Offensive Weapons Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 4, at end insert “without, in the case of a person charged in England and Wales or Northern Ireland (subject to section 2), having taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, alongside the amendment to page 1, line 5, would make a failure to take precautions or exercise diligence criteria for the offence, as distinct from defences which would come into play only after the person had been charged.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to the other amendments in the group in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. These amendments seek to change the offences in the Bill from those where there is a reasonable excuse defence only when charged to ones where, if someone has a reasonable excuse, they do not commit an offence. They seek consistency in approach between legislation where no offence is committed if someone has an offensive weapon in a public place because they have a reasonable excuse and legislation where, in exactly the same circumstances, a person does commit an offence and has to rely on a defence only once they have been charged. The amendments also seek consistency between offences where the burden lies on the prosecution to disprove a reasonable excuse defence and offences where the burden lies on the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they have a reasonable excuse.

We return to an issue that I raised in discussion of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill and which is applicable here; namely, creating offences where a completely innocent person commits an offence and has to rely on a defence once charged, rather than someone with a reasonable excuse for his actions not being guilty of an offence in the first place. In the context of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the Government acknowledged this problem in relation to the designated areas offence. In that Bill, the Government accepted that, rather than a person entering a designated area and having a defence once charged if they had good reason to be there, if they entered or remained in a designated area involuntarily or for a range of other reasons stipulated in the Bill, they did not commit an offence. The Government accepted that there could be legitimate reasons for visiting or remaining in a designated area and that it was more sensible to say that no offence was committed if they had good reason, rather than that they committed an offence but had a defence once charged.

In one part of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the person does not commit an offence if they had good reason yet, in another part, a person has a defence once charged—a different approach in different parts of the same Bill. It is still a Bill, I think, and has not yet received Royal Assent—I am getting nods from the back, so that is good.

In Clause 1 of this Bill, a person commits an offence if they sell a corrosive product to a person who is under the age of 18. They have a defence, if charged, by proving that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying, “They do not commit an offence if they act reasonably”. In Clause 3, a person commits an offence if he delivers the corrosive product or arranges its delivery to residential premises. They too have a defence, if charged, if they prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying that if they act reasonably, they do not commit an offence. There is also an issue with Clause 4, but it slipped through the net and therefore there is no amendment in this group to address it.

In Clause 6, however, a person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place. It is a defensive charge if they prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place, rather than the provision being that if they had good reason or lawful authority, they do not commit an offence. It will perhaps be clearer if I concentrate on the latter of these three offences.

If a 19-year-old young man has a corrosive substance with them in a public place with the intention of using it to attack someone else, they commit an offence under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 of having an offensive weapon with them in a public place with the intention of causing injury to someone. It is an intended offensive weapon. However, if they have been sent out by their mother to buy drain cleaner in a squeezable bottle to unblock the kitchen sink—I speak with some experience having recently cleared one of my drains; drain cleaner does come in squeezable bottles—they do not commit an offence under the 1953 Act. They have a corrosive liquid with them in a public place, in a squeezable bottle that could be used to cause injury to someone, but have a reasonable excuse for possessing it. Were the police to stop and search the youngster, a quick phone call to the mother could establish the reasonable excuse.

Under the Bill, the 19 year-old running the errand for his mother commits a criminal offence because, under Clause 6(1):

“A person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place”.


Under Clause 6(2), it is a defence for the youngster charged with an offence under subsection (1) to,

“prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place”,

but a police officer would be justified in arresting the youngster, because he is clearly committing a criminal offence.

When discussing the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, we also debated the principle of necessity in relation to arrests. One of the circumstances included in the reasons why an arrest might be necessary under Section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 is to allow,

“the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the person in question”.

It would be quite easy for a police officer to reason that the quickest and easiest way to determine whether the young man has a blocked drain is to arrest him and take him to his home address, to see whether the kitchen sink is blocked.

I am sure that the Minister will say that of course the police will act reasonably, but the police do not always act reasonably. Believe me, from 30 years’ experience in the police service, including four years as a bobby on the beat, I can say that sometimes police officers look for any reason to arrest someone. For those who might argue that my experience is not current, I point out that if you own a drone, live within a short distance of Gatwick Airport and have suspicious neighbours, apparently you can end up being arrested even when you can easily prove that you were miles away at work at the time the offence was committed.

There is another anomaly. In the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, in offences that remain of the “defence when charged” type, the burden is on the prosecution to disprove the reasonable excuse defence put forward by the accused, and to do so beyond reasonable doubt. Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 states:

“If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.


