security and law and order with our closest neighbours. It is timely, since fears are growing that the UK could become a more dangerous place as a result of our leaving the European Union. It is also timely because time is running out.

The sharing of intelligence and co-operation between countries will remain as vital in understanding the movement of criminals and domestic and international terrorism in the future as it is now. Security policy is threatened by potential damage to the European police office, Europol, which contributes to more than 13,500 cross-border investigations every year. It could be crippling. Leaving the EU will also make it difficult for agencies such as Eurojust to offer joint investigation teams to tackle a range of crimes from terror to child abuse.

There is considerable worry as to whether the UK will, after Brexit, still be part of the European arrest warrant agreements that allow for the most wanted criminals to be returned promptly. These provisions were introduced in 2002 in response to the growing threat from international terrorism and a recognition that extradition procedures were complex and time consuming.

Another aspect relates to cybercrime, which is the biggest emerging crime problem that we have. It has spread across Europe and indeed across the world and we need international co-operation to tackle it. We seem to be potentially on the brink of another cold war with Russia. We need access to years and years of shared data and resources to ensure robust safeguards. Europol was formed in 1999 and integrated into the EU in 2009, and one of its main functions is cybercrime co-operation.

I am particularly worried about the possible loss of the European arrest warrant, which currently means that most wanted criminals can be returned promptly. Before the European arrest warrant, extradition arrangements could take up to 10 years, whereas now we are talking about people being able to be transferred within a matter of weeks. That has to be maintained. There is a huge amount of legislation to be worked through as a result of the Brexit vote but it is vital that security and policing are given priority by the UK Government.

Furthermore, Brexit is a cause of anxiety for smaller ports in the UK. The North Wales Police and Crime Commissioner, Arfon Jones, is concerned that the new flexible approach to counterterrorism could see resources concentrated in the ports of the south of England, whereas Holyhead and other Welsh ports are underresourced and understaffed. Holyhead is in fact the second busiest ferry port in the UK and handles 2 million passengers each year.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, warned back in 2002 that the underpoliced ports were the soft underbelly in the war on terror. It is inevitable that the common travel area will be abused by criminals trying, illegally, to get into the UK. They will find the soft spots to come into the country and we must be prepared and ready to address that issue. We need some clear guidance from the Government as to how the smaller ports will be resourced, especially those with links across the Irish Sea. All these issues are important and they all need early answers to make sure that if Brexit happens according to the schedule that has been planned, at least there is preparation undertaken to meet these vital concerns.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken to former colleagues, particularly in the National Crime Agency, who have particular responsibility for European co-operation and they are very concerned about the potential consequences of our leaving the European Union. Clearly, in terms of counterterrorism intelligence, most arrangements are bilateral and therefore will not be affected, but bringing those people identified as terrorists to justice very much relies on European Union co-operation.

No doubt the Minister will say that this is an absolute priority for the Government. I have run out of fingers on which to count the number of absolute priorities that this Government have as far as leaving the European Union is concerned. Whichever Minister responds will say that of course it is in the interests of the United Kingdom and the European Union to maintain current levels of co-operation on these issues, but the important point that my noble friend has already been made, particularly in relation to the constitutional issues around Germany and extradition, is that the UK and the European Union may want the current arrangements to continue as far as possible, but the question is what is legally and constitutionally possible if the United Kingdom becomes a third party country and is not a member of the European Union.

There is one other issue related to the previous amendment, and that concerns the fact that we will no longer have a seat at the table at Europol. At the moment, the United Kingdom is central in directing the operations of Europol and in having influence over what Europol does, but it is not possible for a third party country to have that degree of involvement in, or that amount of influence over, Europol. Therefore, clearly British interests will lose out following any exit from the European Union.

Therefore, I ask the Minister to explain how these legal and constitutional obstacles will be overcome and how we will be able to be as influential and effective as we currently are in working with our European neighbours if we no longer have a seat at the table.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, it is really hard to overstate the importance of the issues raised this evening or, indeed, to understate the lack of government progress on them. It was in February of last year that the Government recognised the importance of the issues. Just so, but what action have they taken and what thought has been given to them since then? There was the welcome commitment to negotiate continued or enhanced co-operation in Munich, but what does that mean? We have heard little or nothing.

