Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 116 and speak to my Amendments 117 to 121 inclusive in this group.
Clause 48 gives the police the power to compel people to have their photograph taken at a police station without their consent. It includes someone arrested for a recordable offence and released without being charged or otherwise being prosecuted for an offence, if they have not previously been photographed, the previous photograph is unavailable or inadequate, or a constable thinks that another photograph might be useful to assist in the prevention or detection of crime.
We have had concerns for some time about those not convicted of a criminal offence having their photographs retained by the police, but forcing a person to attend a police station and taking their photograph without their consent in such circumstances seems draconian. However, the clause goes further. It includes anyone who has been convicted abroad of an offence which would have been an offence if committed in England or Wales, if the police do not already have a useable photograph of the person so convicted or if a police officer thinks that it might be useful to have another one.
Aside from how the police would know about such a conviction, particularly since the UK has lost access to EU databases that record all convictions in EU countries, some countries are notorious for having legal systems that fall far short of what would be considered acceptable in the UK. Surely, at least in relation to overseas convictions, there should be some judicial safeguard to ensure that such a conviction is safe, rather than a constable being able to force someone to be photographed in such circumstances. My probing Amendment 117 removes the conditions associated with an overseas conviction, and the other amendments are consequential. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his amendment. I have a very brief comment for the Minister. The Explanatory Notes say:
“Section 64A of PACE confers a power on the police to take photographs from a person who has been detained in a police station and/or arrested. If a person is arrested, charged or convicted without a photograph being taken, there is no power to require them to attend a police station later for this to be done, although there is such a ‘recall’ power in … PACE relating to taking of fingerprints and DNA samples.”
There are so many important things in this Bill, and this is yet another. The noble Lord is quite right to point this out. Therefore, why was it thought not to be necessary to include the taking of photographs in the original legislation but now is thought to be necessary? What is the evidence for the change in legislation to include photographs?
Also, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the very important point about the extension of that power to overseas offences. Does that extension of power include not only photographs but fingerprints and DNA samples?
I am saying it was an omission. I am not saying it was a mistake, because I do not know whether it was, but it was an omission. I think there is a difference.
As things stand, opportunities to take photographs are being missed. This means that matches to crimes the person may have committed in the past or may commit in the future are not made. As the noble Lord explained, these amendments specifically intend to probe the necessity and proportionality of the provisions in proposed new subsections (1H) and (1I) of Section 64A of PACE. These provisions cover occasions when the police have been notified of a conviction in another country that has an equivalent offence in England and Wales. Where there is no photograph on file, or it is of poor quality, police will now be able to ask an individual to attend a police station to have one taken for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime. To ensure appropriate oversight, this will require authorisation at the minimum rank of inspector.
As I said at the start, these provisions simply align the police’s ability to take photographs in certain circumstances with provisions that already exist for DNA and fingerprints. In that sense, we are therefore not breaking new ground. We are dealing here with individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offence, albeit in another country. In the interests of protecting people in this country, it is right that the police should be able to take and retain a photograph of a convicted person in these circumstances. I hope that the noble Lord agrees, particularly given the existing precedent in PACE, that this a necessary and proportionate power, and that he will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support. I have to say to the Minister that I am really none the wiser about the questions I asked. There is a catalogue of cases where people are convicted overseas and where it turns out that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory because of the inadequate legal systems that operate abroad. Yet this is a blanket power for the police to summon and photograph anybody on the basis of an overseas conviction. The noble Lord has not addressed how there could be any safeguard against such an unsafe and unsatisfactory conviction overseas.
The Minister talked about where the police have been notified of an overseas conviction, but I do not understand what the mechanism is by which the police would be notified. So my questions remain unanswered by what the Minister said and I hope that, between now and Report, the Government will be able to answer them, otherwise we will be having another debate on Report. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, briefly, I speak in support of Amendments 122 and 275 in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—who has already made an eloquent and erudite contribution, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said—and other noble Lords. I will also echo elements of the noble Lord’s contribution.
Amendment 122 encapsulates and incorporates precisely the advice that I would now want to give to my own two daughters and, in due time, my own grand-daughter, in the light of what we all know happened to Sarah Everard. There has been talk of flagging down buses or otherwise seeking assistance, in the case of a lone arresting officer seeking to require a person subject to arrest to enter a car or, as the amendment says
“premises other than a police station”.
