Lord Mandelson Humble Address: Government Response Update

Debate between Lord Pack and Baroness Finn

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for agreeing to take questions on yesterday’s Statement.

The Falklands War was won in less than 12 weeks. This Government, however, cannot piece together a paper audit in that time. We have today simply been given a holding statement that more documents will be forthcoming. We remain no more enlightened than we were a month ago. No information has been forthcoming on the quantity of documents within scope of the humble Address passed in the other place, how many documents have been reviewed and by whom, whether the Cabinet Office has sought redactions and whether the Intelligence and Security Committee has agreed to those redactions. Can the Minister give the House a hard deadline by which the second tranche of documents will be published?

In light of press coverage in the Guardian suggesting that the Cabinet Office considered withholding certain documents from the Intelligence and Security Committee, can the Minister give us a categorical assurance that no documents within scope of the humble Address will be withheld from that committee?

In the other place, my honourable friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar asked the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister a number of specific questions that went unanswered. The Chief Secretary’s silence on questions relating to Peter Mandelson’s declaration of interests form was deafening. Can the Minister confirm that that document exists and that it will not be withheld or redacted without the consent of the Intelligence and Security Committee? Serious questions are being asked about Peter Mandelson’s links through business interests, and how his activities as ambassador may have been linked to those interests.

We are also told that the security mitigations that were put in place for Peter Mandelson were not in response to his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. Can the Minister give the House more clarity on that? Can she say whether the detail of those concerns will be made public if the ISC judges that they may be published? On a day when the Labour Party is whipping its MPs to prevent the Privileges Committee making an independent assessment of the Prime Minister’s conduct, can we be reassured that His Majesty’s Government will not stand in the way of other committees doing their work?

The Government’s excuses for delay are wearing a little thin. We have heard all about the urgency that the Government are bringing to the matter: I hesitate to use the famous words “working at pace”. Yesterday, we heard from the Minister in the other place that documents should be published “in a chronological order”. He went on to say:

“Otherwise, I suspect there would be questions about what documents were missing, subject to the conclusion of the Committee’s work”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/4/26; col. 589.]


If it is the Government’s intention to avoid questions about what documents are missing, why are they still refusing to publish a list or overview of all the documents and whether they have been published? That overall document would help us greatly, and surely the titles or descriptions of the documents cannot be seen to prejudice any matter that is currently sub judice. Can the Minister say what progress is being made towards the publication of such a document? We have asked about this many times before and we still await a clear response.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

My Lords, at the heart of this issue is the bravery of the women and girls who spoke up to reveal the truth about Jeffrey Epstein. Following his evil and criminal behaviour, there have been multiple failures of our political systems—failures that are now rightly seeing the end of various political careers. The events also raise questions about how we fix our broken systems so that we can deal much better with whatever future crises or scandals occur.

So I very much welcome the positive noises now being made about new legislation—for example, to allow peerages to be revoked in the case of scandal. However, it is fair to say that the track record of reform in this place is somewhat slow, so I hope that the Minister can confirm both that such legislation is imminent and that it will be given priority in the legislative queue, so that there is an opportunity for Parliament to debate and, if it so decides, pass such legislation promptly in the new Session.

It is also very welcome to have heard of the plans for the review into the vetting processes by Adrian Fulford, particularly because the more we hear details of what happened with the vetting, the more questions are thrown up. I will give just two examples. One is the sequence: make an appointment, announce the appointment, then carry out vetting after the announcement. Leaving aside questions of how well established that process and sequencing is and who knew about it, it is clearly a sequence of events that invites disaster. Vetting should surely come before an announcement, not after, because that is the way to minimise any pressure to come up with a politically convenient answer and to be fair to everyone involved, including somebody who fails the vetting process.

Also inviting disaster is the daisy chain of oral briefings that we now know took place without key decision-makers seeing the relevant summary of the vetting verdict paperwork. As we now know, the official who saw the paperwork orally briefed the FCDO official, Ian Collard, who did not see the paperwork himself. He, in turn, orally briefed Olly Robbins, who also did not see the paperwork. He, in turn, had oral discussions with the Prime Minister, who again did not see the paperwork so was, in fact, having matters described to him third hand. In other words, the more senior the person and the more crucial their personal decision-making in the process, the more removed they were from seeing the core paperwork involved.

There is obviously a political question in this about why the Prime Minister proceeded with such a process, but there is also a crucial issue for the future. Such a daisy chain of decision-making—with one person speaking to another person, who then speaks to another person, who then speaks to another person, without the authoritative written verdict of the vetting system being in front of everyone—is a process that invites disaster.

I hope the Minister can, as well as addressing my question about legislation to remove peerages, also confirm that these issues relating to vetting processes are within the scope of the Fulford review, that the review will be published soon—maybe even at pace—and that this House will have an opportunity to discuss that review promptly.

Pension Schemes

Debate between Lord Pack and Baroness Finn

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a former special adviser and future recipient— I hope in the long-distant future—of a civil service pension. At the heart of this issue are former public servants who are entitled to expect that the Civil Service Pension Scheme would be administered with competence, care and basic humanity. Instead, many have faced delay, uncertainty and financial anxiety. The Government have acknowledged that Capita’s performance was unacceptable, and we acknowledge that this contract was awarded under the previous Government. However, the appalling performance has been sustained under this Government. Warning signs were not acted on sooner and contingency arrangements were not in place before the handover on 1 December.

