Ukraine

Lord Owen Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has made a very eloquent speech about the tragedies and the obscene abuses of the laws of war, such that we have not seen for decades. It was impressive that that was supported so strongly by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. For a military leader to spend as much time as he did on that grotesque situation and the necessity to do something about it was very important.

However, we must not be complacent about the mechanisms in front of us. It is easy to look back on the former Yugoslavia and see the number of people serving in prison—some criminals are in British prisons at this moment—but we had a specific international criminal court to deal with crimes in Yugoslavia, set up by agreement of the Security Council. We have no chance whatever of getting a similar legal structure to deal with the crimes of this war. We should be realistic about that, but we should try our hardest to establish some new mechanism.

We should never forget that we are talking about the second invasion of Ukraine. There was a first invasion, in relation to which we performed lamentably. Once again, we must recognise that appeasement never works. Now that we face this situation, we in Europe must not equivocate about it—and I am proud of how the British Government have responded. However, the facts are that, without President Biden’s leadership and the massive contribution that has been made, NATO would not have been able to do what it has done. The Secretary-General of NATO, Stoltenberg, has done a sterling job, as have many others. We have, quite rightly, transformed a defensive alliance, saying that, when a friendly country—not a member of NATO—is attacked, we have the right to supply it with arms to defend itself. I think I am right in saying that we have never done that before in NATO. This is an important new power that we have taken, and it is wholly legitimate.

How have we done in terms of the rest of the world? The best definition of what we must achieve was provided in July by the G7 leaders of Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. In their strong statement, they affirmed their

“unwavering commitment to the strategic objective of a free, independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine … capable of defending itself and deterring future aggression”.

I stress those last words. That is the task in front of us.

The Russian military is now rallying, as it so often does and as it did in the Second World War, as we all remember. It is rallying with the support of China and, most recently, of North Korea, and it also has Iran. That is a formidable combination; do not let any of us underestimate how it can be, and is being, mobilised.

One thing needs to be said about China. It is pretty clear that it has made President Putin recognise that he will not be able to resort to tactical nuclear weapons in this war. I profoundly hope that this decision is not changed in any way by China and that it stems from a profound belief that there can be no nuclear war. In favour of that being the right interpretation of China, at least it can be said that it is spending substantial sums of money on its own conventional forces. Of course, it has the capacity to use nuclear weapons too. Let us hope that China, this new power—it is a new power, and it is almost right to call it a superpower—will use its power in an intelligent way. When we debate China on many other aspects of this, we should show a little bit more realism about what China is and what it could become.

With elections coming in the United States, I believe that it is of paramount importance that the average American voter believes that Europe has responded fully and totally and made a commitment through NATO that is almost as much as we possibly can. I do not think that we are there yet, but I attach great importance to it. The American military has always been understanding about Europe’s contribution. It wanted more from Europe and it wanted more money, but it believes that we, and some of the key countries, such as France and others, have been ready. Germany has never responded sufficiently in the eyes of an American looking at its contribution. I pay tribute to Chancellor Scholz, in very difficult circumstances, because that has changed remarkably. It is vital that that change continues and is backed by real financial resources and real weapons, commitment and numbers of German military ready to fight.

One other thing that is most important when we look at China is that it understands that this country was deeply affronted when President Xi tore up the treaty over Hong Kong signed by Deng Xiaoping and Margaret Thatcher. It was a massive blow to international authority and devastating that a country emerging as a great country and a great superpower should have acted in that way.

What else can be done in the short term? Britain must step up its own commitment. A lot of it will come not so much in money, though it will eventually have to be paid for, but in taking very valuable weaponry—first, in the first few weeks, in dealing with tanks, and now more recently with the readiness to supply the long-range Storm Shadow missiles, which have been very effective. Each and every member of NATO, particularly the European members, will be watched very carefully, because the debate inside the United States is where this issue is going to be resolved. It is no good trying to escape it. We have to make sure that opinion is shifted in favour of what is happening in the response to Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.