I simply do not find such advice or suggestions helpful or sufficient. These suggestions would not, I am afraid, assuage the well-grounded fears of many women in the wake of recent events and revelations about the behaviour of some police officers. The amendment, however, sets reassuring and necessary parameters, and I am in full support of it. We must use this legislation to afford clarity and safety to women.
With regard to Amendment 275, again, I believe that action taken hitherto by Her Majesty’s Government is insufficient and that a statutory inquiry, for all the reasons advanced already in this debate, is needed. It is needed to learn lessons but also to give a signal that we will now begin to restore the faith and trust in the police which has been so manifestly and extensively damaged.
My Lords, I have to tell the Committee that I find these debates very difficult. I was a police officer for over 30 years and, for part of that time, a senior police officer. Like the overwhelming majority of hard-working, decent and honest police officers in this country, I find it very difficult to hear this sort of debate and to say the sorts of things that I will say now. I do not have the same sympathy for senior police officers who are failing in their leadership. I recall speaking privately to a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and asking that individual, “What on earth is going on at the moment?”. He said, “Well, Brian, I think when the police come under pressure, diversity goes out of the window”. The police have been under a lot of pressure because their resources have been reduced, because knife crime has become an epidemic and because of the horrific situations we find ourselves in.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said earlier, it is not just about Sarah Everard. In the last two weeks we have had a Metropolitan Police officer charged with rape and another with indecent images of children. There were a whole series of cases that point to a real issue with the culture in the police service, and in the Metropolitan Police in particular. So I completely understand and support the principles behind the amendments, and I have indicated my support for Amendment 122 by adding my name to it.
I want to bring some real-world practicality to bear on the amendments. Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggests that a police officer
“may not require or ask the person under arrest to enter a vehicle or premises other than a police station unless at least one other constable is present in the vehicle or when entering the premises”.
Not only does that go to the heart of the Sarah Everard scenario, but it is entirely consistent with best practice for the protection of the person arrested and the arresting officer. I should explain that in the police a person who has been arrested is called a prisoner, and I will do the same.
First, it does not specify that the provision should apply only to a woman or a child, as Amendment 123 does. The noble Baroness pointed out how there might be legal difficulties with that but, as she said, what if the arresting officer is gay or the person arrested is a gay man? Where would the protection be for the arresting officer against allegations of inappropriate behaviour in those circumstances, or the protection for the arrested person, if we restricted it only to a woman or a child? As the noble Baroness said, a black person may also have fears about getting into a vehicle when there was only one officer present. From my own professional experience, I have lost count of the number of reports of black people who have been beaten up on the way to the police station. The issue that we need to address here is male violence perpetrated by police officers, whether directed at a male or a female prisoner, although women may understandably feel more threatened with a lone male arresting officer than a male prisoner would. Amendment 122 would provide protection for the police officer and for the person arrested, whatever sex or sexuality they may be.
Secondly, it is very dangerous for a lone police officer to drive with a prisoner in the car. The prisoner could attack the officer while driving even if handcuffed, as we saw with the tragic death of police Sergeant Matt Ratana, who was shot in Croydon police station by a handcuffed prisoner. Ideally, police officers should patrol and respond in pairs wherever possible, and at least one of those police officers should be female, but that is not always possible. Ensuring that two police officers are present is an important and almost always adequate safeguard.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and as the Minister said in answer to an Oral Question on Thursday, only about one-third of police officers are female—even fewer, I believe, in the Metropolitan Police—so the practicality of requiring a female officer to be present, as Amendment 123 demands, may not always be possible, and in some cases it would not be appropriate to release the prisoner if a female officer could not attend the scene.
I turn to the other aspects of Amendment 123. Giving the person arrested
“an immediate and reasonable opportunity to contact another person”
could have serious officer-safety implications. I myself have been subject to attempts to rescue a person that I had arrested, albeit that it was in Brixton a few months before the Brixton riots. There is a real danger that the arrested person could summon people to effect her escape from police custody. And, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, alluded to, the problem with the arresting officer providing a telephone number purporting to be the number of a police station or control room, were he to have criminal intent, is that he may have an accomplice on the telephone number given to the prisoner.