Indeed, in Clause 3(10) of this Bill we find a similar provision, except that it applies only in Scotland. South of the border, not only is it only a defence once charged—as in subsection (8)—but the person charged has to,

“prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”,

presumably beyond reasonable doubt. Noble Lords will recall that Section 118 of the Terrorism Act saved the Government from the accusation of reversing the burden of proof but, in these offences, the burden of proof is on the accused, presumably to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, that they have a reasonable excuse. Why is the burden of proof reversed in this Bill, except in Scotland, but not in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, which passed through this House only recently?

Sending a message to the police that an offence is not committed if someone has lawful authority or reasonable excuse is preferable to saying that an offence is committed and that there is a defence once charged. Sending a message that you have nothing to fear by buying corrosive substances for illegitimate purposes and carrying the substance home through the streets or to a place of work is preferable to saying: “You are committing an offence and have to prove to a jury beyond reasonable doubt that you did so innocently”. The principle adopted in Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which deals with offensive weapons, is that you are innocent if you have a reasonable excuse. That legislation has not been repealed, nor have the Government sought to amend it. That is the principle adopted by the Government in recent weeks in relation to an offence under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, and it is the principle that the Government should adopt in this Bill. I beg to move—

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Not being familiar with police procedures, to me the essence of the argument seems to be about when the defence is deployed. Can the noble Lord explain what that means in practical terms?

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, when the police are told that the offence is not committed if somebody has a reasonable excuse, the clear message sent to them is that they need to investigate the matter there and then to establish whether that reasonable excuse exists. If a Bill, as in this case, says that somebody who carries a corrosive substance in a public place commits an offence, it sends a message to the police that investigation of any reasonable excuse that the person may have can wait until later because, according to the legislation, the defence is available only once the person has been charged.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Bill. The issue of the misuse of corrosive substances and all other kinds of offensive weapons is too obviously something that has to be addressed. However, I want to raise an issue which is troublesome in the context of the amendment.

Unless an offence is absolute—and we take a strong stand against absolute offences—it is a long-standing principle of criminal justice that you are liable to conviction and sentence, or to go back earlier, to be arrested and charged if you have done something or acted in a way prohibited by the law. Fine—but the proviso to that is, “Provided that simultaneously your state of mind was itself similarly criminal”. You may have done it intentionally or recklessly. There are all sorts of ways in which your state of mind can be identified as criminal but it is of the essence that these two concepts stand or fall together.

This statute asserts that, where certain facts are proved, you have committed an offence—full stop. Without reference to your state of mind or any other circumstance, the offence is established and you are therefore liable to be arrested. It then says, “We shall graciously allow that, in certain circumstances, you may have a defence”, and if you prove them you would have a defence. Perhaps the most gracious of all the circumstances is to be found in Clause 2(6) to (9), where a whole series of them have to be established. You then have a defence, but you have been arrested and may have been charged. Nobody has to examine these two concepts together and say, “The evidence shows that he had a guilty mind”, or “He was reckless”, or whatever it might be.

What I really want to raise in Committee is that we should stick to the normal principles that have worked well for us: you are not guilty of anything and have not committed an offence unless your mental state was simultaneously as criminal as the actions you committed. That is what we believe. I do not want to be overportentous; I cannot see the Minister making any concessions about this. However, I would like to put down a marker. This way of legislating for criminal justice is inappropriate and we should avoid it. We should certainly be very careful not to allow it to happen without us spotting it and stopping it.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

So which is it for the purposes of the Bill?

[Lord Paddick]

Could I assist the Committee? We will return to the problems of not allowing corrosive substances to be delivered to any residential address in an upcoming group. It might be more appropriate to discuss that matter then, if that assists the noble Earl.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Thank you. Sorry, I had not noticed that.

[Lord Paddick]

Not at all.

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It is interesting that the Minister seems to have ignored the inconsistency in approach between the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Bill. In the Prevention of Crime Act, which is a piece of legislation specifically dealing with offensive weapons, you do not commit an offence if you have a reasonable excuse, which is inconsistent with the Criminal Justice Act and the Bill. The Minister says, “We worded it this way for things to be consistent”. It is not consistent.

On the point from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, I do not want to get into the disproportionality of stop and search. What I would say is that I envisage certain circumstances where a 19-year-old young man who has a corrosive substance in their pocket, because that is the only thing they were sent out to the shop for, is stopped by the police very easily leading to arrest if the offence is worded in the way it is, whereas a police officer might be given cause to think twice if it were worded in the way I suggested it should be changed. The Minister and her officials are on slightly dodgy ground in suggesting to me what makes a practical difference to a police officer on the street or not about the way they implement the law.

That will give an indication that we are likely to return to this matter at the next stage. However, at this juncture, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 13, 14 and 15 in this group. I do not put any particular weight on the drafting of these amendments. What concerns me is that we are putting a lot of weight in this Bill on the shoulders of people whose occupations we consider so lowly that we will not let them be the subject of apprenticeships. You cannot get an apprenticeship as a shop worker or as a delivery driver. There is no established pattern of training for these people, but we are putting them in a situation where something that they sold is used very quickly in a horrific crime and all the weight of the media and public opinion comes down on their shoulders as to whether they erred in their action or not. The whole machinery of justice is impelled towards convicting them because it wants some victim to compensate for the crime that has been committed. This is all too regular and humiliating, and we owe it to these people to put them in a situation where they can have a set of rules and know that if they follow this set of rules they will be safe.