This is a huge commitment, which cannot be undertaken by the United States, even with all its power, on its own. It is a fact that a substantial number of American people do not yet understand the challenge and the threat. It is not getting through to decent, average United States people that there will have to be a major response. The American military must go out and campaign that Europe is responding. There are too many people in America who believe that we have not paid our fair whack for defence in NATO, and they are right. It is important that that understanding is changed; if it is not changed, we run a serious risk of a response from the United States that will not be sufficient to deal with the global challenges that it faces.

I will say this: I am very pleased that this country has understood that one way of explaining to the American people that we are paying our full whack and responding is through our having made an adjustment —not a major one, but a small contribution. We have, in effect, gone back east of Suez and accepted that there is a threat and a challenge in the Pacific. The United States should not be facing that purely and simply by itself. It will not be a very large commitment, but the impact of seeing a British aircraft carrier in Pacific waters, supported by escort vessels from the United States, Australia and New Zealand, matters to American public opinion. They then feel that we understand their security concerns. Many of them are more concerned about China than about what is happening in Ukraine. That is the reality—look at the opinion polls in the United States. We are still important movers of opinion.

I must declare an interest in that I am married to an American, but it has given me an understanding over many years of my life that America can do the right thing. There is inherently in the American people a capacity to do the right thing; they have done it in two world wars—though both times a little too late. This will predominantly be their war. We are helping them, and will help them right across the globe, where the horrors of the actions that we have seen in Ukraine will undoubtedly be reproduced. It is in that sense that we in this House see, as someone has already mentioned, that the cross-party nature of the contribution is very real.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Harrington, spoke about what has been done for refugees and the refugee movement. I have seen in Wiltshire—around our house and among our friends, and among anybody who has ever helped the refugees, right across the classes, trades and skills—an amazing response to try to help Ukrainian refugees. The spirit is there in this country, the spirit is growing in Europe, and the spirit will come in the United States. Until it does, we face formidable adversaries, and we should not for any moment underestimate them.

Ukraine

Lord Owen Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, as we debate, people are laying down their lives for the freedom of their country. I know we all respect that very greatly. We are helped in doing so by the serious tone of this debate, particularly the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, who is very welcome.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, who knows the President of Russia very well and has met him, pointed to what he believes is a change, and to what has changed him. Quite apart from power, which tends to change people, there is a contempt and hubristic mendacity about him which is alarming and needs serious study.

There is also a possibility that he has made a grave mistake. It is very noticeable how little time he has spent trying to convince his own people about this invasion, unlike the tragedy of eight years ago. We signed a guarantee of the territorial boundaries of this country. Our response to that attack on another country was disgraceful, negligible and lamentable. It shook me so much that I gave up doing business in Russia. It was very clear that, from that moment on, we were dealing with a different Russia.

However, I strongly support the many noble Lords in this Chamber who have fulfilled a Churchillian attitude to Russia—engaging with it at all times and respecting its people. We must not turn our anger at what is being done by the present President against the people of Russia.

What is there new to say? The one point I want to leave the House with is this: do not believe that this is the end of the story. In 1977, after a six-year lapse of any contact, I spent time in Moscow negotiating and talking with President Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. At times, particularly on a social occasion with Gromyko, the atmosphere turned very nasty when they argued that our signature on the Helsinki Final Act meant that we had accepted that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be incorporated into the then Soviet Union. I argued back very toughly, but I was left with a deep-seated impression that this view would still be held by a lot of people in Russia—and it is certainly held, in my view, by the present President. We ought to look at this very seriously.

He has already placed nuclear weapons in the enclave of Kaliningrad. There was an ominous tone to his speech—he clearly did not mention nuclear weapons but everybody knew exactly what he meant—on what would happen if we changed our position and started to fight, which I think we could not and would be wrong to do. NATO is a defensive organisation; it cannot embark on this intervention. But if we do not take this warning seriously now, who knows what will happen in future?

I do not think it is of anywhere near the same seriousness to those Russians who want a large empire to try to now take the battle to those three states. I do not think they will do it immediately anyhow. But what are we going to do? I have listened to many debates in this House; I wish it were more powerful. Who is going to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said in a good speech, that there is a financial cost to what has happened in Ukraine? This Government increased defence when they came into office. It was a praiseworthy decision. They did something more: they gave a four-year guarantee to the Ministry of Defence that that was going to be its budget. The Chancellor will no doubt feel he ought to hold that, but no. Two years in, we have to increase defence now and we have to do it with direct evidence of what we have seen. There is now, for the first time, I believe, a leader of Russia who would contemplate using nuclear weapons without any great concern—even Stalin, I do not think, would have lightly embarked on using nuclear weapons. I think this man could do so. We need much more evidence than what we have seen over the last few days.

