Queen’s Speech

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Wednesday 19th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, the integrated review of March this year was an important landmark in the UK Government’s definition of a post-Brexit international role for the country and set out a road map for the focus of Britain’s foreign development, security and defence policies for the next decade.

In terms of more immediate consequences, as Chatham House states in its comments on the review, it is

“an important piece of public diplomacy and shows the ‘government machinery’ of the civil service how resources should be allocated for these policies”

and soft power. Its publication gives a clearer sense of the UK’s ambitions and priorities. Its message of a renewed interest in the Indo-Pacific region, driven by a concern to contribute to meeting diplomatic and security challenges presented by an assertive China, will be welcome to the US and other Five Eyes allies—where the UK already has defence commitments such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements—and especially Japan.

I disagree with Chatham House’s view that our

“European neighbours are likely to be less clear on the impact for them in the messages contained in the Review.”

The UK’s continuing commitment to Europe’s security and defence through NATO is predominant in the document, so why do we need—as it suggests—longer-term ambitions for military relations with the EU? I do not support the UK being part of a European army.

The timing of the review could not have been more challenging, coinciding with Covid. The fact of Brexit clearly called for a broader articulation of the international role of the UK, something missing from more recent reviews focusing predominantly on security and defence. In this regard I strongly welcome the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in advance of the review, signalling a welcome desire to see development and aid more aligned to diplomatic influence. Previously, I felt that the separate fiefdoms of the FCO and DfID were not helpful to our international influence, as they operated in their own silos—not always in a helpful way for UK plc as a whole.

I also respect the planned temporary reduction of the foreign aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of GDP. How will Her Majesty’s Government craft a coherent approach for the UK’s development policies that is aligned with the review’s broader policy goals?

It is fortuitous that the integrated review comes against the backdrop of the highest profile for UK diplomacy in decades. The country began its presidency of the UN Security Council in February and is to host both the G7 and the UN Climate Change Conference this year. Each of these provides opportunities for the Government to push forward their security, economic and climate change priorities.

With regard to policy in certain areas, I praise the UK’s reaction to events in Hong Kong and the offering of financial support to Hong Kong citizens arriving under the British national overseas passport scheme.

However, there are countries where the UK could use its influence more to solve long-running disputes. First, there is the Middle East; this might be a tall order, but can the Minister say whether we could be more of a mediator in the Israel/Hamas dispute or in the Iran/Saudi proxy conflict? I feel uneasy that we cannot sort out the settling of our debt with Iran, while condemning wholeheartedly the continued incarceration of Ms Zaghari-Ratcliffe. Also—I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—why cannot we take a more active role in trying to resolve the Cyprus problem, rather than relying on the UN, which, despite its best efforts, has achieved little in nearly 50 years? The UK policy that Greek and Turkish Cypriots must solve their own problems has clearly not worked either.

Elsewhere, I warmly welcome the review’s strong commitment to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. I ask the Minister that financial assistance be extended to them in case of disaster-related emergencies.

I move on to defence and will set out briefly my reaction to the defence Command Paper and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. Against the first test—the accuracy of the assessment of changing threats and risks and the quality of the headline policy response—the integrated review scores well. The analysis of the changing national and international security environment up to 2030 looks thoughtful and comprehensive; the big question is whether the UK can enact a meaningful tilt to the Indo-Pacific region without weakening its ability to respond to crises in Europe. This seems a risk worth taking, as the Chinese threat is increasing, especially in the South China Sea and with regard to Taiwan.

On defence planning, it remains to be seen whether the model of persistent engagement overseas that is at the heart of the defence Command Paper, as well as the new integrated operating concept, will make the required difference in deterrence. I am nervous about the cutting of troop numbers. Finally, I welcome the focus on cyber and space defence.