It is not satisfactory to have that set of rules be just invented by the small shopkeeper who happens to employ them. There has to be some way in which their employers can establish that what they are doing is proof against whatever accusations might come their way. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the burden of proof rests on their shoulders: they have to show that they did what was necessary to avoid the liability in this Bill. The other side of that coin is that we have to do what is necessary to enable them to do that and to enable them to be sure that they have done that. There are plenty of available recording devices around: you can take a picture of the document that you saw or the person himself, but then you are running straight into GDPR. We cannot start doing that without there being a clear set of permissions and expectations at the back of it. We want this to happen: we want a delivery driver, turning up on a wet Sunday and poking something through a gate that somebody might not see too well in the early morning light or in the evening, knowing that what they are doing is right and sufficient. I do not mind what it is, but we must do something. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group in principle, but I will make one or two comments about them. First, there is an apparent contradiction between the pair of Amendments 3 and 13 on the one hand and the pair of Amendments 14 and 15 on the other. The first pair suggests that the police should design a scheme to ensure that corrosive substances are not delivered into the hands of those under 18. The second pair dictate to the police, at least in part, what that scheme should be. However, I understand the principle behind what the noble Lord is saying.

It is currently possible to order age-restricted products online and there are schemes in place designed to prevent age-restricted products being delivered to those under 18. Amazon’s instructions to the buyer say:

“By placing an order for one of these items you are declaring that you are 18 years of age or over. These items must be used responsibly and appropriately.


Delivery of age restricted items can only be delivered to the address on the shipping label, but this can include the reception of a commercial building. A signature of the recipient will be required upon delivery. Amazon adopts a ‘Challenge 25’ approach to delivery of age restricted products. Photo identification will be required if a person appears under 25, to prove that they are over 18 years old. An age restricted item can be delivered to another adult over the age of 18 at the same address. Delivery to a neighbour or nominated safe place location is not available for these items. If an adult over the age of 18 is not available at the address, or if an adult has not been able to show valid photo identification under the Challenge 25 approach, the item will be returned to Amazon”.


The acceptable photo identification is a passport or driving licence.

Would this scheme or something like it be sufficient to restrict the sale and delivery of corrosive substances—and knives for that matter—to those under 18, obviating the need for banning the delivery of such items to residential addresses?

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is absolutely on the right lines. One of the troubles is knowing what is permissible and what is not. In speaking to the amendments in his name, I will suggest something which takes it a bit further. I declare an interest as chair of the Digital Policy Alliance, which, among other things, worked for several years on age verification for the Digital Economy Act. This Bill has exactly the same problem as Section 3 of that Act: what systems are adequate for proving the age of someone in an online sale? We worked on such systems and if noble Lords want to see that it can be done properly and securely I recommend they go to the web portal dpatechgateway.co.uk, where there are several to play with. The challenge is that there is no official certification scheme in place, but those systems are compliant with BSI publicly available specification 1296. I chaired the steering group that produced that standard and it had a lot of different people on it—people from the industry, academics, legislators, lawyers, et cetera. It shows that it can be done securely.

This goes one stage further than the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that the police can certify. Here is a system that you could trust. The technology also enables it to be on a mobile, so you can do point-of-delivery verification. You have got the person there: you can compare them with the device. Amendment 13 goes some way to solving the quandary for a seller, but what is “adequate”? Someone in the industry has suggested to me that it might be better to insert a new paragraph (c) after line 22 saying that: “The Secretary of State may lay regulations as to which bodies are recognised to provide standards against which age-verification schemes can be assessed”. In that way, a certification system could be set up. The BBFC and DCMS have been struggling with this for some time. They are getting there, but there is a lot to be learned from the fallout from that which could be imported into this Bill. Giving the Secretary of State the power to say what schemes can be certified against would go a long way to making life far simpler. We are moving into an online age. We cannot do all this offline and we should not pretend we can.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

This is something we talked about earlier. If we are to put “all” in, it is not unreasonable to have some sort of guidance in the Bill to protect people, otherwise people are just left hanging.

[Lord Paddick]

Would it help the Committee to suggest that the Government have put in Clause 4 exactly the sort of things the delivery courier should be looking at to take reasonable precautions?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, that is where the guidance comes in. All roads are leading back to the guidance. I hope I can leave it there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Eaton (Con)]

I support the words of my noble friend Lady Newlove. Much of what the Committee has heard this afternoon about corrosive substances has referred to the appalling use of them by young people. Statistics on this are more difficult to find than on some of the other offences that we will be discussing later. I have serious concerns about the connection with drugs. The threat of acid attack is regularly used on young people involved in county lines.