I wanted to say something else in this Chamber, although my time is up: thank goodness for President Biden and his extremely good Secretary of State. They have bound NATO together in a way that has been missing for many years. I hope we will stop any form of criticism. I never believed a word of any criticism over Afghanistan; we had lost in Afghanistan. Let us think very carefully about our next few steps, but it will demand sacrifices from the people of this country if we are serious, and woe betide us if we are not.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Owen Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, as we talk in this Chamber, the Middle East is once again a powder keg of extreme danger. I share all the apprehensions and fears that were expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, in his very important speech. It is easy to say what to do. The Secretary-General gave a very good, precise order of priorities as soon as this crisis blew up. He said:

“Stop escalation. Exercise maximum restraint. Restart dialogue”


and avoid a new war.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the JCPOA —the organisation that desperately tries to keep open a dialogue with Iran on nuclear weapons, has once again shown remarkable tenacity and determination to try to rescue something in that area, but we should not put too much on this issue. We have to ask ourselves now what mechanisms we have for restarting the dialogue; it has not restarted and shows no real sign of restarting. The UN Security Council will debate this issue.

The UN Secretary-General appointed an individual, a British person, to be his representative over Yemen, and he has done as much as any human being can do. What he lacks is the clout of the big players in the Middle East. Let us face it, those big players are now very clear. From the moment Putin responded to the plea from the President of Syria to rescue Damascus, which I believe was a very important and correct decision to take, Russia has restored its position. It was at one time very powerful in the Middle East, and it is a powerful player now. It is noticeable how frequently President Putin talks not just to Iran and Arab leaders but to Netanyahu; there is a constant dialogue.

The place where there is no dialogue, and I regret it deeply, is between President Trump and President Putin. We all know the reasons why it is difficult for that to happen during this presidency, but it has never been more urgent, and countries with many different positions on relations with Russia and relations with the United States should all try to encourage a dialogue between Putin and Trump—in particular, a dialogue between trusted representatives of the two of them. That is not easy to find, to be blunt, but we have had experience in the past of trying to develop new mechanisms. The contact group in southern Africa in 1978 proved to be remarkably successful over a long period of time on a resolution that was negotiated then. Namibia came to independence 12 years later. The contact group in the Balkans in 1994 also had some success, and it may be time for another contact group.

It is interesting now how China has a real stake in what happens to the tankers coming in and out of the Gulf. As they go through the Strait of Hormuz, more and more of them now turn left, figuratively speaking. The United States does not itself have much interest in oil coming out of the Gulf. The Iranians, the Russians and the Chinese formed a maritime group almost as a demonstration to those of us who also tried to form maritime groups to protect shipping. But I believe that the biggest danger, as was mentioned earlier, is a proxy starting this war. It could happen at any stage. It has become very clear that many Iranian troops go from Iraq into Syria and then into Lebanon. That pathway has been clearly marked for at least three years, and we have done practically nothing about it. We have to focus on that.

I believe that the Secretary-General and the UN Security Council have a very real responsibility, and it may be that the only thing they can do is to use the five permanent members and appoint people with weight and experience to tour around the Middle East and start a dialogue.

National Security Situation

Lord Owen Excerpts

Thursday 19th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting here in London. Post Brexit, it presents an opportunity for this country to deepen further our relationships with the Commonwealth, in trade of course but not just in economic measures—in diplomacy in the UN, particularly through the UN Security Council debates; and in defence, where I see one part of the deployment of our new aircraft carriers being beyond the Suez Canal, as a UN rapid-reaction maritime force where those carriers will need accompanying vessels. Those could easily come—with enthusiasm, I think—from the Australian, New Zealand and, I hope, Indian navies.