Last month, officials from the Minister’s department confirmed that the Cabinet Office had access to data showing that the backlog of CSPS cases was increasing exponentially during the final months of MyCSP’s tenure. This was known before the transfer, yet Ministers failed to put in place robust contingency plans. They did not require additional resources from Capita ahead of the handover and proceeded regardless, despite being aware that the incoming provider faced a far greater operational challenge than originally anticipated.

The National Audit Office had already found that Capita had failed to meet key transition milestones. The Public Accounts Committee had warned of a clear risk that Capita would not be ready to take over the administration of the scheme and specifically called on the Cabinet Office to fully develop contingency plans before making a final decision. Why, then, did the Government not anticipate this situation as they should have done?

The NAO report highlights a serious issue with the handling of TUPE, the process by which staff transfer to the new contractor. This is meant to ensure continuity by moving experienced staff across with the work, but the NAO notes that the formal TUPE process began only in May 2025, very late in the transition. The consequence is obvious: staff faced prolonged uncertainty about their future, increasing the risk that they would leave before the handover. In a service that depends heavily on experienced personnel, that loss of expertise directly undermines performance. Why was this process started so late and what assessment was made of the risk this posed to service delivery?

The NAO also found that financial penalties were rarely applied under the previous contract and could be waived on the basis of so-called extenuating circumstances. The new contract is supposed to strengthen those provisions, so can the Minister tell the House how many penalties have actually been applied to Capita since go-live, whether any penalties have been waived, on what grounds they were waived and who authorised the decisions?

The Minister in the other place was also asked about standardised mitigation letters for lenders. Members affected by pension delays need clear documentation that they can provide to banks, mortgage providers, landlords and creditors, explaining that their financial difficulty has been caused by administrative failure in the Civil Service Pension Scheme. Can the Minister now confirm whether those standardised letters have been issued? If they have not been, why not? When exactly will affected members receive them?

I ask the Minister about contingency planning. The Statement refers to commercial levers, withheld milestone payments and possible legal remedies. It also refers to explicit personal assurances from Capita’s chief executive, but those assurances were plainly not met. To whom were those assurances made and on what date? What due diligence underpinned them? Who accepted them? Were they set out in writing?

Finally, I am concerned that the department apparently plans to begin a review only in late summer. Why is that timetable considered acceptable? The failures are happening now. There needs to be a credible contingency plan and realistic consideration of future options.

Capita’s failings are unacceptable, but ministerial accountability does not end with condemning the contractor. The contracting authority needs to be relentlessly on the case. This is an issue that I have raised many times previously. Can the Minister tell the House what concrete steps the Civil Service has taken to improve the quality of its contract management? No well-run business would tolerate a contractor performing in such a way, so why should the Government tolerate it?

I appreciate that I have asked a number of detailed questions and that the Minister might want to reply in writing to some of them, but I hope she can shed some light on the concerns raised.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

The Minister may be glad to know that I have a slightly smaller number of questions to ask. Running basic services reliably is at the heart of the Government’s responsibility to us all. Grand promises, fancy manifestos, clever policies or visionary plans about AI mean very little if the basic plumbing of the state is falling apart all around us. Here we have, unfortunately, another failure of that basic plumbing, one with very serious direct consequences for people’s well-being. It is certainly welcome that, faced with another pension scheme going horribly wrong at the hands of Capita, the Government have bitten the bullet and terminated its contract, but that coming after the Civil Service pension contract problems raises two key questions about the Government’s decision-making.

There is certainly a lot of blame to allocate to Capita and MyCSP, but there are also two questions that are fully within the Government’s area of responsibility. One, as I pointed out when we discussed this issue in Questions on 5 February, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, has just touched on, is that the Cabinet Office told the Public Accounts Committee that it was aware of very significant problems with Capita’s preparations to take over the contract on 1 December and that it had a contingency plan ready to use if necessary. Why, therefore, did the Cabinet Office decide to go ahead with the 1 December transfer to Capita rather than invoke its contingency plan? I think it is fair to say that the fact that another Capita pension scheme, the Royal Mail one, has now gone so badly wrong as well redoubles the doubts about why that 1 December transfer was greenlit by the Government.

In addition, in the light of Capita’s failing on these two pension contracts, there is also the problem that the Government have just signed another contract with Capita—a £370 million contract that involves, to quote Capita’s press release from just a few weeks ago,

“tech-enabled back-office services for public servants across four major UK government departments: the Department for Work and Pensions, Ministry of Justice, Home Office, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Capita will deliver a suite of services including HR, payroll, recruitment, finance, procurement, and service desk support”.

That sounds remarkably similar to the very things that Capita has just got so badly wrong twice.

Warned last year that Capita was getting it wrong, the Cabinet Office pressed ahead with Capita on that 1 December deadline. With Royal Mail, Capita has been getting exactly the same sort of work badly wrong. I hope the Minister will explain why those two failures were not enough for the Government to say for this new contract, “Hang on. We’ve seen your track record, we’ve learned from our mistakes, and no, we’re not going to hand over more money and give you more responsibility for financial IT systems”. Will the Minister tell us what consideration was given to those two other failures by Capita when deciding to award it this new contract? Why were those two failures not considered serious enough for the Government to spend their £370 million—or, I should, say the public’s £370 million—elsewhere?