One thing we have not mentioned this afternoon is the terrible situation of violence against individuals in domestic abuse situations, which is less frequent and not often reported. Surely short-term sentences will not deal with that. This is not the same as the pressures on young people to conform to gangs and so on. This is something quite different and I would like to think that there are very serious responses to that in our system.

[Lord Paddick]

If I could assist the Committee at this stage, these amendments relate to the offences of selling and delivering to young people, not to the possession of corrosive substances by young people. We are talking about sending the owner of the corner shop or the Amazon delivery man to prison for delivering these substances into the hands of people who are under 18. I want to ensure that noble Lords are aware that that is what we are talking about in this group of amendments.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Views have been expressed here which I respect but do not share. The seller will be, or is likely to be, an adult, and certainly will not be a vulnerable child. The purchaser, or the person to whom the product is sold, may be a very young child. It may be a 17 year-old who lives in an area where there is an awful lot of violence and who has a bad record which is known to the seller. We have to be careful. I am implacably opposed to minimum terms—we may come to that at some stage—because minimum terms do not do justice. However, a person who sells to a vulnerable child, or to somebody who leads a gang or who has been given a community sentence first time round, with a condition that he is prohibited from selling corrosive products but continues to do so, merits a prison sentence as punishment. Prison is not just about rehabilitation. Short sentences do not do much good; indeed, the evidence suggests that some of them do a lot of harm. However, some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender. Therefore, I cannot support these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

I believe that we have to allow such online ordering to occur, with delivery to residential addresses, and to increase, provided it is safe to do so. I hope I have shown that it is possible in these cases. Were we not to allow it, I have to remind the Minister that there are about 1.2 million motorcycle users, taking up far less space on the roads than others, who might need to change their batteries every two or three years. This is as well as those other categories I have just mentioned, not least electric wheelchair users. For very many of them, especially in rural areas, not to be able to replace their batteries by online means and have them delivered to residential addresses would be more than an inconvenience or disadvantage. The Government would not want to shoulder the blame, especially among what are probably mainly youngish voters, for blighting their lives and effectively discouraging motorcycling. I believe that these amendments can sit safely alongside the laudable purposes of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Viscount. This is an example of how complex this ban on delivering corrosive substances to residential premises is. That is an issue that I will return to in group 7; I shall keep my powder dry until then.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I also rise briefly to support this amendment from my noble friend. He is absolutely right. It is not just cars and motorcycles; things such as uninterruptable power supplies for computers, in which I have a particular interest, have them and I do not know whether the fact that the battery is inside another bit of kit which can be unscrewed matters or not. If you have a heavy-duty burglar alarm panel, that will probably have a lead-acid battery behind it. There are lots of reasons why you might want to get replacement batteries. I personally find it very inconvenient, except for the fact that I am married to a farmer. If I was living in a normal place—like my son for instance, who lives in London—I would not be able to buy batteries like that. They are a damned sight cheaper online, I can tell you that.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 28, after “may” insert “, following consultation with representatives of persons likely to be affected,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require consultation before any amendment of Schedule 1 (corrosive products).

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, Amendment 9 is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to my Amendments 10A and 10B, which are also in this group. I apologise to the Committee for the late arrival of those amendments.

Amendment 9 simply suggests that if the appropriate national authority amends Schedule 1—the list of corrosive products—for the purposes of Clause 1 by regulation, it should consult representatives of those likely to be affected. Amendments 10A and 10B probe the necessity for including 3% or more nitric acid and 15% or more sulphuric acid in Schedule 1 when they are already regulated explosives precursors listed in Schedule 1A to the Poisons Act 1972 as amended by the Deregulation Act 2015. These substances are already restricted for sale to the general public. If a member of the public wants to buy these substances, they need to apply to the Home Office for a licence to acquire, possess and use these substances. Will the Minister explain why these substances therefore need to be included in Schedule 1 to the Bill and why the existing restrictions are not sufficient? For those who are amazed at the depth of my knowledge of these issues, I am very grateful to the House of Lords Library for its excellent briefing on the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, Amendment 10 simply asks why not just list all these substances, since we know what they are and the list will not change. Substances have been left off, such as slaked lime, which are seriously corrosive to skin, might be used and are very easy to obtain, and there are others on the list that would be very difficult to obtain. None the less, if we are going to have a list, since the list is not going to grow over time but is a small collection of basic inorganic chemicals, why not have the lot? It really does not add a lot of weight to the Bill to complete the list.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that, with these assurances and the commitment to consider Amendment 9 further, I have been able to satisfy my noble friend Lord Lucas, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and commend her on her mind-reading ability. Although Amendment 9 is in my name, she correctly identified its author. My noble friend and I are both grateful that the Government are considering their response to the amendment. I am still not quite clear why we need to ban the sale to under-18s and delivery to residential premises of nitric acid and sulphuric acid in the concentrations specified in Schedule 1. The point of the question was that people cannot acquire these substances unless they have a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act, so they are very unlikely to be sold to somebody aged under 18 or delivered to a residential address. The Government are normally keen not to have unnecessary legislation, and including those two substances in Schedule 1 to this Bill appears to be unnecessary, bearing in mind that they are listed in Schedule 1A to the Poisons Act 1972. We may come back to that at a later date, but at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