Long delays between arrest and arrival at the police station, in my professional experience, expose both the arresting officer and the person arrested to danger. It may not always be possible, for example if the prisoner is violently resisting arrest, either to explain her rights to her or to provide them in writing. Again, in my professional experience, people do not want to be arrested by the police and are unlikely to attend a police station if allowed to go free. I completely understand the sentiments behind both these amendments. I have serious reservations about the practicality of Amendment 123, but I have no hesitation in commending Amendment 122 to the Committee.
I also strongly support Amendment 275, which calls for a Macpherson-type inquiry, under the Inquiries Act 2005, into the Sarah Everard atrocity and all the surrounding issues. This is something akin to the issues of public trust and confidence around racism that came out of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence and that the Macpherson inquiry looked to address. We are facing an equivalent situation here in terms of misogyny and violence against women and girls. It is absolutely appropriate that we have a similar inquiry to the Macpherson inquiry to deal with that. I prefer Amendment 275, for that reason, to Amendment 281.
I also support Amendment 282: mandatory training for all officers, not just recruits, on violence against women and girls. Of course, culture is the most difficult thing to change, but training is an important part of changing that culture. I also support Amendment 283, with the caveat that I believe the vetting procedures used in the recruitment of all police officers need to be urgently reviewed, not just for officers transferring between forces.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about the Sarah Everard vigil. I will refer to this at length when we come to the public order parts of the Bill, but I was an advanced, trained senior police officer in public order. I read the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services report into the Sarah Everard vigil. How HMIC came to the conclusions that the police did everything right, on the basis of what it wrote before it got to that conclusion, I have no idea. The evidence in that report is completely contrary to that conclusion, in my professional judgment. So, there is something seriously wrong here: how can we change the culture if we have that sort of whitewashing by HMIC?
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, raised issues around police leadership and police culture and what I have described before as a culture of cover-up rather than own-up. I have always believed the way to build public trust and confidence is, when there is misconduct, to show you are ruthlessly dealing with it rather than trying to cover it up to protect the reputation of the force. I will say more about that when we come to a later group on the duty of candour. The noble Lord is absolutely right: there is a failure of leadership at the top of the police service. It makes me very uncomfortable to stand here and say that, but it is something I felt when I was in the police service and continue to feel now. I absolutely support these amendments.
My Lords, I realise the hour is late, but there are two things I would like to mention. First, I am very interested in what the Deputy Commissioner Sir Steve House said. I do not know when he said it, but it does not seem to chime with the fact that, two weeks ago, I was challenged by a lone officer in plain clothes. That seems to be completely contrary to what the Minister said he announced.
Secondly, the Minister says there should not be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 because we need to move at speed. I can tell noble Lords that the Metropolitan Police never moved quicker on racism than when it was announced that there would be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act. It was not when the inquiry reported that the Metropolitan Police swung into action to deal with racism. It was absolutely ready with an answer as soon as that inquiry reported, because it knew what the problems were and realising that this was all going to become public in an inquiry galvanised it into action.
I note the noble Lord’s points and I do not disagree with him. I ask the Committee to understand the commitment of the Home Secretary. She is deadly serious about ensuring that the inquiry moves at pace and, if necessary, converting it to a statutory inquiry if it is not meeting its commitments.
I will get the date for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Committee. The announcement from Dame Cressida Dick was on 20 October, some 11 days ago, but I will get the date on which Sir Stephen House made those comments.
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 123A in my name. I apologise to the Committee. If I had had my wits about me, I would have grouped it with the previous police bail amendments. I am grateful to Transform Justice for bringing this issue to my attention and for its help and support in drafting this amendment.
The Government continue to place tighter restrictions on when courts can remand children in custody. Those are much stronger than the restrictions currently placed on the police when they decide whether to remand a child in custody to court. Court criteria, most of which do not apply to the police, include that: the child must be between 12 and 17 years of age and be legally represented, other than in exceptional circumstances; they must have been charged with a violent or sexual offence or have been charged with an offence where an adult would have received a custodial sentence of 14 or more years; or they have a recent history of absconding while remanded; or they have a history of committing imprisonable offences while on bail; and there is a real prospect of a custodial sentence for the offence in question. In addition, remand in custody must be necessary to protect the public from death or personal injury or to prevent the child from committing further imprisonable offences.