This evening we have heard from the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about Europol, about Eurojust from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, about the European arrest warrant from everyone who has spoken, about European criminal records and about the Schengen Information System. These are networks that help to keep our people safe. It clearly cannot undermine any negotiations that the Government are having for us to know what they want to achieve, because we assume that they have already shared this with the EU 27. I wonder whether what they worry will undermine the negotiations is their obsession with the red line around the ECJ or their relationship with their own Back Benches. If not, why are we not hearing more?

I want to concentrate on the issue that is perhaps easiest to understand, which is the European arrest warrant, and not simply from the point of view of where the countries named by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, might have a difficulty with it. Are we going to recognise any arrest warrant from the other countries? We do not even know that yet. What access will our law enforcers have to the checks, records and intelligence sharing that they use not simply day by day but hour by hour? As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, says, time is running out. We need some answers to that.

The amendment would ensure that the Government prioritised these issues over their concern with hard Brexiteers, who seem willing for the country to pay any price, even dropping out of the EAW, simply so that they can say, “Yeah, we’re shot of them”. That is a price that is too high to pay. It would put our security and justice outside an organised, functioning European system—one that has given us great confidence that we are being properly protected. This is an area where the Government need to give some leadership and come up with real proposals that can be implemented to keep all our people safe.

Brexit: Immigration

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 29th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and at her request, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the Migration Advisory Committee’s interim report and will consider it carefully as we plan for the future immigration system. However, the MAC has been clear that the analysis is not complete, so it would be wrong to pre-empt its final report, which is due in September. The Government will take account of the MAC’s advice when making decisions about our future immigration system.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, the CBI’s director of people, in response to the report, says that,

“restricting access to EU workers—at a time of record employment rates—would leave companies without the staff they need to grow and invest”.

Will the free movement of EU citizens continue after Brexit across all borders between the EU and the UK or only across the border between the EU and Northern Ireland?

[Lord Callanan]

We have been very clear that free movement will end at the end of the implementation period. Having said that, in our negotiations with the EU we are committed to seeing how we can smooth the flow of people in the future. However, we are very clear that one message from the referendum was that we need to take back control of immigration and deliver that for the people.

Brexit: European Travel Information and Authorisation System

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

Of course, all questions from your Lordships are helpful in this House. We have been very clear that we are going to have these discussions with the EU. We want to get an agreement and to make travel for EU citizens coming to the UK, and UK citizens going to the EU, as easy and painless as possible.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, at the moment citizens from the European Economic Area can use the electronic gates at UK airports. What contingency planning have the Government done should EEA nationals no longer be able to use the e-gates after Brexit? It is reported that, at one point on 29 December, at Heathrow terminal 4 non-EEA passport holders had to wait two and a half hours to cross the UK border.

[Lord Callanan]

I think that the Liberal Democrats are yet again making a whole series of assumptions about things that may not happen. If there are delays at the border, that is clearly unacceptable and I am sure that my Home Office colleagues are looking at that. We want people to visit the UK, we want the UK to be an open and welcoming place, the e-gates are one way that the Home Office is improving the procedures and we will want them to continue after Brexit.

Brexit: Data Transfer

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 16th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they have held with the European Commission on an adequacy decision for data transfers between the United Kingdom and the European Union after Brexit.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Ludford, and at her request, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government set out their approach to our future data relationship with the EU in our paper published in August. The paper examines the UK’s unprecedented point of alignment to the point of exit with the EU’s data framework and explores a future EU-UK model for exchanging and protecting personal data, which could build on the existing adequacy model.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in preparation for Brexit, this House is currently engaged in the process of enshrining European law on data protection into UK law—copying and pasting European legal language that is alien to the UK legal system in many cases. So much for taking back control. As the UK is rejecting all European redress systems, how does the UK expect to secure permission to continue exchanging data once we have left the European Union?