This notice is to probe the relationship between Clause 3 and Clause 4.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, the purpose of opposing the Question that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill is to raise issues around the practicality of the operation of the clause and to ask the Minister why the scheme suggested in Clause 4—Delivery of corrosive products to persons under 18—cannot be extended to sellers inside the United Kingdom as well as outside, thus obviating the need to ban delivery to residential premises. The practicality of Clause 3 arises out of subsection (6) where premises are not considered residential premises when a person carries on a business from the premises. How does a courier know that the house he is delivering to is also used to conduct a business from? For example, I could be registered as a sole trader with Revenue & Customs, as I used to be before my introduction to your Lordships’ House. I was registered as a writer and public speaker and carried on my business from my home. Unless the courier was able to access— presumably confidential—information held by Revenue & Customs, how would he know? In any event, why should being a writer and public speaker carrying on a business from my home allow me to have corrosive substances delivered there, whereas now I cannot? The noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, gave another practical example about the delivery of acid batteries.

Clause 4 applies to the sale of corrosive substances where the seller is outside the United Kingdom. It applies where the seller enters into an arrangement with a courier to deliver the substance. The courier commits an offence if they do not deliver the substance into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. The courier is deemed to have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence if he is shown a passport, a photocard driving licence or other document specified by Scottish Ministers or something that looked like one of those documents and would have convinced a reasonable person that it was genuine. This seems to me to be the proof-of-age system that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was looking for in Amendment 3. Why can this system not be modified or added to so that UK sellers can not only age verify as far as possible at the point of sale but, if they are delivering the substance, age verify at the point of hand-over? If there is age verification at hand-over, as set out in Clause 4, why does there need to be a total ban on the delivery of corrosive substances to residential addresses, assuming that that ban is designed to prevent under-18s getting their hands on corrosive substances?

[The Earl of Erroll]

I apologise for my earlier intervention that should have come under this clause. I can see that it is dealt with in Clause 3(6) about farmhouses, and so my earlier intervention was irrelevant. However, the noble Lord has a very good point about why we are banning delivery to residential premises if there is someone there who can prove that they are over 18. The ban is actually not about whether the substance goes to residential premises. There are many reasons why you might want something delivered. For instance, if you are cooking and things like that—I know that is a later section. There are cleaning products and stuff like that. I cannot see the purpose of the ban if the delivery is being accepted by someone who is over 18. As I said in my earlier intervention, it is easy to do now with modern technology; we can now age-verify people extremely accurately.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as we have discussed, Clause 3 makes it an offence, where a sale is carried out remotely, for a seller to deliver, or arrange for the delivery of, a corrosive product to residential premises or to a locker. Given the concerns over the use of corrosive substances in violent attacks and other criminal acts, to restrict access effectively we believe that it is necessary to stop delivery to private residential addresses. This does not mean that corrosive products cannot be purchased online in the future, merely that individuals will be expected to collect the product from a collection point where their age can be verified before the product is handed over to them. This provision is important as it will ensure that checks are made and that the purchaser will need to prove that they are 18 or over in order to be able to purchase and collect a corrosive product. If the purchaser cannot collect the corrosive product in person, they would have to be able to send a representative who is also over the age of 18.