There are three dangerous potential military crises on the international agenda: North Korean nuclear weapons; eastern Europe, focused on Ukraine; and the Middle East, focused on Syria. Any or all of these could bubble over into serious military conflict. North Korea is of concern to the UK. This is not some far-distant problem. We contributed militarily to the conflict which started in June 1950 and lost many lives. We now know that it was a proxy war. In Moscow in April 1950, Stalin had given the green light to North Korea to start it, as did Mao in Beijing in May, but for years the Chinese and Russians went through a public ritual of blaming each other for starting the war. Both were surprised by the US intervention over Korea in 1950 and by the support that it had from the UK. The UK decided on early recognition of China in 1950 and it was a carefully thought out position, one of which Clement Attlee was rightly proud.

President Trump on Korea has been far better than many of his predecessors. It was a wise decision to ask President Xi to the US so early in his tenure in April last year, and the men have met many times since and taken the measure of each other. Mike Pompeo’s secret visit is extremely encouraging, especially since he will be the US Secretary of State very soon, I hope. Many people in Europe and the US who make justified criticism of President Trump’s handling of foreign affairs should remember that secrecy is an extremely important part of international diplomacy, as is the clear and concise linkage between the use of force and the importance of negotiation. It is necessary that President Trump and President Putin should meet, as soon as possible, to discuss these two very difficult issues of Syria and Ukraine.

Churchill did not say that jaw, jaw is better than war, war. He said: “Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war”, which is a far more toughly worded explanation of why we must always be open to negotiation while preparing for war. But secrecy and co-ordination with colleagues is vital in any defence strategy, and the Prime Minister was absolutely right to use the prerogative powers on this most recent incident. We should be quite clear about it: prerogative powers for international negotiations are an essential. I wish that some of the diplomats who speak in this House frequently would reflect on that in the appalling problems we are making for the Government in their negotiating of Brexit. Even under the infamous Article 50, there has to be some measure of secrecy, flexibility and give and take in any negotiations.

We need to rapidly rethink our problems with Syria. We have made three interventions over chemical weapons, correctly. First, there was Secretary of State Kerry’s and Foreign Minister Lavrov’s initiative to remove large supplies of sarin gas from Syria in 2013, which was far more effective than any pinprick bombing. Secondly, there was the 2017 intervention by President Trump when sarin gas was used, which demonstrated that Russia had either deliberately or inadvertently accepted some sarin gas remaining in Syria. Thirdly, there was the recent co-ordinated action on the use of gas. Of course, chlorine was not included in the 2017 negotiation. But in Syria, we now have a far more dangerous problem: the proven existence of Iranian military forces with drones in Syria, with the real probability that they are in Lebanon as well. We cannot continue to take the same attitude to Iran until it is persuaded to bring its forces back. Iran is not an aggressive nation, historically, but it is an aggressive act to deploy in Syria—particularly since Iraq now has a Shia Prime Minister and the majority in Iraq form the Government of that country. Iran no longer faces the threat that it did from Saddam Hussein and the Sunni minority that was in control of Iraq for many decades.

To come to Europe and defence, for a post-Brexit Britain the challenge is abundantly clear. It has to make an urgent decision—I am surprised it has not already been made by this Government—to increase our defence spending from 2% to, at the very least, 2.5% and as soon as possible up to 3%. President Macron said a few days ago in the European Parliament, “We share so much”—he meant with America, but he said that it is “rejecting multilateralism”. He said he was convinced that this model is more important than ever but it is “very fragile”. America as a whole is not rejecting multilateralism and I am not convinced Trump is either. It is up to us in Europe to demonstrate to the US that we will match its NATO commitment. On this Britain should take a lead, and urgently. It is important to remember that successive US Presidents have warned us that we must give a commitment to NATO if they are to persuade their people to give such a commitment. The US pays over 70% of NATO’s bills. This is freeloading and it was Obama who first warned us that we were doing that. Trump has reiterated it and they are both correct.

There is only one serious multilateral defence organisation in the world, and that is NATO. Anyone, anywhere who damages that is threatening international peace. This country now faces a serious decision over defence policy post Brexit. There can be no doubt whatever that we will remove ourselves from the External Action Service immediately we leave in April 2019. That External Action Service has not been a great success. Its contribution to the fighting in Ukraine through the EU-Ukraine agreement has already been commented on in Select Committee reports in this House, and I will go no further on that.