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is in his place, I will thank him for the opportunity to debate this legislation which we might not have had if he had not played such a good role in the Supreme Court. As our party spokesman on home affairs I want to make absolutely clear that I support the protection of the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK and of UK citizens living in the EU.

This afternoon I seek to make only one point and to use one example to illustrate that point. The British people did not know the full consequences of leaving the EU at the time of the referendum and did not therefore make an informed choice. They are entitled to a vote on the final deal. As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, none of us, on either side of the argument, knew what the full consequences of leaving the EU were going to be at the time of the referendum—and, of course, we will not know definitively until the negotiations are complete, although there are some things of which we are certain and which I will come to.

Let us be honest: no one, least of all the Conservative Government, thought much about the consequences of a leave vote because they never believed it would happen, as the noble Lord, Lord Darling, has just said. That is why the people need to decide, once they can make an informed choice, whether to accept the final deal negotiated by the Government. One thing is for sure: it is the people who started the process that will lead to the negations to leave the EU. Therefore, it is only the people who should decide, by means of a referendum, whether they want to go through with it once they have all the facts.

I come to my example. As the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal said yesterday, the Government’s White Paper sets out in detail the 12 objectives for the negotiations, one of which is to continue to co-operate with our European partners in important areas such as crime, terrorism and foreign affairs—the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, clearly articulated how important such co-operation is. My noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire pointed out yesterday:

“The White Paper also pledges to maintain close co-operation on internal security, intelligence and crime, but without accepting judicial oversight of such sensitive issues. That will not be possible”.—[Official Report, 20/02/17; col. 30.]


A major plank of the leave campaign was to make the UK Parliament sovereign and for law to be decided by British courts. But, as I shall seek to demonstrate, essential co-operation with the European Union on issues of terrorism, serious and organised crime, policing and justice—matters that are the primary role of any Government to keep their people safe—cannot be achieved without ceding sovereignty. To be effective in combating terrorism and serious and organised crime, such as people trafficking and child sexual abuse, and to bring to justice criminals who flee from the EU to the UK or vice versa, there needs to be a mass exchange of information between the countries of the EU and the UK.

At the moment there are shared electronic databases, with more due to come on stream in the coming months. They enable a police officer who stops a suspect in the street in the UK to check instantly whether they are of interest to the security services anywhere in Europe and whether they are wanted under a European arrest warrant. Fingerprint and DNA samples found at the scene of a crime can be checked across the EU in seconds, minutes or hours, rather than in the weeks or months—if it could be done at all—that it would take using Interpol.

These EU databases are subject to data protection law agreed by EU member states. Compliance is overseen by the European Court of Justice. At the moment we have a say as to what these EU data protection laws are. When we leave the EU, we will not. If we are to continue to have access to these vital databases, we will have to comply with EU data protection law over which we will no longer have any say.

The Government have also said that they will no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. So who will adjudicate on our compliance with EU data protection law? The Government may say that there should be a bespoke body specifically to adjudicate on such matters, as it suggests in its White Paper. This will obviously duplicate the work currently undertaken by the ECJ. Who is going to pay for this bespoke body that will ensure that the UK complies with EU law over which we will have no say? One thing is for sure: it is not going to be the Mexicans.

The British people believed that we would be safer outside the EU. They believed that we would no longer be subject to EU law and that we would no longer have to pay anything to, or for anything to do with, the European Union. That is what they were told during the referendum debate, whether in good faith or not. The reality is that we will either be much less safe if we no longer have access to the information held on these EU databases, or we will have to give up sovereignty by complying with EU law over which we will no longer have any say. We will either still be subject to the ECJ or we will have to fund an alternative body to adjudicate on these issues. Not many people realise this, and even fewer realised it at the time of the referendum.

This is why we are proposing an amendment to the Bill which will enable the British people to decide on the final deal when they know exactly what the consequences of leaving the EU are. This is not necessarily because they were misled or did not understand, but because it is only now beginning to dawn on all of us what the full consequences are going to be. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said, what is not democratic about giving the final say to the British people?