We have also included an exemption within the provision to ensure that deliveries to businesses that are run from home—such as a farm—would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to a residential address, for example, where corrosive products are ordered by small family-run businesses, such as metal working, soap making or even farms, in the case of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. We have also provided defences that are available in cases where the individual has taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned why both Clause 3 and Clause 4 are needed. Clause 3 relates to the dispatch of corrosive products bought online in the UK to a residential premises or locker in the UK. We cannot apply the same restrictions on sellers who are based overseas without taking extraterritorial jurisdiction for this offence. Such a step would be inappropriate for a sales offence such as this and, in any event, there would be practical difficulties mounting a prosecution given that an overseas seller would not be within the jurisdiction of the UK courts. Clause 3 is therefore supported by Clause 4, which makes it a criminal offence for a delivery company in the UK to deliver a corrosive product to a person under the age of 18 where that corrosive product has been bought from a seller overseas and where the delivery company knows what it is delivering. The purpose of Clause 4 is to try to stop overseas sellers selling corrosives to under-18s in the UK and having them delivered to a person under the age of 18. There is no overlap between Clauses 3 and 4; we think that both are needed. Clause 3 deals with UK online sales and Clause 4 deals with online sales from overseas sellers.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, again brought up the use of home as a business, which he has mentioned to me before. It will be a matter for the seller under Clause 3 to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is being used for a purpose other than residential purposes. If they cannot satisfy themselves, they should not deliver to that address. Again, it is something that we can deal with in the planned guidance. He also mentioned to me previously his concerns about Amazon’s terms of trade in relation to the sale of alcohol. We are clear from evidence of test purchases of knives that we cannot rely on such terms of business to ensure that the law on age-related restrictions is properly adhered to in the case of online sales.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I have to confess to being even more confused than I was before. Is the Minister saying that you can purchase corrosive substances from a seller overseas and have them delivered to your residential premises, but you cannot get corrosive substances delivered to your residential address if you order them from a UK seller? That appears to be the effect of Clauses 3 and 4.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Yes, I am.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

I will put in an order now.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I think the point still stands. If you order online from an overseas supplier, you can have your corrosive substance delivered to your residential address and the courier, under Clause 4, is obliged to check the age of the person who it is handed over to, to ensure it is not delivered to somebody under the age of 18. Why on earth—

[Lord Lucas]

How can the courier know that there is a corrosive substance in the package? It will just say Amazon on the outside.

[Lord Paddick]

It says so in the clause, to be fair.

[Lord Lucas]

But this is an overseas seller. It is not subject to this law. It just sends a plain package.

[Lord Paddick]

Clause 4 says that if the courier knows it is a corrosive substance, they have to take these precautions. That is what Clause 4 says. It makes no sense to me at all. If age verification at the point of handover is effective in preventing under-18 year-olds getting hold of substances in the case of overseas sellers, why cannot age verification at the point of handover be effective in preventing them getting hold of corrosive substances delivered to residential premises from a UK supplier? It seems to make absolutely no sense whatever.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of that but I am even more confused. She seems to be saying that, in the case of a UK online sale, somebody can pick up the substance from a pick-up point, where their age will be verified. What is the difference between that and a person at the front door of a residential premises having to prove to the courier that they are over the age of 18? I do not understand how picking up the substance at a collection point or picking it up at your front door makes a difference to the ability of the person handing it over to ensure that the person is over the age of 18.

[The Earl of Erroll]

I can see that this will also get more complicated because you can order a product from a supermarket located just across the channel and have it delivered to your residential premises, which presumably means that it is an international transaction. A particular supermarket was mentioned earlier. I do not think that any supermarkets want to lose their trade to people located just across the channel, but a ban is suddenly going to be put on a lot of local supermarket deliveries.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

24: After Clause 5, in the title, leave out “under section 1”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment to insert reference to section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in subsection (1) of this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 24 and 25 in this group. These amendments are designed to have the effect of extending the scope of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, to cover the sale of knives as well as sale of corrosive substances—or, should I say, to prevent the sale of these items to those under 18.

We had an Oral Question last week on this issue, and I suggested that shop workers were acting as law enforcers in the circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, suggested that shopkeepers were simply obeying the law in not selling age-restricted items and that we all have a duty to obey the law. I disagree. The circumstances in which this offence would take place are those where someone underage tries to buy an age-restricted item and is prevented from doing so by a shop worker, who in these circumstances is enforcing the law. They are compelling observance of or compliance with the law, which is the definition of “enforce”. As such, they deserve the protection of the law in carrying out this duty. I support Amendment 23.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judge]

We are devising a system which will impose considerable burdens on sellers. The arguments in favour of this amendment are absolutely obvious. May I make a completely separate point, though? The amendment is brilliant legislation too, unlike the rest of the Bill. Here we have a clear statement of what act you have committed—obstructing the seller—and simultaneously the state of mind you are in: you are acting intentionally. Intention to obstruct is a perfectly clear, simple piece of legislation that anybody could understand. There is an argument that there are various ways those who work in shops can be protected, against violence and so on, but this is very limited in what it is seeking to address: obstructing somebody. In these circumstances, when the burden is so heavy on the seller, they ought to be protected.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lord, if I may have a second go, until very recently I did not support particular protections for shop workers. Being from a policing background, I know we have taken the steps in the law to protect law enforcers, and recently there has been a Bill to protect all emergency workers in this way. But here we are talking about people who are intent on violence; they are looking to get their hands on knives or corrosive substances to commit violence. That is the sort of person that these shop workers are likely to confront, and that is why I am now convinced that this is the right thing to do.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said I would say that there is no problem. I am not going to say that, but I am very grateful to him for explaining his amendment. He attaches particular importance to affording greater protection for retail staff, and his noble kinsman, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, raised this question last week. It was a very good opportunity to discuss the issue, which is of great concern. I understand the concerns of retailers and their staff about being threatened or attacked in the course of their duties, including as part of verifying a person’s age when selling a corrosive product. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, it may be those very people who want to buy these things who will be those who mete out the abuse on retail workers. Nobody should have to experience this sort of behaviour at their place of work, especially when providing a service to members of the public.