The police remand many more children in custody than the courts. In 2019, the year with the most recent data available, over 4,500 children were remanded in police custody compared with 884 children remanded in custody by the courts. Some 60% of children remanded in custody by the police had been charged with non-violent offences and only 12% of those remanded in custody by the police went on to be remanded in custody by the courts. Two-thirds of children remanded in custody by the police do not receive a custodial sentence.
In Clause 132, the Bill suggests further strengthening the restrictions on courts remanding children in custody, including that the history of breaching bail or offending on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. If detention is being considered for the child’s own safety, this would be possible only if the risk cannot be safely managed in the community. It would have to be “very likely” that the child would receive a custodial sentence rather than a “real prospect”. Courts would also be under a statutory duty to record their reasons for imposing custodial remand, including a statement that they have considered the welfare of the child in their decision and that they have considered alternatives.
The Bill as drafted does nothing to tighten the restrictions on the police remanding children in custody, or even to bring them into line with existing court restrictions. Amendment 123A intends to bring the Police and Criminal Evidence Act criteria for police remand of children into closer alignment with the court remand criteria. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his amendment. As the Committee might be aware, I sit as a youth magistrate, usually at Highbury magistrates’ court. I have to say that I was not aware of the difference in the remand criteria; I should have known but I did not. I also thank Transform Justice for bringing this to my attention. The noble Lord has very thoroughly explored the differences in the number of youths remanded by the police versus those remanded by the courts. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising this important issue of children remanded in custody. I quite agree that police custody is not a suitable environment for children and that they should not be detained there unless it is absolutely necessary.
The provisions introduced by this Bill will amend the “tests” set out by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, also known as LASPO, which must be satisfied before the court remands a child to custody. These are intended to ensure that custodial remand is used only as a last resort, where there are no other options and it is necessary to protect the public.
Before the courts get involved, if a child is charged with an offence, Section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that the police must release them either on bail or without bail pending their appearance at court, unless one or more specified conditions apply. These conditions are that the child’s name or address are not known or are not believed to be genuine; there are reasonable grounds to believe the child will not appear in court to answer bail; the detention is believed to be necessary to prevent the child committing an offence, causing physical injury, loss or damage to property, or interfering with the investigation of offences; or the detention after charge is believed to be necessary for the child’s own protection or in their own interests.
I would like to reassure the Committee that there is already a degree of alignment between police bail and court bail, and the police custody officer must have regard to the same considerations as those that apply when a court is considering whether to grant bail under the Bail Act 1976.
I acknowledge the concern that many more children are remanded post charge by the police than are remanded by the courts while awaiting trial, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, and that this may give rise to consideration of risk-averse decision-making by the police. I do not necessarily believe this to be the case. It is important to remember that post-charge detention by the police serves a different purpose from youth remand in the courts, so it is unrealistic to expect an exact alignment of the conditions required to make decisions.
With this in mind, it is perfectly possible for the police to make a decision to remand a child post charge and for the courts to make a decision not to remand the same child to custody, and for both these decisions to be reasonable based on the evidence and circumstances before each party. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a child remanded by the police will be held for no more than 24 hours.
I also acknowledge the concern that police remand is a driver of custodial remand—that is, for example, that a court is more likely to view a child remanded by the police as dangerous. I am not aware of any data showing a causal link between police remand and custodial remand. A comprehensive evidence base comparing the circumstances whereby police bail after charge decisions are made under Section 38 of PACE would be needed, giving consideration to the threshold for grounds to refuse bail and whether custody officers have access to and apply all relevant information when making a bail decision.
Before I conclude, I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks and the Home Office’s gratitude to Brian Roberts, who was the department’s expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Sadly, he died last month after 50 years of public service as a police officer and then an official in the department. He is greatly missed by his colleagues.
On the basis of my remarks, I hope the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for his support.
I am afraid that there is a bit of a pattern developing here in the Government’s responses. On the one hand, the Minister said there is “a degree of alignment” between police remand in custody of children and court remand in custody. Some 4,500 children being remanded by the police and only 884 by the courts does not sound to me like alignment.
The Minister also said a child would never be remanded in police custody for more than 24 hours. Do courts sit on a Sunday? What happens to a child arrested on a Saturday afternoon? They are going to be in custody a lot longer than 24 hours.
Unfortunately, as I say, it is becoming a bit of a theme that the Government’s responses to amendments do not appear to be factually accurate. We need to review that. I am afraid I do not find the Minister’s response satisfactory, and no doubt we will return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.