What could we do to link NATO well with the foreign policy and overall security policy of the EU when it has 27 members? That is a very serious issue. We should not rush into it; we need to gather our thoughts. An example of what we might consider is talking with our friends in NATO who are not members of the EU: Norway, Iceland and Turkey. There is no more difficult problem than how to keep Turkey in NATO. It was extremely encouraging that President Erdoğan came out in support of the action that the US, UK and France took in Syria. It is not proving easy, and there are difficult relations between the US and Turkey. They are greatly strained at the moment. There is a strong case for considering the establishment of a NATO-EU permanent joint council—a PJC—of NATO non-EU members and NATO EU members. It needs to be small if it is to be effective. A council composed of Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the UK might make very good sense, but it is up to NATO to choose its group and the EU to choose its group. That would be the sort of linkage that we might look to post Brexit. Were that to be established, we would have no case for staying in the EU’s permanent structured co-operation on security and defence—PESCO—or for being involved in the EU’s co-ordinated annual review on defence—CARD—which aims to build up European defence planning, or the European defence fund. That raises difficult problems for us as we want joint procurement bilaterally, on a European basis or with the US. That flexibility has served us well. A lot of our Armed Forces’ sophisticated weaponry is due to industrial production agreements with US manufacturers, and we should not put ourselves in a situation where we believe there is merit in Europe being self-sufficient.

This is a troubled and difficult time. This debate is well timed. There needs to be great thought about how we proceed, but we should not underrate the importance of Putin and Trump meeting very soon. The trade-offs in Syria have to come with benefit to Russia. The trade-offs in Ukraine have to come with benefit to the United States.

UK Defence Forces

Lord Owen Excerpts

Thursday 23rd November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, the issue before us all is that defence expenditure has to be increased. There can be no ifs or buts about that. For the next five years, the National Security Council will have to find an increase from 2% to 2.5% as the bare minimum. That body is looking at cyber, development, defence and foreign policy. It is the right body to give a remit to this new review that it will be funded to this extent. Without that, frankly, it will not be serious.

Europe has been freeloading on the United States, as far as NATO is concerned, for long enough. Britain, coming out of the EU, has to demonstrate to the Americans that we are committed to NATO’s defence. Without that, we will not maintain the support of the American people for their commitment to NATO. Everything that we see indicates that that is vital. Why?

President Putin has admitted that he considered putting Russian nuclear forces on full alert at the time of maximum tension over Crimea, which shows how unwise it is to assume that Russian nuclear strategies are anywhere near the same as ours in NATO. It is also true that President Putin has threatened to base nuclear forces in Crimea and that he has deployed missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave in the Baltic Sea which neighbours Poland and Lithuania. I do not wish to exaggerate—Russian Federation military power is far less than that of the old USSR. The relevant concern we have is the growth in the belief among informed NATO military opinion that Russian conventional forces are now able to punch a hole in NATO’s conventional defences, particularly in the Baltic region. This is the rational case for increased NATO defence spending. Not to allow it is, in my view, to put NATO’s whole deterrent strategy at risk.

It is also vital that in this review we look at the role of the aircraft carrier. Aircraft carriers are huge and hugely expensive, so we have to find a way of making a contribution worldwide through a rapid reaction force committed not only to NATO but, more importantly, to the UN. It should operate worldwide from Oman, and be part of a global British strategy for the next decade that will be beneficial to us in achieving greater prosperity and a global profile. In that context, we must look at the amphibious forces. What is envisaged for the Royal Marines, and for the ships that are necessary, raises very serious questions. How many of us were pleased about the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000? Without that amphibious capability, our capacity to intervene would have been negligible—in fact, the intervention would have been so dangerous that we could not have undertaken it.