As I said at Second Reading, the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability held a roundtable on 11 December with David Hanson MP, Richard Graham MP and representatives from the retail sector, including USDAW and the British Retail Consortium, to discuss what more we can do ensure greater protection for shop workers. Last week, I met USDAW to see what more we can do to ensure these greater protections. Following the discussion at the roundtable I am very happy to update the Committee. We will be taking forward the following actions: first, the call for evidence, which I spoke about last week and is intended to help us ensure that we fully understand this issue and look at all the options for addressing it; secondly, that we provide funding to the sector to run targeted communications activity to raise awareness of the existing legislation that is in place to protect shop workers; and thirdly, we are refreshing the work of the National Retail Crime Steering Group, co-chaired by the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability and the British Retail Consortium. An extraordinary meeting of the group, focused exclusively on violence and abuse towards shop workers, will take place on 7 February. That discussion will help to shape the call for evidence.

In addition, the Sentencing Council is reviewing its guidelines on assault. A consultation on a revised guideline is anticipated to commence this summer. These measures are intended to complement existing work under way to tackle this issue. For example, the Home Office is providing funding of £1 million for the National Business Crime Centre over three years between 2016 and 2019. The centre was launched by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in October 2017 to improve communication between police forces on business crime, promote training and advice, and help to identify national and local trends.

In addition, through the national retail crime steering group, which includes representatives from across the retail sector, the police and others, we are taking forward a range of work to strengthen the collective response to these crimes, including: the creation of a “crib sheet” for retailers to use when reporting violent incidents to the police so that they get the information they need to support a timely and appropriate response; exploring options for improving consistency in the recording of business crime by the police, which will include a short pilot analysis of forces applying business crime flags; and the development of guidance on impact statements for businesses to increase their use. These statements give businesses the opportunity to set out the impact a crime has had and are taken into account by courts when determining sentences.

I know that there are concerns about the adequacy of the existing legislation for protecting those selling age-restricted products. The call for evidence is intended to help us understand better how the existing law is being applied and whether there is a case for reform, including in the context of the sale of age-restricted products. However, I want to provide some reassurance about the legislation we have in place, without dismissing noble Lords’ points. A wide range of offences may be used to address unacceptable behaviour towards shop staff—including those who sell age-restricted items—covering the full spectrum of unacceptable behaviour, from using abusive language to the most serious and violent crimes.

Some of the existing offences available include behaviour that causes another to fear the immediate infliction of unlawful violence, which is already an offence of common assault under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Where shop workers are threatened or experience abusive language, this may be captured by the offences under the Public Order Act 1986. There is also the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which means that assaults against shop workers could be considered as assault occasioning actual bodily harm under Section 47 of that Act. In addition, courts have a statutory duty to follow sentencing guidelines when considering any penalty to be imposed further to criminal conviction, unless it is not in the interests of justice to do so. In all cases, the fact that an offence has been committed against a person serving the public may be considered an aggravating factor for the purpose of passing sentence.

In answer to my noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the specific offence in Amendment 3 could be counterproductive and encourage prosecutions for the new obstruction offence with a maximum penalty of a fine—I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made that point as well—rather than a more serious offence, such as assault, which carries a higher penalty. That said, and going through the list of offences that this may capture, we understand retailers’ concerns about the risk of their staff being threatened or attacked—particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, for smaller retailers, such as corner shops. The call for evidence is intended to improve our understanding of the issue and identify potential solutions. We will seek to issue the call for evidence as soon as is practically possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether shop workers were law enforcers. It is a moot point on which I think we will agree to differ. I was trying to make the point that they are not policemen but they have to uphold the law. With that, I hope that I have given the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, enough to help him to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

25: After Clause 5, in subsection (1), at end insert “and under section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (sale of bladed articles to persons under 18).”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would extend Lord Kennedy of Southwark's amendment so it would also be an offence to obstruct retail staff in their responsibilities in preventing the sale of knives to persons under 18.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

27: Clause 6, page 7, line 4, at end insert “with intent to cause injury”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make it an offence to have a corrosive substance in a public place only with the intent to cause injury to someone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, the amendment is in my name and in those of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. We are back to group 1 and the issue of completely innocent people having to prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt.