There are big tasks ahead. We now have an integrated structure that looks at our overall international policy. If that means we have to take more from the overseas budget, I would, extremely reluctantly, accept it. There are ways of achieving it within the normal rules, provided that they are changed. For instance, the HMS “Ocean” mission to the British Virgin Islands during the emergency was not a defence expenditure and should be met out of the foreign aid budget. It is ridiculous to be told that OECD rules imply that we cannot use our foreign aid budget because this country was previously considered to be a medium-sized economy. A lot of those OECD rules are out of date and if they cannot be changed, we have to change them unilaterally. The foreign aid budget is potentially extremely important, but day after day we hear how it is grotesquely badly used. The British public will not go on accepting that. It may be that the House of Commons does not have the will power to change the present resolution, but we in this House have a responsibility to remind Commons Members of their responsibility to the defence of Europe and not to allow this burden to be borne only by the American people.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Owen Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, I deeply regret my own decision to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003. When I look at Iraq today, the spillover into Syria and the emergence of Daesh, I believe that it is incumbent on us not just to praise the Chilcot report, but to apply the same forensic examination to what we are to do about it that it gave to providing us with the facts.

I say immediately that the decision of the young leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, to oppose the war was an outstanding example of political integrity and courage. The judgment of Robin Cook, when he exercised his right to look at the actual intelligence reports and came out against the war, was also a vindication of his intelligence and his integrity. I would furthermore say that the left and the pacifists, which are essential elements in our political society and have often got wars wrong, got this war correct—and all credit to the present leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, for doing so. I have one measure of pride in all this: that my own daughter and son-in-law marched on the protest.

There is one positive element, which came out from the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones. Having chaired the JIC extremely skilfully and with a deep knowledge for many years, few are better equipped than her to draw attention to what must be done. That is the National Security Council, which has been established and which the Minister spoke about. I hope that he might deal with this question a little in his closing speech: how can we entrench that mechanism whereby Prime Ministers and politicians have to be involved in direct dialogue with senior defence chiefs, and in a disciplined framework with papers presented to the National Security Council in advance, assessed accurately and concrete, detailed and specific notes taken? None of this was done during the Iraq war, which was exceptional. It was done in the first Gulf War and even in the Suez crisis, when the Cabinet was told about collusion even though the House of Commons was lied to. It was a terrible mistake not to have a serious examination in Parliament of what had gone wrong in Suez; let us not make the same mistake again.

In some parts of this debate, it somehow seems that this is all over. Chilcot made very few actual judgments but presided with great skill over the facts. Here I must say something direct to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, whose speech today we listened to with attention, as always. Not only was he the chairman of the first report on intelligence but, on 22 February 2007, he made a very powerful speech in this House. Listening to it at the time, he made me feel that he too had learned some lessons from his own report. He said:

“But here was the rub: neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had the intelligence that proved conclusively that Iraq had those weapons. The Prime Minister was disingenuous about that. The United Kingdom intelligence community told him on 23 August 2002 that, ‘we ... know little about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons work since late 1988’. The Prime Minister did not tell us that. Indeed, he told Parliament only just over a month later that the picture painted by our intelligence services was ‘extensive, detailed and authoritative’. Those words could simply not have been justified by the material that the intelligence community provided to him”.—[Official Report, 22/2/07; col. 1231.]

I agreed with the noble Lord’s statement when he made it in 2007 and it is a pity that it was not reiterated today.

Let us now go to the question of what to do. It would have been much easier if the former Prime Minister had made an open confession that he had made many mistakes. Unfortunately, on the day of the report, having no doubt had access to it for some time, he produced a written statement of defiance. That defiance—the only word to describe it— cannot be left unchallenged. He said:

“If I was back in the same place with the same information, I would take the same decision”.

If that is left to stand unchallenged, Chilcot will have failed. Let us be quite clear: that statement is unacceptable and it is no honest reading of the Chilcot report. Some people say that there should be no scapegoating. No, there should not, but it is the duty of Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons, to examine this report and make judgments.

The Times editorial “Catalogue of Failure” on 7 July charges that we went to war,

“on the basis of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction that remained privy to the prime minister and his closest aides but which he insisted, in private as well as public, was incontrovertible”.

I may say that he did so in private to me, on privy counsellor terms, on 24 July 2002. The editorial goes on to say:

“It was anything but. Still defiant 13 years on, Mr Blair insisted in a written statement that the Chilcot report alleged ‘no falsification or improper use of intelligence’. In fact the report states that the intelligence ‘was not challenged and should have been’. Many will conclude that amounts to improper use”.

I am one who believes that it implies improper use. The question is: what to do?