We discussed this at considerable length on group 1 and I do not intend to rehearse those arguments again, save to say that people acting completely innocently commit an offence as the legislation is drafted, hence the need for the amendment. That having been said, if someone has a corrosive substance with them in a public place with the intention of causing injury to someone, they commit an offence under Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which defines an offensive weapon as:

“any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him”.

If they have a corrosive substance in a water pistol or a washing-up liquid bottle capable of squirting the corrosive liquid at someone, it is an article adapted for causing injury. If they have a corrosive liquid in the bottle it was sold in, intending to pour it over someone, it is intended by the person to cause injury, and an offence under the Prevention of Crime Act.

To quote from the briefing on the Bill from the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust, the clause,

“creates a very loose and ill-defined offence, that fails to satisfy the requirements of legal clarity and will lead to unjust prosecutions and custodial sentences”.

It continues:

“New legislation is unnecessary. Currently, someone found in possession of corrosive substances, where there is intent to cause injury, could clearly be prosecuted under existing offensive weapons legislation … Prosecutors should be required to prove intent to cause harm …The new offence puts the onus on the child”—


or adult—

“to show they have good reason for carrying the corrosive substance … Proving such a defence may be difficult”.

I beg to move.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I put my name to this amendment purely to be consistent with what I said at Second Reading. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has pointed out, it could be that children are sent to collect corrosive substances from shops. They do not know that the substance is corrosive, as defined by the Act, and could be caught in possession by stop and search techniques, resulting in thoroughly unfortunate imprisonment.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the rationale behind this amendment which would, as he has acknowledged, fundamentally change the nature of the offence provided for in Clause 6. As the noble Lord pointed out, we return in part to the arguments that he put forward in the first group of amendments. I appreciate the noble Lord’s concerns, but I will set out the reasons why we are seeking to introduce this new possession offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made reference at Second Reading to the existing legislation in this area, and I will explain why it is not sufficient to tackle the problem of individuals carrying corrosive substances in public. Under Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it is already the case that anyone who is in possession of a corrosive substance can be prosecuted for the offence of possession of an offensive weapon. However, for the accused to be guilty of the Section 1 offence, it is necessary to prove that they are carrying the corrosive substance with the intention of causing injury. Such intent can be proved, for example, in cases where an individual has decanted the corrosive substance into a different container for the purposes of making it easier to squirt or throw at another person and also to conceal it from the police. However, the intention of Clause 6 is to strengthen the powers available to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. We want to remove the burden on the police and the prosecution to prove that the person was carrying the corrosive substance with the intention to cause injury.

This approach is not novel; it is consistent with the possession offence for knives and bladed articles. We have modelled the new offence on existing legislation in place for the possession of knives under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. There is also a similar offence in place in Scotland. We have put in place suitable defences for members of the public to prove that they had good reason or lawful authority to be carrying the corrosive substance in a public place. These defences are also modelled on existing legislation for the possession of knives.

I know that noble Lords may be concerned about law-abiding members of the public being stopped by the police as they leave their local supermarket or tradespeople being stopped. However, I reiterate the points that my noble friend made at Second Reading about how we envisage the new offence being used by the police. This is not about the police criminalising tradespeople, children sent on an errand or law-abiding members of the public. We would fully expect the police to use this new offence in response to information or intelligence from the local community that someone was carrying a corrosive substance in public.

Furthermore, as my noble friend also indicated at Second Reading, with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, we have jointly commissioned the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory to develop a testing kit for the police to use to be able to identify corrosive substances in suspect containers. This work is well under way, and we want to have a testing kit in place before commencing the new possession offence.

We need to strengthen the law to tackle the abhorrent use of corrosive substances as weapons. This amendment would effectively leave the criminal law as it currently is. I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord is persuaded of the case for the new offence as currently formulated and would be content on reflection to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I seek clarification, however, on Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, about which the noble Earl said that in order for somebody to be guilty of an offence under that Act, intent had to be proved. However, if the person is in possession of a made offensive weapon—an offensive weapon that has no other purpose than to cause injury: a dagger, for example—then my understanding is that no intent is required. Indeed, if the article that the person has with them is adapted to cause injury—for example, a water pistol filled with a corrosive liquid—again, there is no need to prove intent. That would make the existing offence even stronger than this offence as amended by this amendment.

The noble Earl talks about consistency with Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 regarding bladed and pointed instruments. I accept that the offence as drafted is consistent with that Act, but, in my view, two wrongs do not make a right. The noble Earl and the noble Baroness earlier talked about how the Government envisage that the police will use this legislation. They fully expect the police to use it in response to intelligence. I go back to what I said on the first group: having been an operational police officer for more than 30 years, I do not share the confidence that the Government have about how, in every case, the police are going to use this legislation. This is the source not only of my concern but, as I have said, of the concern of the organisations I mentioned in proposing the amendment.

As far as the testing kit is concerned, that is something that we will return to in a successive group later on. However, having made those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.