It is arguable that the statement which the Prime Minister made on 28 July 2002 that he would support President Bush “whatever” is almost an impeachable offence. Certainly, Lord Sanderson made it perfectly clear, in describing what impeachment meant in February 1906—when he was dealing with the question of the military conversations in that year in which the French and British staff forces got together to plan a British expeditionary force, but did not tell the Cabinet for five years—that the terms of an impeachable offence would be,

“to go to war in certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case would be one which would justify impeachment”.

I do not believe that impeachment is the right solution to our present problems. I make it quite clear that I do not think you can do that in the 21st century.

We now have a body of civil law to represent a civil society. It is for the courts to decide on that for the families of the soldiers who tragically lost their lives, or those suffering appalling injuries, much of which we still do not really know about. There is the question of bringing Parliament into disrepute. That is why in another place they are perfectly right and proper to examine whether this represents contempt of Parliament; otherwise, what do we do? Do we just leave it? How many people ever knew, years on from the Suez crisis, that we had colluded with the Israelis and the French to occupy the Suez Canal? It is absolutely essential that this much is learned, because I am one who believes that we may have to intervene in the future. I do not want what happened in the aftermath of this war to condemn all military interventions in the future. Let us be courageous enough to face the need to examine this issue in Parliament, in another place if not in this place.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Owen Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Owen]

At the end of the Address to insert, “but regret that the Gracious Speech did not include a bill to protect the National Health Service from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”.

[Lord Owen (Ind SD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jowell, on an extremely moving maiden speech. I shall listen to her future contributions with great respect.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Bill—TTIP, as it is commonly called—is vital for this country as the Government have only to sign this treaty and we lose all chance of amendment. The problem with the treaty is not that it is a trade treaty—I have supported every trade treaty in my political life—but it binds into a trade agreement a regulatory activity which could have very profound implications for many of us. It is this aspect to which I particularly wish to draw attention.

First, I pay tribute to the UNITE union, which put the money forward to ask Michael Bowsher QC to make a fully detailed analysis of the treaty. Without this, we would still not have the clarity that is needed. I will quote from what he has said. He is the ex-chairman of the EU Law Committee of the Bar Council and I am told—I do not know whether it is true—that he wishes to remain. So, this is not an issue between remainers and leavers, it is a pretty important issue about how we use treaties to avoid parliamentary scrutiny in both Houses. It does not, therefore, surprise me that a similar Motion is being moved in the other place.

The conclusions of the Bowsher report are as follows:

“For the reasons set out in this advice, our conclusion is that TTIP poses a real and serious risk to future UKG decision-making in respect of the NHS”,

in England. We must remember that it is rather different these days in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. He has seen the most recent statements of Commissioner Malmström and remains of the opinion that:

“The content of the draft texts are such that they do not provide a bar to suit against UKG for substantial compensation—either domestically or within the arbitral Tribunal”,

itself a very new procedure,

“for regulatory changes to the NHS. We do not consider that the new ‘right to regulate’ changes this position”.

The second conclusion is that:

“The circumstances in which a viable claim for compensation will arise, and the extent and level of that compensation, is inherently uncertain under a multi-lateral treaty agreement such as TTIP. This is evidenced by the case-law in the Tribunal, as referred to below. Furthermore, remedies under TTIP may exceed those available under domestic contract law, human rights law and European Union law”.

Thirdly:

“It is the uncertainty referred to in (ii) above which we consider will have a direct ‘chilling’ effect on future action by UKG with respect to the NHS.

We consider that the solution to the problems which TTIP poses to the NHS—and which is likely to provide the greatest protection—is for the NHS to be excluded from the agreement, by way of a blanket exception contained within the main text of TTIP”.

That cannot be done by a Bill, but it could be done by an instruction to the Commissioner, who at times has sounded as if she wants some stern guidance from the member states.

“In the event that this cannot be achieved, we consider that the NHS should be the subject of a carefully worded reservation contained within Annexes II and III of TTIP”.

Much reference has been made in dismissing the concerns that are now beginning to be expressed from all parties and all views. In particular, it reposes on evidence given to the House of Commons Select Committee on 16 October.

“The issue here is whether the new right to regulate affords UKG greater protection were it to seek to make major structural changes, to the detriment of foreign investors, to the NHS … However, despite the new right and the statements from the Commission, as set out above, our view is that the new right is very unlikely to afford UKG any greater protection. This is essentially for three key reasons: the ‘right to regulate’ is not new. Its substance has, in effect, already been recognised in arbitral case-law. The new right in Article 2 therefore adds very little”.

Bowsher traces this whole question:

“The Article 2 right itself is vague. Recognition of the state’s right to regulate and to make changes in fields affecting the welfare of persons, including healthcare, is subject to the inherent uncertainty in the interpretation of that right by the proposed Tribunal”.

Bowsher goes through various international cases and concludes:

“It follows, therefore, that the right to regulate provided for under Article 2 is unlikely to provide additional protection to UKG. Were the matter to proceed to a dispute in the future Tribunal the real issue would remain: is the effect of UKG’s measures such that the investor should be compensated? The right to regulate does not provide a bar to compensation”.

He asks whether an incoming Government would be able to make changes to the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which brought into force the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No.2) Regulations 2013, or amend the regulations themselves. He concludes that it would not be possible, saying that,

“we are of the view that the new right to regulate does not provide sufficient protection to UKG to ensure that no future government or Parliament will have its ability to increase the public sector provision of services limited”.

A lot of what we are going to debate, and the questions of whether or not the EU should be our partner and whether or not we should leave, relate to the way in which over successive years but particularly the past 10 years the EU has crept into the nooks and crannies of all aspects of our lives, including now the NHS. I am not going to make the arguments that are different between the political parties about what we should do with the NHS, but I will argue to my dying day the right of a new Parliament to change the legislation of a previous Parliament under a previous Government. Forfeit that right on an issue as important to us as the National Health Service and the tolerances of society start to break down. This is the great advantage of our system of government.

I will say no more about this and will now make a more partisan but short speech about what I think is—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Owen]

No, I am not going to give way to the noble Lord. I have taken seven minutes and I have two more.

I believe that the choice this country faces now has come about because of a grotesquely mistaken decision that you can introduce a common currency without a common country. It was opposed by the Bundesbank; it was opposed by the Conservative Government under John Major. We got an opt-out but once you get 19 or 20 countries in the eurozone in an EU of 28, it has effectively become an EU-eurozone grouping, and we should stop this belief that we are protected. We will be affected, as the former Governor of the Bank of England said, if the euro crisis continues and there is a euro collapse. The Prime Minister has accepted this. He gave away in his negotiation our treaty amendment rights to protect ourselves over euro changes. He said that we would not use those in order to get euro reform. It is understandable why he said that because it is of very great interest to this country that we get euro reform and an end to this stagnant euro crisis of the past six years.

It is important also to recognise that behind the wish for a single currency is the wish for a single country. It is quite a noble objective. It has been pursued for many decades. It is summed up by federalism or the “United States of Europe”. But in the development of the European Union—and I have watched it very closely since 1962—there will come a point that is not possible to come back from. You will be faced with a decision that you have to join and people will argue why that is. It may be 10 or 20 years down the track. The answer to this is: this is a once in a generation, once in a lifetime choice, just as it was in Scotland. You cannot have referendums repeatedly and we have to make a choice.

Can we really say to ourselves as we vote on 23 June that we are protecting this country from being sucked into a United States of Europe? I believe we cannot say that and for that reason, as well as the changes in Europe that came after the treaty of Maastricht, it is the right moment to say: go and have whatever you can get agreement on—a single state with a single currency in Europe—and good luck to you. But we in this country should not kid ourselves. This is decision time. Failing to take it will find future generations ending up in whatever looks like a European Union. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Owen]

My Lords, both Front Benches have accepted the amendment. We are at the start of a debate. Another place has exactly the same amendment down for discussion in a few days. I think it would be churlish to push the issue tonight, but I hope we will start to build a cross-party consensus that the treaty needs substantial changes through the negotiation process.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I ask the noble Lord to clarify. I assume that he will move the amendment formally.

[Lord Owen]

I was not intending to, but if the noble Lord thinks it is important, I am perfectly prepared to.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, the Government have said that they are prepared to accept his amendment; I respectfully submit that the noble Lord should move it.

[Lord Owen]

I have moved the amendment, and I hope that it does not delay the procedures too long.

Amendment to the Motion agreed.